Structuring information interfaces for procedural learning

Interface design should be informed by the application of top-down cognitive principles derived from basic theory and research. Cognitive design principles from 2 domains, event cognition and media, were applied to the design of interfaces for teaching procedures. According to theories of event cognition, procedures should be presented hierarchically, organized by objects or large object parts and actions on objects. According to research on effects of media, adding appropriate graphics to text instructions can facilitate learning and memory. These principles were partially supported in 2 tasks: assembling a musical instrument and building a model. Although both top-down principles were effective in guiding interface design, they were not sufficient. They can be combined with iterative bottom-up methods to produce usable interfaces.     

Five-month-old infants know humans are solid, like inanimate objects

Infants know that humans are exempt from some of the principles that govern the motion of inanimate objects: for instance, humans can be caused to move without being struck. In the current study, we report that infants nevertheless do apply some of the same principles to both humans and objects, where appropriate. Five-month-old infants expect humans, like all material objects, to be solid.     

Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world

The universality, invariance, and elegance of principles governing the universe may be reflected in principles of the minds that have evolved in that universe--provided that the mental principles are formulated with respect to the abstract spaces appropriate for the representation of biologically significant objects and their properties. (1) Positions and motions of objects conserve their shapes in the geometrically fullest and simplest way when represented as points and connecting geodesic paths in the six-dimensional manifold jointly determined by the Euclidean group of three-dimensional space and the symmetry group of each object. (2) Colors of objects attain constancy when represented as points in a three-dimensional vector space in which each variation in natural illumination is canceled by application of its inverse from the three-dimensional linear group of terrestrial transformations of the invariant solar source. (3) Kinds of objects support optimal generalization and categorization when represented, in an evolutionarily-shaped space of possible objects, as connected regions with associated weights determined by Bayesian revision of maximum-entropy priors.     

Children's reasoning about physics within and across ontological kinds

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.     

Object-based attention in Chinese readers of Chinese words: Beyond Gestalt principles

Most object-based attention studies use objects defined bottom-up by Gestalt principles. In the present study, we defined objects top-down, using Chinese words that were seen as objects by skilled readers of Chinese. Using a spatial cuing paradigm, we found that a target character was detected faster if it was in the same word as the cued character than if it was in a different word. Because there were no bottom-up factors that distinguished the words, these results showed that objects defined by subjects' knowledge--in this case, lexical information--can also constrain the deployment of attention.     

Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world

The universality, invariance, and elegance of principles governing the universe may be reflected in principles of the minds that have evolved in that universe—provided that the mental principles are formulated with respect to the abstract spaces appropriate for the representation of biologically significant objects and their properties. (1)Positions andmotions of objects conserve theirshapes in the geometrically fullest and simplest way when represented as points and connecting geodesic paths in the six-dimensional manifold jointly determined by the Euclidean group of three-dimensional space and the symmetry group of each object. (2)Colors of objects attain constancy when represented as points in a three-dimensional vector space in which each variation in natural illumination is cancelled by application of its inverse from the three-dimensional linear group of terrestrial transformations of the invariant solar source. (3)Kinds of objects support optimal generalization and categorization when represented, in an evolutionarily shaped space of possible objects, as connected regions with associated weights determined by Bayesian revision of maximum-entropy priors.     

First Principles Organize Attention to and Learning About Relevant Data: Number and the Animate-Inanimate Distinction as Examples

Early cognitive development benefits from nonlinguistic representations of skeletal sets of domain-specific principles and complementary domain-relevant data abstraction processes. The principles outline the domain, identify relevant inputs, and structure coherently what is learned. Knowledge acquisition within the domain is a joint function of such domain-specific principles and domain-general learning mechanisms. Two examples of early learning illustrate this. Skeletal preverbal counting principles help children sort different linguistic strings into those that function as the conventional count-word as opposed to labels for objects in the child's linguistic community. Skeletal causal principles, working with complementary perceptual processes that abstract information about biological and nonbiological conditions and patterns of movement, lead to the rapid acquisition of knowledge about the animate-inanimate distinction. By 3 years of age children con soy whether photographs of unfamiliar nonmammalian animals, mammals, statues, and wheeled objects portray objects capable or incapable of self-generated motion. They also generate answers to questions about the insides of animate items more readily than ones about the insides of inanimate items. Although these children already ore articulate about matters relevant to a theory of action, their limited knowledge of growth illustrates that early skeletal principles do not rule out the need to acquire new principles, in this case ones that underlie a biological account of animacy (Carey, 1985).     

Perceptual organization influences visual working memory

Previous studies have demonstrated that top-down factors can bias the storage of information in visual working memory. However, relatively little is known about the role that bottom-up stimulus characteristics play in visual working memory storage. In the present study, subjects performed a change detection task in which the to-be-remembered objects were organized in accordance with Gestalt grouping principles. When an attention-capturing cue was presented at the location of one object, other objects that were perceptually grouped with the cued object were more likely to be stored in working memory than were objects that were not grouped with the cued object. Thus, objects that are grouped together tend to be stored together, indicating that bottom-up perceptual organization influences the storage of information in visual working memory.     

METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORDINARY OBJECTS

Several prominent attacks on the objects of 'folk ontology' argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be 'rivals' of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, 'nothing over and above' appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles.     

How an unfamiliar thing should be called

An empirical method is described to derive good names for unfamiliar objects. It is based on three principles: (1) The names should be within users' linguistic capacities; (2) names should be informationally efficient; (3) names should form a classification system. The principles lead to a three-step method: (1) Subjects generate names for the objects; (2) a subset of the names, which fulfills the principles, is selected; (3) how good the names are is tested by matching and recall tasks. Steps 2 and 3 are iterated to improve the nnames. The names that result are natural, short, easily matched with their physical referents, and well recalled. The method is generalizable and ought to be useful in a large variety of situations where names for unfamiliar objects are needed.This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research Contract No. N00014-78-C-0433 to the first author. This report is No. 111 of the Institute of Cognitive Science's Technical Report Series.     

Phenomenological Naturalism

Naturalists seek to ground what exists in a set of fundamental metaphysical principles that they call ‘nature’. But metaphysical principles can’t function as fundamental explanatory grounds, since their ability to explain anything depends on the intelligibility granted by transcendental structures. What makes metaphysical principles intelligible, what unifies them, and allows them to characterize the being of worldly objects are the transcendental structures through which worldly objects are manifest. This means that the search for fundamental explanatory grounds must go deeper than the postulation of brute metaphysical facts. But this search cannot end with transcendental structures either, since the mode of being of transcendental subjects also calls out for explanation. Conceiving of transcendental subjects through the concept of being-in-the-world ties the mode of being of subjects to the world they inhabit. What grounds the existence of worldly objects, and what grounds our existence as being-in-the-world is nature: a principle that is neither an object, nor a subject – a principle that makes possible our encounters with intelligible worldly things.     

Blind children recognizing tactile pictures respond like sighted children given guidance in exploration

Theory of tactile pictures argues that untrained blind subjects can recognize raised, outline pictures. It contends the blind person’s knowledge of the shapes of common objects is like that of the sighted, and the blind person’s pictorial abilities use the same principles as the sighted person’s. To test this theory, blind children (aged 8–13) and blindfolded age-matched sighted children were asked to identify raised-line drawings of common objects. Their performances were correlated. In addition, the blind children identified more than sighted children exploring the pictures actively, but the same number of pictures as sighted children who were given passive, guided exploration. We argue blind and sighted children use the same principles to identify the pictures, but the blind have superior exploration skills. The differences in the effects of exploration skills on recognition scores are minimized when the sighted children are given guidance, since the sighted children then have efficient contact with the displays, and the performance of the sighted and the blind is then governed by the same principles, without one group benefitting from advantages in exploration skills.     

Neologicist Nominalism

The goal is to sketch a nominalist approach to mathematics which just like neologicism employs abstraction principles, but unlike neologicism is not committed to the idea that mathematical objects exist and does not insist that abstraction principles establish the reference of abstract terms. It is well-known that neologicism runs into certain philosophical problems and faces the technical difficulty of finding appropriate acceptability criteria for abstraction principles. I will argue that a modal and iterative nominalist approach to abstraction principles circumvents those difficulties while still being able to put abstraction principles to a foundational use.     

Do 5-month-old infants see humans as material objects?

Infants expect objects to be solid and cohesive, and to move on continuous paths through space. In this study, we examine whether infants understand that human beings are material objects, subject to these same principles. We report that 5-month-old infants apply the constraint of continuous motion to inanimate blocks, but not to people. This suggests that young infants have two separate modes of construal: one for inanimate objects and another for humans.     

Knowledge of counting principles: How relevant is order irrelevance?

Most children who are older than 6 years of age apply essential counting principles when they enumerate a set of objects. Essential principles include (a) one-to-one correspondence between items and count words, (b) stable order of the count words, and (c) cardinality—that the last number refers to numerosity. We found that the acquisition of a fourth principle, that the order in which items are counted is irrelevant, follows a different trajectory. The majority of 5- to 11-year-olds indicated that the order in which objects were counted was relevant, favoring a left-to-right, top-to-bottom order of counting. Only some 10- and 11-year-olds applied the principle of order irrelevance, and this knowledge was unrelated to their numeration skill. We conclude that the order irrelevance principle might not play an important role in the development of children’s conceptual knowledge of counting.     

Hume’s Big Brother: counting concepts and the bad company objection

A number of formal constraints on acceptable abstraction principles have been proposed, including conservativeness and irenicity. Hume’s Principle, of course, satisfies these constraints. Here, variants of Hume’s Principle that allow us to count concepts instead of objects are examined. It is argued that, prima facie, these principles ought to be no more problematic than HP itself. But, as is shown here, these principles only enjoy the formal properties that have been suggested as indicative of acceptability if certain constraints on the size of the continuum hold. As a result, whether or not these higher-order versions of Hume’s Principle are acceptable seems to be independent of standard (ZFC) set theory. This places the abstractionist in an uncomfortable dilemma: Either there is some inherent difference between counting objects and counting concepts, or new criteria for acceptability will need to be found. It is argued that neither horn looks promising.     

Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are subject to different composition principles. I argue that he is mistaken on both counts.     

A Meinongian Way out of the Polish Proofs Against General Objects

The triangle in general or the man as such are general objects. These are objects that possess the properties common to all the individual objects in their range. Stanis?aw Le?niewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński, two Polish philosophers and logicians belonging to the Lvov-Warsaw School, produced several proofs aiming to show that such objects are impossible because the principles that govern them lead to a contradiction. In this paper I first clarify the structure of their proofs. Then I suggest a way to elude their conclusion. In order to do that I use two Meinongian distinctions: the distinction between complete and incomplete objects, on the one hand, and the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, on the other hand. I claim first that general objects are incomplete objects, i.e. they do not satisfy the ontological principle of the excluded middle, and second that the principle that governs the relations between the properties of general objects and the properties of the individual objects in their range should be restricted to nuclear properties.     

Composition as pattern

Philosophical Studies - I argue for patternism, a new answer to the question of when some objects compose a whole. None of the standard principles of composition comfortably capture our natural...     

Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: a Response to Olson

Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show that the differences are not at all inexplicable once it is recognized that the conditions for a persisting object to be composed by certain particles at a moment of time must involve facts concerning other moments of time, and that the relevant facts are different for persisting objects of different kinds. Philosophers who neglect this sort of constraint on composition principles may be said to be victims of the 'cinematographic fallacy'.