The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it,and how to cope with it

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.     

The Cultural Community: An Husserlian Approach and Reproach

What types of unity and disunity belong to a group of people sharing a culture? Husserl illuminates these communities by helping us trace their origin to two types of interpersonal act—cooperation and influence—though cultural communities are distinguished from both cooperative groups and mere communities of related influences. This analysis has consequences for contemporary concerns about multi- or mono-culturalism and the relationship between culture and politics. It also leads us to critique Husserl’s desire for a new humanity, one that is rational, cooperatively united, and animated by a universal philosophical culture. Reflecting on culture, a spiritually shaped and shared domain of the world, draws us to reflect also on ourselves as social and rational animals, and to ask, what should we reasonably hope for—and aim for—in a human culture that expresses and supports our shared lives of reason? Aristotle is used for occasional comparisons and contrasts.     

Iona College Community Centered Family Health History Project: Lessons Learned from Student Focus Groups

The Community Centered Family Health History project was initiated to create accessible family health history tools produced by and for the community. The project goal was to promote increased community engagement in health education by encouraging conversations among family members that would translate knowledge of family health history into healthy lifestyle choices. As one of seven community partners, Iona College participated in customizing and beta-testing the Does It Run in the Family? toolkit. Twenty-nine college students were engaged to recruit three relatives related by blood to provide feedback on the utility of the toolkit. The toolkit consists of two booklets—“A Guide to Family Health History” and “A Guide to Understanding Genetics and Health”—explaining the importance of knowing and talking about health within the family as well as basics about how conditions are passed down through generations. Twenty-two of the twenty-nine students participated in focus groups to discuss their reactions to participation in the project. Students in the focus group reported that the study participants—students and their family members—found the toolkit to be user friendly and the experience a valuable one that prompted many to take positive steps toward good health.     

Acculturating to the Role of Tenure-Track Assistant Professor: A Family Systems Approach to Joining the Academy

The trajectory toward tenure is complex and arduous, and it requires one to balance attention among diverse and competing demands. It is not surprising that many newly appointed assistant professors report struggling with this process. Borrowing from family and ecological systems theories, we proffer a framework that may help junior faculty members—defined in this article as tenure-earning assistant professors—learn about the tenure-earning process as they navigate through the university system and beyond. We also describe and clarify the many parts of the tenure-earning process, including the roles, responsibilities, and multiple contexts that must be considered concurrently by junior faculty members as they progress through the stages of their tenure-earning appointment in the academy.     

When Darwin flopped: The rejection of sexual selection

Charles Darwin considered sexual selection as integral to evolution as natural selection, but the theory of sexual selection was rejected by most scientific and lay audiences. This article argues that sexual selection theory clashed with biases prevalent in the 19th-century—about culture and nature, mind and body, male and female—in ways that Darwin’s first sketch of evolution did not. Whereas the 1859 The Origin of Species tracked the development of bodily structures, the 1871 The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex focused not on form but function—on behavior. In Darwin’s view, “mind is function of body,” and the mind was the seat not of reason but of sex. Also, when he postulated that female choice sculpted the male form, he conflicted with the long-standing cultural assumption that men controlled women. And, in discussing female beauty, Darwin showed a fascinating ambivalence about its implications for human gender relations. Finally, he was at odds with his culture in the premium he placed on desire. In short, his theory landed on a cultural fault line, causing upheaval and mayhem, and then it fell into an abyss it had helped to create.     

The ethical implications of the new research paradigm

Research is now an increasingly heterogeneous activity involving an expanded range of new actors and stake-holders and employing an eclectic range of epistemologies and methodologies. The emergence of these new research paradigms — and, in particular, of so-called ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production that is highly contextualised and socially distributed — raises new and challenging ethical issues and also important questions about the autonomy of science and the social responsibilities of scientists.     

Know Thyself: Macrocosm and Microcosm

There was a time when, in the Liberal Arts, philosophy and education enjoyed the most intimate and productive relationship. Drawing together philosophy and nature they sought to understand the greatest of human mysteries. This meant thinking about both the macrocosm and the microcosm and especially the relation between them. In this relation lies the most fundamental vocation of Liberal Arts education—Know Thyself. In my article I attempt to retrieve the philosophical education that lies between the individual and the universe. I explore the macrocosm through Newton and Einstein, the microcosm through Heisenberg and Zizek, and the relation between them in the structure of the modern Kant/Hegel philosophical experience. The result—only relatively overambitious—is an educational theory of the uncertainty of the universe and everything in it.     

The Contributing Factors of Change in a Therapeutic Process

The clients’ and therapists’ perceptions about the degree to which each of four common factors in therapy—extra-therapeutic factors; model/techniques; therapeutic alliance; and hope/expectancy—contribute to change in the therapeutic process were investigated in this study. In addition, the perceptions about the percentage of change attributed to clients and therapists were also explored. Results revealed that the therapists and clients have different perceptions on what factors contribute the most to change and that clients and therapists believe that the client contributes the most to change in a therapeutic process.M. L. Thomas, MSW, is a doctoral student in Marriage and Family Therapy at Florida State University.     

