Information processing by performers and observers in a paired associate learning task

The effects of two training procedures on learning and performance are compared. Performers select a response alternative for each stimulus on Trial 1 and receive feedback in terms of “Right” or “Wrong”. Observers receive the same information by listening to the experimenter. Experiment I tests the hypothesis that performers and observers are using a different learning strategy when there are only two response alternatives available for each stimulus on Trial 1. A recognition procedure was used on Trial 2; each stimulus was followed by four alternatives, two of them being the same as presented on Trial 1. Subjects have to recognize the two “old” alternatives. Performers are always better at recognizing the chosen alternative, whereas observers are better at recognizing the correct alternative. Experiment II extends the comparison between performers and observers to a task with four response alternatives on Trial 1. There are no longer differences in performance between the two training procedures.     

On the dynamic nature of response criterion in recognition memory: effects of base rate, awareness, and feedback

The authors examined whether participants can shift their criterion for recognition decisions in response to the probability that an item was previously studied. Participants in 3 experiments were given recognition tests in which the probability that an item was studied was correlated with its location during the test. Results from all 3 experiments indicated that participants' response criteria were sensitive to the probability that an item was previously studied and that shifts in criterion were robust. In addition, awareness of the bases for criterion shifts and feedback on performance were key factors contributing to the observed shifts in decision criteria. These data suggest that decision processes can operate in a dynamic fashion, shifting from item to item.     

Stimulus control and auditory discrimination learning sets in the bottlenose dolphin

The learning efficiency of an Atlantic bottlenose dolphin was evaluated using auditory discrimination learning-set tasks. Efficiency, as measured by the probability of a correct response on Trial 2 of a new discrete-trial, two-choice auditory discrimination problem, reached levels comparable to those attained by advanced species of nonhuman primates. Runs of errorless problems in some cases rivaled those reported for individual rhesus monkeys in visual discrimination learning-set tasks. This level of stimulus control of responses to new auditory discriminanda was attained through (a) the development of a sequential within-trial method for presentation of a pair of auditory discriminanda; (b) the extensive use of fading methods to train initial discriminations, followed by the fadeout of the use of fading; (c) the development of listening behavior through control of the animal's responses during projection of the auditory discriminanda; and (d) the use of highly discriminable auditory stimuli, by applying results of a parametric evaluation of discriminability of selected acoustic variables. Learning efficiency was tested using a cueing method on Trial 1 of each new discrimination, to allow the animal to identify the positive stimulus before its response. Efficiency was also tested with the more common blind baiting method, in which the Trial 1 response was reinforced on only a random half of the problems. Efficiency was high for both methods. The overall results were generally in keeping with exceptations of learning capacity based on the large size and high degree of cortical complexity of the brain of the bottlenose dolphin.     

Differences in Acquisition, Not Retention, Largely Contribute to Sex Differences in Multitrial Word Recall Performance

Approximately 2,500 adults (ages 18-97) completed multiple study-test trials of a list of unrelated words. Consistent with past research, females outperformed males in the recall task. To assess whether sex differences in recall performance were attributable to differences in acquiring and/or retaining information, the data were analyzed at the individual item level to distinguish gains (i.e., items not recalled on Trial n that were recalled on Trial n+1) and losses (i.e., items recalled on Trial n that were not recalled on Trial n+1). Being a male, increased age, lower verbal episodic memory ability, and lower vocabulary ability were associated with smaller gains and greater losses. Even when controlling for the influence of other individual difference variables, being a male was still associated with fewer gains across the majority of trials. These results suggest that one factor contributing to sex differences in recall performance are differences in acquiring new items rather than differences in retaining information across trials.     

Prediction of wins and losses in a series of field hockey games: A study of probability assessment quality and cognitive information-processing models of players

The ability of players in a competitive team sport to assess win/loss probabilities, and the role that feedback plays in improving the quality of their assessments are the major foci of this study. The paper describes a study of sequential probability assessments by members of a women's field hockey team participating in a championship series. Several classes of cognitive models of probability revision were postulated and tested. The results of the paper indicate that (1) players generally attain a high level of calibration in their assessments, (2) their assessments are reliable and of high quality, (3) those who systematically and sensitively revise their probabilities attain, on average, significantly higher quality forecasts than those who are more conservative in responding to feedback scores, and (4) most of those who systematically revise their assessments in response to feedback scores appear to employ myopic models utilizing information about only one team—either their own or their opponents.     

Repetition of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ responses with a different number of response alternatives in study and test trial

The reinforcement values of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ upon subsequent repetition of the response have been explained by the subject's independent memory for his previous response and its outcome ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Detailed analyses on the data of recent experiments suggest that an increasing number of response alternatives for each stimulus makes the recall of the response and the outcome ‘right’ no longer independent. Therefore it was predicted that for a given number of response alternatives at the Test Trial, the likelihood that a subject will repeat a response called ‘right’ at the study Trial will be a function of the number of response alternatives at the Study Trial. The results were confirmatory. The explanation of these results was based on there being a larger informational value in the outcome ‘right’ with an increasing number of response alternatives.     

Responding to Feedback after Multiple-choice Answers: The Influence of Response Confidence

A model is proposed that describes how people choose multiple-choice answers and deal with subsequent feedback. Central to the model is the construct of likelihood, a signal that: (1) indexes the match between task demands and what is known, (2) gives a basis for decisions, and (3) is estimated by response confidence ratings. In two experiments, subjects answered an item, rated confidence, and studied feedback (for 100 items), and then answered the items again. All predictions of the model were confirmed. Specifically, for right/wrong feedback messages, feedback study intervals were longer after correct than incorrect choices (for correct choices, these intervals decreased as confidence increased). Also, there was no relation between the probability of correcting errors and level of confidence. For feedback messages that consisted of an item with correct alternative marked, there was a positive relation between probability of correcting errors and level of confidence.     

Factorial effects in the categorization of externally distributed stimulus samples

On each trial a sample point randomly drawn from one of two normal probability distributions was exhibited to S, who had to guess whether the sample was a “1” or a “2.” He was then given feedback, which was determined by which of the two distributions the sample point derived from. Two continua were employed: dot position on a file card, and groyness of square in. patches. Three levels of d’ were employed. The function giving the probability of a response “1” for different sample values was sharper for the higher d’ conditions, and for the dot position continuum. Cessation of feedback resulted in improved performance for the low d’ condition. Incentive payoff, confidence ratings, and experimenter had virtually no effects on task performance.     

Comparisons of some learning models for response bias in signal detection

The effects of variations in signal probability and varying degrees of correct feedback on response bias were studied in a yes-no auditory signal detection task. The main finding was that the bias towards saying yes was an increasing function of the frequency of signal feedback events, but did not depend on the correctness of the feedback. Several learning models coupled with a simple psychophysical and decision model yielded predictions about overall biases and certain sequential statistics. Only one model, which can be decribed as an “informational” model, gave a good account of both observed overall biases and sequential statistics. This model assumes the observer’s response bias is strengthened for the feedback-reinforced response when the observer’s sensory information is ambiguous or is contradicted by the feedback information.     

Deficit in Response Inhibition in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Impact of Motivation?

To date, neuropsychological and psycho-physiological studies have revealed inconsistent results regarding an executive or motivational deficit explaining the response inhibition deficit in children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Research on differentiating neuropsychological processes in ADHD subtypes is still scarce. Therefore, the motivational impact on response inhibition among boys with ADHD was examined in this study. In the first study, 19 boys with ADHD-combined type (ADHD-C) and 19 age-matched healthy control subjects performed a modified Go/No-Go task with the following experimental conditions: neutral, auditory feedback, reward, response cost, and reward/response cost. Performance and physiological data (heart rate and skin conductance responses) were recorded. In a second study with the modified Go/No-Go task, data for six children with ADHD-C, six with ADHD-inattentive subtype (ADHD-I), and six healthy control subjects were compared. Neither of the two studies revealed group by condition interactions. In study 1, boys with ADHD-C generally made more commissions and omissions compared to the control group. However, feedback significantly improved the response inhibition in all children. The heart rate of all children was increased in the two conditions of reward and reward/response cost. Study 2 revealed that children with ADHD-I responded more slowly and showed increased reaction time variability compared to both other groups. The present study supports an executive rather than a motivational deficit in the response inhibition among children with ADHD-C, though further results also indicate the role of auditory feedback on response inhibition. Additionally, the findings support the differentiation of ADHD-C and ADHD-I, suggesting that ADHD-I children are characterized by a sluggish cognitive tempo.     

