“Motority” in three functional domains of word meaning

This article deals with relations between mental motor evoking capacity (motority, Putnoky, 1975a, b) and the sensory and affective connotations, as well as certain denotations, of words. Sensory connotation is indexed by degree of visual auditory, and tactual imagery, as assessed on a 7-point scale, while affective connotation is indexed by the usual three factors tapped by the semantic differential. The aspect of denotation used here is the abstractness value of words, also based on rating by scales. The general conclusions about motority are as follows: (1) the finding that its sensory connotations are mainly via theauditory modality of imagery, and especially in correlation with abstract words, suggests that it has a specific function that may have originated in the processing of heard language; (2) it correlates with thepotency andactivity factors of affective connotation, which suggests the existence of a nonspecific function or component in it; (3) correlations with abstractness reflect that motority must have a denotative function or component, especially in case of abstract verbal stimuli. On the basis of the results, motority is supposed to play a regulative role at higher levels of the organization of word meaning in particular.Computation of SD data was carried out under the direction and according to the programming of Professor William H. May in the Center for Comparative Psycholinguistics (Director: Charles E. Osgood), University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, with support provided by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH 07705) and National Science Foundation (NSF GS 360 and 2012-X).     

Are you afraid of the dark? Notes on the psychology of belief in histories of science and the occult

Abstract

The popular view of the inherent conflict between science and the occult has been rendered obsolete by recent advances in the history of science. Yet, these historiographical revisions have gone unnoticed in the public understanding of science and public education at large. Particularly, reconstructions of the formation of modern psychology and its links to psychical research can show that the standard view of the latter as motivated by metaphysical bias fails to stand up to scrutiny. After highlighting certain basic methodological maxims shared by psychotherapists and historians, I will try to counterbalance simplistic claims of a ‘need to believe’ as a precondition of scientific open-mindedness regarding the occurrence of parapsychological phenomena by discussing instances revealing a presumably widespread ‘will to disbelieve’ in the occult. I shall argue that generalized psychological explanations are only helpful in our understanding of history if we apply them in a symmetrical manner.     

Speaking in stone — On the meaning of architecture in the Middle Ages

Architecture has often served a variety of purposes in addition to that of mere functionality. Different categories of meanings can be distinguished. In this essay some aspects of political meaning in medieval architecture will be discussed. The architecture of churches commissioned for instance by bishops, archbishops, provosts or other high-ranking clerical patrons was often used to express views about the status and position of both patron and institution. Rivalling patrons could copy those parts of each other's churches that were considered essential and characteristic. Buildings were thus often symbols, not only of the Church and of Heavenly Jerusalem, but also of an idealized history and an aspired status and position.     

The “Feeling of Movement”: Notes on the Rorschach Human Movement Response

Human movement responses (M) on the Rorschach have been traditionally viewed as lying neither completely in the inkblot (external reality) nor within the subject's mind (inner world). The authors contend that M is not reducible to the “body that I have” but to the “body that I am,” which is a higher level organization of bottom-up and top-down brain networks, integrating body implicit awareness, psychological functioning, and social cognition. Two sources of evidence suggest the close relationship among M, psychological functions, and brain mechanisms. One comes from meta-analytical evidence supporting the close association between M and higher level cognitive functioning or empathy. The second comes from some preliminary studies showing that M activates brain circuits included in the mirror neuron system (MNS). Two conclusions can be drawn: (a) M is related to the effective use of the mentalization function; and (b) future neuroscientific investigations could lead to an understanding of the neuropsychological mechanisms underlying Rorschach responses and variables.     

The meaning of “Evolution”

In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars.     

