How smart do you need to be to get it wrong? The role of cognitive capacity in the development of heuristic-based judgment

We examined the relationship between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding on four types of reasoning and decision-making tasks. A total of 84 children, between 5 years 2 months and 11 years 7 months of age, participated in the study. There was a marked increase in heuristic responding with age that was related to increases in cognitive capacity. These findings are inconsistent with the predominant dual-process accounts of reasoning and decision making as applied to development. We offer an alternative explanation of the findings, considering them in the context of recent claims concerning the role of working memory in contextualized reasoning.     

Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

The relationships among cognitive development,locus of control,and gender

Research has shown that perhaps 50% of all adults in this country are not able to perform abstract reasoning tasks described as formal opertions in the Piagetian cognitive developmental framework. Abstract reasoning is related to an individual's ability to perceive contingencies between their actions and subsequent outcomes. This pattern is seen as crucial for the development of an internal locus of control. Fifty-eight male and female undergraduates completed the Rotter Internal-External scale and a Cognitive Developmental Level assessment. For women, a highly significant inverse relationship was demonstrated between cognitive developmental level and locus of control. Women with higher levels of cognitive development were more likely to be internal. For men, no such relationship was found. Such results suggest that locus of control develops differently in men and women.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Links between cognitive distortions and cognitive emotion regulation strategies in non-clinical young adulthood

Cognitive Processing - This study examined the possible link between cognitive distortions (CDs), which involve erroneous information processing in normal reasoning, and cognitive emotion...     

Automatic–heuristic and executive–analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

A functional approach for research on cognitive control: Analysing cognitive control tasks and their effects in terms of operant conditioning

Cognitive control is an important mental ability that is examined using a multitude of cognitive control tasks and effects. The present paper presents the first steps in the elaboration of a functional approach, which aims to uncover the communalities and differences between different cognitive control tasks and their effects. Based on the idea that responses in cognitive control tasks qualify as operant behaviour, we propose to reinterpret cognitive control tasks in terms of operant contingencies and cognitive control effects as instances of moderated stimulus control. We illustrate how our approach can be used to uncover communalities between topographically different cognitive control tasks and can lead to novel questions about the processes underlying cognitive control.     

不同类型数学任务的PASS认知加工发展特点

PASS理论是由Das和Naglieri提出的关于智力理论的一种认知过程理论。研究采用以PASS理论为基础编制而成的认知评估系统（第二版简版,CAS-2B）为研究工具,选取226名二年级、四年级以及七年级的学生,探讨PASS过程在数学计算流畅性,数学问题解决及数学推理等不同数学任务中的作用。研究结果显示：PASS模型各过程在三个年级的不同数学任务上各有侧重。在数学推理任务中,同时性加工对三个年级的数学推理任务预测显著,解释率为15%~17%,注意过程只在二年级对学生的数学推理任务预测;在数学计算流畅性任务中,注意过程随着年级的升高,其预测作用逐渐减退,解释率为5%~24%,计划功能的作用随年级的升高而逐渐突显;在数学问题解决任务中,继时性加工与注意功能对二年级预测显著,四年级时突显了计划和同时性加工的作用。不同复杂性的数学任务具有不同的认知特点,编码加工过程对于较复杂数学任务作用明显;计划与注意过程对简单数学任务作用明显。研究结果为今后不同年级学生开展有针对性的数学学习训练提供了理论基础。     

Theory-of-mind, cognitive development, and children's interpretation of anxiety-related physical symptoms

The present study investigated developmental patterns in children's interpretation of anxiety-related physical symptoms and emotional reasoning, and to what extent these phenomena are influenced by children's level of cognitive development. A large sample of 4-13-year-old children (N=358) were exposed to vignettes in which the presence and absence of physical symptoms was systematically varied. In addition, children completed a series of conservation tasks and a theory-of-mind-test. Results demonstrated that from the age of 7, children were increasingly able to link physical symptoms to anxiety. Furthermore, cognitive development appeared to enhance children's ability to interpret physical symptoms as a sign of anxiety. Further, children's tendency to infer danger from vignettes with physical symptoms (i.e., emotional reasoning) was already prominent in 4-6-year-olds. The implications for physical symptom-based theories of childhood anxiety are briefly discussed.     

The influence of alcohol and loud music on analytic and holistic processing

The influence of alcohol and loud music on analytic versus holistic processing was examined in classification, concept learning, and embedded figures tasks. In the classification task, loud music reduced analytic responding by individuals who had consumed alcohol and increased analytic responding by individuals who had received placebo drinks. Alcohol also decreased the speed with which individuals were able to generate analytic responses in the classification task and decreased analytic performance on the embedded figures test. Alcohol slowed the rate of learning in the concept-learning task but did not lead to less analytic responding in that task. The results are consistent with the idea that alcohol slows the rate of information processing, particularly in tasks requiring visual analysis of stimuli.     

Stress-related cognitive interference predicts cognitive function in old age

Both subjective distress and cognitive interference have been proposed as mechanisms underlying the negative effects of stress on cognition. Studies of aging have shown that distress is associated with lower cognitive performance, but none have examined the effects of cognitive interference. One hundred eleven older adults (M-sub(age)=80) completed measures of working memory, processing speed, and episodic memory as well as self-report measures of subjective distress and cognitive interference. Cognitive interference was strongly associated with poorer performance on all 3 cognitive constructs, whereas distress was only modestly associated with lower working memory. The results suggest that cognitive process related to stress is an important predictor of cognitive function in advanced age.     

Authoritarianism and its relationship with intuitive-experiential cognitive style and heuristic processing

Two studies examined the relationship between authoritarianism, cognitive style and heuristic processing. Focusing on Epstein’s (2003) cognitive-experiential self-theory, Study 1 shows that authoritarianism is related to Epstein’s dimension of faith in intuition, but not need for cognition, even when controlling for individual differences in need for structure. Study 2 confirms that authoritarianism is related to greater heuristic processing. The discussion suggests ways in which individual differences in cognitive style and heuristic processing may account for established effects of authoritarianism.     

The association between change in cognitive ability and cause-specific mortality in a community sample of older adults

While there is consistent evidence that initial levels of cognitive ability predict mortality, there is mixed evidence for a relationship between changes in cognition and mortality. There have been few studies that have examined whether the level and slope of cognitive performance is predictive of subsequent mortality from all causes or from cardiovascular disease, stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease, or cancer. This study aimed to assess whether the level and slope of cognitive ability were associated with all-cause or cause-specific mortality. A cohort of 896 community-based elderly people in Australia was interviewed four times over 12 years, with vital status followed for up to 17 years. Of these, 592 participants completed two or more interviews and were included in survival models of six mortality outcomes. Cognitive change in five domains of ability was estimated using latent growth models. Poorer initial processing speed or verbal fluency was significantly associated with greater all-cause and/or cardiovascular mortality. In addition, declines in global ability were associated with greater all-cause, cardiovascular, and heart disease mortality. Vocabulary and episodic memory were not associated with mortality, and none of the cognitive tests significantly predicted respiratory or cancer mortality. Initial levels of cognitive ability tended to be better predictors of subsequent mortality than were changes in ability. The results suggest that vascular events may be largely responsible for the overall relationship between cognition and mortality.     

分析性认知风格对偏差反应与冲突探查的影响

采用2Wingdings 2MC@2Wingdings 2MC@2混合设计和相关分析法,考察个体的分析性认知风格对其在完成有、无冲突的推理判断任务时的逻辑反应倾向和冲突探查过程的影响。结果表明分析性认知风格不会直接影响被试完成推理任务的逻辑反应倾向性,高、低分析性认知风格倾向组被试在逻辑反应正确率上不存在显著差异; 但对个体的冲突探查过程会有影响,高、低认知风格倾向组被试在反应自信率上存在显著差异,且冲突探查大小与分析性认知风格显著负相关,这一结果表明那些高分析性认知风格倾向的个体在完成冲突任务时,更可能探查到刻板反应与遵从逻辑规则做出的反应之间的冲突。     

Influences of credibility of testimony and strength of statistical evidence on children’s and adolescents’ reasoning

According to dual-process models that include analytic and heuristic modes of processing, analytic processing is often expected to become more common with development. Consistent with this view, on reasoning problems, adolescents are more likely than children to select alternatives that are backed by statistical evidence. It is shown here that this pattern depends on the quality of the statistical evidence and the quality of the testimonial that is the typical alternative to statistical evidence. In Experiment 1, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 64) were presented with scenarios in which solid statistical evidence was contrasted with casual or expert testimonial evidence. When testimony was casual, children relied on it but adolescents did not; when testimony was expert, both children and adolescents relied on it. In Experiment 2, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 83) were presented with scenarios in which casual testimonial evidence was contrasted with weak or strong statistical evidence. When statistical evidence was weak, children and adolescents relied on both testimonial and statistical evidence; when statistical evidence was strong, most children and adolescents relied on it. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for dual-process accounts of cognitive development.     

