Clinging to Nothing: The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Upādāna in Early Buddhism

The concept of clinging (upādāna) is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging     

Mental Pain in the Mahābhārata

International Journal of Hindu Studies - A number of passages in the Mahābhārata draw the distinction between bodily pain (?ārīra? du?kham) and mental pain...     

Spacious Awareness in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Role in the Modern Mindfulness Movement

This paper investigates a particular understanding of ‘awareness’ in Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relevance for secular mindfulness. We will focus on the Zen and Mahāmudrā traditions which share a view of awareness as an innate wakefulness, described using metaphors of space, light and clarity. These traditions encourage practices in which the meditator rests in this spacious ‘non-dual’ awareness: Zen’s ‘just sitting’ and Mahāmudrā’s ‘open presence’. We explore the role of this approach within secular mindfulness, in particular Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT). We see how Jon Kabat-Zinn brought influences from Zen into the creation of MBSR, in his approach of ‘non-doing’, and in the practice of ‘choiceless awareness’, akin to Zen’s ‘just sitting’. We then examine how ‘open presence’ meditation is developed in the Tibetan Mahāmudrā tradition, using a sixteenth-century text Mahāmudrā: The Moonlight as our focal point. Turning to interviews with leading UK mindfulness teachers with Tibetan Buddhist training, we explore how this understanding of awareness can infuse meditation with a sense of ‘space’, and how that manifests in their teaching. We argue that a willingness to explore the ‘space of awareness’ can help mindfulness to offer a transformative path beyond stress reduction and therapy.     

On the Propositional Treatment of Anatmavāda in Early Buddhism and Ātmavāda in Hinduism

As propositions, Anatmavāda and ātmavāda are simply negations of one another. Thus whatever serves as a criterion for truth of the one must serve as a criterion for the other. When we treat them both as a priori propositions, I claim that we are unable to determine their truth value. But if we treat them both as a posteriori propositions, I argue, we are only able to determine their truth value if we attain unqualified omniscience. Because the Hindu account of knowing is far more conducive to the idea of unqualified omniscience, we might be tempted to assert that the empirical verification of these doctrines taken as propositions is far more likely in the Hindu tradition than the early Buddhist one. However, 'empirical omniscience' carries us very far from received views, thus I conclude that it makes no sense to treat these doctrines as truth-valued propositions.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Ghazāli and the Ash'arites

It has been widely accepted that the thought of al‐Ghazāli was broadly in line with the Ash'arite approach to theology, which came to have a dominant role in Islamic thought for the last thousand years. Recently, though, many commentators have argued that this is a misconception, and that there are many instances where Ghazāli produces arguments and opinions which are not compatible with Ash'arism. It is argued here that these examples do not establish that the general line of Ghazāli's thought is not Ash'arite. The fact that on occasion he is prepared to use the language of his opponents does not invalidate the Ash'arite basis of his thought. It is quite possible to adhere to a philosophical view about how reality is and at the same time use the language of those who have a different view without committing oneself to that different form of expression. Although the revisionist approach to the interpretation of Ghazāli is interesting and often perceptive, it does not lead to any necessity to question his adherence to Ash'arite principles in general.     

Dual and non-dual ontology in Satre and Mahāyāna Buddhism

Continental Philosophy Review - This paper examines Sartre's dualistic ontology in the light of the non-duality asserted by Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the first section, I show, against...     

Theodicy in a Deterministic Universe: God and the Problem of Suffering in Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The classical traditions of Vedānta in India explored the problem of why an omnipotent being like God would permit sentient beings to suffer in His...     

The Problem of Foundation in Early Nyāya and in Navya-Nyāya

The evaluation of arguments was not the sole concern of logicians in ancient India. Early Nyāya and the later Navya-Nyāya provide an interesting example of the interaction between logic and ontology. In their attempt to develop a kind of property-location logic (Navya-)Naiyāyikas had to consider what kind of restrictions they should impose on the residence relation between a property and its locus (which might again be a property). Can we admit circular residence relations or infinitely descending chains of properties, each depending on its successor as its locus? Early Naiyāyikas and to some extent also Navya-Naiyāyikas regard these phenomena as a kind of absurdity and they want to rule them out. Their intuitions about properties are close to well-founded systems of set theory, whereas the author of the Navya-Nyāya work Upādhidarpa?a is a proponent of a non-well-founded property concept. Despite certain similarities with sets properties are still regarded as intensional objects in Navya-Nyāya. In the present article I demonstrate that a Quine/Morse-style extension of George Bealer's property calculus T1 (with or without a property adaptation of the axiom of regularity) may serve as a formal system which adequately mirrors the Navya-Nyāya property-location logic.     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

Rādhātantram: Rādhā as Guru in the Service of the Great Goddess

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The Rādhātantram can serve as a tool with which to examine textual and doctrinal appropriations that took place between Vai??avas and...     

The Meaning of Prakṛti in the Yogasūtra and Vyāsabhāṣya

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prak?ti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sā?khya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sā?khya and Yoga texts the word prak?ti is used in various ways. Prak?ti does not always refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prak?ti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prak?ti in the Sā?khya-Yoga texts the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhā?ya and criticises some translation practices.     

Kāma,Preman, and Bhakti in Śrīdhara’s Commentary on Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Although the Bhāgavata Purāṇa presents an innovative soteriology of emotion that explicitly identifies kāma as the gopīs’...     

‘Aloneness’ and the problem of realism in classical Sākhya and yoga

The concept of kaivalya (literally, ‘aloneness’) is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts—namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogasūtra—and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside.