Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study. This work represents the beginning of a new way to study the processes that can explain the therapeutic change. The method used is the observation and analysis of therapeutic sessions directly recorded and developed inside a behavioural approach. The category system tries to carry out a functional analysis of the therapist-client interaction which enables the identification of learning processes that work in clinical setting and explain success in therapy. Outcomes are provisional but show the utility of this initial trend of investigation to the comprehension of clinical phenomenon. Conclusions also emphasize the importance of associative learning processes on the therapeutic change.     

Why do people rideshare? An experimental study

Enabled by mobile technologies and fueled by the economic downturn, ridesharing has emerged in recent years as a private transportation facet of the shared economy. Our study investigates the motives for participation in situated ridesharing. We propose a theoretical model that includes economic benefits, time benefits, transportation anxiety, trust, and reciprocity either as direct antecedents of ridesharing participation intention, or mediated through attitude towards ridesharing. We conduct a scenario-based survey, with 300 participants. Our findings indicate that, in situations where transportation anxiety is high (e.g. construction on the road), if people can trust the ridesharing service providers and participants, in the presence of economic and time benefits, they will have a strong intention to participate in ridesharing.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

Why do young people become Jihadists? A theoretical account on radical identity development

Identity status theory and Lofland and Starks' (1965, Becoming a world-saver: A theory of conversion to a deviant perspective, American Sociological Review, 30, 862–875) model of religious conversion were used to explain why young people become jihad fighters. Both theories maintain that young people with unclear commitments are vulnerable for radical identity change. A religious problem-solving perspective, along with a self-definition as religious seeker, steers this potential identity change into the direction of religious conversion. This may lead young Muslims or young people with an uncertain identity and a religious orientation to move closer to radical Islam and jihad. Also, research from both traditions found that absence of positive affective bonds with relevant others go together with unstable identity. A new group with a clear defined mission may therefore be able to solve their problems in two ways: it offers warm interpersonal bonds, as well as potential new personal goals and commitments. Groups of jihadists are perfectly fit to serve this twofold purpose.     

Why male adolescent bicyclists perform risky stunts? A qualitative study

Stunts are one of the main reasons for traffic accidents, particularly among male adolescent bicyclists (ABs). Nonetheless, there are limited data about the theoretical framework of its contributing factors. Moreover, the theoretical frameworks explaining the factors contributing to other risky behaviors have not been used in the area of risky bicycle stunts. The aim of this qualitative study was to explore the factors contributing to risky stunts among male ABs in Iran. This qualitative study was conducted from September 2019 to December 2020 using conventional content analysis. Participants were 29 male ABs purposively selected from Isfahan, Iran. Data were collected through eighteen interviews with sixteen ABs and three focus group discussions with thirteen ABs. Data analysis was conducted concurrently with data collection through conventional qualitative content analysis. The mean of participants’ age was 16.4 ± 1.1 years. Factors contributing to their engagement in risky stunts were grouped into three main themes, namely predisposing personal factors (such as risk underestimation, perceived superiority, sensation seeking, emotional condition, and previous stunt-related experiences), reinforcing social factors (such as supportive social norms and weaknesses of traffic regulations), and environmental conditions (such as time conditions and structural factors). This study provides a new classification of the facilitators to risky stunts among male ABs and reveals new facilitators to these stunts, namely perceived superiority and police non-deterrent reactions to stunts. Therefore, programs on the improvement of safe bicycling should focus not only on perceptual and emotional factors and correction of false perceived superiority through education, but also on social norms and beliefs, regulations, and environmental factors.     

Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review

Terror management theory (TMT; J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, & S. Solomon, 1986) posits that people are motivated to pursue positive self-evaluations because self-esteem provides a buffer against the omnipresent potential for anxiety engendered by the uniquely human awareness of mortality. Empirical evidence relevant to the theory is reviewed showing that high levels of self-esteem reduce anxiety and anxiety-related defensive behavior, reminders of one's mortality increase self-esteem striving and defense of self-esteem against threats in a variety of domains, high levels of self-esteem eliminate the effect of reminders of mortality on both self-esteem striving and the accessibility of death-related thoughts, and convincing people of the existence of an afterlife eliminates the effect of mortality salience on self-esteem striving. TMT is compared with other explanations for why people need self-esteem, and a critique of the most prominent of these, sociometer theory, is provided.     

Why do people behave immorally when drunk?

