Euthanasia and John Paul II's "silent language of profound sharing of affection:" why Christians should care about Peter Singer.

Peter Singer's recent appointment to Princeton University created considerable controversy, most of it focused on his proposal for active euthanasia of disabled infants. Singer articulates utilitarian ideas that often appear in public discussions of euthanasia. Drawing on Pope John Paul II's work on ethics and suffering, I argue that Singer's utilitarian theory of value is impoverished. After introducing the Pope's ethic based on the imago dei, I discuss love as self-gift. I show how this concept supports a theory of value in which spiritual goods are preeminent over material goods. I then describe how suffering reveals spiritual goods, discussing how participation in Christ's suffering can alter our perception of value. I also consider how communal responses to suffering provide opportunities for self-giving. Third, I consider Singer's proposal for killing infants with hemophilia, arguing that it arbitrarily ignores spiritual goods. I then discuss proposals to kill anencephalic infants, discussing how parental responses to their suffering can demonstrate an extraordinary love in seemingly hopeless circumstances. I conclude by calling for a more sustained social response to euthanasia initiatives.     

Some problems for Gibbard's norm-expressivism

Conclusion I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about morality which have at most indirect connections to his expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later discussions of hyperscepticism (180), parochialism (203 ff.), and indirect pragmatism (224). These views could still be developed even if he gave up expressivism. All I have tried to show here is that he does need to give up expressivism unless he can solve the problems that I have raised.     

On Seeing That Someone is Angry

Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you see that James is angry in the first way, your knowledge is inferential. If you see that James is angry in the second way, your knowledge is not inferential. These are different ways of knowing that James is angry. So the Perceptual Hypothesis alone does not adequately answer the question of how you know that fact. To ascertain how you know it, we need to decide whether or not you saw his anger. This is an epistemological argument. But it has consequences for a theory of perception. It implies that there is a determinate fact about which features of an object you see. This fact is made true independently of what you come to know by seeing. In the final section of the paper, I seek to undermine various ways in which the claim that you see James' anger may be thought implausible.     

组织认同的基础理论、测量及相关变量

组织认同是个体源于组织成员身份的一种自我构念,它与组织认定、组织承诺等概念存在显著差异。文章阐述了组织认同基础理论的三种主要观点,对比了差异论、资源论和信息论的研究视角和相互关系。文章着重说明了组织认同的测量工具,分析了组织层面和个人层面的前因变量,以及组织认同对离职意愿等结果变量的影响。文章最后指出今后有必要对扩展定义、影响因素和国家文化差异等方面进行探讨     

Reply to Review Essay

I thank John Kerr for his long and detailed review of my Freud biography and note our major points of agreement and disagreement. Kerr and I both see the wisdom of placing Freud in the context of the major relationships of his life as opposed to viewing him as a self-created hero. We also note the value of using contemporary ideas and research, much of them based on the foundation that Freud erected, to loop back and understand him in new ways. I believe, more strongly than Kerr, that Freud's early traumatic losses, and the way he came to terms with them—or did not—in his self-analysis, had long-lasting effects on his character, relationships, and psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Several minor points of agreement and disagreement are also discussed.     

Homosexuality and Nature: happiness and the law at stake

ABSTRACT In this essay the argument set forth by Michael Levin regarding the abnormality of homosexual behaviour is reviewed and criticized. Against his argument which holds that homosexual behaviour is abnormal because it constitutes an evolutionary aberration, I argue that Levin's and all similarly constructed arguments fail to show that evolutionary origins of sexual behaviour have any significant normative force. I contend that his notion of homosexuality is confused and that he fails to consider alternative methods of how homosexuality might have indeed served evolutionary adaptive purposes or been the result of surplus adaptations. I argue, too, that Levin's linking of unhappiness with homosexual behaviour is spurious and ill-supported. Consequently, I reject Levin's claims that public policy ought to do what it can to minimize the incidence of such behaviour. I argue by contrast that if happiness is the end of public policy decisions, then society ought to take what measures it can to protect persons in respect of their homosexual behaviour and identities.     

Fairy-tales and teaching family therapy

This paper sets out to illustrate how well-known fairy-tales can be adapted to serve as a useful teaching tool in family therapy. Familiarity with fairy stories means they can be used as a ready access to common family constellations and dynamics. This may be particularly useful when asked to present an introductory workshop or single lecture to participants unsophisticated in family therapy conceptualizations or practice. Potential clinical applications are also briefly mentioned.     

On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to Presence in a Distracted World

In the biblical creation story human beings are depicted as beings ejected from the true home given to them in creation and entrapped in the dynamics of their flight from God. Franz Rosenzweig suggested that modern life is best understood as a type of chronic living death characterized by an animate but nevertheless sterile experience of loss. Following Eric Santner's presentation of this theme in Rosenzweig, this article will explore what it might mean to recover a sense of the goodness of place and particularity. I will examine Santner's suggestion that to become present to ‘place’ is to have undergone the ‘undeadening’ intervention of another person, who offers us an exit route in the midst of the tangle of our lived lives. I will then show how the main lines of his analysis both parallel and offer ways to sharpen important aspects of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account in Creation and Fall of the dynamics of the Fall and the healing of creatures. Human beings are depicted by Bonhoeffer as in need of being transformed into creatures, a theological insight resting on a complex account of creation, and which I will suggest, in conclusion, is a particularly important theme of a Christian gospel that can speak to a world saturated by the desire to be elsewhere.     

The Kant and Race Debate: A Frederick Douglass Intervention

Samuel Fleischacker is interested in two questions that are—what he refers to as—a rephrasing of three implications Charles Mills takes away from his encounter with Kant: (1) Is Kant's moral philosophy racist at its core? and (2) Whether it is or not, how should we respond to the fact that Kant displays open racism in some of his writings when we study, teach, or try to make use of his purportedly egalitarian teachings? Frederick Douglass was an abolitionist who wrestled with similar questions regarding the liberatory and inclusive nature of emancipatory documents like the Constitution. In this essay, I want to consider Douglass's changing views on this issue and reasons behind them to think about how he might offer insights into this current debate concerning Kant and race. In doing so, I will consider to what extent Fleischacker adheres to Douglass's guidelines on this matter as he makes his case. I then offer suggestions on how to move forward.     

Shaping and Discovering: Thoughts About Marc Rehm's Meditations

Marc Rehm invites us to muse about the theme of undue influence as it affects our relationships with our patients and children. Marc suggests that alongside our good intentions and loving vision of their future lie feelings of hate and destructiveness that complicate our efforts on their behalf. I address Marc's thesis, its Winnicottian roots, and then turn his question back on itself by musing about how his paper—which was born and nurtured in my writing group—might have itself been shaped (as much as discovered) by the group. I raise the question of undue influence as it affects the process of mentoring.     

A Realist Analysis of the Relationship between Logic and Experience

I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their formal character and relationships alone. The laws thus understood explain how algorithms set up to mirror them can accomplish what they do to advance knowledge, even though they operate purely mechanically. Further, they explain the proper sense in which formal laws "govern," and may guide, processes of actual thinking. Husserl's theory is a realist theory in the sense that, on his interpretation, the laws of pure or formal logic hold true regardless of what any individual, culture or species may or may not think, or even if no thinking ever occurs. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Humour and the super-ego: A case study of Paul Muldoon’s poetry

This article focuses on the workings of ‘humour’, a phenomenon that is often neglected in Freudian readings of literature, and also (perhaps relatedly) in the analysis of work with patients. Challenging views that the details of humour are best left uninterpreted, it explores how they can provide a mode of access to what is important. In particular, it focuses on the idea of Galgenhumor (literally ‘gallows humour’) in Northern Irish verse. The Ulster poet Paul Muldoon provides a ‘case study’ of someone using considerable humour while facing political atrocities. I aim to show that Muldoon can be viewed as a useful chronicler of ‘the Troubles’ and that a Freudian view of his humour can help readers to appreciate his significance. The method of the article is to interpret some of Muldoon’s verse by applying Freudian theory, working on the basis that poetry can sometimes achieve its effects in ways that are obscured to both the reader and the poet. I have not set out to psychoanalyze Paul Muldoon through a reading of his poems, but rather to stage a discussion of ways that humour can work, making use of Freud’s theories about the unconscious, especially his writings on humour. I examine how humour can create an outlet for affect while simultaneously assisting its repression, and also how it can leave memorable traces of traumatic experience, making it easier for the experience to become available for retrospective examination and exploration.     

Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars's Myth of Jones

Part of Sellars's general attack on the Myth of the Given is his endorsement of psychological nominalism, a view that implies that awareness of our own mental states is not given but must be earned. Sellars provides an account of how such awareness might have been earned with the Myth of Jones. Such an account is important for Sellars, for without it the Given can look necessary after all. But a problem with such accounts is that they can look extremely implausible. Sellars himself seems unconcerned to make his account plausible, and so others have stepped in here. But, I argue, they have done so in ways that fail to respect his psychological nominalism. This evinces, as well as reinforces, a lack of sensitivity to the scope of Sellars's attack on the Given, the aim of which is the dismantling of “the entire framework of givenness.” In this essay, I show how one can make Sellars's Myth of Jones plausible, while still respecting his psychological nominalism, by seeing how Jones's thought is governed by the norms of rationality as interpretability.     

Critique,Finitude and the Importance of Susceptibility: A Rossian Approach to Interpreting Kant on Pleasure

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo (2014), who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude (and really his commitment to Transcendental Idealism itself), remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence.

     

LAW NECESSITARIANISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING INTUITIVE

The counter-intuitive implications of law necessitarianism pose a far more serious threat than its proponents recognize. Law necessitarians are committed to scientific essentialism, the thesis that there are metaphysically necessary truths which can be known only a posteriori. The most frequently cited arguments for this position rely on modal intuitions. Rejection of intuition thus threatens to undermine it. I consider ways in which law necessitarians might try to defend scientific essentialism without invoking intuition. I then consider ways in which law necessitarians who accept the general reliability of intuition might try to explain away the intuitions which conflict with their theory.     

Basic‐Know And Super‐Know

Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term ‘know’ as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic‐know or super‐know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure‐Thing Principle.     

Causation in the Phaedo

Abstract: In the Phaedo Socrates says that as a young man he thought it a great thing to know the causes of things; but finding existing accounts unsatisfying, he fell back on a method of his own, hypothesizing that Forms are causes. I argue that part of what this hypothesis says is that certain phenomena – the ones for which it postulates Forms as causes – are the result of processes whose object was to produce them. I then use this conclusion to explain how Socrates’ discussion of causality in the Phaedo might be supposed to contribute to his final argument for immortality.     

From disconnection to connection: 'Race', gender and the politics of therapy

Person-centred therapy typically fails to address structural dimensions of inequality such as 'race', gender and class. In this paper, I explore why this is, and what can be done about it - at the levels of theory, practice and the organisation of services. Drawing on person-centred theory and practice, I discuss theoretical and practical resources that can inform a critical therapeutic practice that both attends to the individual and connects with social contexts. Focusing on the intersectionality between gendered and 'raced' positions mobilised within any therapeutic intervention highlights the inevitability of working across various dimensions of structural difference and power. Rather than obscuring these, I illustrate how a direct engagement with them can enhance person centred theory and practice. In particular, I highlight the role of racialised and gendered conditions of worth (Chantler, 2004) together with concepts of minoritisation and intersectionality (Batsleer et al., 2002). I also indicate ways forward for inclusive counselling services.     

事件时间估计偏差理论述

人们总是倾向低估完成某一任务的时间。计划谬误理论认为,时间低估倾向的原因是人们估计时间时忽视过去完成类似任务的经验,过于关注理想的任务计划和任务情景,从而导致乐观的时间估计。但是基于该理论的一些提高时间估计精确性的策略没有达到预期效果。针对这种不足,记忆偏差理论认为,人们利用的时间记忆带有偏差,从而导致偏差的时间估计。两个理论之间引起一些争论,但如果从解释水平理论的角度可以找到其相通之处     

The phenomenology of virtue

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much.