‘Paralysed associations’: countertransference difficulties in recognising meaning in the treatment of children on the autistic spectrum

Children with autism can have a paralysing effect on the clinician’s capacity to associate freely: connections that seem obvious on reflection may be impossible to notice in the child’s presence. The author argues that this situation can be reached by more than one pathway, and that the degree of the child’s bodily and emotional cohesion is an important factor. Children may seek to immobilise the therapist’s thought processes through projective identification, whether to communicate their own experience of paralysis or because these thought processes are equated with a parental intercourse that produces a ‘baby’ (as described by Bion and Britton). Vignettes are offered to illustrate how the therapist may be nudged into overlooking this baby as well as a potentially growing part of the child that is identified with it, with important consequences for development. A second possible pathway appears to involve the much more primitive mechanism of adhesive identification, in which the child’s sense of continuing existence depends on sticking to the therapist’s surface and any movement can lead to a sense of bodily disintegration. In the clinical illustration, the therapist felt physically constrained and unable to recognise links in the material: it is suggested that this was in resonance with the child’s fear that movement, whether physical or mental, meant losing parts of his body and must be avoided at all costs. These levels can mask each other, and it seems essential to attend to both in order to avoid impasse or the overlooking of essential aspects of the child’s experience.     

On the problem of the meaning of life in ��Chinese Philosophy��

The goal of “(modern) Chinese Philosophy” established during the period of the May 4th Movement is to reestablish the meaning of life for Chinese people. However, because it takes the approach of interpreting Chinese thinking through a Western lens, thus forming a discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” which is only capable of manifesting Western culture, “Chinese Philosophy” is made logically impossible as the ideological source from which modern Chinese thinkers could construct the meaning of life. The ideological source of the still lasting traditional lifestyle is Yili Xue 义理学 (The Learning of Righteousness and Principles); whereas that of modern life, which was established as an imitation of the West, is Western culture. Neither of them takes “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. Therefore, “Chinese Philosophy” is excluded from the construction of the meaning of life, and falls into the dilemma of life meaning.     

Universalism in cultural history and the meaning of the Russian Revolution: on some aspects of cultural theory in the work of Mikhail Lifšic

Mikhail Lif?ic (1905–1983) is one of the most contradictory and to this date poorly understood authors of the Soviet era. He represented an independent Marxist position, but one internally characterized by the tense relationship between Marxism and the philosophy of Hegel. This relationship, concerning historical philosophical questions, is the subject of this essay. In the 1930s, as “historical materialism” was canonized in the USSR, a development that Soviet civilization understood as the “beginning of the end of (universal) history”, Lif?ic drafted a different, skeptical summary of the revolutionary era. However, he remained loyal to both the concept of universal history and the examination of Russian-Soviet cultural history within the framework of this concept. With the help of a text from Lif?ic from the 1930s as well as his later (early 1980s) reflection and remembrance of the ideological debates of the 1930s, this essay will show that Lif?ic’ reconstruction of idealism in Marxism was no accident, but rather a necessary movement in thought. This, in turn, enabled him to give a new account of the historical experience of the October Revolution.     

“Paramount reality” in Schutz and Gurwitsch

Conclusion Both Schutz and Gurwitsch describe reality as having a manifold character: Schutz speaks of multiple realities and Gurwitsch of orders of existence. Both hold that one realm of reality has a privileged status compared to the others: common everyday experience. However, in spite of this apparent convergence in their views, a closer reading of their various works reveal the important difference in what they understand under common everyday experience.For Schutz, it is the world of social action, characterized by him as paramount reality because of the constitutive processes of the experiences of time, space, sociality and meaning involved in action. For Gurwitsch, the realm of common everyday experience represents the counterpart and the origin of the constructed realm of science: therein lies its status of paramount reality. But what it really refers to is not ordinary experience, as most of his statements suggest, but pre-predicative experience, wherefrom the categories of the natural sciences, namely space and time, originate. Gurwitsch speaks of this pre-predicative experience, which he also calls primordial experience, as being essentially perceptual experience. However, he limits perceptual experience to sensory perception, leaving out the symbolic, social and action-related components of perception and becomes thus inconsistent with his adherence to the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in his field theory of consciousness. The dismissal of the constancy hypothesis implies the recognition of the appresentational structures involving symbols, action and Others as inherent components of every perception. Schutz disagrees with Gurwitsch's reduction of the life-world Erlebnisse to sensory perception and this issue becomes the core of their debate on the phenomenon of paramount reality.     

The effects of “effort after meaning” on recall: Differences in within- and between-subjects designs

In four experiments, we examined free recall of ambiguous sentences with or without corresponding cues to facilitate comprehension, using Auble and Franks’s (1978) paradigm to examine effort after meaning (Bartlett, 1932). The ambiguous sentences were studied without cues, with cues meaningfully embedded in them, with cues provided shortly before the sentence (precue), or with cues following the sentence after several seconds (delayed cue). When these conditions were manipulated within subjects, the process of cue integration in the pre- and delayed-cue conditions enhanced recall, relative to the no-cue and embedded-cue conditions. Furthermore, in a test condition in which subjects first attempted to recall the cues alone, recall was also best in the delayed-cue condition. The effects described above did not occur when the cue presentation conditions varied between subjects, and on a test of order reconstruction, there was even an advantage for sentences studied in the embedded-cue condition over those studied in the delayed-cue condition. The dissociative effects of experimental design on sentence recall and order reconstruction suggest that effort after meaning might enhance memory for study items at the cost of impairing memory for temporal order information.     

“Method and meaning”: Storytelling as decolonial praxis in the psychology of racialized peoples

In psychology, there is a growing recognition of how racialized groups are often dehumanized and pathologized, and how racist and colonial legacies still inform our research and practices today. In order to dismantle racism within academic institutions we must decolonize and indigenize psychological science. One promising strategy is the use of storytelling methodology wherein participants from racialized groups share their lived experiences. However, the process of how storytelling contributes to decolonization is rarely explained, and decolonization is rarely defined. The present paper systematically reviewed studies that examined racialized individuals’ lived experience using storytelling methodology in order to synthesize conceptualizations of decolonization and of how storytelling contributes to decolonizing psychological research. Findings suggest storytelling meaningfully contributes to decolonial praxis in psychology. Researchers must work consciously and collaboratively, center research around liberating racialized communities, and explicitly define how their study decolonizes in order to be accountable to their community of study and to the colonial history of the lands on which they're situated.     

On the meaning of the question “How fast does time pass?”

In this paper I distinguish interpretations of the question ``How fast does time pass?’’ that are important for the debate over the reality of objective becoming from interpretations that are not. Then I discuss how one theory that incorporates objective becoming—the moving spotlight theory of time—answers this question. It turns out that there are several ways to formulate the moving spotlight theory of time. One formulation says that time passes but it makes no sense to ask how fast; another formulation says that time passes at one second per supersecond; and a third says that time passes at one second per second. I defend the intelligibility of this final version of the theory.     

Rethinking the Body and Space in Alfred Schutz’s Phenomenology of Music

What is initially striking about Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological account of the musical experience, which encompasses both the performance and reception of music, is his apparent dismissal of the corporeal and spatial aspects of that experience. The paper argues that this is largely a product of his wider understanding of temporality wherein the mind and time are privileged over the body and space, respectively. While acknowledging that Schutz’s explicit or stated view is that the body and space are relatively insignificant to his account, the paper reveals how they actually feature significantly in the latter, but in ways that remain largely implicit. First, the analysis demonstrates that the mental and temporal aspects of Schutz’s phenomenology of the musical experience cannot be considered independently of their interrelations with the equally important, albeit under-examined, corporeal, and spatial aspects. Concepts from Nietzsche’s early aesthetics are recruited to fulfil this task. Second, the analysis challenges Schutz’s dismissal of space in his theory of music perception. Lastly, it reveals the crucial, yet implicit, role of the body and space in his key examination of the intersubjective phenomenon he terms “making music together”. By presenting the above arguments, the paper aims to draw out the implicit dimensions of Schutz’s phenomenology of music and thereby enrich his influential account.