Alcohol intoxication is a major source of antisocial behavior in our society, strongly implicated in various forms of interpersonal aggression. Yet, moral philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to the literature on alcohol and its effects. In part, this is because philosophers who have adopted a more empirically informed approach to moral psychology have gravitated toward moral sentimentalism, while the literature on alcohol intoxication fits very poorly with the sentimentalist account. Most contemporary research on the psychological effects of alcohol is focused upon variants of the “disinhibition” theory, which suggests that alcohol does not provoke any specific affect, it merely weakens executive control. This research, we argue, lends support to a deontic moral psychology, which identifies our ability to suppress behavioral impulses as a central feature of moral agency.     

Why do people remain in abusive relationships?

Increasingly ministers and pastoral counselors are being consulted by people who are in abusive relationships. Consequently, it is important for all ministers and pastoral counselors to develop both an intellectual and an emotional appreciation for the complexities involved in remaining in, or leaving, abusive relationships. This article discusses six basic reasons why people choose to remain in abusive relationships, and concludes with three pastoral implications for ministers who counsel people in such relationships.     

Why do people sacrifice to approach rewards versus to avoid costs? Insights from attachment theory

This research provides the first empirical investigation of how attachment orientations contribute to approach and avoidance goals for engaging in sacrifice. Study 1 is a cross‐sectional study of individuals in dating relationships, and Study 2 is a 14‐day daily experience study of dating couples. Results showed that attachment anxiety was associated with a greater frequency of sacrifice and more willingness to sacrifice for approach goals (particularly self‐focused goals) and avoidance goals. Attachment avoidance was associated with a lower frequency of sacrifice, less willingness to sacrifice for approach goals (particularly partner‐focused goals), and more willingness to sacrifice for avoidance goals (both self‐ and partner‐focused). Daily sacrifice goals were also associated with the partner's attachment orientation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Why do people perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup traits?

People tend to perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup stereotypical traits (e.g., Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992a; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). If it is assumed that people use homogeneity ratings to indicate the extent to which groups possess traits, then this stereotype effect may be interpreted as an expression of perceived trait possession (i.e., ingroups possess ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroups possess outgroup stereotypical traits). If it is further assumed that research participants abide by the conversational norm of appropriate quantity (e.g., Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, 1993), then this stereotype effect should be significantly reduced following prior expressions of perceived trait possession. A literature review and two minimal group experiments (Ns = 75, 104) supported this prediction. This evidence is discussed in relation to the outgroup homogeneity effect and self-categorization theory.     

Why do people like bicycling? Modeling affect toward bicycling

Studies show that the way an individual feels about bicycling – the degree to which they like bicycling – is an important predictor of whether or not they bicycle. But why do some people like bicycling and others don’t? This study explores factors that may influence an individual’s liking of bicycling, or more formally, their bicycling affect. We analyze a rich dataset from a cross-sectional survey of residents of six small U.S. cities using an ordered logit model. Results show that bicycling behavior has the strongest association with liking bicycling, with bicycling constraints following as the second most important factor. Individual cognitions, including perceptions and normative beliefs, also play important roles in predicting bicycling affect. Individual measures of the physical environment do not correlate with liking of bicycling, but the perception that biking to various destinations is safe does. Social environment factors influence liking of bicycling as well. Longitudinal research is needed to better understand the reciprocal relationship between bicycling affect and bicycling behavior as well as the effect over time of factors such as the physical environment. Nevertheless, this study offers an initial understanding of the potential determinants of bicycling affect that provides a starting point for further research as well as direction for the development of policies for getting more people on bicycles.     

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.     

Why do people give? The role of identity in giving

Why do people give to others? One principal driver involves one's identity: who one is and how they view themselves. The degree to which identities are malleable, involve a readiness to act, and help make sense of the world have significant implications determining whether and how much people give. Drawing on the Identity-Based Motivation model (IBM; Oyserman, D. (2009). Identity-based motivation: Implications for action-readiness, procedural-readiness, and consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19.), we provide a tripartite framework to help advance the research on the psychology of giving.     

Why do pictures produce priming on the word-fragment completion test? A study of encoding and retrieval factors

Three experiments examined why pictures produce priming on the word-fragment completion test, despite the fact that there is no match between the physical features of the picture and the word fragment. Pictures and words were presented as primes, and performance on the word-fragment completion test was measured; encoding and retrieval conditions were varied. Experi-ments 1 and 2 examined the role of picture labeling by increasing the presentation rate and by introducing a shadowing task during encoding; labeling appears to play a role in priming. In Experiment 3, the word fragments were presented for 500 msec, and subjects were required to provide a solution immediately. Word priming was unaffected, but picture priming was elimi-nated, suggesting that word fragments enable efficient recovery of perceptually similar primes (i.e., words), but slower and less direct recovery of conceptually similar but physically dissimilar     

Why do I study? The moderating effect of attachment style on academic motivation

Past research has shown the importance of considering close others' interests when pursuing goals, but no research has examined potential moderators of this effect. Two studies examined how attachment style moderates the association between reasons for studying and academic outcomes. In Study 1, 119 participants reported their attachment style, the reasons why they study, and their study habits. As predicted, the association between relational reasons and studying was positive for secure individuals and negative for avoidant individuals. In Study 2, 195 participants reported their attachment style and reasons for studying, as well as their GPA and academic well-being. As predicted, the association between relational reasons and GPA was positive for secure individuals, whereas the associations between personal reasons for studying and academic well-being were positive for avoidant individuals. These results indicate the importance of considering individual differences as moderators of the association between goal motives and outcomes.     

Is social projection based on simulation or theory? Why new methods are needed for differentiating

The literature on social cognition reports many instances of a phenomenon titled ‘social projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’. These terms indicate egocentric predictions, i.e., an over-reliance on the self when predicting the cognition, emotion, or behavior of other people. The classic method to diagnose egocentric prediction is to establish high correlations between our own and other people's cognition, emotion, or behavior. We argue that this method is incorrect because there is a different way to come to a correlation between own and predicted states, namely, through the use of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the use of correlational measures is not sufficient to identify the source of social predictions. Based on the distinction between simulation theory and theory theory, we propose the following alternative methods for inferring prediction strategies: independent vs. juxtaposed predictions, the use of ‘hot’ mental processes, and the use of participants’ self-reports.     

Why are some people more knowledgeable than others? A longitudinal study of knowledge acquisition

The purpose of this study was to investigate correlates of knowledge acquisition within a real-world domain-basketball. The study employed a longitudinal design and involved two sessions, with approximately 2.5 months between sessions. Session 1 occurred near the beginning of the men's college basketball season, and Session 2 occurred after the season. There was an indirect effect of interest in basketball on new basketball knowledge, via exposure to domain-relevant information. In addition, prior basketball knowledge had a strong effect on new basketball knowledge distinct from an influence through basketball exposure. This finding suggests that prior knowledge may provide a framework into which new knowledge can be integrated. By contrast, there was no effect of fluid intelligence on new basketball knowledge. Although somewhat surprising given evidence that this aspect of intelligence may play a role in the acquisition of certain types of knowledge, this finding accords with the view that knowledge is a major determinant of various aspects of cognitive functioning, including learning.     

A grand theory of motivation: Why not?

Baumeister asks what a grand theory of motivation might look like, and he identifies the key problems, challenges, and opportunities that need to be considered in its pursuit. I address four of these challenges—how to define motivation, whether motivation is a state or a trait, the primacy of motivation in psychology, and the necessity to not only manage motivational conflict but also to vitalize motivational assets. I focus primarily, however, on the key obstacle that prevents a grand theory—our non-shared assumptions about the nature and dynamics of motivation. I suggest we capitalize on new advances in statistics, methodology, and technology to test what used to be untestable assumptions about motivation. Shared assumptions are necessary for a coherent science, and only a coherent science is capable of constructing a general theory.     

A computational model based on Gross’ emotion regulation theory

Emotion regulation describes how a subject can use certain strategies to affect emotion response levels. Usually, models for emotion regulation assume mechanisms based on feedback loops that indicate how to change certain aspects of behavior or cognitive functioning in order to get a more satisfactory emotion response level. Adaptation of such feedback loops is usually left out of consideration. This paper introduces an adaptive computational model for emotion regulation by formalizing the model informally described by Gross (1998). The model has been constructed using a high-level modeling language, and integrates both quantitative aspects (such as levels of emotional response) and qualitative aspects (such as decisions to regulate one’s emotion). This model includes mechanisms for adaptivity of the degree of flexibility of the emotion regulation process. Also, the effects of events like traumas or therapies on emotion regulation can be simulated. Based on this computational model, a number of simulation experiments have been performed and evaluated.