The unattended speech effect: perception or memory?

Broadbent (1983) has suggested that the influence of unattended speech on immediate serial recall is a perceptual phenomenon rather than a memory phenomenon. In order to test this, subjects were required to classify visually presented pairs of consonants on the basis of either case or rhyme. They were tested both in silence and against a background of continuous spoken Arabic presented at 75 dB(A). No effect of unattended speech was observed on either the speed or accuracy of processing. A further study required subjects to decide whether visually presented nonwords were homophonous with real words. Again, performance was not impaired by unattended speech, although a clear effect was observed on an immediate serial memory task. Our results give no support to the perceptual interpretation of the unattended speech effect.     

Is fat perception a thermal effect?

It has been generally assumed that fat is detected by its flavour and by its lubrication of the oral mucosa. A recent study reported a correlation of -.99 between perceived temperature of a product and its fat content. This was significantly higher than correlations of sensory scores for fat flavour, mouthfeel, and afterfeel. This suggested a third detection mechanism; fat may be detected via its effect on the thermal conductivity of the food. In 3 studies, thermal sensitivity in humans was investigated to verify whether oral thermal receptors are sufficiently rapid and accurate to play a role in the perception of fats. The thermal sensitivity of the lips and oral mucosa of the anterior and middle one-third of the tongue were assessed using a Peltier device. Subjects detected 0.5 Hz fluctuations in temperature of 0.08'C on the lower lip, 0.26 degrees C and 1.36 degrees C at the tip and dorsum of the tongue, demonstrating that the lips are sufficiently sensitive to detect small differences in temperature. In two further experiments subjects ingested custards and mayonnaises and then spat out samples after 5, 10, or 20 sec. The temperature of the food and oral mucosa was measured before and after spitting and the rates of heating were calculated. Results suggest assessment of thermal conductivity of food may be used to assess fat content.     

Does geomagnetic activity effect extrasensory perception?

Data from two kinds of experiments for extrasensory perception were retrospectively analysed for possible relationships with local geomagnetic activity (K-index). ESP scores from 70 Ganzfeld sessions (telepathy-clairvoyance) were found significantly related to high geomagnetic activity of the day prior to the experimental sessions (rs = 0.23, n = 70, P = 0.03, one-tailed) but not to the geomagnetic activity of day of the sessions (rs = 0.03, n = 70, n.s.). The same relationship was found in experiments which consisted mostly of 80 trials clairvoyance computer games per subject (rs = 0.10, n = 269, P = 0.05, one-tailed). The results partially confirm Persinger's earlier findings on three independent samples, i.e. that spontaneous paranormal experience tend to occur on a day of low geomagnetic activity which is preceded by days of high geomagnetic activity.     

The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes

Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. A related bias was shown to exist in the observers' social inferences. Thus, raters estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actors' distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to the raters' own responses; responses differing from those of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.     

The Zeigarnik effect and intrinsic motivation: Are they the same?

The present study focused on delineating the parameters under which intrinsic motivation leads an individual to reengage an activity from those that result in the Zeigarnik effect. In a posttask free-choice period, participants not completing the experimental task displayed more reengagement behavior than participants completing the task (the Zeigarnik effect). When participants were also provided self-efficacious performance feedback via a prearranged competitive outcome manipulation, there was no evidence of the Zeigarnik effect, while there was support for intrinsic motivation from competent self-efficacious performance feedback. Results were discussed in terms of distinguishing between intrinsic motivation and the Zeigarnik effect as sources of reengagement motivation. It was concluded that, in the presence of self-efficacious performance feedback, the competent-incompetent impression was more salient than task-completion feedback.Preparation of this article was supported by Texas Christian University grant TCU/RF 5-23757.     

The SNARC effect: an instance of the Simon effect?

Our aim was to investigate the relations between the Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect and the Simon effect. In Experiment 1 participants were required to make a parity judgment to numbers from 1 to 9 (without 5), by pressing a left or a right key. The numbers were presented to either the left or right side of fixation. Results showed the Simon effect (left-side stimuli were responded to faster with the left hand than with the right hand whereas right-side stimuli were responded to faster with the right hand), and the SNARC effect (smaller numbers were responded to faster with the left hand than with the right hand, whereas larger numbers were responded to faster with the right hand). No interaction was found between the Simon and SNARC effects, suggesting that they combine additively. In Experiment 2 the temporal distance between formation of the task-relevant non-spatial stimulus code and the task-irrelevant stimulus spatial code was increased. As in Experiment 1, results showed the presence of the Simon and SNARC effects but no interaction between them. Moreover, we found a regular Simon effect for faster RTs, and a reversed Simon effect for longer RTs. In contrast, the SNARC effect did not vary as a function of RT. Taken together, the results of the two experiments show that the SNARC effect does not simply constitute a variant of the Simon effect. This is considered to be evidence that number representation and space representation rest on different neural (likely parietal) circuits.     

The laterality effect: myth or truth?

Tzelgov and colleagues [Tzelgov, J., Meyer, J., and Henik, A. (1992). Automatic and intentional processing of numerical information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 18, 166-179.], offered the existence of the laterality effect as a post-hoc explanation for their results. According to this effect, numbers are classified automatically as small/large versus a standard point under autonomous processing of numerical information. However, the genuinity of the laterality effect was never examined, or was confounded with the numerical distance effect. In the current study, I controlled the numerical distance effect and observed that the laterality effect does exist, and affects the processing of automatic numerical information. The current results suggest that the laterality effect should be taken into account when using paradigms that require automatic numerical processing such as Stroop-like or priming tasks.     

Action and motivation: Measuring perception or strategies?

It has been suggested that when judging the distance to a desirable object, motivated distortions of perceived distance occur, and that these distortions can be measured by actions, such as throwing a beanbag. The results of two new experiments suggest that reported variations in beanbag performance may instead depend on instructional effects, such as ones that emphasize proximity rather than accuracy. When the goal was to be closest to the target, underthrowing was observed, whether the target was intrinsically valuable or not. When the goal was to hit the target, however, throwing performance was unbiased.     

Infants’ sensitivity to familiar size: The effect of memory on spatial perception

Two experiments investigated infants’ sensitivity to familiar size as information for the distances of objects with which they had had only brief experience. Each experiment had two phases: a familiarization phase and a test phase. During the familiarization phase, the infant played with a pair of different-sized objects for 10 min. During the test phase, a pair of objects, identical to those seen in the familiarization phase but now equal in size, were presented to the infant at a fixed distance under monocular or binocular viewing conditions. In the test phase of Experiment 1, 7-month-old infants viewing the objects monocularly showed a significant preference to reach for the object that resembled the smaller object in the familiarization phase. Seven-month-old infants in the binocular viewing condition reached equally to the two test phase objects. These results indicate that, in the monocular condition, the 7-month-olds used knowledge about the objects’ sizes, acquired during the familiarization phase, to perceive distance from the test objects’ visual angles, and that they reached preferentially for the apparently nearer object. The lack of a reaching preference in the binocular condition rules out interpretations of the results not based on the objects’ perceived distances. The results, therefore, indicate that 7-month-old infants can use memory to mediate spatial perception. The implications of this finding for the debate between direct and indirect theories of visual perception are discussed. In the test phase of Experiment 2,5-month-old infants viewing the objects monocularly showed no reaching preference. These infants, therefore, showed no evidence of sensitivity to familiar size as distance information.     

The spacing effect in older and younger adults: does context matter?

Age-related memory change has been a topic of much investigation in recent years, including spacing benefits and reliance on contextual cues. We manipulated the spacing schedule and the context of learning and observed the effects on long-term recall ability in healthy older and younger adults. After learning Swahili–English word pairs, half practiced immediately (massed) and half practiced 24 h later (spaced) either in the same room or a different room (context) from the initial session. A final recall test 10 days after the practice session occurred in the same room as the first session. Participants in the spaced condition remembered more than those in the massed condition 10 days later. Younger adults remembered more word pairs than older adult participants. Context change eliminated the spacing benefit for both age groups.     

What's so funny about that?: The domains-interaction approach as a model of incongruity and resolution in humor

The domains-interaction approach, originally developed in metaphor research, was used to model humor processing. Using jokes of the structure A is the B of A's domain (e.g., John Candy is the hamburger of actors), this approach allows for precise operationalizations of incongruity and resolution in terms of between-domain and within-domain semantic distance, respectively. Distances between 26 terms used in 250 of these simple jokes were derived from semantic differential ratings. As predicted, humor ratings of the jokes were positively correlated with incongruity (between-domain distance) but not with resolution (within-domain distance). Also as predicted, a significant interaction revealed that jokes with both incongruity and resolution were rated as most humorous. These findings were replicated in a second study. A third study indicated that humor perception differs from metaphor appreciation, showing main effects for both types of semantic distance, but no interaction, when the sentences were presented as metaphors instead of jokes and rated for aptness.The authors wish to thank Richard Harshman and Albert Katz for their helpful suggestions in conducting this research.     

The list-strength effect: Strength-dependent competition or suppression?

If several items are associated with a common cue, the cued recall of an item is often supposed to decrease as a function of the increase in strength of its competitors' associations with the cue. Evidence for such a list-strength effect has been found in prior research, but this effect could have been caused both by the strength manipulations and by retrieval-based suppression, because the strengthening and the output order of the items were confounded. The experiment reported here employed categorizable item lists; some categories in each list contained strong items only, some contained weak items only, and some contained both strong and weak items. Strengthening was accomplished by varying the exposure time of the items. The testing sequence of the items from each category was controlled by the use of category-plus-first-letter cues. When the typical confounding of strengthening and output order was mimicked, list-strength effects were found, which is consistent with prior research. However, when this confounding was eliminated, the list-strength effects disappeared: The recall of neither strong nor weak items varied with the strengths of the other category exemplars. This pattern of results indicates that the list-strength effect is not the result of strength-dependent competition, but is caused by output-order biases and a process of suppression.     

The Bransford-Franks linear effect: Integration or artifact?

It was hypothesized that the Bransford-Franks linear effect is an artifact of the method of presentation of stimulus sentences and is unrelated to semantic processes. Ss were given sentences containing the same information in one of two ways. In a control condition, which was identical to the procedure used in earlier research, overlapping combinations of ideas were presented during learning and recognition; in an experimental condition, ideas were presented one at a time. Results demonstrated that one-idea sentences received significantly higher recognition confidence ratings in the experimental condition, thus supporting the artifact interpretation. It was proposed that Ss assign recognition confidence ratings based on the probability that a sentence containing a certain number of ideas could have occurred in acquisition.     

Recognition and lexical decision without detection: unconscious perception?

Stimulus detection and concurrent measures of stimulus recognition were compared to establish whether perception occurs in the absence of detection. The target stimuli were familiar words (Experiments 1 and 2), nonwords (Experiment 3), or both words and nonwords (Experiment 4). On each trial, either a stimulus or a blank field was presented. Ss first decided whether a stimulus had been presented and then made either a forced-choice recognition decision (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or a lexical decision (Experiment 4). Both words and nonwords were recognized and discriminated following correct detections (i.e., hits). However, in the absence of stimulus detection (i.e., misses), only words were recognized or discriminated. These qualitatively different patterns of results following hits and misses for words and nonwords suggest that stimulus detection may provide an adequate measure of conscious awareness.     

The dissociation paradigm and its discontents: how can unconscious perception or memory be inferred?

Erdelyi does us all a great service by his customarily incisive discussion of the various ways in which our field tends to neglect, confuse, and misunderstand numerous critical issues in attempting to differentiate conscious from unconscious perception and memory. Although no single commentary could hope to comprehensively assess these issues, I will address Erdelyi's three main points: (1) How (and if) the dissociation paradigm can be used to validly infer unconscious perception; (2) The implications of below-chance effects; and (3) The role of time. I suggest that (a) significant progress on construct validity issues is possible; (b) below-chance effects are part of a more general bidirectional phenomenon, very likely unconscious, and do not threaten absolute subliminality; and (c) practice/learning effects pose potential difficulties for time-based dissociation paradigms.     

The impact of emotion on perception: bias or enhanced processing?

Recent studies have shown that emotionally significant stimuli are often better identified than neutral stimuli. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to enhanced perceptual processing or to a bias favoring the identification of emotionally significant stimuli over neutral stimuli. The present study used a two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification task to disentangle the effects of bias and enhanced processing. We found that emotionally significant targets were better identified than neutral targets. In contrast, the emotional significance of the foil alternative had no effect on performance. The present results support the hypothesis that perceptual encoding of emotionally significant stimuli is enhanced.     

The plausibility effect: Lexical priming or sentential processing?

Five experiments are reported that investigated whether the plausibility effect is caused by lexical priming resulting from the higher proportion of related words in plausible than in implausible sentences. In Experiment 1, a plausibility effect was demonstrated that was entirely attributable to the way in which lexical items were combined rather than to the properties of individual lexical items. In Experiment 2, the content words from the sentences used in Experiment 1 were shown to produce a similar reaction-time difference in a task in which syntactic processing was disrupted, supporting a lexical priming explanation of the plausibility effect. However, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in another task less prone to task-specific strategies but sensitive to plausibility, the disruption of syntactic processing eliminated the effect. In Experiment 5, it was shown that when lexical priming was eliminated, a plausibility effect still occurred. Thus, two separate lines of evidence suggested that the plausibility effect cannot be fully explained in terms of lexical priming.     

The word-detection effect: Sophisticated guessing or perceptual enhancement?

Subjects discriminate letters in words better than letters in nonwords. The sophisticated guessing hypothesis attributes this word advantage to a guessing strategy. In words, the possible letters at each letter position are constrained by letters at other positions, whereas letters in nonwords are not restricted in this manner. A critical test of this hypothesis is that if subjects are givenexplicit knowledge of the letters in nonwords before the trial, the word advantage would disappear. We investigated the effect of preknowledge of the alternatives in the word-detection effect. In the word-detection effect, subjects decide which of two character strings contains letters and which contains pseudoletters. In four experiments, subjects were more accurate with words than with nonwords, and subjects were more accurate when they were told the word or nonword before the trial. However, even with foreknowledge of the alternatives, subjects were more accurate with words than with nonwords.