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1.
Diego Marconi 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):301-318
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent
entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled
out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true
in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of
w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w
and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who
hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A”
as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. 相似文献
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Philosophia - How compelling is radical normative pluralism, i.e. the view that contrary moral positions (deontological, consequentialist and so on) are all morally acceptable even in one given... 相似文献
4.
We show how to construct certain L
M, T
-type interpreted languages, with each such language containing meaningfulness and truth predicates which apply to itself. These languages are comparable in expressive power to the L
T
-type, truth-theoretic languages first considered by Kripke, yet each of our L
M, T
-type languages possesses the additional advantage that, within it, the meaninglessness of any given meaningless expression can itself be meaningfully expressed. One therefore has, for example, the object level truth (and meaningfulness) of the claim that the strengthened Liar is meaningless. 相似文献
5.
On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
PHILIP KITCHER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2002,64(2):346-364
An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth. 相似文献
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Philosophia - We often think or say that someone was wrong about something but almost right about it or close to the truth. This can mean more than one thing. Here, I propose an analysis of the... 相似文献
7.
《哲学分析》2014,(4)
毫无疑问,真之理论在戴维森的哲学理论中扮演着核心地位,如果不理解他的真之理论也就无法理解他的整个哲学思想。虽然在他的哲学生涯中,戴维森对真的理解并非完全保持一致,甚至在某些地方曾出现过重大转变,但这并不妨碍他的真之理论形成一个整体。因为戴维森在很多关键地方,对真的理解保持着不变。戴维森对真的理解可以从两个方面进行阐述。从否定方面看,戴维森认为真是不可被定义的,因为它是一个最简单的概念;其次,真之紧缩论对真的解释是不能成立的,因为它并不能把握真的实质。从积极方面看,戴维森肯定了真与人之间的紧密关系,并认为人是真的前提;同时,他又强调了真与信念、愿望以及意义之间的联系,认为对这些概念的解释必须以真为基础。 相似文献
8.
Matthew McKeon 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(3):205-224
I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based on a misrepresentation of Quine. This serves not only to clarify Quine's position, but also to crystallize what is and what is not at issue in choosing the model-theoretic account of first-order logical truth over one in terms of substitutions. I conclude by highlighting the need for justifying the belief that the definition of first-order logical truth in terms of models is superior to its definition in terms of substitutions. 相似文献
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Victoria S. Harrison 《Sophia》2012,51(1):71-86
In our increasingly multicultural society there is an urgent need for a theory that is capable of making sense of the various
philosophical difficulties presented by ethical and religious diversity—difficulties that, at first sight, seem to be remarkably
similar. Given this similarity, a theory that successfully accounted for the difficulties raised by one form of plurality
might also be of help in addressing those raised by the other, especially as ethical belief systems are often inextricably
linked with religious belief systems. This article adumbrates a theory that is suitably sensitive to the challenge posed by
cultural diversity, and that is respectful of ethical and religious differences. The theory, called “internalist pluralism,”
provides a philosophical account of the widely differing claims made by religious believers resulting from the tremendous
diversity of belief systems, while simultaneously yielding a novel perspective on ethical plurality. Internalist pluralism
is based on Hilary Putnam’s theory of internal realism. This article is not concerned to defend internal realism against its
critics, although such defense is clearly required if the theory is to be adopted. Its more modest aim is to show that internal
realism has a distinctive voice to add to the current debate about how best to understand religious and ethical diversity. 相似文献
10.
Philosophia - In situations where we ought to tolerate what we morally disapprove of we are faced with the following moral conflict: we ought to interfere with X, we ought to tolerate X, we can do... 相似文献
11.
Eugene Schlossberger 《The Journal of value inquiry》1999,33(3):389-403
12.
The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence
theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is
inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference
to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes
with a brief outlook on the “family” of theories of truth generated by the new methodology.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
13.
Matthew Sleat 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(3):288-305
This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics. 相似文献
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George Crowder 《Journal of applied philosophy》1998,15(3):287-298
John Gray claims that 'value pluralism', or the plurality and incommensurability of basic values, undermines any attempt to make a reasoned case for the superiority of liberalism (or any other ideology) over its rivals. Incommensurable values, he says, cannot be subjected to a rational ranking, except in particular cases, yet liberalism appears to advocate the promotion of certain values rather than others in general terms. I argue that Gray's critique has force against some traditional justifications of liberal politics, but that he exaggerates its reach against other, more recent forms of liberal theory. In particular, Gray's view of liberalism as merely one form of life among others, with no rational claims to precedence, rests on a mistaken understanding of the implications of value pluralism. The incommensurability of values does not imply the absolute incommensurability of forms of life, such as those of liberal and non-liberal cultures. Far from being incompatible with the reasoned advocacy of liberalism, value pluralism may itself provide liberalism with a rational grounding. 相似文献
16.
Sungmoon Kim 《Dao》2012,11(3):315-336
In this paper, I attempt to revamp Confucian democracy, which is originally presented as the communitarian corrective and cultural alternative to Western liberal democracy, into a robust democratic political theory and practice that is plausible in the societal context of pluralism. In order to do so, I first investigate the core tenets of value pluralism with reference to William Galston??s political theory, which gives full attention to the intrinsic value of diversity and human plurality particularly in the modern democratic context. I then construct a political theory of Confucian pluralist democracy by critically engaging with two dominant versions of Confucian democracy??Confucian communitarian democracy and Confucian meritocratic democracy. My key argument is threefold: (1) the unity in Confucian democracy should be interpreted not as moral unity but as constitutional unity; (2) Confucian virtues should be differentiated (or pluralized) between moral virtues and civic virtues; (3) in Confucian democracy minorities have the constitutional right to contest public norms in civil society. 相似文献
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Ernest Adams 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2002,83(3):207-222
This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on. 相似文献
20.
Philosophia - This paper distinguishes two ways in which to think about the freedom of extremists. Non-pluralists claim to have identified the general rule for resolving moral conflicts, and... 相似文献