Misreporting signs of child abuse: The role of decision‐making and outcome information

Two studies provided evidence that a decision to report an ambiguous case of child abuse affected subsequent memory of the case information, such that participants falsely recognized details that were not presented in the original information, but that are schematically associated with child abuse. Moreover, post‐decision information that the child had later died from abuse influenced the memory reports of participants who had chosen not to report the case, increasing their reports of false schema‐consistent details. This suggests that false decision‐consistent memories are primarily due to sense‐making, schematic processing rather than the motivation to justify the decision. The present findings points to an important mechanism by which decision information can become distorted in retrospect, and emphasize the difficulties of improving future decision‐making by contemplating past decisions. The results also indicate that decisions may generate false memories in the apparent absence of external suggestion or misleading information. Implications for decision‐making theory, and applied practices are discussed.     

Remembering and diagnosing clients: does experience matter?

Experienced mental health clinicians often do not outperform novices in diagnostic decision making. In this paper we look for an explanation of this phenomenon by testing differences in memory processes. In two studies we aimed to look at differences in accuracy of diagnoses in relation to free recall of client information between mental health clinicians with different levels of experience. Clinicians were presented with two cases, and were asked afterwards, either directly (Study 1) or after 1 week (Study 2), to give the appropriate diagnoses and to write down what they remembered of the cases. We found in Study 1 that the accuracy of the diagnoses was the same for all levels of experience, as was the amount of details recalled. Very experienced clinicians did remember more higher-order concepts, that is, abstractions from the presented information. In Study 2 we found that the very experienced clinicians were less accurate in their diagnoses and remembered fewer details than the novices. In response to these findings we further discuss their implications for psychodiagnostic practice.     

Fatigue biases the decoy effect in males but not females

Individuals often need to make critical decisions even when they are in a fatigued state. Mental fatigue may lead to increased susceptibility to distraction and poor information processing but it is unclear exactly how fatigue shapes individuals' decision‐making. We studied how mental fatigue influences sensitivity to contextual information, indexed as decoy bias. Mental fatigue was induced using a multi‐source interference task, and decoy bias was assessed using a gambling task, in 124 young adults. Results showed that mental fatigue increased decoy bias through enhanced perceptual salience of contextual cues, but only in males. The findings provide insight into a gender‐specific relationship between fatigue and poor judgments. This study extends the current literature on links between fatigue and poor decision‐making by documenting a possible mechanism of the association. The results may have practical implications for designing optimal working hours and safeguarding people from suboptimal decisions.     

Mindless decision making and environmental issues: gestalt/feature-intensive processing and contextual reasoning in environmental decisions

In the absence of relevant information in working memory during decision consideration, respondents tend to rely on a style of cognitive processing that may result in premature or inaccurate decision making (M. J. Sharps, 2003). M. J. Sharps and S. S. Martin (2002) demonstrated this effect in executive decision making. In the present study, the authors extended these methods to decisions about environmental issues. Respondents rated decisions about issues such as overpopulation, energy policy, and food production in the presence or absence of simple pertinent information. The presence of such information in the immediate context of environmental decisions, and therefore in working memory, significantly improved respondents' ability to understand negative decision consequences. These results demonstrate the importance of contextual information in environmental decision making.     

The influence of number line estimation precision and numeracy on risky financial decision making

This study examined whether different aspects of mathematical proficiency influence one's ability to make adaptive financial decisions. “Numeracy” refers to the ability to process numerical and probabilistic information and is commonly reported as an important factor which contributes to financial decision‐making ability. The precision of mental number representation (MNR), measured with the number line estimation (NLE) task has been reported to be another critical factor. This study aimed to examine the contribution of these mathematical proficiencies while controlling for the influence of fluid intelligence, math anxiety and personality factors. In our decision‐making task, participants chose between two options offering probabilistic monetary gain or loss. Sensitivity to expected value was measured as an index for the ability to discriminate between optimal versus suboptimal options. Partial correlation and hierarchical regression analyses revealed that NLE precision better explained EV sensitivity compared to numeracy, after controlling for all covariates. These results suggest that individuals with more precise MNR are capable of making more rational financial decisions. We also propose that the measurement of “numeracy,” which is commonly used interchangeably with general mathematical proficiency, should include more diverse aspects of mathematical cognition including basic understanding of number magnitude.     

