Can fast and slow intelligence be differentiated?

Responses to items from an intelligence test may be fast or slow. The research issue dealt with in this paper is whether the intelligence involved in fast correct responses differs in nature from the intelligence involved in slow correct responses. There are two questions related to this issue: 1. Are the processes involved different? 2. Are the abilities involved different? An answer to these questions is provided making use of data from a Raven-like matrices test and a verbal analogies test, and the use of a psychometric branching model. The branching model is based on three latent traits: speed, fast accuracy and slow accuracy, and item parameters corresponding to each of these. The pattern of item difficulties is used to draw conclusions on the cognitive processes involved. The results are as follows: 1. The processes involved in fast and slow responses can be differentiated, as can be derived from qualitative differences in the patterns of item difficulty, and fast responses lead to a larger differentiation between items than slow responses do. 2. The abilities underlying fast and slow responses can also be differentiated, and fast responses allow for a better differentiation between the respondents.     

Can intelligence be estimated from drawings of a man?

There has been some disagreement as to whether intelligence can be estimated reliably and validly from the Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Man Test (DAM). In order to assess the DAM, 21 graduate students in psychology administered the Harris DAM and either the WISC or Stanford-Binet (S-B) to 158 “normal” children. Discrepancy scores between the DAM and the S-B or WISC indicated that the DAM IQ tends to be below, at times considerably, IQs obtained from individual scales. Moreover, the DAM seemed to be virtually useless in making discriminations among children of average and superior intelligence. The Harris scoring system was not found to be more discriminating than the original Goodenough, and the results provided little encouragement for the practice of estimating intelligence from a child's DAM.     

Can fluid intelligence be reduced to ‘simple’ short-term storage?

Much is written regarding the associations between human intelligence and cognition. However, it is unusual to find comprehensive studies. Here twenty four measures tapping eight cognitive abilities and skills are considered for assessing a sample of one hundred and eighty five young adults. The simultaneous relationships among fluid, crystallized, and spatial intelligence, along with short-term memory, working memory capacity, executive updating, attention, and processing speed are analyzed using a latent-variable approach. The key findings show that (a) short-term storage, working memory, and updating are hardly distinguishable, and (b) fluid intelligence is near-perfectly correlated with these three cognitive functions. It is concluded that this nuclear intelligence component can be largely identified with basic and general short-term storage processes, namely, encoding, maintenance, and retrieval.     

Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?

Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his Deflationary Truth and the Liar (JPL 28:455–488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism.     

Can Bioethics be Lutheran?

Abstract :  A Lutheran bioethics must rest on a reconstructed version of Martin Luther's ethics. In the article it is shown that this ethics is Christian in that it has faith in Jesus Christ as its source. But the ethics of neighbor love is practiced in the secular world where it to some extent corresponds with natural law ethics. A Christian believer acts ethically both as an individual and as a citizen. Against the background of this understanding of Lutheran ethics, the position of Ted Peters and Gilbert Meilaender on genetics and stem cells is presented and criticized. One conclusion is that there is no Lutheran doctrine on the status of the human embryo.     

Can semantics be syntactic?

The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only because they assume the foundations of strong AI at the outset.The author wishes to thank Brad Bergeron, David J. Cole, James H. Fetzer, Charles E. Jahren, Michael Losonsky, William J. Rapaport, and Robyn Roslak for reading earlier drafts of this paper and/or their general discussions on cognitive science and AI. An earlier version of this paper was given at the Student Conference of the Minnesota Philosophical Society, Bethel College, 1988.     

Can Philosophy be International?

There is a difference between internationalism in politics and philosophy. This paper takes the position that internationalism is possible in politics but not in philosophy, although it is an objective worth pursuing in both domains.     

Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?

The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare.     

Can Architecture be Barbaric?

The title of this article is adapted from Theodor W. Adorno’s famous dictum: ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.’ After the catastrophic earthquake in Kocaeli, Turkey on the 17th of August 1999, in which more than 40,000 people died or were lost, Necdet Teymur, who was then the dean of the Faculty of Architecture of the Middle East Technical University, referred to Adorno in one of his ‘earthquake poems’ and asked: ‘Is architecture possible after 17th of August?’ The main objective of this article is to interpret Teymur’s question in respect of its connection to Adorno’s philosophy with a view to make a contribution to the politics and ethics of architecture in Turkey. Teymur’s question helps in providing a new interpretation of a critical approach to architecture and architectural technology through Adorno’s philosophy. The paper also presents a discussion of Adorno`s dictum, which serves for a better understanding of its universality/particularity.     

Kvashchev's experiment: Can we boost intelligence?

In an effort to improve performance of high school students on intelligence tests, a large-scale study involving 296 students was carried out. Members of the experimental group (N = 149) were given exercises in creative problem solving 3 to 4 times a week over a period of 3 years and performance was assessed on four occasions—at the beginning of the experiment, at the end of it, and twice during the fourth year of High School. The test battery contained 28 measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. The results indicate that it is possible to achieve small improvement in performance and that this improvement remains 1 year after the end of training. The improvement is more pronounced with measures of fluid intelligence than with measures of crystallized intelligence.     

Can Psychoanalysis be a Science?

This essay proposes to examine a limited number of critical assessments regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis with reference to intents and purposes, claims and disclaimers, contrasting views of what constitutes a science and the nature of scientific thinking and how these might apply to psychoanalysis epistemologically. It assumes a certain degree of familiarity with criticisms that have been leveled against psychoanalysis from those who insist on absolutist testing for what some call true science, particularly on the part of those who are not practitioners of the art. It wonders about the concern with scientizing by those who actually practice it, or value it in some way or another. It suggests an open minded approach without premature or even warranted closure on the subject of human beings and of ways of getting to know them, let alone understanding them and perhaps being of help to them.     

Can transcendental intersubjectivity be naturalised?

I discuss Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project on the one hand and Molyneux’s Question on the other.