Threshold adjustment in response to asymmetric loss functions: The case of auditors’ “substantial doubt” thresholds

Thresholds play a critical role in linking judgments and choices. One way they do so is by dividing a continuous judgment variable, such as probability, into two regions that imply different choices and actions, such as operate/do not operate, admit/do not admit, or invest/do not invest. We examine this link by focusing on the tendency of professional decision makers to adjust their thresholds when the risks associated with negative decision outcomes are elevated. We report two studies involving experienced auditors that investigate thresholds in a “going-concern” setting. In this setting, the auditor assesses the probability that a business firm will be unable to continue in existence for the coming year; if that probability exceeds a “substantial doubt” threshold (also assessed by the auditor), the auditor is required to disclose the relevant information in the firm’s annual report to the public. Our studies use two experimental cases based on actual business firms that differ in their objective likelihoods of not continuing as going concerns. We derive the auditors’ substantial doubt thresholds from the relationship between their probability assessments and their disclosure choices, unlike all prior research which has simply asked auditors to state the probability they believe represents substantial doubt. We find that auditors’ derived thresholds are adjusted downward for the more problematic firm, a result that we attribute to the asymmetric loss functions inherent in going-concern settings. The second study has some of the auditors directly provide their substantial doubt thresholds (SDTs). The downward adjustment is again found for derived thresholds but not for elicited thresholds, suggesting that the method of capturing thresholds may be an important issue in understanding judgment and choice.     

Inverse effectiveness, multisensory integration, and the bodily self: Some statistical considerations

A recent report in Consciousness and Cognition provided evidence from a study of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) that supports the multisensory principle of inverse effectiveness (PoIE). I describe two methods of assessing the principle of inverse effectiveness (‘a priori’ and ‘post-hoc’), and discuss how the post-hoc method is affected by the statistical artefact of ‘regression towards the mean’. I identify several cases where this artefact may have affected particular conclusions about the PoIE, and relate these to the historical origins of ‘regression towards the mean’. Although the conclusions of the recent report may not have been grossly affected, some of the inferential statistics were almost certainly biased by the methods used. I conclude that, unless such artefacts are fully dealt with in the future, and unless the statistical methods for assessing the PoIE evolve, strong evidence in support of the PoIE will remain lacking.     

Order effects in sequentially judged options due to the direction of comparison

Many real-world judgment tasks present options in sequence. Typically, these judgments are made step-by-step, immediately after considering each option, or end-of-sequence, after all have been seen. We report similar order effects in both procedures, due to direction of comparison. It appears that judges form an impression of each new option by comparing it to those that preceded it. Using that option’s features as a “checklist,” more weight is given to unique ones than to ones shared with previous options. This unidirectional comparison process produces increasing ratings in options with unique positive features, and decreasing ratings when options have unique negative features. By manipulating the barriers to making multiple comparisons, we show that the direction-of-comparison effect is not limited to judgment tasks with sequential presentation. Even simultaneously presented options may show order effects, if they are judged one at a time—in sequence. Possible explanations and implications are discussed.     

The role of desires in sequential impulsive choices

The present research provides evidence for a sequential mitigation effect, which is the phenomenon that participation in a prior impulsive choice task significantly reduces the decision maker’s likelihood of choosing impulsively in a subsequent task. The results of five experiments: (a) provide evidence for the Sequential Mitigation Effect using different study materials and contexts (Experiments 1–3), (b) show that prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice is required for the effect to occur (Experiment 4), and (c) find that the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes moderates the effect (Experiment 5). The results support the notion that desire for impulsive options functions as a limited motivational resource, and being consumed in the first task, is experienced to a lesser extent in the second task. The sequential mitigation effect may be characterized as a motivational contextual influence on decision making, complementing existing research showing that cognitive context effects influence sequential choices.     

Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Consciousness Explained</Emphasis>

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.     

Mothers’ attuned responses to infant affect expressivity promote earlier achievement of language milestones

To investigate infants’ affective expressivity and maternal attuned responsiveness to infant expressivity in relation to early language achievement, 77 dyads were visited in their homes at 9 and 13 months, and mothers were interviewed about their children’s language between 9 and 21 months. Maternal responses that were attuned to infant affect, by selectively matching either the gradient features or the valence of infants’ affective expressions, were more predictive of children’s language achievement than maternal nonmatching responses; and maternal matching responses at 9 months were more predictive of children’s language achievements than maternal responses at 13 months. Moreover, maternal matching responses at 9 months predicted second-year language achievements over and above infant affect expressivity at 9 and 13 months, and over and above maternal matching responses at 13 months. Infants’ affective expressivity per se was not predictive.     

Types of inconsistency in health-state utility judgments

In making judgments of health-related quality of life, respondents often compare the relative magnitude of two intervals between health states, such as the interval between normal health and blindness compared to that between normal health and death. We examined two ways of comparing such intervals: person-trade-off (PTO)—in which the judgment concerns matching numbers of people so that two changes are equivalent—and direct judgment of the ratio. Both measures showed ratio inconsistency (a ratio that should be the product of two other ratios is too high) and superadditivity (two ratios that should add to 1 are too high). Some responses in both methods implied that two intervals which should have been different (because they shared a top or bottom point, but differed on the other point) were nevertheless viewed by subjects as being of equal size. These equality responses were more common when death was the bottom (worse end) of both intervals being compared (e.g., the interval between death and blindness is perceived as being the same size as the interval between death and normal health) than when any other condition was at the bottom or when the condition common to the two intervals was at the top. A second experiment indicated that subjects really do consider the intervals to be equal. Our findings argue for giving subjects a chance to reflect on such apparent inconsistencies in practical utility elicitation.     

On how we perceive the social world. Criticizing Gallagher's view on direct perception and outlining an alternative

Criticizing Gallagher’s view on direct perception, I develop a basic model of social perception. According to the Cartesians another person’s intentions (and similar properties) are not directly accessible to an observer. According to the cognitivist Cartesians (quasi-)conscious processes are necessary for social understanding. According to the Anti-Cartesians (Gallagher’s view) social perception is direct. Since both of these latter approaches face serious problems, I will argue in favor of an alternative: anti-cognitivist Cartesianism. Distinguishing between an active- and a passive part of the perceptual system we can describe the situation as follows: Some functionally individuated parts of our nervous system generate percepts that correspond to the properties that causally trigger the system, whilst others form percepts of properties that do not causally trigger the system. The model is basic in that it merely helps clarifying some of the fundamental concepts we need in order to describe empirical findings.     

How left inferior frontal cortex participates in syntactic processing: Evidence from aphasia

We report on three experiments that provide a real-time processing perspective on the poor comprehension of Broca’s aphasic patients for non-canonically structured sentences. In the first experiment we presented sentences (via a Cross Modal Lexical Priming (CMLP) paradigm) to Broca’s patients at a normal rate of speech. Unlike the pattern found with unimpaired control participants, we observed a general slowing of lexical activation and a concomitant delay in the formation of syntactic dependencies involving “moved” constituents and empty elements. Our second experiment presented these same sentences at a slower rate of speech. In this circumstance, Broca’s patients formed syntactic dependencies as soon as they were structurally licensed (again, a different pattern from that demonstrated by the unimpaired control group). The third experiment used a sentence-picture matching paradigm to chart Broca’s comprehension for non-canonically structured sentences (presented at both normal and slow rates). Here we observed significantly better scores in the slow rate condition. We discuss these findings in terms of the functional commitment of the left anterior cortical region implicated in Broca’s aphasia and conclude that this region is crucially involved in the formation of syntactically-governed dependency relations, not because it supports knowledge of syntactic dependencies, but rather because it supports the real-time implementation of these specific representations by sustaining, at the least, a lexical activation rise-time parameter.     

DELAY‐AMOUNT TRADEOFFS IN CHOICES BY PIGEONS AND RATS: HYPERBOLIC VERSUS EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING

An adjusting‐delay procedure was used to study the choices of pigeons and rats when both delay and amount of reinforcement were varied. In different conditions, the choice alternatives included one versus two reinforcers, one versus three reinforcers, and three versus two reinforcers. The delay to one alternative (the standard alternative) was kept constant in a condition, and the delay to the other (the adjusting alternative) was increased or decreased many times a session so as to estimate an indifference point—a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Indifference functions were constructed by plotting the adjusting delay as a function of the standard delay for each pair of reinforcer amounts. The experiments were designed to test the prediction of a hyperbolic decay equation that the slopes of the indifference functions should increase as the ratio of the two reinforcer amounts increased. Consistent with the hyperbolic equation, the slopes of the indifference functions depended on the ratios of the two reinforcer amounts for both pigeons and rats. These results were not compatible with an exponential decay equation, which predicts slopes of 1 regardless of the reinforcer amounts. Combined with other data, these findings provide further evidence that delay discounting is well described by a hyperbolic equation for both species, but not by an exponential equation. Quantitative differences in the y‐intercepts of the indifference functions from the two species suggested that the rate at which reinforcer strength decreases with increasing delay may be four or five times slower for rats than for pigeons.     

An alternative approach to calculating Area‐Under‐the‐Curve (AUC) in delay discounting research

Applied to delay discounting data, Area‐Under‐the‐Curve (AUC) provides an atheoretical index of the rate of delay discounting. The conventional method of calculating AUC, by summing the areas of the trapezoids formed by successive delay‐indifference point pairings, does not account for the fact that most delay discounting tasks scale delay pseudoexponentially, that is, time intervals between delays typically get larger as delays get longer. This results in a disproportionate contribution of indifference points at long delays to the total AUC, with minimal contribution from indifference points at short delays. We propose two modifications that correct for this imbalance via a base‐10 logarithmic transformation and an ordinal scaling transformation of delays. These newly proposed indices of discounting, AUC_{log d} and AUC_{or d,} address the limitation of AUC while preserving a primary strength (remaining atheoretical). Re‐examination of previously published data provides empirical support for both AUC_{log d} and AUC_{or d} . Thus, we believe theoretical and empirical arguments favor these methods as the preferred atheoretical indices of delay discounting.     

Using Ordinal Data to Estimate Cardinal Values

We investigate methods developed in multiple criteria decision‐making that use ordinal information to estimate numerical values. Such methods can be used to estimate attribute weights, attribute values, or event probabilities given ranks or partial ranks. We first review related studies and then develop a generalized rank‐sum (GRS) approach in which we provide a derivation of the rank‐sum approach that had been previously proposed. The GRS approach allows for incorporating the concept of degree of importance (or, difference in likelihood with respect to probabilities and difference in value for attribute values), information that most other rank‐based formulas do not utilize. We then present simulation results comparing the GRS method with other rank‐based formulas such as the rank order centroid method and comparing the GRS methods using as many as three levels of importance (i.e., GRS‐3) with Simos' procedure (which can also incorporate degree of importance). To our surprise, our results show that the incorporation of additional information (i.e., the degree of the importance), both GRS‐3 and Simos' procedure, did not result in better performance than rank order centroid or GRS. Further research is needed to investigate the modelling of such extra information. We also explore the scenario when a decision‐maker has indifference judgments and cannot provide a complete rank order. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personality assessment in the Great Apes: Comparing ecologically valid behavior measures, behavior ratings, and adjective ratings

Three methods of personality assessment (behavior measures, behavior ratings, adjective ratings) were compared in 20 zoo-housed Great Apes: bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii). To test a new bottom-up approach, the studied trait constructs were systematically generated from the species’ behavioral repertoires. The assessments were reliable, temporally stable, and showed substantial cross-method coherence. In most traits, behavior ratings mediated the relations between adjective ratings and behavior measures. Results suggest that high predictability of manifest behavior is best achieved by behavior ratings, not by adjectives. Empirical evidence for trait constructs beyond current personality models points to the necessity of broad and systematic approaches for valid inferences on a species’ personality structure.     

