Balancing Justice and Mercy

The concept of forgiveness is analyzed as a moral gesture toward the offender designed to help restore that individual's moral standing. Jewish sources on the conditions under which forgiveness is obligatory are explored and two contrasting positions are presented: one in which the obligation to forgive is conditional on the repentance of the offender and another in which people are required to forgive unconditionally. These two positions are shown to represent different ways of framing the offending behavior that rest, in turn, on different ways of balancing the need for justice and for mercy respectively. In the final analysis, Judaism's two contrasting attitudes toward forgiveness are rooted in different theological assumptions and different ways of construing the very goals of the moral life. The author points out the merits and shortcomings of both positions and concludes with the suggestion that the two complement each other in important ways.     

Internalism and epistemically responsible belief

In section one the deontological (or responsibilist) conception of justification is discussed and explained. In section two, arguments are put forward in order to derive the most plausible version of perspectival internalism, or the position that epistemic justification is a function of factors internal to the believer's cognitive perspective. The two most common considerations put forward in favor of perspectival internalism are discussed. These are the responsibilist conception of justification, and the intuition that two believers with like beliefs and experiences are equally justified in their like beliefs. In section three it is argued that perspectival internalism is false, and that in fact the position is not supported by a responsibilist conception of justification. Section four explicates two other forms of internalism, which are rejected for reasons similar to those presented against perspectival internalism. In section five, an internalist theory of justification is defended which is supported by a responsibilist conception of justification. Roughly stated, the position is that justified belief is belief which arises from the use of correct rules of reasoning. The idea of correctness is explicated, and the position is distinguished from others which are similar to it.     

A study of semantic and syntactic processing in monolinguals and fluent early bilinguals

The present study consists of two reaction-time experiments administered in English. These experiments were designed to compare semantic and syntactic processing in English monolinguals and fluent early French-English bilinguals. Results of both experiments revealed that the bilinguals did not function as the English monolinguals did. That is, their reaction times were slower and they made twice as many errors in response to certain sentences. These findings are especially important for two reasons: (1) The bilinguals were all highly fluent, and in most cases dominant, in English, and (2) the bilinguals exhibited systematic differences in two different linguistic components (the semantic and the syntactic). The results are viewed as evidence of the interdependence of the bilinguals' languages. Some note is made of individual patterns of response, and two interpretations of linguistic interdependence are provided.     

Generalized concepts of syntactically and semantically trivial differences and instant-based and period-based time ontologies

It is argued that there are interesting cases in which two axiomatic systems syntactically and semantically non-trivially different in the standard sense are rather to be classified as only trivially different. For a strict comparison of the systems of such a kind the generalized concepts of syntactically and semantically trivial differences are formally defined. As an example, it is shown that an instant-based time system and a period-based time system sketched in the paper are just trivially different in the defined sense in spite of the fact that, contrary to Quine's famous requirement, the variables of the two systems can never range over the elements of one and the same basic set. What is the same in relation to both systems is time topology.     

Recognition of affixed words and the word frequency effect

Three experiments are reported in which the word frequency effect is used as a diagnostic for determining whether affixed words coming from the same stem are stored together or separately in the lexicon. Prefixed words are examined in the first experiment, inflected words in the second and third. In the first two experiments, two types of word are compared where the words in each condition are matched on surface or presented frequency but are varied on the frequency of their stems or base frequency. It is found that lexical decision times are influenced by base frequency, thus indicating that words related by affixation are stored together in the lexicon. The third experiment, however, demonstrates that when base frequency is held constant and surface frequency is varied, lexical decision times are influenced by surface frequency. The results are accounted for by a model of word recognition whereby frequency has its effect at two different stages of the recognition process.     

Two components and two stages in search performance: a case study in visual search

A model of skilled performance in visual search tasks is presented. According to the model, search behavior is controlled by two memory components. Each of them plays a different role in two stages of search. The two components are the memory representations of the target category and context category, respectively. The two stages are scan and check-for-target. It is argued that the scan is dominantly context-controlled (resulting in target detection) and that the target check is target-controlled (leading to target identification). The model is tested in a transfer experiment. It is shown that the model must be revised to account for two different ways of processing, depending on properties of the stimulus lists: (i) one-stage-scan under target and context control and (ii) scan-and-check processing where checking is target-and-context controlled and scanning is not under memory control at all. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

社会认知中热情与能力的补偿效应

刻板印象内容模型(SCM)提出了热情与能力社会认知维度, 这两个维度之间存在着特殊的补偿效应。补偿效应是在比较两个基本维度的情境下, 为了区分两个社会目标, 通过热情与能力之间的补偿使社会目标形成反差的一种倾向。其心理机制可能通过对比效应、系统公正理论或混合印象预期理论来解释。可以通过直接和间接的方法来测量补偿效应。补偿效应包括单维补偿和双维补偿两种基本类型, 其中单维补偿又可分为能力补偿热情以及热情补偿能力两种。补偿效应的研究仍处于起步阶段, 其理论研究和实际应用研究仍需要进一步深化和扩展。     

Context-independent and context-dependent information in concepts

It is proposed that concepts contain two types of properties. Context-independent properties are activated by the word for a concept on all occasions. The activation of these properties is unaffected by contextual relevance. Context-dependent properties are not activated by the respective word independent of context. Rather, these properties are activated only by relevant contexts in which the word appears. Context-independent properties form the core meanings of words, whereas context-dependent properties are a source of semantic encoding variability. This proposal lies between two opposing theories of meaning, one that argues all properties of a concept are active on all occasions and another that argues the active properties are completely determined by context. The existence of context-independent and context-dependent properties is demonstrated in two experimental settings: the property-verification task and judgments of similarity. The relevance of these property types to cross-classification, problem solving, metaphor and sentence comprehension, and the semantic-episodic distinction is discussed.     

"伦理"与"道德"辨析

在日常使用中,"伦理"与"道德"往往被当作同义词或近义词使用,这种现象已经引起了学术理论的混乱,本文归纳了学术界目前现存的几种有代表性的理论观点,并对"伦理"与"道德"的东西方涵义及二者的相互关系进行了辨析与梳理。笔者认为,西方的伦理与道德的涵义相近,但与中文里伦理与道德的涵义有别;中文里伦理与道德的涵义存在着本质的区别。东西方的词源词义不可能完全对应,更不能以西方文化中伦理与道德的词源学涵义来取代中国文化里伦理与道德的基本涵义。对二者的正确理解必须依赖于相应的文化背景。     

心理学研究方法中“质”与“量”的整合

心理学研究方法中“质”与“量”的分歧由来已久。虽然“质”与“量”的研究方法各有其优势,但是也不可避免地存在一些弱点。如果将质与量的方法进行整合,使之进行优势互补,从而更大可能地揭示心理现象发生和发展的规律是我们所面临的课题。要对质的研究方法与量的研究方法进行整合,首先必须“去范式”,将研究的重点聚焦于研究问题,而非范式;其次必须将质性的资料与定量的资料放在同一个层面上进行比较。该文通过一个案例,向读者介绍如何进行“质”与“量”的研究方法的整合     

The phenomenology of spatial integration: data and models

A briefly presented visual stimulus followed by darkness seems to persist beyond its physical offset. We are concerned here with the relation between two characteristics of this visible persistence: first, its phenomenological resemblance to the stimulus that spawned it and second, its usefulness as a basis for integrating visual stimuli that are separated in time. We describe two experiments using a task in which two halves of a visual stimulus were presented successively and observers reported how complete the stimulus appeared to be. Stimuli appeared less complete with increases in both the duration of the interval intervening between presentation of the two halves and the duration of the initially presented stimulus half. This data pattern is similar to that obtained in tasks in which spatial integration of two temporally disparate stimuli is necessary for correct responding. On the basis of this similarity, we argue that phenomenological appearance and ability to integrate stimuli over time are two facets of the same perceptual events. We describe a formal model to account for these and other data.     

The minimum principle and the perception of absolute,common, and relative motions

Wheel-generated motions have served as a touchstone for discussion of the perception of wholes and parts since the beginning of Gestalt psychology. The reason is that perceived common motions of the whole and the perceived relative motions of the parts are not obviously found in the absolute motion paths of points on a rolling wheel. In general, two types of theories have been proposed as to how common and relative motions are derived from absolute motions: one is that the common motions are extracted from the display first, leaving relative motions as the residual; the other is that relative motions are extracted first leaving common motions as the residual. A minimum principle can be used to defend both positions, but application of the principle seems contingent on the particular class of stimuli chosen. We propose a third view. It seems that there are at least two simultaneous processes—one for common motions and one for relative motions—involved in the perception of these and other stimuli and that a minimum principle is involved in both. However, for stimuli in many domains the minimization of relative motion dominates the perception. In general, we propose that any given stimulus can be organized to minimize the complexity of either its common motions or its relative motions; that which component is minimized depends on which of two processes reaches completion first (that for common or that for relative motions); and that the similarity of any two displays depends on whether common or relative motions are minimized.     

Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches

The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size perception. Earlier calls for their reconciliation and unification are reviewed. Neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of two quite distinct visual systems, the ventral and the dorsal, is presented. These two perceptual systems differ in their functions; the ventral system's central function is that of identification, while the dorsal system is mainly engaged in the visual control of motor behavior. The strong parallels between the ecological approach and the functioning of the dorsal system, and between the constructivist approach and the functioning of the ventral system are noted. It is also shown that the experimental paradigms used by the proponents of these two approaches match the functions of the respective visual systems. A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges from this analysis, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious. Some implications of this dual-process approach to visual-perceptual phenomena are presented, with emphasis on space perception.     

Evaluating mediation and moderation effects in school psychology: A presentation of methods and review of current practice

Third variable effects elucidate the relation between two other variables, and can describe why they are related or under what conditions they are related. This article demonstrates methods to analyze two third-variable effects: moderation and mediation. The utility of examining moderation and mediation effects in school psychology is described and current use of the analyses in applied school psychology research is reviewed and evaluated. Proper statistical methods to test the effects are presented, and different effect size measures for the models are provided. Extensions of the basic moderator and mediator models are also described.     

Meaning and ontology

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so‐called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of ‘possible'; one among three uses of ‘same’ in the phrase ‘the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism.     

Acquiescence as a source of bias and model and person misfit: A theoretical and empirical analysis

In personality and attitude measurement, the presence of acquiescent responding can have an impact on the whole process of item calibration and test scoring, and this can occur even when sensible procedures for controlling acquiescence are used. This paper considers a bidimensional (content acquiescence) factor‐analytic model to be the correct model, and assesses the effects of fitting unidimensional models to theoretically unidimensional scales when acquiescence is in fact operating. The analysis considers two types of scales: non‐balanced and fully balanced. The effects are analysed at both the calibration and the scoring stages, and are of two types: bias in the item/respondent parameter estimates and model/person misfit. The results obtained theoretically are checked and assessed by means of simulation. The results and predictions are then assessed in an empirical study based on two personality scales. The implications of the results for applied personality research are discussed.     

Contrasts and correlations in effect-size estimation

This article describes procedures for presenting standardized measures of effect size when contrasts are used to ask focused questions of data. The simplest contrasts consist of comparisons of two samples (e.g., based on the independent t statistic). Useful effect-size indices in this situation are members of the g family (e.g., Hedges's g and Cohen's d ) and the Pearson r . We review expressions for calculating these measures and for transforming them back and forth, and describe how to adjust formulas for obtaining g or d from t , or r from g , when the sample sizes are unequal. The real-life implications of d or g calculated from t become problematic when there are more than two groups, but the correlational approach is adaptable and interpretable, although more complex than in the case of two groups. We describe a family of four conceptually related correlation indices: the alerting correlation, the contrast correlation, the effect-size correlation, and the BESD (binomial effect-size display) correlation. These last three correlations are identical in the simple setting of only two groups, but differ when there are more than two groups.     

Self-Expression and Self-Control

It is often said that people are ‘not themselves’ when they are in situations which rob them of their self‐control. Strangely, these are also circumstances in which people are often said to be most fully themselves. This paper investigates the pictures of the self behind these two truisms, and the relation between them. Harry Frankfurt’s work represents the first truism, and standard objections to his work the second. Each of these approaches is found to capture one independent and widely employed picture of the self. The connection each draws between being oneself and flourishing, however, suggests a point of contact between them. This point of contact is used to develop a third view of being oneself which integrates the insights of the other two.     

Additive factors and stages of mental processes in task networks

To perform a task a subject executes mental processes. An experimental manipulation, such as a change in stimulus intensity, is said to selectively influence a process if it changes the duration of that process leaving other process durations unchanged. For random process durations a definition of a factor selectively influencing a process by increments is given in terms of stochastic dominance (also called “the usual stochastic order”). A technique for analyzing reaction times, Sternberg’s Additive Factor Method, assumes all the processes are in series. When all processes are in series, each process is called a stage. With the Additive Factor Method, if two experimental factors selectively influence two different stages by increments, the factors will have additive effects on reaction time. An assumption of the Additive Factor Method is that if two experimental factors interact, then they influence the same stage. We consider sets of processes in which some pairs of processes are sequential and some are concurrent (i.e., the processes are partially ordered). We propose a natural definition of a stage for such sets of processes. For partially ordered processes, with our definition of a stage, if two experimental factors selectively influence two different processes by increments, each within a different stage, then the factors have additive effects. If each process selectively influenced by increments is in the same stage, then an interaction is possible, although not inevitable.