THE ‘UNIVERSAL DHARMA FOUNDATION’ OF MINDFULNESS-BASED STRESS REDUCTION: NON-DUALITY AND MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST INFLUENCES IN THE WORK OF JON KABAT-ZINN

ABSTRACT

The discussion on the Buddhist roots of contemporary mindfulness practices is dominated by a narrative which considers the Theravāda tradition and Theravāda-based ‘neo-vipassanā movement’ as the principal source of Buddhist influences in mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) and related mindfulness-based programmes (MBPs). This Theravāda bias fails to acknowledge the significant Mahāyāna Buddhist influences that have informed the pioneering work of Jon Kabat-Zinn in the formation of the MBSR programme. In Kabat-Zinn’s texts, the ‘universal dharma foundation’ of mindfulness practice is grounded in pan-Buddhist teachings on the origins and cessation of suffering. While MBSR methods derive from both Theravāda-based vipassanā and non-dual Mahāyāna approaches, the philosophical foundation of MBSR differs significantly from Theravāda views. Instead, the characteristic principles and insights of MBSR practice indicate significant similarities and historical continuities with contemporary Zen/S?n/Thi?n and Tibetan Dzogchen teachings based on doctrinal developments within Indian and East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism.     

Suffering and the Shape of Well-Being in Buddhist Ethics

This article explores the defense Indian Buddhist texts make in support of their conceptions of lives that are good for an individual. This defense occurs, largely, through their analysis of ordinary experience as being saturated by subtle forms of suffering (du?kha). I begin by explicating the most influential of the Buddhist taxonomies of suffering: the threefold division into explicit suffering (du?kha-du?khatā), the suffering of change (vipari?āma-du?khatā), and conditioned suffering (sa?skāra-du?khatā). Next, I sketch the three theories of welfare that have been most influential in contemporary ethical theory. I then argue that Buddhist texts underdetermine which of these theories would have been accepted by ancient Indian Buddhists. Nevertheless, Buddhist ideas about suffering narrow the shape any acceptable theory of welfare may take. In my conclusion, I argue that this narrowing process itself is enough to reconstruct a philosophical defense of the forms of life endorsed in Buddhist texts.     

How Nonsectarian is ‘Nonsectarian’?: Jorge Ferrer's Pluralist Alternative to Tibetan Buddhist Inclusivism

This paper queries the logic of the structure of hierarchical philosophical systems. Following the Indian tradition of siddhānta, Tibetan Buddhist traditions articulate a hierarchy of philosophical views. The ‘Middle Way’ philosophy or Madhyamaka—the view that holds that the ultimate truth is emptiness—is, in general, held to be the highest view in the systematic depictions of philosophies in Tibet, and is contrasted with realist schools of thought, Buddhist and non-Buddhist. But why should an antirealist or nominalist position be said to be ‘better’ than a realist position? What is the criterion for this claim and is it, or can it, be more than a criterion that is tradition-specific for only Tibetan Buddhists? In this paper, I will look at the criteria to evaluate Buddhist philosophical traditions, particularly as articulated in what came to be referred as the ‘nonsectarian’ (ris med) tradition. I draw from the recent work of Jorge Ferrer to query the assumptions of the hierarchical structures of ‘nonsectarian’ traditions and attempt to articulate an evaluative criteria for a nonsectarian stance that are not based solely on metaphysical or tradition-specific claims.     

No Outside,No Inside: Duality,Reality and Vasubandhu's Illusory Elephant

Some of the basic terminology of Yogācāra philosophy needs reevaluation. Whereas commentaries almost universally gloss the term dvaya (‘duality’) with some version of the phrase grāhya grāhaka ca (lit. ‘grasped and grasper’, but usually translated as ‘subject and object’), in fact this gloss is absent from the earliest strata. The term and its gloss are derived from separate streams of Yogācāra reasoning—one from discussions of linguistic conceptualization and the other from discussions of perception. Once we see that these two are distinct, it becomes clear that the commentarial literature asserts their identity in order to philosophically unify Yogācāra thought. One upshot of this is that even in this later assertion ‘duality’ refers not to the distinction between internal and external reality (as in ‘textbook’ Yogācāra), but to the falsely projected distinction between mental subjects and mental objects.     

Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions

The Mīmā?sā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmā?sā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmā?sā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmā?sā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning.     

Knowledge and Devotion in the Bhagavad-Gītā: A Suggestive Parallel from Chinese Buddhism

How is devotion (bhakti) related to knowledge (jñāna)? Does one lead to the other? Do they correspond to different paths for different people? Commentators on the Bhagavad-Gītā have debated these questions for centuries. In this essay I will suggest, as many Indian commentators have, that the paths of devotion and knowledge described in the Gītā can be harmonized. I will not draw from Indian texts, however, but from a suggestive parallel in the history of Chinese religions: namely, the development of a tradition of “dual cultivation” of Pure Land and Chan 禪. I will focus in particular on the works of Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祩宏 (1535–1615) and his use of the distinction between principle (li 理) and phenomenon (shi 事) to reconcile seemingly divergent religious paths. I will conclude by considering the implications of this synthesis for nondualist interpretations of the Gītā.     

Yinshun's Recovery of Shizhu Piposha Lun 十住毗婆沙論: a Madhyamaka-based Pure Land practice In twentieth-century Taiwan

Yinshun (1906–2005) is regarded as one of the eminent monks of twentieth-century Chinese Buddhism. In the mission of reinventing Chinese Buddhism Yinshun engaged particularly in the revival and restatement of Madhyamaka. His interpretation of Nāgārjuna's texts, the reassessment of the links between pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Prajn?āpāramitā tradition, and the critical analysis of the Chinese San-lun became the core of the new Mahāyāna that he planned for the twentieth-century China. Yinshun also adopted Madhyamaka criteria to reconsider the Mahāyāna schools that were popular in China, and theorized a Madhyamaka-framed Pure Land based on his reading of the Shizhu piposha lun [T26 n1521]. This article discusses Yinshun's views on the Easy Path (yixing dao) and Difficult Path (nanxing dao) in the Pure Land practice, and contextualizes Yinshun's interpretation within the past history of the Chinese Pure Land School, as well as within the new debates on Pure Land that emerged in twentieth-century China.     

The Concept of Intermediate Existence in the Early Buddhist Theory of rebirth

This article investigates the concept of intermediate existence in the early Buddhist theory of rebirth. The main sources investigated for this article are the Pāli canonical and commentarial literature. My main thesis is that early Buddhist discourses contain instances that suggest a spatial-temporal gap between death and rebirth known as ‘intermediate existence’ (antarābhava), in contrast to the idea of Theravāda Buddhist theory that rebirth takes place immediately without a spatial-temporal gap. In order to prove this, I argue that the ‘one who liberates in interval’ (anarāparinibbāyī) attains Nibbāna in the intermediate existence and the concept of gandhabbā in early Buddhist discourses refers to a being in intermediate existence, not to a dying consciousness (cuti-viññāna), and there are indirect inferences to an spatiotemporal gap between death and rebirth in the early Buddhist discourses.     

Checking the heavenly ‘bank account of karma’: cognitive metaphors for karma in Western perception and early Theravāda Buddhism

To visualize the accumulation of good and bad karma in terms of credit or debt in a bank account is a common feature in works on Buddhism and other Indian traditions. Applying conceptual metaphor theory, this article tracks the metaphorical framework of understanding karma as a kind of ‘heavenly bank account’ back to its roots in early European scholarship. Based on a comparison with metaphors for karma to be found in Pāli texts of the Theravāda tradition, namely, the analogies of ripening, inheritance, and the dark/bright dichotomy, this article argues that the ‘bank-account’ imagery differs in significant – if subtle – respects from these emic metaphors, displaying certain Judeo-Christian preconceptions of moral bookkeeping, sin, and salvation.     

Mindfulness-based Therapy in Modern Psychology: Convergence and Divergence from Early Buddhist Thought

This article offers a comparative analysis on mindfulness from mindfulness-based therapies in the contemporary literature and from Buddhist meditation practices in the Pāli Canon. This includes a review of the presiding definitions of mindfulness, recent scientific findings in the literature and the current theories on the underlying mechanisms of mindfulness. The meditation practices from the Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction (MBSR) programme are compared to the origins of mindfulness of breathing meditations from the Satipa??hāna Sutta (MN 10). Further, recent research into the cultivation of skilful states of mind including compassion, self-compassion, loving-kindness, equanimity and sympathetic joy are reviewed and compared to an anthology of texts from the Pāli Canon. Ethical issues emerging from the convergence of science and Buddhist philosophy are also discussed for further consideration.

Abbreviations: AN: A?guttara Nikāya; BPS: Buddhist Publication Society; Dhp: Dhammapada; Dhs: Dhammasa?ga?ī; DN: Dīgha Nikāya; Iti: Itivuttaka; MN: Majjhima Nikāya; Miln: Milindapañha; Pa?is: Pa?isambhidāmagga; SN: Sa?yutta Nikāya; Sn: Sutta Nipāta; Ud: Udāna; Vibh: Vibha?ga; Vim: Vimuttimagga; Vsm: Visuddhimagga     

Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhart?hari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhart?hari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: (A1) Language is coextensive with external reality. (A2a) Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. (A2b) Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality (upacārasattā/aupacārikī sattā). (A3) Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity (vyavahāra) would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vai?e?ika and Buddhist Pramā?avāda) are examined. Approach (A3), according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhart?hari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions.     

