An experimental synthesis of the associations and gestalt accounts of the perception of size. part iii

Two control experiments are described which are concerned with the effect, on judgements of size, of varying the angular separation of the compared objects in the horizontal plane. The first experiment investigates order effects. The second experiment compares judgements of real size at small and large angles of separation. The findings are discussed in relation to parts I and II of these papers.     

Indirect majority and minority influence: An exploratory study

In a 2 × 2 design, 85 subjects were asked to estimate the size of angles (direct influence) that were either 90 or 85°, after being confronted with incorrect judgements of a majority (88 per cent) or a minority (12 per cent) of people estimating the angles at 50°. Additionally, pre- and post-test measures were used to establish indirect influence on subjects' judgements pertaining to acute angles (i.e. on the estimation of the length of lines constituting the angles, and on the imaginary weight of figures represented by these angles). Overall, little direct influence is observed. This may partly be due to the introduction of a denial of the credibility of the source in all conditions. In fact, some evidence of direct influence is only found in the majority–85° angles condition. An instance of indirect influence (on the estimation of length of lines) appeared as the result of a majority stance when the angles in the experimental phase were 90°. When these angles were 85°, indirect minority influence (on the estimation of weight of figures) was observed. These effects had been predicted on the basis of the hypothesis stating that indirect majority influence would be possible when subjects expected consensus on the correct response (in the 90° angles condition), without being able to reach consensus at the manifest level (because of the denial and the restriction imposed by the clear shape of 90° angles). Indirect minority influence was hypothesized to be stronger in a situation that allows for diverse responses (i.e. for 85° angles).     

A further investigation of apparent size and retinal size as determinants of the figural after-effect

A figure which is more distant from the eye than another but subtends the same visual angle is usually seen as the larger. This phenomenon is called perceptual size constancy. Experiments have been reported which show that sometimes the apparent and sometimes the retinal sizes of the stimulus figures determine the direction of the figural after-effect. These experiments are reviewed and two further experiments are reported. In the first experiment two types of stimulus figure (discs and annuli) which subtended a visual angle of 1° 36' resulted in figural after-effects, the direction of which would have been predicted by the retinal sizes of the figures. In the second experiment larger figures were used which subtended a visual angle of about 4° and which were the same as those used by Sutherland (1954). In this experiment the after-effects were generally in a direction which would have been expected if apparent size determined the direction of the after-effect. In the interpretation of the results attention is drawn to the “Central Tendency Effect” which has been observed in size judgements of stimulus figures of varying size. Two hypotheses are suggested; one is that the true figural aftereffect has been obscured by the “Central Tendency Effect” in successive judgements, and the other is that time error in successive judgements of size is essentially a figural aftereffect. Some supportive evidence for the latter hypothesis is reported. It is concluded that apparent size is not a critical determinant of the figural after-effect.     

Observational drawing biases are predicted by biases in perception: Empirical support of the misperception hypothesis of drawing accuracy with respect to two angle illusions

We tested the misperception hypothesis of drawing errors, which states that drawing accuracy is strongly influenced by the perceptual encoding of a to-be-drawn stimulus. We used a highly controlled experimental paradigm in which nonartist participants made perceptual judgements and drawings of angles under identical stimulus exposure conditions. Experiment 1 examined the isosceles/scalene triangle angle illusion; congruent patterns of bias in the perception and drawing tasks were found for 40 and 60° angles, but not for 20 or 80° angles, providing mixed support for the misperception hypothesis. Experiment 2 examined shape constancy effects with respect to reproductions of single acute or obtuse angles; congruent patterns of bias in the perception and drawing tasks were found across a range of angles from 29 to 151°, providing strong support for the misperception hypothesis. In both experiments, perceptual and drawing biases were positively correlated. These results are largely consistent with the misperception hypothesis, suggesting that inaccurate perceptual encoding of angles is an important reason that nonartists err in drawing angles from observation.     

