Nonindexical contextualism

Philosophers on all sides of the contextualism debates have had an overly narrow conception of what semantic context sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on features of context). As a result of this conflation, proponents of contextualism have taken arguments that establish only context sensitivity to establish indexicality, while opponents of contextualism have taken arguments against indexicality to be arguments against context sensitivity. Once these concepts are carefully pulled apart, it becomes clear that there is conceptual space in semantic theory for nonindexical forms of contextualism that have many advantages over the usual indexical forms.     

The Prospect of Genome-guided Preventive Medicine: A Need and Opportunity for Genetic Counselors

One of the major anticipated benefits of genomic medicine is the area of preventive medicine. Commercially available genomic profiling is now able to generate risk information for a number of common conditions several of which have recognized preventive guidelines. Similarly, family history assessment affords powerful health risk prediction based on the shared genetic, physical and lifestyle environments within families. Thus, with the ability to help predict disease risk and enable preemptive health plans, genome-guided preventive medicine has the potential to improve population health on an individualized level. To realize this potential, steps to broaden access to accurate genomic health information must be considered. With expertise in genetic science, risk assessment and communication, and a patient-centered practice approach, genetic counselors are poised to play a critical role in facilitating the incorporation of genomic health risks into the burgeoning field of genome-guided preventive medicine.     

Pragmatic Contextualism

Contextualism in epistemology has traditionally been understood as the view that “know” functions semantically like an indexical term, encoding different contents in contexts with different epistemic standards. But the indexical hypothesis about “know” faces a range of objections. This article explores an alternative version of contextualism on which “know” is a semantically stable term, and the truth‐conditional variability in knowledge claims is a matter of pragmatic enrichment. The central idea is that in contexts with stringent epistemic standards, knowledge claims are narrowed: “know” is used in such contexts to make assertions about particularly demanding types of knowledge. The resulting picture captures all of the intuitive data that motivate contextualism while sidestepping the controversial linguistic thesis at its heart. After developing the view, the article shows in detail how it avoids one influential linguistic objection to traditional contextualism concerning indirect speech reports, and then answers an objection concerning the unavailability of certain types of clarification speeches.     

Getting the Big Picture in Community Science: Methods That Capture Context

Community science has a rich tradition of using theories and research designs that are consistent with its core value of contextualism. However, a survey of empirical articles published in the American Journal of Community Psychology shows that community scientists utilize a narrow range of statistical tools that are not well suited to assess contextual data. Multilevel modeling, geographic information systems (GIS), social network analysis, and cluster analysis are recommended as useful tools to address contextual questions in community science. An argument for increased methodological consilience is presented, where community scientists are encouraged to adopt statistical methodology that is capable of modeling a greater proportion of the data than is typical with traditional methods.     

A Historical Perspective on the Distinction Between Basic and Applied Science

The traditional distinction between basic (“pure”) and applied science has been much criticized in recent decades. The criticism is based on a combination of historical and systematic epistemic argument. The present paper is mostly concerned with the historical aspect. I argue that the critics impose an understanding at odds with the way the distinction was understood by its supporters in debates on science education and science policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And I show how a distinction that refers to difference on several epistemic and social dimensions makes good sense of representative historical cases. If this argument is tenable it suggests more continuity in the epistemology and politics of science than has been claimed by a new paradigm of science studies and politics during recent decades.     

The Argument from Skepticism for Contextualism

Epistemic contextualism was originally motivated and supported by the response it provides to skeptical paradox. Although there has been much discussion of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox, not much attention has been paid to the argument from skepticism for contextualism. Contextualists argue that contextualism accounts for the plausibility and apparent inconsistency of a set of paradoxical claims better than any classical invariantist theory. In this paper I focus on and carefully examine the argument from skepticism for contextualism. I argue not only that the prima facie advantage of contextualism is specious, but also that contextualism is in fact at a competitive disadvantage with respect to two classical invariantist views. I also argue that contextualism takes an arbitrary and unsatisfying strategy in its response to skepticism. That contextualism is alone in taking this arbitrary strategy marks a second competitive disadvantage for it. In addition, I argue that the contextualist response to skeptical paradox regenerates a skeptical paradox which contextualism is powerless to solve. Consequently, the argument from skepticism for contextualism fails. Furthermore, this feature of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox completely undermines the motivation and support for contextualism deriving from its treatment of skeptical paradox. I conclude that the argument from skepticism for contextualism fails, and that the contextualist response to skeptical paradox fails to motivate contextualism, pending the success of another argument for the contextualist thesis.     