Individual differences in attentional capability are linked to creative decision making

There is a link between visual attention and creativity concerning the generation of rare and flexible decisions/solutions. However, the relationship between individual differences in attentional capability and creative decision making has not yet been investigated in detail. The current study scrutinized this link in a sport‐specific divergent thinking task including videos of real game situations and compared performances between football players being divided into two different expertise levels (expert and amateur football players). We conducted a multiple linear regression analysis to assess whether attentional capability along the attentional focus’ meridians (horizontal, vertical, diagonal) and participants’ expertise level predict creative decision making. The attentional capability along the horizontal meridian of participants’ attentional focus and participants’ expertise level emerged as positive predictors. The findings provide evidence of a relationship between football players’ spatial distribution of attention that match the demands of their sport and an expertise advantage in sport‐specific creative decision making. Implications are not only important for sports, but also for all areas in which spatial attention is required in order to generate unusual solutions.     

Preventative Detention Decisions: Reliance on Expert Assessments and Evidence of Partisan Allegiance within the Canadian Context

The purpose of this study was to examine judges’ written reasons for sentencing in preventative detention hearings and the expert risk assessment reports presented, to determine the level of reliance placed on expert risk assessment reports and to examine the presence of partisan allegiance within the Canadian context. Results demonstrated that judges’ decisions were consistent with expert assessments in terms of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management. Experts’ ratings of treatment amenability and risk management were also significant predictors of the designation outcome, indicating that judges rely on this information in making their final decision. Finally, there was evidence of partisan allegiance, with prosecution-retained Psychopathy Checklist-Revised scores being significantly higher than defense-retained experts’ scores. The results have implications for the development of consistent guidelines for the communication of risk, treatment amenability, and management information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of working memory in information acquisition and decision making: Lessons from the binary prediction task

The effects of memory constraints upon information acquisition and decision making were examined in two experiments using binary prediction tasks, where participants observe outcomes for two options before deciding which one to bet upon. Our studies extend previous investigations to the case where participants learn the structure of the task through observation, but where information acquisition is separated from the task of prediction. Participants with higher cognitive capacity (larger memory span or higher intelligence) were more likely to adopt the “maximizing” strategy (always selecting the more frequent alternative). This finding conflicts with some recent investigations of similar tasks, a contrast that implies that the presence of feedback on choices may be important in determining the strategic actions of high-capacity individuals. Participants selecting the optimal strategy were in turn more efficient in their data acquisition. The behaviour of participants adopting suboptimal choice strategies was consistent with prediction based upon a “narrow window of experience”—that is, seeking to match the characteristics of small samples of observations.     

The Collective Preference for Shared Information

Decision-making groups prefer to discuss shared information that all members know instead of unshared information that a single member knows. This bias toward discussing shared information can lead groups to make suboptimal decisions when unshared information is critical for good decision making. This preference for discussing shared information may stem from group members' positive evaluations of each other's task capabilities when shared information is communicated. Members who already are perceived as capable (i.e., those high in status, experts, and leaders) need not bolster their image by communicating shared information. Instead, they discuss unshared information more than members perceived as less capable. As members low in status gain respect by communicating shared information, they may risk mentioning unshared information later during discussion. Assigning group leaders, informing members of their expert roles, and allowing ample time for discussion may increase groups' discussion of unshared information.     

Recognition Decisions From Visual Working Memory Are Mediated by Continuous Latent Strengths

Making recognition decisions often requires us to reference the contents of working memory, the information available for ongoing cognitive processing. As such, understanding how recognition decisions are made when based on the contents of working memory is of critical importance. In this work we examine whether recognition decisions based on the contents of visual working memory follow a continuous decision process of graded information about the correct choice or a discrete decision process reflecting only knowing and guessing. We find a clear pattern in favor of a continuous latent strength model of visual working memory–based decision making, supporting the notion that visual recognition decision processes are impacted by the degree of matching between the contents of working memory and the choices given. Relation to relevant findings and the implications for human information processing more generally are discussed.     

Decision Accuracy in Computer-Mediated versus Face-to-Face Decision-Making Teams

Changes in the way organizations are structured and advances in communication technologies are two factors that have altered the conditions under which group decisions are made. Decisions are increasingly made by teams that have a hierarchical structure and whose members have different areas of expertise. In addition, many decisions are no longer made via strictly face-to-face interaction. The present study examines the effects of two modes of communication (face-to-face or computer-mediated) on the accuracy of teams' decisions. The teams are characterized by a hierarchical structure and their members differ in expertise consistent with the framework outlined in the Multilevel Theory of team decision making presented by Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, and Phillips (1995). Sixty-four four-person teams worked for 3 h on a computer simulation interacting either face-to-face (FtF) or over a computer network. The communication mode had mixed effects on team processes in that members of FtF teams were better informed and made recommendations that were more predictive of the correct team decision, but leaders of CM teams were better able to differentiate staff members on the quality of their decisions. Controlling for the negative impact of FtF communication on staff member differentiation increased the beneficial effect of the FtF mode on overall decision making accuracy.     

