A modern meditation on death: identifying buddhist teachings in George A. Romero's Night of the Living Dead

A confluence of increasing interest in popular culture as a source for religious inspiration and the growing interest, both popular and scholarly, in zombie-fiction bring together several possibilities for scholarship in the context of religious studies. This paper will present one aspect of the zombie-craze in the light of Buddhist philosophy. The Buddha taught that the illusion of self-ish-ness, and resulting attachments, are the greatest hurdles to achieving nibbana. Through meditating on the decomposing corpse, Buddhists may come to realize the Ten Impurities of the Body, and so come to grips with the impermanence of the self. I will illustrate how George Romero's Night of the Living Dead, recognized as the watershed film of the modern zombie sub-genre, unintentionally conveys the Buddhist teachings of dukkha (suffering by attachments), anatta (no-self), and anicca (impermanence).     

A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind

In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vai?e?ikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.     

SELF OR NO-SELF? CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM

Abstract. The nature of self is examined in relation to psychological observations which reveal some form of dissociation of knowledge from consciousness. Such dissociations are apparent in cases of blindsight, and amnesic patients displaying implicit memory effects, among others. While amnesic patients, for example, are unable consciously to recall material previously presented, such material does influence subsequent physiological and psychological processes. Thus, it is not the memories themselves that have been lost, but the ability to make conscious connection to them. In attempting to account for such observations, theoreticians generally have posited some kind of "consciousness system" that may become dissociated from brain modules dealing with specific processing.
It is argued here that a view of self along the lines of the Buddhist concepts of no-self and the conditioned nature of "I" introduces a more parsimonious perspective on the neuropsychological data. A theory of the nature of self is presented that constitutes a synthesis between key ideas drawn from Buddhist and other mainly mystical traditions and the scientific observations in psychology. Central to this theory is the role that the left hemisphere's interpreter (Gazzaniga 1985; 1988a; 1988b) plays in constructing a unified "I." This "I" is, in effect, a hypothesis that the mind generates to introduce some coherence into otherwise fragmentary mental elements. Although it appears to be the causal focus of the individual's behavior and experience, it is in fact a retrospective construction and not a true causal structure of the mind. This theoretical view is discussed in relation to various meanings of the term consciousness and also in relation to the relevant neuropsychological cases.     

无我：佛教中自我观的心理学分析

“无我”不仅是佛教心理学的核心, 也是佛教心理学关于自我本质的独特见解：微细难知的末那识是自我产生的根源; 东方式禅定是自我研究的方法; 自我是五蕴和合的幻相, 无我是假我与真我的统一。佛教心理学以“无我”揭示了自我的真谛, 是对西方心理学自我研究范式的一种补充与超越。     

No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership

The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownership of experiences, and thereby apparently obliged to explain our purported experience of ownership. My experiences seemingly come with the sense that I am the one who is undergoing this experience. But is there a really an experience of ownership—namely, an experience of being a subject that underlies our sense of ownership? I argue that there is nothing that it is like to be an owner of experiences, in the sense that there is no experiential phenomenology associated with the ownership of experience. The second part of the paper argues that, since there is no experience of ownership, there is no onus on the Abhidharma philosopher to give an explanation of the sense of ownership.     

The development of our sense of self as a defense against invading thoughts: From Buddhist psychology to psychoanalysis

In interdisciplinary debates on the nature of the self, no-self accounts often refer to Buddhist psychology, arguing that the self is an illusion arising from our identification with mental content. What is often missing, however, is a developmentally, motivationally and emotionally plausible reason why this identification happens in the first place. It is argued that directing attention to our ongoing thought activities and their effect on our mind reveals their often invasive character. This is supported by psychoanalytic accounts on the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of thinking. On an experiential level, invading thoughts have similarities to attacks and provoke defensive reactions. The defense mechanism described as identification with the aggressor is used as a model in order to better grasp how we deal with invading thoughts, namely, by identifying with them and thus generating a sense of self as an agent of thoughts which provides an illusion of control.     

Searching for the Power–I: Nietzsche and Nirvana

The usual approach in Buddhist-Western writings uses Buddhist perspectives to help answer Western philosophical–psychological questions. This paper reverses the process and uses the Western philosophical perspective of Nietzsche to answer questions of Buddhist-conceived nirvana. Nietzsche's philosophy of will, expounded primarily through the Zarathustra essays, provides an active and affirmative alternative for understanding and attaining nirvana. His ideas of free will and will to power have commonalities with Buddhist practice and thought, including nonattachment, nihilism, no-self, and meditation. Nietzschean will revises the Buddhist notion of right effort to answer questions about coping with inner suffering and outer-world corruption. It shows nirvana to be less a state of passive being and more a state of active becoming.?Why approach such important matters as transcendence, power, and God from the standpoint of the ‘I’? First, I-centered analysis can clarify egological concepts such as the subject-I, object-self, and conceptualizing-ego and what these concepts contribute to an experience-based metaphysics, for even the most objective factual or mathematical expression must be stated and understood by an active subject-I. Second, I-centered analysis can advance the phenomenological study of the role of the I in the subjective realms of mind. Third, it can help resolve issues in both Western and Buddhist philosophy such as activism–passivism, subjectivity–objectivity, will and freedom, I and other, and secular/sacred presence in consciousness.     

