Varieties of Linear Calculi

A uniform calculus for linear logic is presented. The calculus has the form of a natural deduction system in sequent calculus style with general introduction and elimination rules. General elimination rules are motivated through an inversion principle, the dual form of which gives the general introduction rules. By restricting all the rules to their single-succedent versions, a uniform calculus for intuitionistic linear logic is obtained. The calculus encompasses both natural deduction and sequent calculus that are obtained as special instances from the uniform calculus. Other instances give all the invertibilities and partial invertibilities for the sequent calculus rules of linear logic. The calculus is normalizing and satisfies the subformula property for normal derivations.     

A sequent calculus for a logic of contingencies

We introduce a sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to propositional contingencies, i.e., formulas which are neither provable nor refutable. Like many other sequent and natural deduction proof systems, this calculus possesses cut elimination and the subformula property and has a simple proof search mechanism.     

A note on the proof theory the λII-calculus

The II-calculus, a theory of first-order dependent function types in Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence with a fragment of minimal first-order logic, is defined as a system of (linearized) natural deduction. In this paper, we present a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the II-calculus and prove the cut-elimination theorem.The cut-elimination result builds upon the existence of normal forms for the natural deduction system and can be considered to be analogous to a proof provided by Prawitz for first-order logic. The type-theoretic setting considered here elegantly illustrates the distinction between the processes of normalization in a natural deduction system and cut-elimination in a Gentzen-style sequent calculus.We consider an application of the cut-free calculus, via the subformula property, to proof-search in the II-calculus. For this application, the normalization result for the natural deduction calculus alone is inadequate, a (cut-free) calculus with the subformula property being required.This paper was written whilst the author was affiliated to the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K. and revised for publication whilst he was affiliated to the University of Birmingham, England, U.K.Presented byDaniele Mundici     

Cut-Elimination and a Permutation-Free Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Logic

We describe a sequent calculus, based on work of Herbelin, of which the cut-free derivations are in 1-1 correspondence with the normal natural deduction proofs of intuitionistic logic. We present a simple proof of Herbelin's strong cut-elimination theorem for the calculus, using the recursive path ordering theorem of Dershowitz.     

A note on sequent calculi intermediate between LJ and LK

We prove that every finitely axiomatizable extension of Heyting's intuitionistic logic has a corresponding cut-free Gentzen-type formulation. It is shown how one can use this result to find the corresponding normalizable natural deduction system and to give a criterion for separability of considered logic. Obviously, the question how to obtain an effective definition of a sequent calculus which corresponds to a concrete logic remains a separate problem for every logic.     

Cut as Consequence

The papers where Gerhard Gentzen introduced natural deduction and sequent calculi suggest that his conception of logic differs substantially from the now dominant views introduced by Hilbert, Gödel, Tarski, and others. Specifically, (1) the definitive features of natural deduction calculi allowed Gentzen to assert that his classical system nk is complete based purely on the sort of evidence that Hilbert called ‘experimental’, and (2) the structure of the sequent calculi li and lk allowed Gentzen to conceptualize completeness as a question about the relationships among a system's individual rules (as opposed to the relationship between a system as a whole and its ‘semantics’). Gentzen's conception of logic is compelling in its own right. It is also of historical interest, because it allows for a better understanding of the invention of natural deduction and sequent calculi.     

Cut Elimination inside a Deep Inference System for Classical Predicate Logic

Deep inference is a natural generalisation of the one-sided sequent calculus where rules are allowed to apply deeply inside formulas, much like rewrite rules in term rewriting. This freedom in applying inference rules allows to express logical systems that are difficult or impossible to express in the cut-free sequent calculus and it also allows for a more fine-grained analysis of derivations than the sequent calculus. However, the same freedom also makes it harder to carry out this analysis, in particular it is harder to design cut elimination procedures. In this paper we see a cut elimination procedure for a deep inference system for classical predicate logic. As a consequence we derive Herbrand's Theorem, which we express as a factorisation of derivations.     

Natural Deduction Calculi and Sequent Calculi for Counterfactual Logics

In this paper we present labelled sequent calculi and labelled natural deduction calculi for the counterfactual logics CK + {ID, MP}. As for the sequent calculi we prove, in a semantic manner, that the cut-rule is admissible. As for the natural deduction calculi we prove, in a purely syntactic way, the normalization theorem. Finally, we demonstrate that both calculi are sound and complete with respect to Nute semantics [12] and that the natural deduction calculi can be effectively transformed into the sequent calculi.     

NORMAL DERIVATIONS AND SEQUENT DERIVATIONS

The well-known picture that sequent derivations without cuts and normal derivations “are the same” will be changed. Sequent derivations without maximum cuts (i.e. special cuts which correspond to maximum segments from natural deduction) will be considered. It will be shown that the natural deduction image of a sequent derivation without maximum cuts is a normal derivation, and the sequent image of a normal derivation is a derivation without maximum cuts. The main consequence of that property will be that sequent derivations without maximum cuts and normal derivations “are the same”.     

A Mixed λ-calculus

The aim of this paper is to define a λ-calculus typed in aMixed (commutative and non-commutative) Intuitionistic Linear Logic. The terms of such a calculus are the labelling of proofs of a linear intuitionistic mixed natural deduction NILL, which is based on the non-commutative linear multiplicative sequent calculus MNL [RuetAbrusci 99]. This linear λ-calculus involves three linear arrows: two directional arrows and a nondirectional one (the usual linear arrow). Moreover, the -terms are provided with seriesparallel orders on free variables. We prove a normalization theorem which explicitly gives the behaviour of the order during the normalization procedure. Special Issue Categorial Grammars and Pregroups Edited by Wojciech Buszkowski and Anne Preller     

Logic and Majority Voting

Journal of Philosophical Logic - To investigate the relationship between logical reasoning and majority voting, we introduce logic with groups Lg in the style of Gentzen’s sequent calculus,...     

Synchronized Linear-Time Temporal Logic

A new combined temporal logic called synchronized linear-time temporal logic (SLTL) is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus. SLTL can represent the n-Cartesian product of the set of natural numbers. The cut-elimination and completeness theorems for SLTL are proved. Moreover, a display sequent calculus ??SLTL is defined.     

Expressive Power and Incompleteness of Propositional Logics

Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules (however formulated) underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the standard readings, for example by adopting sequent rules with multiple conclusions. Another is to explore what readings the natural deduction rules do enforce. When the notion of a model of a rule is generalized, it is found that natural deduction rules express “intuitionistic” readings of their connectives. A third approach is presented here. The intuitionistic readings emerge when models of rules are defined globally, but the notion of a local model of a rule is also natural. Using this benchmark, natural deduction rules enforce exactly the classical readings of the connectives, while this is not true of axiomatic systems. This vindicates the historical motivation for natural deduction rules. One odd consequence of using the local model benchmark is that some systems of propositional logic are not complete for the semantics that their rules express. Parallels are drawn with incompleteness results in modal logic to help make sense of this.     

A Contraction-free and Cut-free Sequent Calculus for Propositional Dynamic Logic

In this paper we present a sequent calculus for propositional dynamic logic built using an enriched version of the tree-hypersequent method and including an infinitary rule for the iteration operator. We prove that this sequent calculus is theoremwise equivalent to the corresponding Hilbert-style system, and that it is contraction-free and cut-free. All results are proved in a purely syntactic way.     

Commuting Conversions vs. the Standard Conversions of the “Good” Connectives

Commuting conversions were introduced in the natural deduction calculus as ad hoc devices for the purpose of guaranteeing the subformula property in normal proofs. In a well known book, Jean-Yves Girard commented harshly on these conversions, saying that ‘one tends to think that natural deduction should be modified to correct such atrocities.’ We present an embedding of the intuitionistic predicate calculus into a second-order predicative system for which there is no need for commuting conversions. Furthermore, we show that the redex and the conversum of a commuting conversion of the original calculus translate into equivalent derivations by means of a series of bidirectional applications of standard conversions. Presented by Heinrich Wansing and Jacek Malinowski     

Marginalia on Sequent Calculi

The paper discusses the relationship between normal natural deductions and cutfree proofs in Gentzen (sequent) calculi in the absence of term labeling. For Gentzen calculi this is the usual version; for natural deduction this is the version under the complete discharge convention, where open assumptions are always discharged as soon as possible. The paper supplements work by Mints, Pinto, Dyckhoff, and Schwichtenberg on the labeled calculi.     

Bunched sequential information

It is known that the logic BI of bunched implications is a logic of resources. Many studies have reported on the applications of BI to computer science. In this paper, an extension BIS of BI by adding a sequence modal operator is introduced and studied in order to formalize more fine-grained resource-sensitive reasoning. By the sequence modal operator of BIS, we can appropriately express “sequential information” in resource-sensitive reasoning. A Gentzen-type sequent calculus SBIS for BIS is introduced, and the cut-elimination and decidability theorems for SBIS are proved. An extension of the Grothendieck topological semantics for BI is introduced for BIS, and the completeness theorem with respect to this semantics is proved. The cut-elimination, decidability and completeness theorems for SBIS and BIS are proved using some theorems for embedding BIS into BI.     

C. I. Lewis on Intensional Predicate Logic: A Letter Dated May 11, 1960

The idea of an ‘inversion principle’, and the name itself, originated in the work of Paul Lorenzen in the 1950s, as a method to generate new admissible rules within a certain syntactic context. Some fifteen years later, the idea was taken up by Dag Prawitz to devise a strategy of normalization for natural deduction calculi (this being an analogue of Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem for sequent calculi). Later, Prawitz used the inversion principle again, attributing it with a semantic role. Still working in natural deduction calculi, he formulated a general type of schematic introduction rules to be matched – thanks to the idea supporting the inversion principle – by a corresponding general schematic Elimination rule. This was an attempt to provide a solution to the problem suggested by the often quoted note of Gentzen. According to Gentzen ‘it should be possible to display the elimination rules as unique functions of the corresponding introduction rules on the basis of certain requirements’. Many people have since worked on this topic, which can be appropriately seen as the birthplace of what are now referred to as “general elimination rules”, recently studied thoroughly by Sara Negri and Jan von Plato. In this study, we retrace the main threads of this chapter of proof-theoretical investigation, using Lorenzen's original framework as a general guide.     

Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic?

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction- and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hilbert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of ${\square\,A}$ from A.     

Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs

A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with respect to the underlying Kripke semantics follows from a general direct and uniform argument for labelled sequent calculi extended with mathematical rules for frame properties. As an example of the use of the calculus we present an analysis of the discursive dilemma.