别对我期望太高：运动领域中的自我设限

运动领域中存在自我设限行为。自我设限是指个体针对可能到来的失败威胁而事先设计障碍的自我保护策略,可分为行动式自我设限及自陈式自我设限。抬举他人也是一种特殊形式的自我设限。自我设限的动机有自我价值和印象管理两种理论解释。与自我设限相关的因素包括归因、自尊、目标定向、群体凝聚力、任务性质及性别等。在前人研究的基础上,从实践的角度为教练员正确处理自我设限问题提供了建议。从理论上提出身体自尊可能是运动员整体自尊和自我设限之间的中介变量     

Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Buchanan [2014] argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet [2016] develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan's own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.     

Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology

The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.     

Algebraic Kripke Sheaf Semantics for Non-Classical Predicate Logics

In so-called Kripke-type models, each sentence is assigned either to true or to false at each possible world. In this setting, every possible world has the two-valued Boolean algebra as the set of truth values. Instead, we take a collection of algebras each of which is attached to a world as the set of truth values at the world, and obtain an extended semantics based on the traditional Kripke-type semantics, which we call here the algebraic Kripke semantics. We introduce algebraic Kripke sheaf semantics for super-intuitionistic and modal predicate logics, and discuss some basic properties. We can state the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation theorem within this semantics. Further, we show new results on super-intuitionistic predicate logics. We prove that there exists a continuum of super-intuitionistic predicate logics each of which has both of the disjunction and existence properties and moreover the same propositional fragment as the intuitionistic logic.     

Frames of Reference for Human Perceptual-Motor Coordination: Space-Based Versus Joint-Based Adaptation

In this study, the authors addressed the issue of whether space-based motor planning occurs at a higher, equal, or lower level of central nervous system control than joint-based motor planning by using a computerized adaptation paradigm. Visual displays of participants' (N = 32) reaching movements to spatial targets were distorted either with respect to spatial hand displacements (space-based distortion) or with respect to joint angle displacements (joint-based distortion). Participants adapted more easily to space-based distortion than to joint-based distortion. The results suggest that when the participants were confronted with new visuomotor mappings, they aimed for virtual spatial targets whose positions were adjusted to compensate for the distortions associated with the new mappings. That strategy was preferred over a joint- or posture-based strategy, in which a posture is selected for the displayed spatial target and is then modified so that the new mapping between adopted and seen positions can be accommodated. The results support the widely held view that space-based planning occurs at a higher level than joint-based planning.     

Double Reference Points: the Effects of Social and Financial Reference Points on Decisions Under Risk

The existing literature is inconsistent about how social comparison affects risk attitudes. We propose a framework where the total utility is composed of the social and financial utilities. The financial utility is consistent with prospect theory (i.e., an S‐shaped utility function with a financial reference point), whereas the social utility is affected by both social and financial reference points. Therefore, social risk attitudes are determined by interaction between gains/losses in both social and financial contexts. On the basis of safety‐first principle, we propose that when experiencing financial gains, individuals tend to seek upside potential and take social risks (i.e., a convex social utility function). In contrast, when facing financial losses, people would be more risk seeking in social gains but more risk averse in social losses to maximize security (i.e., an inverse S‐shaped utility function). We also propose that the relative importance of financial and social utilities depends on the saliency of the reference points and size of stakes. Studies 1 and 2 showed that individuals were risk seeking in both social gains and losses with social reference points alone. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when both financial and social reference points were salient, participants were risk averse in both social gains and losses when facing financial gains, but risk seeking in social gains and risk averse in social losses when facing financial losses. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were in general supported by our experiments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Developed Dynamic Reference Work

The present information explosion on the World Wide Web poses a problem for the general public and the members of an academic discipline alike, of how to find the most authoritative, comprehensive, and up-to-date information about an important topic. At the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), we have since 1995 been developing and implementing the concept of a dynamic reference work (DRW) to provide a solution to these problems, while maintaining free access for readers. A DRW is much more than a web-based encyclopedia, and its scope far exceeds that of an electronic journal or preprint exchange. In this article we document the progress of the SEP toward full implementation of the DRW concept. We discuss the fiscal challenges posed by our desire to maintain free or low-cost access to the contents of the SEP, and we consider technological challenges posed by the desire to stay abreast of technological developments in document markup while making it easy for authors and subject editors to write and maintain entries representing the very best scholarship.     

Rats’ memory for time and relational responding in the duration-comparison procedure

Rats were trained in a duration-comparison task to press one lever if the comparison duration (c) was 1.2-s shorter than a standard duration (s), and another lever if c was 1.2-s longer than s. The interval between s and c duration was 1 s. The 10 duration pairs used during training controlled for the absolute duration of c and the total duration of an s-c pair. The total duration of an s-c pair was not predictive of the correct response. In Experiment 1, during equal-duration pair test trials, rats increasingly responded long (i.e., c > s) as the s-c delay was lengthened. In Experiment 2, long responding increased as the s-c delay was lengthened, even when the illumination condition during the s-c delay differed from that during the intertrial interval (ITI). In Experiment 3, transfer to novel duration pairs was assessed. Overall accuracy for the novel duration pairs was significantly above chance, but transfer performance was also affected by the absolute value of the novel c durations. This is the first study to demonstrate that rats can acquire relational duration discriminations. As in previous studies with pigeons the evidence was consistent with subjective-shortening of the standard duration and there was also evidence of a reliance on a mixture of absolute and relational strategies in responding.     