Motor constraints on the development of perception-action matching in infant reaching

Previous studies on reaching and grasping have suggested that infants need considerable experience at both seeing and touching in order to develop responses adapted to the environment. Such an account, however, does not reveal how appropriate perception-action matching emerges from these repeated experiences at seeing and touching. The present research addresses this issue by investigating the dynamics of perceiving and acting in 5- to 9-month-old infants as they saw, reached for, touched, and grasped objects of different sizes and texture. To gain insights into the mechanisms of change that underlie pattern formation, we observed infants’ responses as a function of time, as infants reached for and manipulated objects successively. We found that the developmental process by which appropriate perception-action matching emerges is tied to important changes in the motor system. Before 8 months, infants’ reaching responses are constrained by systemic motor tendencies that conflict with the process of perceptual-motor mapping. When these motor tendencies disappear, infants are able to use and integrate visual and haptic information to scale their actions to objects. These results are consistent with a dynamic systems approach, which views behavioral changes and their underlying psychological processes as the product of continuous tensions and interactions between the organism’s own constraints and the characteristics of the task at hand.     

A critical examination of Michael Polanyi's conception of skills

In this paper I will consider some of the main issues in Michael Polanyi's discussion of ‘Skills’ from Chapter 4 of his book Personal Knowledge published in 1958.The concept of ‘skill’ features prominently in psychological theories of human performance in activities such as games, gymnastics, swimming and dance; such theories are often applied to other spheres of human activity in which issues about skill acquisition arise. It is not surprising to discover that skill theory is considered to be essential to the study of human movement and physical education. Physical education teachers in schools have consistently maintained that ‘skill acquisition’ is a major objective for the P.E. curriculum — see Kane 1974. Yet concepts such as ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and ‘know-how’ are constituent features of practical knowledge therefore the notion of ‘skill acquisition’ on its own will not do as a curriculum objective since all instances of skill and practical knowledge are specific to their contexts, namely, to different practical activities. If particular activities are valued in schools in the pursuit of children's learning and education it seems necessary to clarify the epistemological features of such activities in order to understand what it means to teach them and what it means for children to learn and know-how to perform them successfully. It is in these respects that the concept of ‘skill’ in different human activities should attract the interest of physical education students. In order to draw attention to major features of Polanyi's thesis on the nature of ‘skill’ I shall consider the relevance of his ideas about skill and knowledge in relation to human action theory. I suggest that misconceptions may arise in teaching and learning theories relating to ‘playing soccer’ if the basic underlying ideas about ‘skill’ in human activities are inconsistent with ideas about human action or, say, practical reasoning. It is this issue that is not, in my view, attended to by Polanyi in his discussion of ‘skill’. Thus, if my criticisms of Polanyi's ideas are shown to be valid it will be necessary, by implication that is, to exercise caution before any attempt is made to use his thesis as a basis from which to formulate ideas about teaching skills and skill acquisition. The extensive use I make of quotations from Polanyi's writings is necessary because it is towards Polanyi's use of language in his explanation of ‘skills’ that much of my criticism is directed. It is hoped that what follows may provide students of human movement and physical education with an insight into Polanyi's view of ‘skills’ in particular and to issues related to skill theory and human action in general.     

Intelligence, reaction time (RT) and a new ‘odd-man-out’ RT paradigm

A sample of adult Ss of reasonably normal intelligence were given an ‘IQ’ test, a series of RT tests using 0, 1, 2, 3 bits of information in a Hick paradigm and an RT task requiring choice of 1 of 3 lights as an ‘odd-man-out’ on the basis of its relative position. Negative correlations were found between both RT and measures of variation in RT and ‘IQ’ for both of the two tasks. Recent results showing no correlation between Hick slope and ‘IQ’ and no increase in correlation between ‘IQ’ and RT with increasing number of bits, are confirmed. An explanation for findings of Ss whose RT data do not conform to Hick's law is tested and found inadequate. The ‘odd-man-out’ task is found to show an effect of ‘learning’ across the period of the task, the size of the learning effect was found also to correlate with ‘IQ’, but no evidence for learning was found with the choice RT task.     