The Bhakta and the Sage: An Intertextual Dialogue

Comparing the Bhagavad Gītā and the Buddhist essay “Prajñā is Not-knowing” (Panruo Wuzhi 般若無知) yields interesting insights. The texts have similar dialogical structures and discuss complex philosophical matters. Rhetorically, both texts weave together quotations and allusions from other texts, make liberal use of paradox, and have decidedly spiritual intentions. Their differences, though, remain striking. They emerge from distinct circumstances and their original languages (Sanskrit, Chinese) differ markedly. Stylistically, “Prajñā” is more intellectual and less devotional, espousing a distinctly “this worldly” ideal; by contrast, the Gītā is more dramatic. While espousing “this worldly” ideals, the Gītā is more inclusive and thus more accessible to a broad audience; on the contrary, “Prajñā” has a subtler effect, its “dark” qualities appealing to a more select group. Therefore, while these texts are not “the same,” reading across their convergences and divergences can lead to a deeper understanding of mysticism and cross-cultural spirituality.     

From Buddha's speech to Buddha's essence: philosophical discussions of Buddha‐vacana in India and China1

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and those written by 7th century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. This issue labeled fo‐chiao t'i lun, the theory of ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching', was one of the topics on which Chinese Yogācāra scholars have shown a keen interest and served as the inspiration for extensive intellectual dialogues in their texts. It is in Hsüan‐tsang's massive and organized translation works, begun in 648, that various previous translations of the term buddhavacana from Indian Abhidharma texts were given the unified translation of fo‐chiao. (Fo‐chiao literally means “the Buddha's teachings,” and is the term used in the modern period for “Buddhism.”) By combining fo‐chiao with the term t'i, meaning ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ throughout his translations, Hsüan‐tsang attempted to define ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. In Indian Abhidharma texts, the nature of the Buddha's word was either ‘sound’ (?abdha), the oral component of speech, or ‘name’ (nāma), the component of language that conveys meaning, or some combination of the two. From the time of Hsüan‐tsang's translation, however, discourse on the nature of sacred language was no longer relegated to the category of language or of epistemological investigation, but became grounded in the Chinese discussion investigating the ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ of the Buddha's teaching, and even of ‘Buddhism’ itself. As such, it sought to transcend the distinction between language and meaning. This gradual but explicit process of inquiry into the nature of ‘the Buddha’s word' was a necessary antecedent to the transition to a ‘Chinese’ Buddhism.     

VARIATIONS IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE REPULSIVENESS OF FOOD, ĀHĀREPATIKŪLASAÑÑĀ: CANONICAL,THERAVĀDA,SARVĀSTIVĀDA AND MAHĀYĀNA FORMS

ABSTRACT

This article explores the changing treatment of a meditation practice, the contemplation of the repulsiveness of food, āhārepa?ikūlasaññā, from its presence in lists of saññā in canonical texts to its detailed explanation in post-canonical texts of the first millennium CE. We observe two main developments: the limitation in the benefits attributed to the practice within commentarial-period Theravada, and two entirely divergent branches in the way the practice is treated. In the Visuddhimagga of Theravada Buddhism, we see a somewhat practical approach that identifies the unpleasant aspects of the monk’s experience of seeking, eating, digesting and excreting food, and takes them as the focus of a 10-stage meditation practice. In the Sarvāstivāda texts, we see a conceptual aversion created by the association of specific food items with other items treated as impure within meditation practice. This articles explores all these divergences, drawing conclusions about what this says in terms of the understanding of food in these two branches.     

Traditional and Modern Meditation Practices in Shan Buddhist Communities

ABSTRACT

This article explores how meditation is inculcated throughout the life of Shan Buddhists using poetic phrasing and texts, culminating in several forms of meditation as part of the practice of temple-sleeping undertaken by lay Buddhist seniors from the age of 40 upwards. I look at how the poetic texts, lik loung, that form the basis of temple-sleeping practice, may have shifted in content in the 19th to 20th centuries to focus on meditation topics, in a move parallel to the development of vipassanā in lowland Burma in reaction to the threat colonialism posed to Buddhism. I then document the rise of separate vipassanā meditation centres in Shan regions from the 1930s and their ambiguous status as either representatives of Burmese hegemony or drivers of Shan revival. I note the influence of Shan lik loung on practice at such centres, as well as a more recent development, the uptake of vipassanā within temple-sleeping contexts.