Horse-parts,White-parts,and Naming: Semantics,Ontology, and Compound Terms in the White Horse Dialogue

In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual.     

I Was Pleased a Moment Ago: How Pleasure Varies with Background and Foreground Reference Points

The pleasure of an outcome is often evaluated relative to salient reference points. In the background, increasing sequences of positive outcomes are more enjoyable than decreasing sequences. In the foreground, outcomes that could have been worse are often more enjoyable than those that could have been better. How does pleasure vary when both background and foreground reference points are salient? Using a repeated gambling task in which participants make a choice, learn the outcome, watch their cumulative earnings change, and rate the pleasure of the outcome, we explore this question. Pleasure depends on background and foreground reference points, but the immediate events tend to dominate. The relatively narrow focus on the most recent reference points leads to myopic pleasure. We offer a modified version of decision affect theory to account for the results and explore the implications for consumer satisfaction.     

Space in Hand and Mind: Gesture and Spatial Frames of Reference in Bilingual Mexico

Speakers of many languages prefer allocentric frames of reference (FoRs) when talking about small-scale space, using words like “east” or “downhill.” Ethnographic work has suggested that this preference is also reflected in how such speakers gesture. Here, we investigate this possibility with a field experiment in Juchitán, Mexico. In Juchitán, a preferentially allocentric language (Isthmus Zapotec) coexists with a preferentially egocentric one (Spanish). Using a novel task, we elicited spontaneous co-speech gestures about small-scale motion events (e.g., toppling blocks) in Zapotec-dominant speakers and in balanced Zapotec-Spanish bilinguals. Consistent with prior claims, speakers’ spontaneous gestures reliably reflected either an egocentric or allocentric FoR. The use of the egocentric FoR was predicted—not by speakers’ dominant language or the language they used in the task—but by mastery of words for “right” and “left,” as well as by properties of the event they were describing. Additionally, use of the egocentric FoR in gesture predicted its use in a separate nonlinguistic memory task, suggesting a cohesive cognitive style. Our results show that the use of spatial FoRs in gesture is pervasive, systematic, and shaped by several factors. Spatial gestures, like other forms of spatial conceptualization, are thus best understood within broader ecologies of communication and cognition.     

Mechanisms of Reference Frame Selection in Spatial Term Use: Computational and Empirical Studies

Previous studies have shown that multiple reference frames are available and compete for selection during the use of spatial terms such as “above.” However, the mechanisms that underlie the selection process are poorly understood. In the current paper we present two experiments and a comparison of three computational models of selection to shed further light on the nature of reference frame selection. The three models are drawn from different areas of human cognition, and we assess whether they may be applied to a reference frame selection by examining their ability to account for both existing and new empirical data comprising acceptance rates, response times, and response time distributions. These three models are the competitive shunting model (Schultheis, 2009 ), the leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001 ), and a lexical selection model (Howard, Nickels, Coltheart, & Cole‐Virtue, 2006 ). Model simulations show that only the LCA model satisfactorily accounts for the empirical observations. The key properties of this model that seem to drive its success are its bounded linear activation function, its number and type of processing stages, and its use of decay. Uncovering these critical properties has important implications for our understanding not only of spatial term use, in particular, but also of conflict and selection in human cognition more generally.     

Social Identity versus Reference Frame Comparisons: The Moderating Role of Stereotype Endorsement

Two studies tested the prediction that belief in a negative stereotype about an in-group will cause members to shift from viewing their in-group as a social identity to viewing it as a frame of reference. The stereotype that was the focus of inquiry was the belief that women have less aptitude at math and spatial tasks than do men. In both studies, female participants took a test of math and spatial ability and then received social comparison information about their abilities relative to a male and a female confederate. In Study 1, participants felt enhanced when the two women outperformed the male confederate, even when this meant that the participants themselves performed worse than the other woman. If participants were first reminded of the negative stereotype, however, they felt best when they outperformed the other woman, even if this meant that the two women performed worse than the man. Study 2 showed that the effects of stereotype activation were especially pronounced among female participants who showed moderate to high levels of stereotype endorsement. These findings suggest that belief in stereotypes about the in-group can lead to in-group comparison and contrast, even in contexts in which a group member's ability level challenges the validity of the stereotype.     

Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.

Ambiguity and the dialogical self: In search for a dialogical psychology

Abstract

It is intuitively felt that ambiguity plays a crucial role in human beings' everyday life and in psychologists' theoretical and applied work. However, ambiguity remains essentially non-problematised in psychological science since its foundation. This article analyses positivist and social constructionist perspectives on ambiguity in the context of their epistemological and ontological fundamental assumptions. The relational thesis of social constructionism is further analysed and it is argued that it constitutes a “weak thesis” concerning the relational constitution of human beings. In the second part, a dialogical alternative is elaborated. In this perspective, ambiguity is placed in the context of relationship and both are brought to an ontological ground. Therefore, it is argued, ambiguity is a fundamental property of human experience and plays a fundamental role in the constitution of (inter)subjective processes. The impact of this thesis on dialogical perspective on self is elaborated.     

Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition–Based Rationality

Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self–referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self–referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism.