High Stakes Instrumentalism

In this paper, I aim to establish that, according to almost all democratic theories, instrumentalist considerations often dominate intrinsic proceduralist considerations in our decisions about whether to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. The reason for this is that almost all democratic theorists, including philosophers commonly thought to be intrinsic proceduralists, accept ‘High Stakes Instrumentalism’ (HSI). According to HSI, we ought to use undemocratic procedures in order to prevent high stakes errors - very substantively bad or unjust outcomes. However, democratically produced severe substantive injustice is much more common than many proponents of HSI have realised. Proponents of HSI must accept that if undemocratic procedures are the only way to avoid these high stakes errors, then we ought to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. Consequently, according to almost all democratic theorists, democratic theory ought, for practical purposes, to be reoriented towards difficult moral and empirical questions about the instrumental quality of procedures. Moreover, this is potentially very practically important because if there are available instrumentally superior undemocratic procedures, then wholesale institutional reform is required. This is one of the most potentially practically important findings of normative democratic theory. In spite of this, no-one has yet explicitly recognised it.     

Measurement Issues in High Stakes Testing

SUMMARY

Validity and reliability of the new high stakes testing systems initiated in school systems across the United States in recent years in response to the accountability features mandated in the No Child Left Behind Legislation largely depend on item response theory and new rules of measurement. Reliability and validity in item response theory and classical test theory are reviewed. Additionally, practices in the states are considered. The conclusion of the paper is that the new test technology is theoretically better suited to assess achievement than classical test theory, but has not been shown to be valid and reliable enough for use as the sole criterion for determination of what was learned in school. Further, there is no evidence that they will ever be found to be valid and reliable enough for that purpose. Areas of additional needed research are considered.     

When the Objects of Perception Are Spoken

An analysis of the auditory enhancement theory of speech perception reveals its liabilities despite its plausibility. Four points are featured in a critique of its main premise: that the objects of speech perception are sounds, and, therefore, the perception of speech relies primarily on the categorization of auditory qualities. First, this critique notes that auditory enhancement theory is conventional, despite professed differences from the accounts which it disputes, in adopting consonant and vowel inventories as the objects of perception. Second, the critique argues that auditory enhancement theory fails three empirical tests of this equa- tion of phonetic attributes and auditory qualities. Third, the critique alleges that the auditory enhancement theory seeks support from equivocal experiments on animal training, in which the limited similarity of human and nonhuman test performance remains unexplored empirically and unexplained. Last, the critique concludes that the theory of speech perception by auditory enhancement relies on parsimony and distinctiveness as organizing principles for phonetic sound pat- terns, both of which are clearly inconsistent with central findings of linguistic and psychological research on speech perception and production.     

Nudging the Responsibility Objection

abstract   The 'Responsibility Objection' to Judith Thomson's famous argument for the permissibility of abortion challenges the relevance of her 'Violinist Analogy' to certain types of voluntary unwanted pregnancy, on the grounds that those pregnancies, even though they may be unwanted, are pregnancies for which the woman can be plausibly held responsible. This article considers the force of a number of recent objections to the Responsibility Objection, advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan, and judges them to be unpersuasive. It is concluded that, in the absence of further considerations, the Responsibility Objection carries force.     

In Defense of the Play-Creativity Hypothesis

The hypothesis that pretend play facilitates the creative thought process in children has received a great deal of attention. In a literature review, Lillard et al. (2013, p. 8) concluded that the evidence for this hypothesis was “not convincing.” This article focuses on experimental and training studies that have tested this hypothesis. As categorized by Lillard et al., the majority of these studies failed to find evidence for the hypothesis. Furthermore, they contend that several of the studies that found evidence for the hypothesis were flawed either methodologically or statistically. This review of the evidence relative to this hypothesis included a larger number of studies, and, more important, screened studies for statistical power. The conclusion reached is that that the hypothesis is likely true. Additionally, it is shown that Lillard et al.’s criticisms of the studies that found evidence for the hypothesis do not stand up on close examination     

In Defense of Paternalism

This paper argues that we have wrongly and not for the patient’s benefit made a form of stark autonomy our highest value which allows physicians to slip out from under their basic duty which has always been to pursue a particular patient’s good. In general – I shall argue – it is the patient’s right to select his or her own goals and the physician’s duty to inform the patient of the feasibility of that goal and of the means needed to attain it. If the goal is not one that is possible, the patient, with the physician and family, must select a feasible goal and then discuss the costs/benefits of various approaches. The physician should take a leading role in helping the patient select the goal. I argue that to simply present a laundry list of means and insist that patients choose for themselves is not only abandoning patients to their autonomy but is, in fact, a crass form of violating the patient’s autonomy. Freely choosing not to choose is a choice a patient with decisional capacity is entitled to make and one that needs to be respected.     

In Defense of Sensitivity

The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision, we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation.     

In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative

Sample (Philos Sci 82(5):856–866, 2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves.     

In Defense of Transracialism

Former NAACP chapter head Rachel Dolezal's attempted transition from the white to the black race occasioned heated controversy. Her story gained notoriety at the same time that Caitlyn Jenner 1 graced the cover of Vanity Fair, signaling a growing acceptance of transgender identity. Yet criticisms of Dolezal for misrepresenting her birth race indicate a widespread social perception that it is neither possible nor acceptable to change one's race in the way it might be to change one's sex. Considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism. Although Dolezal herself may or may not represent a genuine case of a transracial person, her story and the public reaction to it serve helpful illustrative purposes.