Functional relations and cognitive psychology: Lessons from human performance and animal research

We consider requirements for effective interdisciplinary communication and explore alternative interpretations of “building bridges between functional and cognitive psychology.” If the bridges are intended to connect radical behaviourism and cognitive psychology, or functional contextualism and cognitive psychology, the efforts are unlikely to be successful. But if the bridges are intended to connect functional relationships and cognitive theory, no construction is needed because the bridges already exist within cognitive psychology. We use human performance and animal research to illustrate the latter point and to counter the claim that the functional approach is unique in offering a close relationship between science and practice. Effective communication will be enhanced and, indeed, may only occur if the goal of functional contextualism extends beyond just “the advancement of functional contextual cognitive and behavioral science and practice” to “the advancement of cognitive and behavioral science and practice” without restriction.     

Science Policy and Concomitant Research in Synthetic Biology—Some Critical Thoughts

In science policy, public controversy around synthetic biology has often been presented as a major risk because it could deter innovation. The following inter-related strategies for avoiding contestation have been observed: (1) There have been attempts to close down debates by alluding to the importance and legitimacy of reliance on scientific evidence as input to regulatory processes. (2) Scientific policy advice has stressed sufficiency of existing regulation, economic risks of additional regulation and/or suggestions for monitoring that are limited in scope. (3) Initiatives for self-governance have narrowed the scope of topics for consideration. (4) Engagement with humanities, social sciences and arts has been co-opted for legitimisation and science communication. Although such agendas are of course not ubiquitous, in this paper, I criticise that instrumentally motivated engagement has been supported not only by the scientific community but also by policy institutions and funding bodies. I argue that it is good that this now seems to fuel controversy in the academic and policy realms. As synthetic biology is not the only technoscientific field to see such dynamics, this is also part of the broader context of debate about the governance of science, especially the concept of “responsible research and innovation” (RRI) currently promoted in the EU.     

‘Developing’ the Self in the Knowledge Economy

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words].     

Stabilizing Knowledge

If epistemic contextualism is correct, then knowledge attributions do not have stable truth‐conditions across different contexts. John Hawthorne, Timothy Williamson, and Patrick Rysiew argue that this unstable picture of knowledge attributions undermines the role that knowledge reports play in storing, retrieving, and transmitting useful information. Contrary to this view, I argue that the truth‐conditions of knowledge attributions are more stable than critics have claimed, and that contextualism is compatible with the role knowledge attributions play in storing, retrieving, and transmitting information across contexts. In particular, I discuss a social dimension of ‘knowledge’ that limits contextual variability. This indicates a new way of characterizing contextualism.     

Avoiding Empty Rhetoric: Engaging Publics in Debates About Nanotechnologies

Despite the amount of public investment in nanotechnology ventures in the developed world, research shows that there is little public awareness about nanotechnology, and public knowledge is very limited. This is concerning given that nanotechnology has been heralded as 'revolutionising' the way we live. In this paper, we articulate why public engagement in debates about nanotechnology is important, drawing on literature on public engagement and science policy debate and deliberation about public policy development. We also explore the significance of timing in engaging the public, and we make some suggestions concerning how to effectively engage publics. Our conclusions indicate the significance of scientific researchers, policy makers and representative consumer groupings in public reasoning towards a better public policy framework for debate about technological development.     

Community Science, Philosophy of Science, and the Practice of Research

Embedded in community science are implicit theories on the nature of reality (ontology), the justification of knowledge claims (epistemology), and how knowledge is constructed (methodology). These implicit theories influence the conceptualization and practice of research, and open up or constrain its possibilities. The purpose of this paper is to make some of these theories explicit, trace their intellectual history, and propose a shift in the way research in the social and behavioral sciences, and community science in particular, is conceptualized and practiced. After describing the influence and decline of logical empiricism, the underlying philosophical framework for science for the past century, I summarize contemporary views in the philosophy of science that are alternatives to logical empiricism. These include contextualism, normative naturalism, and scientific realism, and propose that a modified version of contextualism, known as perspectivism, affords the philosophical framework for an emerging community science. I then discuss the implications of perspectivism for community science in the form of four propositions to guide the practice of research.Portions of this paper are based on an invited paper presented at the May 1997 Pre-Conference Workshop of the Biennial Conference of the Society for Community Research and Action, Columbia, South Carolina.     

VIRTUES, SOCIAL ROLES, AND CONTEXTUALISM

Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts.     

Factors Which Impact the Delivery of Genetic Risk Assessment Services Focused on Inherited Cancer Genomics: Expanding the Role and Reach of Certified Genetics Professionals

There is tremendous excitement about the promise of new genomic technologies to transform medical practice and improve patient care. Although the full power of genetic diagnosis has not yet been realized, paradigms of clinical decision-making are changing. In fact, recent policy level changes to promote genetic counseling by certified genetics professionals (GP) such as genetic counselors and clinical geneticists, are occurring at both the payer and state level. However, there remain opportunities to develop policies within the United States to: 1) enhance the access to the limited workforce of GPs; 2) revise reimbursement schemes such that costs to deliver these services may be recouped by institutions with GPs; and 3) protect against the potential for discrimination based on genetic information. Although many of these issues predate advances in genomic technologies, they are exacerbated by them, with increasing access and awareness as costs of testing decrease. Consequently, evolving shifts in national policies poise GPs to serve as a hub of information and may be instrumental in facilitating new models to deliver genetics-based care through promoting academic-community partnerships and interfacing with non-GPs. As we acknowledge the potential for genomics to revolutionize medical practice, the expertise of GPs may be leveraged to facilitate incorporation of this information into mainstream medicine.     

Expanding the Political Psychology Toolkit: The Potential of Discursive Psychology for Understanding Contentious Political Debate at a Grassroots Level

In its location at the intersection of political science and psychology, political psychology draws on many of the research techniques of both disciplines in its exploration of power, voting behavior, leadership, attitudes, and values. One hitherto relatively underutilized approach for understanding public policy debate is discursive psychology (DP). Applying this perspective to a contentious policy issue in Australia, we seek to demonstrate that this approach can add richness and depth to our understanding of how ordinary citizens engage in public policy debates. We suggest that this type of analysis can augment insights obtained from more traditional methods—such as focus groups, experimental approaches, and opinion polling—by analyzing how debates are constructed and presented at the grassroots level. This research is innovative in two ways. First, it applies a rigorous, empirical research approach to an area in which it has not previously been used: the study of public policy issues. Second, rather than analyzing the communicative practices of political leaders, we consider the rhetorical arguments made by ordinary citizens in their engagement with political issues and how they negotiate what counts as evidence. This can provide insights into how public debate can be conducted more productively and respectfully.     

人类基因组计划中的计算机科学

叙述了人类基因组计划（HGP）实施过程中计算机科学向基因组学领域的不断渗透及面临的挑战。基因组数据库及网络系统的构建与完善为基因组信息的交流提供了基础,一系列计算机软件的开发和改进简化了HGP这一繁重的劳动。在HGP的推动下,世界各大信息技术公司也加盟到基因组研究中,使生物学中融入了更多的计算机专业技能,有利于引进新的思维模式,开拓新的研究方法。但目前在基因组信息的交流与分析方面,标准化和精确性仍显不足,信息的处理能力也受到计算机存储量和运算速度的制约,这些问题将随着计算机科学的不断发展而逐渐解决。     

Contextualism,Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives,and Closure

Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure principle can be articulated that will survive scrutiny. Opponents of contextualism often try to gain an advantage over it by claiming that their view mimics these virtues of contextualism as well as having other virtues. A recent example of the same is termed ‘contrastivism," as presented by Jonathan Schaffer. I will argue that the representation made is chimerical, that in fact contrastivism has no hope of mirroring these twin virtues of contextualism.     

RULES OF EVIDENCE:

Abstract— Statistical tests define rules of evidence in psychological science Agreed-upon rules of evidence are needed to discuss what is true Statistics are probability statements about the reliability of associations In public and journalistic debates about psychological topics, the need far statistical rules is evident Anecdotes, intuitions, and sensational and unlikely events often dominate popular discussions Psychological science demands that the probability of events and associations be evaluated by statistical means Understanding of statistical tests can be improved by abandoning the term significance, winch means reliability to psychologists, but in everyday English, means importance. The importance of a result depends on magnitude of association, not on whether the event has a nonzero chance of recurring. Given large samples and multiple measures, statistical tests are used too often to draw misleading conclusions about the importance of research results. Better uses of statistics would focus on the magnitude of effects and error estimates     

Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke

According to Antonia Barkes version of contextualism, epistemic contextualism, a context is defined by a method and its associated assumptions. The subject has to make the assumption that the method is adequate or reliable and that good working conditions hold in order to arrive at knowledge by employing the method. I will criticize Barkes claim that epistemic contextualism can provide a more satisfactory explanation or motivation for context shifts than conversational contextualism (in particular, David Lewiss contextualism). Two more points of criticizm will be presented, which are meant to show that epistemic contextualism presupposes epistemic internalism, and that (epistemic) contextualism leads to an implausible view about which parameters the special achievement that is constitutive of knowledge depends on. I suggest that, contra (epistemic) contextualism, knowledge is a more robust phenomenon that does not depend on whether anyone calls into question any assumptions or raises skeptical doubts in conversation or in his or her mind (as, for example, Fred Dretskes account says). I indicate how this can be reconciled with the phenomenon that knowledge attributions are somewhat unstable and seemingly context-dependent.