No source memory for unrecognized items when implicit feedback is avoided

In a recent empirical study, Starns, Hicks, Brown, and Martin (Memory & Cognition, 36, 1–8 2008) collected source judgments for old items that participants had claimed to be new and found residual source discriminability depending on the old-new response bias. The authors interpreted their finding as evidence in favor of the bivariate signal-detection model, but against the two-high-threshold model of item/source memory. According to the latter, new responses only follow from the state of old-new uncertainty for which no source discrimination is possible, and the probability of entering this state is independent of the old-new response bias. However, when missed old items were presented for source discrimination, the participants could infer that the items had been previously studied. To test whether this implicit feedback led to second retrieval attempts and thus to source memory for presumably unrecognized items, we replicated Starns et al.’s (Memory & Cognition, 36, 1–8 2008) finding and compared their procedure to a procedure without such feedback. Our results challenge the conclusion to abandon discrete processing in source memory; source memory for unrecognized items is probably an artifact of the procedure, by which implicit feedback prompts participants to reconsider their recognition judgment when asked to rate the source of old items in the absence of item memory.     

Verbal self-reports of delayed matching to sample by humans

Undergraduates participated in two experiments to develop methods for the experimental analysis of self-reports about behavior. The target behavior was the choice response in a delayed-matching-to-sample task in which monetary reinforcement was contingent upon both speed and accuracy of the choice. In Experiment 1, the temporal portion of the contingency was manipulated within each session, and the presence and absence of feedback about reinforcement was manipulated across sessions. As the time limits became stricter, target response speeds increased, but accuracy and reinforcement rates decreased. When feedback was withheld, further reductions in speed and reinforcement occurred, but only at the strictest time limit. Thus, the procedures were successful in producing systematic variation in the speed, accuracy, and reinforcement of the target behavior. Experiment 2 was designed to assess the influence of these characteristics on self-reports. In self-report conditions, each target response was followed by a computer-generated query: “Did you earn points?” The subject reported by pressing “Yes” or “No” buttons, with the sole consequence of advancing the session. In some cases, feedback about reinforcement of the target response followed the reports; in other cases it was withheld. Self-reports were less accurate when the target responses occurred under greater time pressure. When feedback was withheld, the speed of the target response influenced reports, in that the probability of a “Yes” report increased directly with the speed of accurate target responses. In addition, imposing the self-report procedure disrupted target performance by reducing response speeds at the strictest time limit. These results allow investigation of issues in both behavioral and cognitive psychology. More important, the overall order in the data suggests promise for the experimental analysis of self-reports by human subjects.     

Children’s Feedback Preferences in Response to an Experimentally Manipulated Peer Evaluation Outcome: The Role of Depressive Symptoms

The present study examined the linkage between pre-adolescent children's depressive symptoms and their preferences for receiving positive vs. negative feedback subsequent to being faced with an experimentally manipulated peer evaluation outcome in real time. Participants (n = 142) ages 10 to 13, played a computer contest based on the television show Survivor and were randomized to either a peer rejection (i.e., receiving the lowest total 'likeability' score from a group of peer-judges), a peer success (i.e., receiving the highest score), or a control peer evaluation condition. Children's self-reported feedback preferences were then assessed. Results revealed that participants assigned to the negative evaluation outcome, relative to either the success or the control outcome, showed a significantly higher subsequent preference for negatively tuned feedback. Contrary to previous work and predictions derived from self-verification theory, children higher in depressive symptoms were only more likely to prefer negative feedback in response to the negative peer evaluation outcome. These effects for depression were not accounted for by either state mood at baseline or mood change in response to the feedback manipulation.     

Item-specific congruency effects in nonverbal auditory Stroop

In the current study, participants judged as 'low' or 'high' either the location or the frequency of a single tone presented in one of two locations at one of two frequencies. The classification associated with the irrelevant feature could be either congruent or incongruent with the required response. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that responses were made more slowly on incongruent than on congruent trials, regardless of whether participants judged sounds according to their location or their pitch. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the probability that the classification associated with the irrelevant acoustic feature was consistent with the classification associated with the task-relevant dimension. In this experiment responses were made more quickly on congruent trials when the response associated with the irrelevant feature was likely to be consistent with the required response, and on incongruent trials when the response associated with the irrelevant feature was likely to be inconsistent with the required response.     