Enlightenment as a Psychological Construct and as a Buddhist Religious Pursuit: A Cross-cultural Understanding

Enlightenment has been explored in a variety of ways, for example, in Buddhist cultural traditions and in psychological science. In this essay, we categorise enlightenment as both a religious pursuit and psychological construct in order to reach a deep understanding. We summarise the key elements of enlightenment in Chinese Chan history and the development of an Enlightenment Scale in a Western context then discuss the weaknesses of Chan teaching methods with respect to the assessment of levels of Chan practitioners’ enlightenment. Instrument development methods in Western psychological science provide a useful way to capture the concept of enlightenment, and we argue that the Enlightenment Scale can be used to assess Chan practitioners’ enlightenment. The Enlightenment Scale may not assess all features of enlightenment from a Chan Buddhist perspective, so it is proposed that the scale is examined and if necessary adapted accordingly, a research area in Chinese Buddhist study that to date has been neglected.     

A Buddhist contribution to the psychoanalytic psychology of self

The author attempts to integrate the concepts of self used in psychoanalytic theory with the understanding of the nature of self as explained within the Buddhist meditative tradition. He divides different concepts of self in psychoanalytic theory into three major levels of consciousness and abstraction: self as experience, representational self and self as system. The representational level is defined as consisting of unconscious organizing structures of interaction: the system level is a hierarchically higher organization of representations, while the experiential level consists of the moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. He argues that for the sake of theoretical clarity these levels should be differentiated in discussions of self. He then describes the Buddhist psychology of self and tries to show how this perspective can enrich psychoanalytic understanding of the experiential self and of narcissism, which in Buddhist language would be described as clinging to (seeking or avoiding) images of self that arise in the mind. Last, he describes a model of therapeutic development using different levels of self and the interrelationship between them, showing how psychoanalytic psychotherapy and Buddhist insight meditation emphasize different levels of self using complementary rather than mutually exclusive methods.     

No-Self and the phenomenology of agency

The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments (as presented in Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?a-bhāsya) for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified, extended, narrative self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with sense of ownership and sense of agency. The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The second part of the paper reconstructs the Buddhist explanation using resources from contemporary discussions about the sense (or lack thereof) of agency.     

A kantian reading of aesthetic freedom and complete human nature nourished through art in a classical Chinese artistic context

In this paper, I will show that classical Chinese artists adopted either Daoist or Chan Buddhist meditation to cultivate their mind to be in accord with the Dao, and that their view of the detached mental state as an ideal mental state for art appears to fit in with Kant’s notion of aesthetic freedom. Even though it might be claimed that sensibilities are stressed over rationality in the classical Chinese artistic tradition, I suggest that the detached mental state cultivated through Daoist or Chan Buddhist meditation and experienced in artistic practice helps artists restore a balanced human nature. By projecting Schiller’s account of the play drive, and the account of aesthetic freedom he developed from Kant’s ideas, into the classical Chinese artistic context, I attempt to explain the balanced nature realised through artistic play by classical Chinese artists and point out the differences behind the parallels between these two approaches.     

Integrating Spiritual Modeling Into Education: A College Course for Stress Management and Spiritual Growth

The article explores the relationship between mysticism and creativity from a psychoanalytic perspective. First, it first surveys prominent psychoanalytic perspectives on mysticism and creativity, situating British psychoanalyst Marion Milner among them. Milner suggests that the same psychological processes are involved in both creative expression and mystical experiences. A state of paradox, affirming both I and not-I, self and no-self, is at the core of mysticism. Similarly, for Milner the paradox of creativity is to break down the barrier of space between self and other while maintaining it. Second, the idea that mystics and artists share a common basic experience is investigated. In both mystical and creative states one finds elements of joy, union, ecstasy, absorption, loss of self-consciousness, and loss of sense of time. Milner's discussion in turn revolves around the I-not-I distinction. She posits that mysticism is one dimension of the creative process-in contrast to the pure oceanic feeling of the mystic, the creative process is constituted by the oceanic state in cyclic oscillation with the surface mind, actively used with the intent to produce something. Third, the relevance of mysticism and creativity for mental health is explored. For Milner, both creativity and mystical experiences are psychologically beneficial in that they undo the overfixed separation self and other caused by the tyranny of the conscious mind. Yet neither mysticism nor creative expression alone, in her view, can heal an underlying lack of sense of self.     

A Buddhist–Lacanian Perspective on Lack

The historical and contemporary dialogue between psychoanalysis and Buddhism is examined to advance theories of self-representation. This theoretical foundation provides for a reinterpretation of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory as it applies to the unconscious lack that haunts human subjectivity. The inevitable failure to construct an enduring and permanent sense of self is linked to a chronic feeling of lack and cultural malaise. Drawing upon the work of Buddhist philosopher David Loy, the article proposes that this feeling of lack is symptomatic of a more fundamental and primary repression: a fear of no-self, or egolessness. Both the Buddhist tradition and Lacanian methods rely on unconventional and indirect methods for circumventing the will of the ego. Such unconventional methods are employed to decenter our familiar and common modes of representational discourse in order to deconstruct the ego.     

Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness

In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self.     

The Spacious Mind: Using Archetypes for Transformation Towards Wisdom

The spacious mind model combines Hindu and Buddhist philosophy on spiritual maturity with the Jungian view on psychological maturity to delineate how archetypal work can spur the development of wisdom. Both psychological and spiritual development defuse the ego's hold on reality to create a spacious mind that has contact with the spiritual Self. To explain such a transformation, this article discusses 5 parts of the mind: the ego, the conscious, the unconscious, the archetype, and the Self. The innovative features here are an integrated view of spiritual and psychological development, and the insight that archetypal work can be a mechanism for growth in both domains, because an archetype resides in the energetic plane with the Self and in the conscious mind with the ego.     

The Compatibility between Bodhisattva Compassion and ‘No-self’

Since arguably Bodhisattva Practice (bodhisattva-carya) is the foundation of Mahayana Buddhist ethics, it is significantly important for Bodhisattva compassion to be compatible with other Buddhist doctrines, specifically with the doctrine of ‘no-self ’ (anatta). There are two thoughts on the relation between compassion and ‘no-self ’: they are compatible or incompatibility. Most Buddhist authors accept the former view. However, the principal problem with the two views is that their arguments have not been singled out. So the acceptance or denial of the compatibility may not be well grounded. This paper is to identify and evaluate the arguments for and against the agreeability, and to defend the compatible view.     

Paradoxicality of Institution, De-Institutionalization and the Counter-Institutional: A Case Study in Classical Chinese Chan Buddhist Thought

This article examines the issue of the paradoxicality of institution, de-institutionalization, or the counter-institutionalization in classical Chan thought by focusing on the texts of Hongzhou School. It first analyzes the problem of 20th century scholars in characterizing the Chan attitude toward institution as iconoclasts, and the problem of the recent tendency to return to images of the Chan masters as traditionalists, as opposed to iconoclasts. Both problems are examples of imposing an oppositional way of thinking on the Chan masters. The essay then introduces a new paradigm for interpreting the Chan attitude toward institution, the model of de-institutionalization, which borrows certain insights from Derrida’s idea of the counter-institutional. However, the new model is supported by the Chan heritage of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. This model can more consistently construe the Chan understanding of the paradoxicality of institution, the subtle Chan relationship of being “with and against” institution, and the Chan “middle way” to make institution remain open to its outside and to transformation.     

Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being

From its inception psychoanalysis claimed not merely to be an effective therapy for psychological suffering, but to shed light on the human condition. But what kind of insight does psychoanalysis offer? This paper locates psychoanalysis in the western philosophical tradition, arguing that psychoanalysis provides not only theoretical wisdom about the human, but practical wisdom of a peculiar kind. The human mind, through its self‐conscious understanding can be immediately and directly efficacious in shaping its own structure.     

‘Freedom/Ignorance’: Buddhist-Ontological Non-Duality and Metaethics in an Age of Terror

This essay considers some meta-ethical questions that emerge from a consideration of the phenomena of terrorism in the context of Buddhist metaphysics: what, in the Buddhist view, ultimately causes terrorism (and its subsidiary effects)? What resources do the Buddhist metaphysical claims of no-self, karma, emptiness and related concepts bring to a meta-ethical understanding of terrorism and its effects?     

A Buddhist Take on Gilbert Ryle’s Theory of Mind

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out similarities between the Buddhist outlook and Ryle’s ideas in three parts. First, I illustrate that Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ has certain points in common with the Buddhist refutation of ‘self’. Within the Buddhist framework, referents such as ‘mind’ and ‘self’ are merely imputed terms. The presumed existence of an independent substance such as a ‘soul’, when considered in isolation from the expedient usage of the term ‘mind’, can therefore also be viewed as a ‘category mistake’. Second, attempting to solve the questions of ‘what mind is’ and ‘how mind operates’ are two entirely different approaches to the study of mind. I argue that it is necessary to focus on ‘knowing-how’ rather than ‘knowing-that’, if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of mind and avoid any kind of category mistake such as those that follow from isolating the physical properties of brain or drawing inferences from a mystical soul. Third, I aim to show why investigating mind from the perspective of ‘dispositions’ of behavior is a valid approach. The Buddhist concept of karma-vāsanā elucidates the habitual tendency to act or not act in various situations. Based on this theory, I argue that the workings of the human mind bears strong links to the formation of karma and as such have important axiological implications that cannot be ignored. I conclude by pointing out that Ryle’s insightful ideas could in certain ways be complemented by the Buddhist theory of mind. In my view, his philosophy is not only a mediator between Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, but could perhaps also be seen as a mediator between traditional Eastern systems of thought and contemporary philosophies of mind.