小学儿童一维空间方位传递性推理能力的发展

研究了小学儿童一维空间方位传递性推理能力的发展水平及认知策略 ,同时 ,对心理模型理论进行了检验。被试为城市中等小学 7岁、9岁、11岁儿童各 2 4名 ,男女各半。 4种实验任务分别为三前提单模型、三前提双模型、四前提单模型和四前提双模型。采用个别实验 ,儿童在前提呈现的情况下进行推理。主要研究结果 :(1)从小学 7岁到 11岁 ,儿童的一维空间方位传递性推理能力明显提高 ,7岁儿童初步形成了一维空间方位推理能力 ,9岁和 11岁基本具有了这种能力 ;(2 )随着年龄增长 ,使用模型建构策略解决问题的儿童人次越来越多 ,绝大部分 11岁儿童都能使用这一策略进行推理。但即使儿童使用了模型建构策略 ,他们的推理成绩也没有反映出模型数量所造成的任务难度差异 ,即不符合心理模型理论关于模型数量的主要预期。     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications

In this paper, I discuss the current state of theorising about dual processes in adult performance on reasoning and decision making tasks, in which Type 1 intuitive processing is distinguished from Type 2 reflective thinking. I show that there are many types of theory some of which distinguish modes rather than types of thinking and that assumptions about underlying cognitive architecture vary. I show that some dual-system theories have been replaced recently by the idea that we have two or more distinct ‘minds’ with different evolutionary histories. I also present the most recent formulation of my own account of dual processing within hypothetical thinking theory, at a level more easily applied to performance on specific tasks. I then consider implications for cognitive development, pointing out that while Type 2 thinking is clearly linked to the development of cognitive ability, it combines and competes with multiple Type 1 processing systems which persist in adult cognition, each of which could have their own developmental time course. Hence, while dual-process theories can and should inspire much research and theory in cognitive development, the derivation of predictions for cognitive development is far from straightforward.     

Common and specific cognitive deficits in schizophrenia: relationships to function

The goals of the present study were to assess the interrelationships among tasks from the MATRICS and CNTRACS batteries, to determine the degree to which tasks from each battery capture unique variance in cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia, and to determine the ability of tasks from each battery to predict functional outcome. Subjects were 104 schizophrenia patients and 132 healthy control subjects recruited as part of the CNTRACS initiative. All subjects completed four CNTRACS tasks and two tasks from the MATRICS battery: Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia Symbol Coding and the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test. Functional outcome was also assessed in the schizophrenia subjects. In both the patient and control groups, we found significant intercorrelations between all higher order cognitive tasks (episodic memory, goal maintenance, processing speed, verbal learning) but minimal relationships with the visual task. For almost all tasks, scores were significantly related to measures of functional outcome, with higher associations between CNTRACS tasks and performance-based measures of function and between one of the MATRICS tasks and self-reported functioning, relative to the other functioning measures. After regressing out variance shared by other tasks, we continued to observe group differences in performance among task residuals, particularly for measures of episodic memory from both batteries, although these residuals did not correlate as robustly with functional outcome as raw test scores. These findings suggest that there exists both shared and specific variance across cognitive tasks related to cognitive and functional impairments in schizophrenia and that measures derived from cognitive neuroscience can predict functional capacity and status in schizophrenia.     

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.     

Neurobehavioral and psychosocial functioning of women exposed to high altitude in mountaineering

The effects of chronic hypoxemia upon cognition and behavior were studied in women exposed to high altitude in mountaineering. Neuropsychological tests and psychosocial and physiological questionnaires were given to eight women before, during, and immediately after a Himalayan climb to 20,500 feet. Cognitive functioning remained relatively intact with only two significant decrements, complex abstract reasoning and word-finding ability. Significant changes were found on all psychosocial and physiological questionnaires. Feelings of acceptance of others and anxiety declined significantly. Physical symptoms were greatest during the first five days of ascent. Subjects' self-ratings of mental functioning were significantly better after the expedition than either before or during the climb. Self-assessments were correlated with emotions and physical symptoms, not with actual performances on the test battery. It is suggested that complex cognitive tasks and psychosocial functioning be studied in more detail as these were more influenced by exposure to high altitude in mountaineering.