Optimal classifier feedback improves cost-benefit but not base-rate decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

Unequal payoffs engender separate reward- and accuracy-maximizing decision criteria; unequal base rates do not. When payoffs are unequal, observers place greater emphasis on accuracy than is optimal. This study compares objective classifier (the objectively correct response) with optimal classifier feedback (the optimal classifier's response) when payoffs or base rates are unequal. It provides a critical test of Maddox and Bohil's (1998) competition between reward and accuracy maximization (COBRA) hypothesis, comparing it with a competition between reward and probability matching (COBRM) and a competition between reward and equal response frequencies (COBRE) hypothesis. The COBRA prediction that optimal classifier feedback leads to better decision criterion leaning relative to objective classifier feedback when payoffs are unequal, but not when base rates are unequal, was supported. Model-based analyses suggested that the weight placed on accuracy was reduced for optimal classifier feedback relative to objective classifier feedback. In addition, delayed feedback affected learning of the reward-maximizing decision criterion.     

Repeated magnitude estimations with a variable standard: Sequential effects and other properties

Twelve Ss made magnitude estimations of the loudness of each one of a sequence of pure tones according to the rule R(N) = R(N - 1) · [S(N)/S(N - 1)], where R(N) is the response on Trial N, R(N - 1) is the response on Trial N - 1, and S(N)/S(N - 1) is the judged ratio of the “loudness” of the pure tone presented on Trial N to that of the pure tone presented on Trial N - 1. It was found that these magnitude estimations were assimilated toward the immediately preceding stimuli as far as five trials back in the sequence of stimuli. In addition, ratio judgments were consistently asymmetric and the data displayed a form of “time order error.” In all cases, there are similar effects displayed in category judgment data. These and other data imply that at least some kinds of magnitude estimations may involve a judgment of the “difference” or “distance” between pairs of stimuli as a first step in the production of the response required by the judgment situation.     

Effect of performance and state orientation on achievement and attention indicators in a simple stimulus-response task with and without performance feedback

In formulating his theory of action control, Kuhl (1983) proposed two motivational states: action orientation and state orientation. People who are action oriented are able to ignore all informations in concrete situations which are irrelevant with regard to the preferred goals. Persons who are state oriented tend to focus sooner on the outlast aspects of a special state. Kuhl introduced a questionnaire HAKEMP to record these tendencies. Further on, there occurs the general assumption that in a particular state of state orientation, people have only a limited processing capacity for given tasks. This hypothesis was tested in an experiment (n = 88) with a stimulus-reaction task. The conditions were varied by the type of the task (fixed or variable stimulus interval) and feedback for the subjects' ability to react. It was expected that for the fixed stimulus interval condition, state-oriented people would be less efficient than action-oriented subjects; with feedback there should be increasing results. The experiment however, shows no significant difference between the performance of state- and action-oriented subjects. These results are discussed in relation to modifications of the HAKEMP questionnaire.     

A re‐examination of probability matching and rational choice

In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high‐payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. We report three experiments on this choice anomaly using a simple probability learning task in which participants were provided with (i) large financial incentives, (ii) meaningful and regular feedback, and (iii) extensive training. In each experiment large proportions of participants adopted the optimal response strategy and all three of the factors mentioned above contributed to this. The results are supportive of rational choice theory. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some evidence on additive learning models

Deterministic and probabilistic additive learning models forsignal detection/recognition replace the fixed criterion of classical detection models with one which shifts from trial to trial in the light of the preceding trial events. Data from a sinusoid in noise detection task without feedback and an auditory amplitude recognition task with feedback are used to test these models with respect to their predictions about asymptotic response frequency, and, where possible, by likelihood ratio tests. These and some previous experiments show that whether or not feedback is given subjects do not universally probability match, overmatch, undermatch, or keep response probability constant over discriminability, so that none of the testable special models can fit more than a proportion of subjects. The likelihood ratio tests confirm this conclusion for the special deterministic models. The six-parameter general deterministic model does nonsignificantly better than an ad hoc six-parameter response runs model in fitting the recognition data and significantly better than the five-parameter memory recognition model of Tanner, Rauk, andAtkinson (1970). Monte Carlo methods are used to confirm the applicability of asymptotic response frequency results to practically feasible sample sizes.     

Role of response imagery on stimulus recognition*

This experiment investigated the role of response imagery on recognition of stimulus terms following associative training. Ss learned to associate 12 high-imagery or low-imagery responses with trigram stimuli by the study-associative matching procedure. Half the pairs were consistently paired and half were re-paired anew on each trial. Following associative training, Ss were given a stimulus recognition and an associative matching task The results indicated that the probability of stimulus recognition, given correct associative matching, was greater when the responses were high-imagery rather than low-imagery. In contrast, no rehable response imagery effects were found for the probability of stimulus recognition, given incorrect associative matching. It was argued that the locus of the response imagery effect was primarily during retrieval rather than during encoding.