共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Stephen Houlgate 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(5):1009-1015
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Willem A. deVries 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2019,27(3):363-378
ABSTRACTI have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four. 相似文献
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Anders Odenstedt 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2008,46(4):559-580
Hegel argues that Bildung (cultivation or education) involves an ability to reflect on one's habitual beliefs in a detached, uncommitted way. According to Hegel, the educated (gebildete) individual is able to consider a manifold of standpoints on a given issue through awareness of the historical and cultural variability of beliefs. Hans‐Georg Gadamer invokes Hegel's account of Bildung in arguing that historical study permits current presuppositions (Vorurteile) to become reflected through the awareness of cognitive plurality and change that such study brings about. The paper mainly tries to show three things: (i) that Hegel is a source of inspiration for Gadamer in this regard but that there are also important differences between their accounts of Bildung; (ii) that these accounts are not unambiguous; and (iii) that Gadamer, in particular, makes somewhat elusive claims on the power of Bildung. 相似文献
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Frederick Beiser 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2020,28(3):501-513
ABSTRACTThis article attempts to expose an unwarranted narrowness in the study of idealism in nineteenth century philosophy, and to show that the field of idealism is much wider than usually assumed. This narrowness stems from the influence of Hegel’s history of philosophy, which saw the idealist tradition as beginning in Kant, passing through Fichte and Schelling, and then culminating in his own system. This conception of history has been disseminated by Hegel’s followers and still prevails today. I argue that this conception is too narrow for several reasons. First, it ignores the romantic idealists (Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel); second, it excludes the opposing tradition of idealism of Herbart, Fries and Beneke, which affirmed (against Schelling and Hegel) transcendental idealism, an empiricist epistemology, the existence of the thing-in-itself and the value of the Kantian dualisms; and, third, it neglects the history of idealism after Hegel later in the nineteenth century, more specifically, the idealism of Trendelenburg, Lotze and Hartmann. 相似文献
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Henry Somers-Hall 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):555-572
The aim of this paper is to explore the uses made of the calculus by Gilles Deleuze and G. W. F. Hegel. I show how both Deleuze
and Hegel see the calculus as providing a way of thinking outside of finite representation. For Hegel, this involves attempting
to show that the foundations of the calculus cannot be thought by the finite understanding, and necessitate a move to the
standpoint of infinite reason. I analyse Hegel’s justification for this introduction of dialectical reason by looking at his
responses to Berkeley’s criticisms of the calculus. For Deleuze, instead, I show that the differential must be understood
as escaping from both finite and infinite representation. By highlighting the sub-representational character of the differential
in his system, I show how the differential is a key moment in Deleuze’s formulation of a transcendental empiricism. I conclude
by dealing with some of the common misunderstandings that occur when Deleuze is read as endorsing a modern mathematical interpretation
of the calculus. 相似文献
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This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory. 相似文献
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Mark Alznauer 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(4):365-389
When Hegel first addresses moral responsibility in the Philosophy of Right, he presupposes that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do, but appears to offer little, if any, justification for this assumption. In this essay, I claim that the first part of the Philosophy of Right, “Abstract Right”, contains an implicit argument that legal or external responsibility (blame for what we have done) is conceptually dependent on moral responsibility proper (blame for what we have intended). This overlooked argument satisfies the first half of a thesis Hegel applies to action in the Encyclopaedia Logic, namely, that the outer must be inner, and thus provides a necessary complement for his more explicit treatment of the second half of that thesis, that the inner must be outer. The claim that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do might appear, at first, to risk conflating legal and moral responsibility and to lack the necessary means to deal with the phenomenon of moral luck, but I argue that if it is properly situated within the whole of Hegel's philosophy of action it can be saved from both of these consequences and so take its place as an essential component of Hegel's full theory of moral responsibility. 相似文献
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