THE MORAL MURDERER. A (MORE) EFFECTIVE COUNTEREXAMPLE TO CONSEQUENTIALISM

My aim in this paper is to provide an effective counterexample to consequentialism. I assume that traditional counterexamples, such as Transplant (A doctor should kill one person and transplant her organs to five terminal patients, thereby saving their lives) and Judge (A judge should sentence to death an innocent person if he knows that an outraged mob will otherwise kill many innocent persons), are not effective, for two reasons: first, they make unrealistic assumptions and, second, they do not pass the rule‐consequentialist institutional test. My example (The Moral Murderer), instead, assumes a realistic empirical framework and the relevant action does not undermine basic social institutions. On the contrary, it reinforces them. In The Moral Murderer, Tom (an adult male) is morally allowed to murder a person (preferably a woman) in order to be punished to death.     

Misrecognitions and the fear of not knowing

A form of pathological internal object relationship is described that timelessly perpetuates the infant's subjective experience of the mother's difficulty in recognizing and responding to her infant's internal state. The individual identifies with both the mother and the infant in this internal object relationship and experiences intense anxiety and despair in relation to his efforts at knowing what he is feeling and therefore of knowing who he is. Substitute formations are utilized to create the illusion that the individual knows what he feels.     

Death by non-feeding: Not in the baby's best interests

It has recently been suggested that doctors have a duty to act in their patient's best interest and that this duty demands that life-sustaining treatment—including food and fluids—should sometimes be withheld or withdrawn and the patient allowed to die. In this article, the author explores the scope of the ‘best interests principle’ in the context of treatment decisions for seriously handicapped newborn infants. She argues that those who hold that it is permissible to starve or dehydrate an infant to death are mistaken to think that this course of action is in the infant's best interests. While it may be true that there are times whendeath is, everything considered, in an infant's best interests, a slow and distressingmethod of bringing death about is not. Since death by dehydration and starvation is not benign, the withholding of food and fluids is generally not in an infant's best interests. The author concludes by suggesting thatwhenever the withdrawal or non-employment of life-sustaining means imposes a heavy burden on the infant, the ‘best interests principle’ would demand that the infant be killed rather than allowed to die.     

Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen von Amoktaten aus kriminologischer,forensisch-psychiatrischer und forensisch-psychologischer Sicht

Cases of running amok are intentional, accomplished and attempted multiple homicides by which mass murder is generally carried out by a single offender, motivated by anger, hate and revenge, attacking defined or randomly selected victims. The offender intends to become famous and in many cases commits suicide after the attack. Young offenders up to the age of 24 years old differ from the heterogeneous group of adults. Within a core group of young offenders personality disorders and behavioral problems are the main cause of the attacks. A quiet, reclusive and always somewhat strange loner has a deep feeling of alienation, feels offended and disregarded, identifies with perpetrators and stages the crime as revenge for subjectively experienced insults. Schizotypal, paranoid and narcissistic aspects dominate. The offenders are not characterized by patterns of impulsive, aggressive or dissocial behavior.     

The minister and the birth of a defective child

Summary There now exists a gap in the humanistic and professional care of the newborn defective child and his family—a gap which is so vital that it further adds to the debilitation of the infant and increases force behind the statement, The family with a handicapped child is a handicapped family. The minister in the community is the logical person by reasons of training, sphere of call, and availability to fill this void and assist parents through this most difficult shock or mourning period.In times of death or severe illness, the family minister does not wait to be called by the family before showing his, and the church's, concern. Neither should he wait in the case of defective birth, for no longer is this a subject to be hidden in closets while parents suffer in agonized self-accusation. The very first days are crucial ones, and the minister that makes himself available to the parents during that time in a supportive, listening post role will produce more positive results than will many sessions of counseling in the later years of that infant's childhood.     

Autonomy and the Moral Symmetry Principle: Reply to Frowe and Tooley

Helen Frowe has recently objected to Michael Tooley’s famous Moral Symmetry Principle, which is meant to show that in themselves killing and letting die are morally equivalent. I argue that her objection is not compelling but a more compelling objection is available. Specifically, Tooley’s rebuttal of a proposed counter-example to his Moral Symmetry Principle has two problematic implications. First, it undercuts the very principle itself. If we reject the proposed counter-example, then any instance of the Moral Symmetry Principle will actually demonstrate the moral in-equivalence of killing and letting die. Second, it commits us to the view, which Tooley wishes to avoid, that we are just as obligated to refrain from doing wrong as we are to prevent others from doing the same. I conclude with a brief discussion of a more general concern regarding Tooley’s basic strategy. My focus here is quite narrow. My claims, if plausible, only show that the Moral Symmetry Principle is unsound and thus cannot serve as a basis for the view that killing and letting die are morally equivalent.     

A life worth giving? The threshold for permissible withdrawal of life support from disabled newborn infants

When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant's future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counter-arguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant's life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view.     

The infant's theory of self-propelled objects

"Theory of mind" is treated as a modular component of human social behavior and an attempt is made to find the origins of this component in the perception of the infant. According to the theory I describe here, the infant assigns a high priority to changes in motion and divides the world into two kinds of objects on the basis of this criterion: those that are and those that are not self-propelled. How the infant perceives these two kinds of objects is described by four basic assumptions. First, when the state of motion of a nonself-propelled object is changed by another object, the infant's principal hard-wired perception is causality; when a self-propelled object changes its motion without assistance from another object the infant's principal hard-wired perception is intention. Second, if two self-propelled objects are related in a special way--a relation called the BDR sequence--the infant perceives not only intentional movement but also one object as having the goal of affecting the other object. Third, the BDR sequence has a more powerful consequence: the infant perceives that the affected object intends to reciprocate. Fourth, the infant expects that reciprocation will preserve valence (not form), where valence is formulated either as the preservation/denial of liberty, or as an aesthetic response.     

Players,Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player's character commits murder and video games in which the player's character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck's “Gamer's Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and argue that the ethical difference between so‐called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction‐making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation.     

Just How Unlawful is “Euthanasia”?

Those who campaign for law reform to permit "euthanasia" may seek different things and at least some of what they seek may already be permissible under the criminal law of England and Wales. In this paper I examine one means whereby the criminal law delivers outcomes acceptable to the euthanasia lobby, that is the curious notion of "causation" deployed by the law, which adds a value override to the more usual notion of factual causation such that, for example, if medical treatment falls within the acceptable range as normal and proper, the pre–existing injury or illness is treated as exclusively the cause of death and the doctor escapes criminal liability, even where the medical treatment will shorten life to the certain knowledge, possibly even the wish, of the doctor. Thus the law may already be delivering a range of outcomes — euthanasia in a weak sense — acceptable to the euthanasia lobby. If so, it achieves this by stealth. That is inappropriate to the doctor–patient relationship, which is one of trust. So there is a strong case for greater transparency. Moreover, there are limits to the acceptable outcomes which an unreformed criminal law can deliver and in a range of cases the criminal law condemns the doctor to impotence and the patient to a prolonged, miserable and undignified death. So there is also a case for going beyond the current law and legalising euthanasia in a strong sense.     

Causal Necessity in Aristotle

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understood— or attacked— in several ways, however, and so whether the view or its criticism is tenable depends on how we understand the necessitation claim. In fact, Aristotelian efficient causation may be said to involve two distinct necessary connections: one is a relation between causes considered as potential, while the other relates them considered as active. That is, the claims that (1) what has the power to heat necessarily heats what has the power to be heated, and that (2) a particular flame which is actually under a pot necessarily heats it, both of which appear to be true for Aristotle, involve distinct notions of necessity. The latter kind of necessity is based on the facts, as Aristotle sees them, about change, whereas the former is based in the nature of properties. Though different, both kinds of necessity are instances of what contemporary philosophers would call metaphysical necessity, and together they also amount to a theory of causal determination.     

THE PSYCHOANALYST AND THE BABY: A NEW LOOK AT WORK WITH INFANTS

The author argues that objections to involving the infant in a relationship with an analyst have led psychoanalysts to overlook the possibility that the interaction between the infant and the analyst may be able to activate and retrieve those parts of the infant's inner world that have been excluded from containment and be conducive to a vitalisation of the emotional disturbance that can then become worked through in the mother-infant relationship. As long as the infant's ego is weak, the infant and the mother have a unique flexibility that enables them to repair disturbances in their relationship when the emotional container-contained link is (re-)established. Based on the assumptions (1) that a relationship can be established between the infant and the analyst, (2) that the infant has a primordial subjectivity and self as base for intersubjectivity and the search for containment, (3) that the infant has an unique flexibility in changing representations of itself and others that comes to an end as the ego develops, and (4) that the infant is able to process aspects of language, three cases, at the ages of 6, 18 and 20 months, are presented to illustrate what is considered to be a novel approach to work with infants.     