Just for Fun: The Playful Image of Nanotechnology

In 1959, Richard Feynman suggested that the most compelling reason to pursue nanoscale research might be ‘just for fun.’ This article traces a history of playful images and ludic practices in nanotechnology. Two case studies—nanocars and nanosoccer—exemplify the ways in which scientific research mobilizes speculative futures, less through engineering design or stepwise protocol than through the recreational dynamics of play. Although such molecular toys might appear frivolous, they index the increasingly widespread conditions of play labor, or ‘playbor’, shaping today’s technoculture. Exploring the processes of transmutation and transvaluation by which technological imaginaries are rendered operative, this article tells a story of how the nanoworld became an everyday reality by becoming a game.     

Teaching and Truthfulness

Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams, as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs), and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’ from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within ‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’.     

The role of category coherence in experience-based prediction

Both real-world category knowledge and instance-based sample data are often available as sources of inductive inference. In three experiments using natural social categories, we test the influence of general category knowledge on the use of category instances to make property inductions both to other category members and to others in the population. We find that a category’s coherence—the extent to which its features are interrelated through prior knowledge (Murphy & Medin, 1985)—influences inductions positively to new category members and negatively to the population. This effect of coherence is strongest with small as compared with large samples of instances. The results are interpreted from both similarity and explanation-based perspectives.     

The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts

This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers “do” what the stated reasons are reasons for “doing.” Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason R for “doing X” manifest is something other than “doing X,” I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

The typology of the converso in Isaac Abravanel’s biblical exegesis

Isaac Abravanel commented on conversos in the course of his writings. There is an uncanny resemblance between what he writes and documents produced by the Inquisition that present conversos as at least ambivalent about their new religion and sometimes even ironic in their expressions. While reserving judgment about the verisimilitude of the Inquisitional text, it is clear that this picture of ambivalence suited Abravanel—nor was he alone in adopting it—who wished to view conversos as integral to the Jewish collective and its fate. They would return to Judaism to fulfill their role in the history of redemption in the times of the Messiah.     

Experimenting with Engagement

Social scientists can explore questions about what counts as knowledge and how researchers—including social science researchers—can produce that knowledge. An art/space installation examining issues of public participation in science demonstrates the process of co-creation of knowledge about public participation, not simply the co-creation of the meaning of the installation itself.     

The Impact of Behaviors upon Burnout Among Parish-Based Clergy

Burnout has an important impact upon the professional satisfaction of clergy. Identifying protective behaviors that may prevent against burnout is important for the long-term emotional health of individual clergy as well as the wider church. This research reports findings among 358 parish-based clergy that identifies the prevalence of burnout and correlates this data with demographic risk factors and protective behaviors. Clergy who met criteria for burnout were younger, identified themselves as being depressed and unsatisfied with their spiritual life, and have endured a traumatic church placement. This research also suggests that having a variety of interests and activities outside of one’s vocation may protect against burnout. In particular, behaviors that enhance relationships—such as seeking mentors and attending retreats—as well as pursuing outside activities—such as regular exercise and scholarly reading—protect against burnout. Further implications for the wider church are discussed.     

The Paranoia of Everyday Life: Some Personal,Psychological, and Pastoral Thoughts

Freud, early in his writings, makes the argument that paranoia results from the repression of distressing memories, paralleling hysteria and obsessional neurosis. The difference, however, is that paranoia makes use of a special psychic mechanism—projection—whereas hysteria makes use of conversion into somatic innervations and obsessional neurosis makes use of substitution or displacement. Drawing on recent research in paranoia, which suggests that feelings of paranoia are quite common among non-clinical populations, perhaps even as common as feelings of anxiety and depression in non-clinical populations, I suggest that paranoia “in everyday life”—that is, paranoia among non-clinical or so-called “normal” populations—results from the suppression (rather than the repression) of distressing thoughts (rather than memories). The mechanism of projection is still at work, but because paranoia in everyday life results from suppression rather than repression, it is much less severe but also much more common. I have followed the logic of Freud’s writings and I have used the method of introspection to come to this conclusion. I argue that pastors and other such persons would do well in knowing something about paranoia so that (1) they can deal more compassionately with those struggling with paranoia and so that (2) they can deal more compassionately with themselves, since it is likely, I believe, that many pastors often struggle with feelings of paranoia. I note several strategies for coping with paranoia as I deal with religious and psychological aspects of paranoia.     

Physico-mathematics and the search for causes in Descartes’ optics—1619–1637

One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy, non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system.     

Bearing the lightning of possible storms: Foucault’s experimental social criticism

This paper argues that Michel Foucault explicitly rejected the model of critique by which he is often understood—by both his defenders and detractors. Rather than justifying norms that could be said to represent “the people;” judging institutions, norms, and practices accordingly; and creating programs for others to enact, he theorized and practiced an experimental social criticism in which specific intellectuals help people work through “intolerable” situations by multiplying the ways they can think about and act upon them. As Foucault’s work with the prisons in France shows, one way intellectuals can be part of the experimental transformations social bodies carry out upon themselves is through genealogical work describing the ways problems have come to be identified—and can thus be transformed. This account of criticism undercuts the problem of justifying a standpoint of critique that has plagued philosophers and suggests a few concrete means of better aligning theory and practice.