Love and anarchy in Romania : A critical review of Mircea Eliade's Autobiography, volume one, 1907–1937

Eliade is a problem: to at least half of today's historians of religion he embodies the discipline; to the other half he is anathema. I do not intend to review this debate here, nor to rehearse the themes of Eliade's massive oeuvre. I will, however, point over my shoulder to the mixed legacy of theoretical debts and doubts Eliade's work has inspired and try to bring them into relationship with the life story Eliade tells in the Autobiography. This review then attempts to show how Eliade's ‘life’ and ‘letters’ cohere and thus how in illuminating one we shed light on the other.     

Romancing the Family: Umberto Eco’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Baudolino</Emphasis>

Referencing Umberto Eco’s novel Baudolino, the author discusses issues concerning the authenticity of the narrative, specifically the distortions in the story presented to the audience and doubts surrounding the veracity of the tale. The act of narration is associated with the shame caused by the abuse and neglect that is an integral part of this story. The ambivalence of the protagonist—to tell his story and to keep it (and his true identity) concealed—associates narration, a creative act, with lying. Trauma generates the lies and hiddenness as a means of coping with abuse and indifference. In order to deal with the feelings of inadequacy caused by his humble birth, the traumatized protagonist lies: he romanticizes his family origins, the illusion of being the offspring of distinguished parents. His attempt to win the love of the parents, by being both good and all-knowing, is one of the motivating forces of his family romance. Telling lies makes the protagonist omniscient: he is the only one who knows if and when he is telling the truth. Paradoxically, the narrator creates and undermines that image of omniscience by revealing the thought processes of one character while leaving opaque those of the protagonist, and by denying the trueness of the tale affirmed when he presents as objective his own subjective sentiments by indirectly attributing them to the protagonist. The uncertainty that underpins the narration is indicative of the storyteller’s absence. This vacancy structures the work because it allows kindred spirits, nonjudgmental readers (listeners) who willingly suspend disbelief, to enter the world of the narrator. This uncritical participation counters the chaos of the storyteller’s reality, as they create their own new world where the split parental images are united.     

Sources of Intertrial Proactive Interference in Rats’ Short-Term Memory in a Delayed Successive Matching-to-Sample Modality Discrimination

Rats were trained on a delayed successive matching-to-stimulus modality task consisting of onset of chamber lights or a tone for the sample stimulus, S1, and a comparison stimulus, S2. Lever pressing to S1 was reinforced as was lever pressing to its matching S2 (light–light or tone–tone pairs) but not to its mismatching S2 (light–tone, tone–light pairs). The interval between S1 and S2 within a trial, the retention interval (RI), was varied between 1 and 6 s within sessions while the interval between S2 and the next S1, the intertrial interval (ITI), was reduced from 24 to 12 s and finally to 6 s over blocks of sessions. In Experiment 1, where S1 was kept at 2 s and S2 at 10 s, rats’ matching accuracy declined over the longer RI, was slightly disrupted as ITIs were reduced to 6 s only over 1-s RIs, and was generally poorer to the tone than light S1. In Experiment 2, where both stimuli were 10 s increasing RIs caused steeper declines in matching accuracy to the tone S1 than light S1 and decreasing ITIs to 6 s disrupted rats performance over both RIs. Matching accuracy to the tone but not to the light S1 was also poorer when a preceding trial's S2 was a light S2 than when it was a tone S2 only during Experiment 2. Thisintertrial stimulus disagreementeffect was not influenced by ITI duration. These results suggest that intertrial proactive interference in delayed matching tasks consists of two separate and independent processes in rats similar to those found in pigeons (Edhouse & White, 1988).