Hume and the phenomenology of agency

Some philosophers argue that Hume, given his theory of causation, is committed to an implausibly thin account of what it is like to act voluntarily. Others suggest, on the basis of his argument against free will, that Hume takes no more than an illusory feature of action to distinguish the experience of performing an act from the experience of merely observing an act. In this paper, I argue that Hume is committed to neither an unduly parsimonious nor a sceptical account of the phenomenology of agency.     

Ripple effects in memory: judgments of moral blame can distort memory for events

Can judging an individual as being morally responsible for a negative act affect memory for details of the act? We presented participants with a story describing an individual (Frank) who committed a crime (he walked out on a restaurant bill). Some participants were told that the negative act was not intentional and that Frank was essentially a good person. Others were told that the negative act was intentional and that Frank actually enjoyed it. Control participants were given no extra information. All the participants then judged Frank’s moral responsibility for walking out on the bill. When asked a week later to recall information about the event, the participants who had received negative information about Frank remembered that Frank had walked out on a larger restaurant bill than he actually had. Moreover, the degree of memory distortion was predicted by the degree of moral blame that had been attributed to Frank.     

On Art and Intention

The author discusses a puzzle about the place of intention in art, a puzzle first articulated by Richard Wollheim in his well-known lecture 'On Drawing an Object'. The puzzle arises if we try to hold jointly three commonly-held claims, viz. (1) Art is intentional; (2) The artist, in making a work of art, needs to observe what he has done, in order to know what he has done; (3) A necessary condition of intentional action is that when an agent acts intentionally then he knows what he is (intentionally) doing without observation, or any need for it. Prima facie it would appear that we cannot hold all these claims together.
The author spells out the problem, discusses Wollheim's own solution to it (which he rejects) and seeks to dispel the puzzle by closer attention to intention and action in relation to artistic production.     

Moral Rationalism without Overridingness

Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one of two possible explanations for Moral Rationalism. In this paper I will investigate which of these two explanations a moral rationalist should accept. I will argue that when we properly attend to the form of Moral Rationalism supported by the intuitions that motivate the view, we are left with no reason to accept The Overridingness Thesis.     

Poverty and the Peril of Particulars

Moral extremists argue for a demanding duty of poverty relief by leveraging powerful intuitions about our duties to rescue those close at hand. I clear the way for a less demanding duty by arguing that this argumentative strategy commits the extremist to a conception of our duty in the face of global poverty that is deeply at odds with our convictions about how we may discharge that duty. These convictions reveal that global poverty and easy rescue cases give rise to duties of different kinds: whereas duties of rescue are ultimately explicable by appeal to moral claims to assistance, duties of poverty relief are not. The extremist’s most compelling argumentative strategy is therefore not viable—he may not straightforwardly appeal to facts about the demandingness of duties of rescue in arguing for demanding duties of poverty relief.     

Crib death: a biobehavioral phenomenon?

In developed countries, more children under 1 year of age die of crib death (sudden infant death syndrome, SIDS) than of all other causes combined. Researchers and clinicians have proposed many possible causes of SIDS, but the abrupt, unexpected death of some babies remains mysterious and frightening. Although infant behavior may explain some of these deaths, scant attention has addressed behavioral characteristics of babies who die without medical explanation. Any explanation of SIDS must account for the fact that most SIDS deaths occur at 2 to 5 months of age, acknowledging that a protective mechanism appears to spare babies before 2 months but then disappears. The respiratory occlusion reflex serves as an initial defense against smothering and can provide such an explanation. Infantile reflexes wane, after providing opportunities for learned responses to be acquired. During this well-documented neurobehavioral transition from subcortical to cortically mediated responding, some babies, viable for the first 2 months, may become especially vulnerable if they fail to acquire sufficiently strong defensive behaviors needed to prevent occlusion after the waning of the life-preserving reflex. Recent success of back-to-sleep directives, urging that babies sleep on their backs to avoid smothering, supports this hypothesis.