Implicit Learning of an Invariant: Just Say No

Following exposure to 30 four-digit numbers containing an invariant “3”, subjects are found falsely to recognize novel four-digit numbers containing this invariant (positives) in preference to novel numbers that do not contain the invariant (negatives). Despite this false recognition, they are generally unable to report the rule relating test positives to the positives seen during the learning phase. This finding has been taken to show implicit learning of a rule. Two experiments are reported here which show that it is not necessary to learn this rule in order to perform at above-chance levels on this test. Most of the effect can be explained in terms of the rejection of particularly distinctive test items that are more prevalent in the test negatives. This rejection appears to be mediated by knowledge that is potentially explicit as opposed to implicit, and we present tentative evidence that it is rule-based as opposed to analogic.     

学无止境

从前,一位哲学家带着一帮弟子来到郊外,在一块草地上席地而谈.哲学家问:“我们现在坐的草地,到处杂草丛生,那么,如何才能除掉这些杂草呢?“弟子们都不以为然,心想这位探讨人生奥妙的哲学家,竟问这么一个简单的问题.……     

Just Say No: Japanese and American Styles of Refusing Unwanted Sexual Advances1

To determine whether cultural and gender differences in directness of communication are reflected in styles of refusing unwanted sexual advances, we surveyed American college students and Japanese international college students about direct and indirect ways of saying “no” in dating relationships. While both American and Japanese students said they would rather use indirect refusal tactics than direct ones, Americans rated direct strategies as more likely to be effective than did Japanese participants. Further, American students interpreted direct strategies as clearer refusals than indirect strategies, whereas Japanese respondents did not make this distinction. Men and women responded similarly in both cultural groups, so the findings point primarily to possible cultural differences in the meaning of direct refusals of sexual advances.     

Learning to like or dislike by association: No need for contingency awareness

One way to learn to like or dislike a neutral target stimulus is through associations with positive or negative context stimuli. The present research investigates whether people need to be aware of the association between a target and a context stimulus (i.e., contingency aware) in order for associative learning of likes and dislikes to occur. We predicted that awareness of the association between context and target is necessary when target novelty is low, but not when target novelty is high. We conducted two experiments in which we varied target novelty and measured contingency awareness using a picture-bound recognition task. This allowed us to separately investigate evaluative conditioning for “contingency awareness” and “contingency unawareness” context–target pairs. The results show, as predicted, that awareness of the association between context and target is needed for low-novelty targets but not needed for high-novelty targets.     

Relatives Children Say

In an experiment designed to elicit restrictive relatives clauses, 28 children ranging in age from 2:2 to 3:10 provided a corpus of communicatively appropriate relative clauses. In evaluating this corpus, we found that most children produced mostly adult relative clauses most of the time. Detailed study of these utterances uncovered a few error patterns, which we analyzed in light of several considerations (e.g., the overall frequency of an error type, its distribution across children and items, its relation to the construction under study, and the similarity of the error to what children do elsewhere). Only one error pattern, namely some children's production of inappropriate relative pronouns, is argued to reflect a systematic feature of language development. We conclude that children's ability to represent the syntactic structure of the embedded clause is on target very early.     

Disclosure of Divorce Plans to Children: What the Children Have to Say

Divorce has become a common experience for children. One part of the process that children of divorcing parents experience is the time when they are informed of their parents' approaching separation or divorce. In this study, 20 adults from eight families who had experienced the divorce of their parents when they were younger were interviewed using a guided interview format. At least two siblings from each family except one was interviewed. Qualitative analyses of data revealed interesting themes around the questions of how the participants were told about the impending separation or divorce, who told them, whether or not siblings were present, how they reacted to the news, and how they would have preferred being told.     

When the Tree Falls and No One Hears It: On Being Dropped and Learning to Hold

This case study focuses on a student therapist’s reflections upon a premature termination that occurred in her work with an adolescent male patient. The therapeutic process is traced back to the beginning of treatment, and the article delineates the extent in which the patient’s early interpersonal experiences influenced the development of the therapeutic alliance. The author addresses several themes that evolved throughout the treatment, including the patient’s experience of unpredictability and instability and his inconsistent understanding of time, and the ways in which these experiences ultimately influenced the treatment’s ending. The article describes the therapist’s development as a clinician over the course of the treatment, focusing on the various experiences that helped her consolidate a dynamic understanding of the holding environment.     

Learning artificial grammars: No evidence for the acquisition of rules

Two experiments investigated whether there is evidence for acquisition of rules in implicit artificial grammar learning (AGL). Two different methods were used in meeting this goal, multiple regression analysis and analysis of receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs). By means of multiple regression analysis, several types of knowledge were identified that were used in judgments of grammaticality, for example, about single letters and about larger stimulus fragments. There was no evidence for the contribution of rule knowledge. The ROCs were in accord with a similarity-based account of AGL and thus did not support the notion that rule knowledge is acquired in AGL either. Simulations with a connectionist model corroborated the conclusion that the results were in accord with a similarity-based, associative account.     

Equality,Bias, and the Right to an Equal Say

Philosophia - Thomas Christiano argues that democracies acquire a right to rule by being the unique embodiment of publicly accessible rules. Justice requires the equal advancement of the interests...     

From Sole Learning to Soul Learning

Abstract. Is it effective or even possible to teach an introductory course in religious studies that not only provides first‐year university students with the fundamental vocabulary, concepts, and critical tools of religious inquiry but also invites and stimulates the transformation of the religious imagination? In what kind of teaching and learning method could the process of personal transformation occur and how might one assess it? These are the questions that led to an experiment in teaching religion the objective of which was to prepare beginning students for the academic approach to religion and, at the same time, transmit the experience of learning as an embodied process that engages personal narrative within a community context. This essay is based on a three‐year project that has made considerable progress in meeting these goals and answering these questions. (Supplementary materials for this essay are available on the Wabash Center for Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religion web site http://www.wabashcenter.wabash.edu/journal/baldwin.html .)     

Therapeutic Communication: Knowing What to Say When, 2nd edition

Abstract

Counselling in Medical Settings, Patricia East, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995, 153 pp., £10.99 pb.

An Introduction to the Therapeutic Frame, Anne Gray, London: Routledge, 1994, 162 pp. £30 hb., £10.00 pb.

Supervising the Counsellor: A Cyclical Model, Steve Page and Val Woskett, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, 215 pp., £35 hb., £12.99 pb.

Paedophiles and Sexual Offences against Children, Dennis Howitt, Chichester: Wiley, 1995, 289 pp., £27.50 hb., £16.99 pb.

A Question of Time: Essentials of Brief Dynamic Psychotherapy, Angela Molnos, London: Karnac, 1995, 132 pp., £14.95 pb.

Mental Space, Robert M. Young, London: Process Press, 1994, 200 pp., £15.95 pb.

Counselling in the Pastoral and Spiritual Context, David Lyall, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994, 159 pp. £10.99 pb.     

Facilitation by Variation: Right-to-Left Learning of English Yes/No Questions

This study advances the hypothesis that optional structural variation in language facilitates syntactic learning (facilitation‐by‐variation). Support for this is provided by a right‐to‐left‐elaboration acquisition model for English yes/no questions (YNQs). Previous studies have focused on the acquisition of ‘‘inverted’’ YNQs, a cornerstone of nativist theories of language development. Data from five American children (1;3 to 5;1) and their parents show that children hear a range of adult questions (Coming?You coming?Are you coming?), not all inverted. These variants are ordered from structurally least complex noncanonical forms to complex canonical inverted forms. I use state‐of‐the‐art econometric techniques to estimate breakpoints in YNQ time series and show that noncanonical questions emerge early in children’s speech and facilitate acquisition of canonical ones. This incremental structure‐building process relies on an adjunction strategy that augments noncanonical questions with initial auxiliaries and subjects. Development proceeds incrementally from right to left to derive auxiliary‐initial structures.     

Interpreting What Speakers Say and Implicate

The traditional view in pragmatic theory is that a distinction exists between what speakers say and what they mean, communicate, or implicate in context. For example, when uttering Jane has three children, a speaker might only say that "Jane has three children but may have more than three," but the speaker implicates that "Jane has exactly three children." Under this view, pragmatics plays only a small role in determining what speakers say and has a primary part in interpreting speaker's intended messages. My aim in this article is to challenge this view. I describe empirical work showing that pragmatics has a fundamental role in determining both what speakers say and implicate. Thus, when a speaker utters Jane has three children, enriched pragmatic information is used to infer that the speaker says "Jane has exactly three children" and that in specific contexts, the speaker can go on to express additional pragmatic meanings, such as "Jane is married" or "Jane is very busy because she has three children." I also describe work on the importance of complex pragmatic, metarepresentational reasoning in understanding irony and metaphor. Finally, I briefly discuss the relevance of these new developments in pragmatics for neurolinguistic research.     

What New Wave Materialists Can't Say

Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to “thin” phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept dualists, claim that our physical and phenomenal concepts each represent experience completely and accurately, but nevertheless so differently that a priori links don't (and can't) hold between them. This paper argues that you can't have two distinct but nevertheless complete and accurate representations of the same thing. One (or both) of the representations must misrepresent, or the two representations must represent different things. The paper then puts its arguments in a wider context. It notes that our phenomenal concepts must be transparent, translucent, mildly opaque, or radically opaque (in senses reviewed in the paper). It canvasses arguments that a posteriori physicalists can't consider our phenomenal concepts opaque. Then it shows how its own arguments against New Wave Materialism have the result that a posteriori physicalists can't consider phenomenal concepts transparent or translucent. The paper thus advances its arguments as part of a broad‐based case against a posteriori physicalism.