Computer-augmented decision making

The principal judgmental components of multiattribute decision making are examined here with specific reference to how these components can be captured electronically. Once captured, a function, rule, or algorithm may be executed for the integration of this information and the selection of the optimal alternative(s). Two kinds of algorithms are discussed: one based on linear models, the other on fuzzy-set theory and ratio scaling. With on-line support and certain assumptions about human biases (which lead to nonoptimal decisions), the quality of decisions can be enhanced considerably. The principal concerns are with end-user acceptance of computer augmented decisions.     

The effects of information-processing demands and social-situational factors on the social decision making of children

Previous research has consistently demonstrated age differences in cooperative, competitive, and individualistic social decision making. The present studies were designed to demonstrate that these age differences may result from the development of the requisite information-processing capabilities and social/situational factors. It was hypothesized that the limited information-processing systems of young children place constraints upon the social decisions available, but making a specific social decision was dependent upon sociocultural factors which influence the salience of aspects of the social situation or the expected contingencies of each social decision. Study 1 assessed the social decision making of 3- to 11-year-olds in two forms of a decision-making task (designed to manipulate the information processing demands of key social decisions) under two instructional sets (designed to manipulate the expected reward contingencies of key social decisions). Study 2 assessed the social decision making of 3- to 12-year-olds toward close friends or acquaintances (designed to manipulate the expected social contingencies) in the same two forms of the decision-making task. Age, the task form manipulation, and the social/situational manipulation influenced social decision making in each study in a manner consistent with the theoretical perspective A cognitive social learning interpretation, and the implications for the cognitive developmental influence upon social behavior, are discussed.     

Looking for Cancer: Expertise Related Differences in Searching and Decision Making

We examined how the ability to detect lung nodules in chest x‐ray inspection is reflected in experience‐related differences in visual search and decision making, and whether the eye‐tracking metric time‐to‐first hit showed systematic decreases across expertise levels are examined. In the study decision making improved with expertise, however, time‐to‐first fixate a nodule showed only a non‐significant trend to decrease with expertise. Surprisingly, naïve and expert observers allocated less visual attention at nodules compared with first and third year radiography students. This similarity in visual attention at nodules but not in decision making was explained by the fact that naïve observers were more likely to fixate and make errors on distracter regions. Time‐to‐first hit has been linked to expert performance in mammography, but in this study was not sufficiently sensitive to demonstrate clear linear improvements across expertise groups. This brings into question the use of this metric as an indirect measure of rapid initial holistic processing. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adolescents let sufficient evidence accumulate before making a decision when large incentives are at stake

Adolescent decision‐making has been described as impulsive and suboptimal in the presence of incentives. In this study we examined the neural substrates of adolescent decision‐making using a perceptual discrimination task for which small and large rewards were associated with correctly detecting the direction of motion of a cloud of moving dots. Adults showed a reward bias of faster reaction times on trials for which the direction of motion was associated with a large reward. Adolescents, in contrast, were slower to make decisions on trials associated with large rewards. This behavioral pattern in adolescents was paralleled by greater recruitment of fronto‐parietal regions important in representing the accumulation of evidence sufficient for selecting one choice over its alternative and the certainty of that choice. The findings suggest that when large incentives are dependent on performance, adolescents may require more evidence to accumulate prior to responding, to be certain to maximize their gains. Adults, in contrast, appear to be quicker in evaluating the evidence for a decision when primed by rewards. Overall these findings suggest that rather than reacting hastily, adolescents can be incentivized to take more time to make decisions when large rewards are at stake. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://youtu.be/1g4F5vzFDl0     

Doc, what would you do if you were me? On self-other discrepancies in medical decision making

Doctors often make decisions for their patients and predict their patients' preferences and decisions to customize advice to their particular situation. We investigated how doctors make decisions about medical treatments for their patients and themselves and how they predict their patients' decisions. We also studied whether these decisions and predictions coincide with the decisions that the patients make for themselves. We document 3 important findings. First, doctors made more conservative decisions for their patients than for themselves (i.e., they more often selected a safer medical treatment). Second, doctors did so even if they accurately predicted that their patients would want a riskier treatment than the one they selected. Doctors, therefore, showed substantial self-other discrepancies in medical decision making and did not make decisions that accurately reflected their patients' preferences. Finally, patients were not aware of these discrepancies and thought that the decisions their doctors made for themselves would be similar to the decisions they made for their patients. We explain these results in light of 2 current theories of self-other discrepancies in judgment and decision making: the risk-as-feelings hypothesis and the cognitive hypothesis. Our results have important implications for research on expert decision making and for medical practice, and shed some light on the process underlying self-other discrepancies in decision making.     

Does the feedback from previous trials influence current decisions? A study on the role of feedback processing in making decisions under explicit risk conditions

Decision situations frequently provide information about the amount of gains and losses and winning probabilities. In decisions under these conditions, also called risk conditions, both the use of feedback and executive functions have been shown to influence the decision‐making process, as revealed in different patient populations. However, the influence of offering feedback in tasks examining decisions under risk conditions has not been investigated experimentally, so far. This was the aim of the present study. For this purpose, a sample of healthy individuals was examined with the Game of Dice Task, a decision‐making task that explicitly provides the rules for gains and losses and in which participants receive feedback after each trial. In addition, a modified version of this task was performed, in which the feedback after each trial and all associated feedback components were removed. Results indicate that participants had a lower performance in the modified Dice Task without feedback. They selected the disadvantageous alternatives more frequently, when they did not receive feedback following their choices. Task performance in either version was correlated with executive functioning. Conclusion: In decisions under risk conditions, both executive functions as well as the use of feedback following previous trials are important components for optimal performance. Results have implications for the interpretation of deficient decision making in patients with neuropsychological impairments as both disturbances in categorization and other cognitive processes as well as emotional dysfunctions can compromise decision making in risky situations.     

Do consumers ever learn? Analysis of segment behavior in experimental markets

Economists argue that, despite cognitive limitations, economic agents arrive at optimal choice rules by learning. The assumption is that consumers, for example, are adaptively rational. Adaptive rationality raises a host of issues. We address three of these in the context of experimental markets: do consumers differ on the basis of learning; how do these differences, when aggregated, affect market efficiency; and how do consumers learn? Analysis of our experimental data reveals the following. First, multiple segments of consumers exist on the basis of learning. Second, the largest segment consists of subjects who do not learn despite timely feedback and motivation. Third, although some consumers do learn to make optimal choices, the effect of this segment on market efficiency is cancelled by an equal number of subjects who ‘learn' false relations. Finally, although subjects do not learn strict rationality even with experience, they are in the aggregate not so irrational as to allow highly suboptimal brands to survive. Further analysis of how consumers learn, specifically on the cues (signals) and the rules consumers employ in making choices over time leads to the following two conclusions. First, some signals make learning more easy than others: for example, providing market share information improves learning but not as much as providing quality information does. Second, people employ different rules depending upon the type of information they have. For example, consumers making decisions based only on price information are more likely to use a heuristic like ‘buy a medium‐priced product provided it has not failed in the past'. Consumers making decisions based on price and quality information may employ a heuristic such as ‘buy top quality products regardless of price'. We discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Emotion on Visual Attention to Information and Decision Making in the Context of Informed Consent Process for Clinical Trials

The aim of this study was to examine the influence of emotion on visual information processing and decision making in the context of informed consent. Researchers are ethically obligated to ensure informed consent in clinical trials; however, many volunteers have unrealistic expectations about the value of an experimental therapy. Moreover, suboptimal participation rates for clinical trials may be partially attributable to perceptions that ethical obligations to volunteers are not met. This study examines whether discrete negative emotions (fear, anger, and sadness) differentially influence information processing, visual attention, and decisions in the context of clinical trial informed consent. Community participants completed a standard emotion induction (or control) and then read an actual consent form from a clinical trial while eye movements were tracked. Fear and anger produced the most prominently different patterns of systematic processing and visual attention, such that fear induced longer fixations to information presented, whereas anger induced shorter fixations. Moreover, among women only, fear increased decisions to participate, compared with anger and neutral emotion. Examinations of associations between eye‐tracking variables and self‐reported outcomes indicated that for angry participants only, less systematic processing was associated with greater decisions to participate. Negative emotions of any kind decreased accurate perceptions of trial benefit. These patterns suggest a complex interplay among emotion, processing style, and decision making. Future research is necessary to further probe these effects among potential clinical trial volunteers. Published 2016. This article is a U.S Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.