Mind,Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language

Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001 Todes S 2001 Body and World Cambridge MA MIT Press  ) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994 McDowell J 1994 Mind and World Cambridge MA Harvard University Press  ) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical‐perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual “all the way down” only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical “all the way up”. This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism.     

Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind

Abstract

McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer look at the prima facie puzzling asymmetry dissolves the apparent disagreement and reveals a deeper agreement concerning both the nature and the origin of the problems haunting the Cartesian picture in question. Both McDowell and Merleau-Ponty argue that on the picture of the relation of between mind and world in question, we lose our grip on the very idea of a perceptual appearance. Furthermore, the two authors regard a certain conception of nature as conceived in the image of science, as one of the crucial elements in making the picture of the mind in question look attractive.     

Equipment,World, and Language

Contrary to Eckart Förster, I argue that the Opus postumumrepresents more of an evolution than a revolution in Kant's thought. Among other points, I argue that Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre, or theory of self-positing, according to which we cannot have knowledge of the spatio-temporal world except through recognition of the changes we initiate in it by our own bodies, does not constitute a radicalization of Kant's transcendental idealism, but is a development of the realist line of argument introduced by the "Refutation of Idealism" of 1787-90; and I argue that Kant's concept of the highest good, which according to Förster was only revised to connect virtue to collective rather than individual happiness in 1790-93 and was then in any case withdrawn in the Opus postumum, was uninterruptedly focused on collective happiness from the first edition of the first Critique, and that there is no reason to believe that ever Kant retracted it.     

Brain,Mind, World: Predictive Coding,Neo-Kantianism,and Transcendental Idealism

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism?     

Homo Virtualis: Body,Mind, and Soul in a Virtual World

The virtual reality that stands in the center of the digital revolution is changing the bases of our lives today. This new reality is both a product of the basic human ability of imagination and an essential element of analytical psychology. The close relationship between the activity of imagination and its influence on the body is shown in research results from the oldest known prehistoric figures, dating back between 40,000–30,000 b.c.e., and the experiences derived from the work with robots at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Additionally, how this virtual, body-transforming power is reflected in the current ideas of the transhumanists is examined. In this perspective, the extension of physical abilities via technical skills is a necessary step in human evolution: to transfer the human mind onto a machine as a means of circumventing inherent physical limitations.

The psychodynamics of deep psychological needs, frustrations, and fears are discussed as the motors of technical development. An interpretation of this development, based on the mythological biography of the ancient god Hephaistos, is discussed as showing astonishing parallels to the characteristics of the digital revolution and the transhumanist ideas. Thus, Hephaistos can be understood as an archetypal manifestation of those impulses from the collective unconscious that are significantly affecting our present time. The potentialities as well as the dark sides that are hidden behind such “hephaistic” solutions to deep inner psychological and spiritual conflicts are explored.     

论语言与心智

作者对语言与心智的关系及研究历史进行了梳理与阐述,理性地评价了自机械哲学以来对心智概念的多种探索性尝试,并对笛卡尔提出身-心二元论背后的"方法论上的自然主义"和世界可理解性之伽利略模式做了积极的肯定。"方法论上的自然主义"有别于"方法论上的二元论",前者是无可厚非的,而后者极具争议。作者认为语言与心智的某些方面,无论是还原还是整合,在建立丰富的学说主体之前,还不为人类当前的智力所及。     

语言,语义,语言表征,心理理论--从语言获得建构理论谈心理理论和语言能力的关系

语言获得建构论认为儿童利用社会和一般的认知技能进行范畴化。通过主动的用法建构获得语言符号系统。通过大量研究分析推断：儿童心理理论的发展是儿童社会认知概念系统发展和语言表征发展的结果。通过概念系统发展和语言表征以及语言功能性发展的分析,有助于理解语言能力和心理理论的关系。     

Mind and World: From Soft Naturalism to Anti-naturalism

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper seeks to move from soft naturalism to anti-naturalism with regard to the understanding of mind and the world. John McDowell has...