Worry and anxiety account for unique variance in the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and depression

The evidence supporting the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty (IU), a cognitive construct well established in the anxiety literature, and depression is mixed. Some research has demonstrated a direct association between IU and depression, whereas other studies suggest that IU is either unrelated or indirectly related to depression through other pathways, including anxiety. The present study aimed to further elucidate the relationship between IU and depression in an undergraduate sample (N = 221). We posited a model in which worry and anxiety account for unique variance in the association between IU and depression. Results supported this hypothesis. Worry and trait anxiety significantly accounted for unique variance in the relationship between IU and depression. Furthermore, the model that best fit the data included two additional direct paths, from IU to anxiety and from worry to depression, and excluded the direct path from IU to depression. Our findings support the notion that IU and depression are indirectly related through worry and anxiety. Limitations and future directions are discussed.     

The Prediction of Worry in Non-Clinical Individuals: The Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty,Meta-Worry,and Neuroticism

The present study investigated the relation between intolerance of uncertainty (IU), meta-worry, and neuroticism on the one hand, and worry on the other hand, in a sample of 105 university students. Two different operationalizations of worry were used: trait worry and idiosyncratic worry. Results showed that IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism correlated significantly with trait worry. Further, IU and meta-worry were strongly related but made a unique and independent contribution to trait worry. Finally, IU and meta-worry could be considered as partial mediators of the relation between neuroticism and trait-like worry. Relations of IU, meta-worry, and neuroticism with idiosyncratic worry were weak or even absent, although neuroticism was associated with idiosyncratic worry when the stressful event was more imminent. In conclusion, not IU and meta-worry, but the general vulnerability factor of neuroticism appeared to possess the most declarative value in relation to both trait and idiosyncratic worry.     

Do individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty affect health monitoring?

Researchers have postulated that individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may affect people's health behaviours. Study 1 (N?=?147 university students) supports this proposition showing that higher IU is associated with higher monitoring (seeking threat-relevant information). Study 2 (N?=?117 university students) experimentally manipulated IU to ensure that the association is not due to other related constructs such as anxiety or worry. Results show that inducing high IU led to increased monitoring as reflected by higher scores on an index of monitoring measures. Wanting information about the health threat in order to reduce their uncertainty was an independent predictor of monitoring and did not mediate the relationship between IU and monitoring. Findings suggest that high IU induces people to increase their monitoring; an adaptive strategy when the health threat can be reduced through this behaviour.     

A preliminary investigation of impulsivity in generalized anxiety disorder

Few studies have examined the association between impulsivity and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This study examined whether individuals with probable GAD display impulsivity in a particular way, and the extent to which impulsivity uniquely predicts GAD severity and GAD status, over and above intolerance of uncertainty (IU), a key cognitive factor in GAD. Individuals with (n = 63) and without (n = 77) probable GAD completed self-report measures of impulsivity and IU. Results revealed that elevations in the severity of GAD symptoms and in IU were associated with impulsive actions in the face of negative affect (i.e., negative urgency), but also greater premeditation and lower “functional” impulsivity (i.e., the ability to take quick action when it is advantageous to do so). Impulsivity led to an increment in the prediction of GAD symptoms and GAD status, over and above IU. Negative urgency and lower functional impulsivity were significant unique predictors of GAD severity or GAD status. The findings highlight a need to consider impulsivity in theories that implicate intolerance of negative affect and uncertainty in excessive and uncontrollable worry.     

Are we certain about which measure of intolerance of uncertainty to use yet?

Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) has been understood as a dispositional tendency to view the presence of negative events as unacceptable and threatening, regardless of the likelihood of those events occurring. The preference over the 12-item vs. 27-item of the IUS has been central to debate. The goals of the present study were to evaluate two competing models of measuring IU with model-fitting analyses and explore model invariance of gender (e.g. men vs. women). A sample of 980 individuals completed an online IUS survey. Results indicated that the two-factor short-form model provided better fit to the data compared to the full-length two-factor model proposed by. Results also indicated that the short-form IUS is gender invariant, suggesting acceptable use among men and women. These findings provide further support of a two-factor structure and suggest that the IUS is appropriate for men and women.     

Measuring General Indecisiveness

Although indecisiveness seems to be a widespread problem, little empirical research has addressed its measurement. Frost and Shows (1993; Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 683–692) introduced the Indecisiveness Scale (IS) as a measure of individual differences in general indecisiveness. Although these authors conducted various psychometric analyses, some properties (e.g., factor structure, test-retest reliability) were not investigated. In the present studies, several reliability and validity indices were computed. First, four of the fifteen items of the IS were found to be omissible. Second, 4-week test-retest reliability was found to be satisfactory. Third, scores on the IS were found to correlate meaningfully with a concurrent measure of decision making, and with various scales of psychopathology. Lastly, in Study 4, the IS was found to predict scores on a behavioural measure of decision making, suggesting good predictive validity. Overall, these findings suggest that the IS has good psychometric properties.     

Anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty: Evidence of incremental specificity in relation to health anxiety

Anxiety sensitivity (AS) reflects the fear of arousal-related sensations and intolerance of uncertainty (IU) represents the dispositional fear of the unknown. Within cognitive–behavioral models, AS and IU are individual difference variables considered central to the phenomenology of health anxiety. However, prior studies have cast doubt on whether both variables incrementally contribute to our understanding of health anxiety. Addressing limitations of these prior studies, the present study examined the incremental specificity of AS and IU as these two variables relate to health anxiety in a large medically healthy sample of community adults (N = 474). Both AS and IU incrementally contributed to the concurrent prediction of health anxiety beyond both negative affect and one another. However, within these analyses, the physical dimension of AS and the inhibitory dimension of IU were the only AS and IU dimensions to evidence incremental specificity in relation to health anxiety.     

Intolerance of uncertainty and perceived threat

The present study examined the relations between dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., desire for predictability and uncertainty paralysis) and perceptions of threat (i.e., perceptions of the probabilities and costs of future undesirable outcomes) in a sample of 239 college students. Uncertainty paralysis was positively associated with both perceived probabilities and perceived costs for negative outcomes. Desire for predictability was positively associated with perceived costs for negative outcomes but was not associated with perceived probabilities for negative outcomes. When probability estimates for low base rate outcomes were examined separately, desire for predictability was negatively associated with perceived probabilities. Finally, perceived threat partially mediated the relations between dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty and worry. The results of the present study suggest mechanisms through which dimensions of intolerance of uncertainty might lead to excessive worry.     

Intolerance of uncertainty,causal uncertainty,causal importance,self-concept clarity and their relations to generalized anxiety disorder

Although numerous studies have provided support for the notion that intolerance of uncertainty plays a key role in pathological worry (the hallmark feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)), other uncertainty-related constructs may also have relevance for the understanding of individuals who engage in pathological worry. Three constructs from the social cognition literature, causal uncertainty, causal importance, and self-concept clarity, were examined in the present study to assess the degree to which these explain unique variance in GAD, over and above intolerance of uncertainty. N = 235 participants completed self-report measures of trait worry, GAD symptoms, and uncertainty-relevant constructs. A subgroup was subsequently classified as low in GAD symptoms (n = 69) or high in GAD symptoms (n = 54) based on validated cut scores on measures of trait worry and GAD symptoms. In logistic regressions, only elevated intolerance of uncertainty and lower self-concept clarity emerged as unique correlates of high (vs. low) GAD symptoms. The possible role of self-concept uncertainty in GAD and the utility of integrating social cognition theories and constructs into clinical research on intolerance of uncertainty are discussed.     

Anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty: requisites of the fundamental fears?

Fears related to anxiety sensitivity (AS)-illness/injury sensitivity, fear of negative evaluation, and fear of pain-may have important theoretical associations with intolerance of uncertainty (IU). In separate investigations, AS and IU have been independently related to the same anxiety-related psychopathology. AS and IU seem to share a basis in fearing unknown, potentially harmful consequences; however, their inter-relationship remains uncertain. IU regarding a specific stimulus, a physical sensation for example, may result in a variety of interpretations and responses, including the catastrophic appraisals that characterize AS. The association between AS and IU was examined in a sample of 293 undergraduates. Results of confirmatory factor and correlation analyses suggest the two constructs are related, but nonetheless independent. It appears that IU may be a required component of catastrophic misappraisals while being an important construct related to fear and anxiety in its own right. Future research directions and potential applications are discussed.     

Clarifying the unique associations among intolerance of uncertainty,anxiety, and depression*

Increasing evidence suggests that intolerance of uncertainty (IU) may be a transdiagnostic factor across the anxiety disorders, and to a lesser extent, unipolar depression. Whereas anxiety inherently involves uncertainty regarding threat, depression has traditionally been associated with certainty (e.g. the hopelessness theory of depression). Some theorists posit that the observed relationship between depression and IU may be due to the relationship between depression and anxiety and the relationship between anxiety and IU. The present study sought to elucidate the unique relationships among trait anxiety, depression, and IU in undergraduate (N = 554) and clinical (generalized anxiety disorder; N = 43) samples. Findings suggest that IU may play a larger role in anxiety than depression, although some evidence indicates that inhibitory IU and depression may have a modest but independent relationship.     

What’s in a name? Intolerance of uncertainty,other uncertainty-relevant constructs,and their differential relations to worry and generalized anxiety disorder*

A number of studies have examined the association of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) to trait worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, few studies have examined the extent of overlap between IU and other psychological constructs that bear conceptual resemblance to IU, despite the fact that IU-type constructs have been discussed and examined extensively within psychology and other disciplines. The present study investigated (1) the associations of IU, trait worry, and GAD status to a negative risk orientation, trait curiosity, indecisiveness, perceived constraints, self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism, intolerance of ambiguity, the need for predictability, and the need for order and structure and (2) whether IU is a unique correlate of trait worry and of the presence versus absence of Probable GAD, when overlap with other uncertainty-relevant constructs is accounted for. N = 255 adults completed self-report measures of the aforementioned constructs. Each of the constructs was significantly associated with IU. Only IU, and a subset of the other uncertainty-relevant constructs were correlated with trait worry or distinguished the Probable GAD group from the Non-GAD group. IU was the strongest unique correlate of trait worry and of the presence versus absence of Probable GAD. Indecisiveness, self-oriented perfectionism and the need for predictability were also unique correlates of trait worry or GAD status. Implications of the findings are discussed, in particular as they pertain to the definition, conceptualization, and cognitive-behavioral treatment of IU in GAD.     

The role of fear of anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty in worry: An experimental manipulation

The tendency to fear emotional experiences, such as anxiety, may be an important factor in the maintenance of excessive worry, which is the central feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The goal of the present study was to clarify the role of fear of anxiety in worry by assessing whether the experimental manipulation of fear of anxiety affects worry level. The study also assessed the combined effects of fear of anxious responding and intolerance of uncertainty (a factor already linked to pathological worry) on level of worry by grouping participants according to their tolerance for uncertainty. The results indicated that participants whose fear of anxiety was increased showed higher levels of worry compared to participants whose fear of anxiety was decreased. This finding provides preliminary support for the causal role of fear of anxiety in worry. Moreover, the results showed that increased fear of anxiety in combination with an intolerance for uncertainty led to the highest levels of worry, which suggests that these constructs have an additive effect on worry. The findings lend support to the integration of new conceptualizations of psychopathology with existing models of excessive worry, which could ultimately increase treatment efficacy for GAD.     

Cognitive content-specificity in future expectancies: role of hopelessness and intolerance of uncertainty in depression and GAD symptoms

The present study examined cognitive content-specificity in future-event predictions associated with symptoms of depression and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). College undergraduates (N=284) completed measures of depression, GAD, and rated their certainty that a given set of positive and negative outcomes were or were not likely to happen in their future. Participants also completed measures of hopelessness and intolerance of uncertainty (IU). Individuals (N=263) completed the same measures again 6 weeks later. Certainty in an absence of positive future outcomes was associated with symptoms of depression but not GAD, and hopelessness mediated this relationship - concurrently and when examining change scores over 6 weeks. Certainty in negative outcomes was concurrently associated with both symptoms of depression and GAD, and hopelessness partially mediated these relationships. IU predicted concurrent increases in depression and GAD symptoms, and negative-outcome certainty partially mediated the IU-depression but not the IU-GAD symptom relationship. Change in certainty did not mediate the relationship between changes in IU and GAD symptoms but partially mediated the relationship between change in IU and depression symptoms over time. Hopelessness appears to play a unique role in the relationship between reduced anticipation of positive future outcomes and depression. Although less clearly suggested by the data, IU may contribute to both depression and GAD symptoms but may do so through different pathways.