The lability of the tactile-kinaesthetic framework

This paper is concerned with the ability to recognize settings of a rod (pivoted at the centre) at various angles of tilt without the use of vision. Five angles of tilt, all within the upper right quadrant, were used and 80 subjects took part in the experiments. It is shown that tactile-kinaesthetic recognition of a given angle of tilt is decidedly poor, subjects commonly reporting that the position of the rod had been changed. The direction of these subjective shifts was found to be in general towards the centre of the quadrant. If, following the recognition experiments, the subjects were required to judge settings of the rod in fact vertical and horizontal, errors made tended to be in a direction opposite to that normally found in making these judgements. It was further found that attempts to reinstate the original settings led to mean judgements equivalent to those given on the recognition tests, but with signs reversed. These various phenomena are ascribed to lability and disorganization of the tactile-kinaesthetic framework. An analogy with the autokinetic phenomenon is adduced.     

Five-factor personality correlates of perceptions of women’s body sizes

This study examined the association between observers’ personalities and body size perceptions. In total, 1119 participants from an international sample completed a five-factor personality inventory and the female Photographic Figure Rating Scale (PFRS). Results showed that Openness to Experience was correlated with the idealisation of a heavier body size among women, as well as the perception of a wider range of body sizes as attractive among both women and men. In addition, Agreeableness was associated with the perception of a wider range of body sizes as attractive among men. Personality factors explained only a small proportion of the variance in body size perceptions, although present results were consistent with a previous proposal on the role played by observers’ personalities in attractiveness judgements     

Ease‐of‐retrieval effects on procedural justice judgements under conditions of informational and personal uncertainty

This study tests whether individuals' reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval processes when forming procedural justice judgements are moderated by informational and personal uncertainty. In Studies 1 and 2 we examined the predicted effects of informational uncertainty. Results indicated that participants in information‐uncertain conditions relied on ease‐of‐retrieval, whereas those in information‐certain conditions relied on content information to make procedural justice judgements. In Study 3 we examined the combined effects of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval when forming procedural justice judgements. The findings of Study 3 indicated that personal uncertain participants who were in informational certain conditions based their procedural justice judgements on content information, whereas all other participants based their procedural justice judgements on ease‐of‐retrieval. This is the first paper to demonstrate that the joint effect of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval is different from the two uncertainties acting alone.     

Human judgements of control: The interaction of the current contingency and previous controllability

Two experiments were carried out to determine the effects of the learned helplessness treatment on judgement of control over a outcome. In the first experiment judgements were found to be sensitive to the actual level of response-outcome contingency. When the contingency level was high, this sensitivity was also influenced by pretreatment, in that a prior uncontrollable experience gave rise to lower judgements than both a controllable one and no experience at all. The latter pretreatments produced the most accurate judgements. In the second experiment the judgements after an uncontrollable task were found to be insensitive to a previous controllable or uncontrollable pretreatment. The results are discussed in terms of contingency-learning models.     

Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance – in short: education – of our moral intuitions.     

Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions

Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt’s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey’s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker’s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker’s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker’s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker’s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements.

     

Classification and recognition in artificial grammar learning: Analysis of receiver operating characteristics

In two experiments we investigated recognition and classification judgements using an artificial grammar learning paradigm. In Experiment 1, when only new test items had to be judged, analysis of z-transformed receiver operating characteristics (z-ROCs) revealed no differences between classification and recognition. In Experiment 2, where we included old test items, z-ROCs in the two tasks differed, suggesting that judgements relied on different types of information. The results are interpreted in terms of heuristics that people use when making classification and recognition judgements.     

Kant on Truth-Aptness

Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims.

Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: ? according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience.

? Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric.

Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.     

Effects of stimulus order on discrimination processes in comparative and equality judgements: Data and models

In typical discrimination experiments, participants are presented with a constant standard and a variable comparison stimulus and their task is to judge which of these two stimuli is larger (comparative judgement). In these experiments, discrimination sensitivity depends on the temporal order of these stimuli (Type B effect) and is usually higher when the standard precedes rather than follows the comparison. Here, we outline how two models of stimulus discrimination can account for the Type B effect, namely the weighted difference model (or basic Sensation Weighting model) and the Internal Reference Model. For both models, the predicted psychometric functions for comparative judgements as well as for equality judgements, in which participants indicate whether they perceived the two stimuli to be equal or not equal, are derived and it is shown that the models also predict a Type B effect for equality judgements. In the empirical part, the models' predictions are evaluated. To this end, participants performed a duration discrimination task with comparative judgements and with equality judgements. In line with the models' predictions, a Type B effect was observed for both judgement types. In addition, a time-order error, as indicated by shifts of the psychometric functions, and differences in response times were observed only for the equality judgement. Since both models entail distinct additional predictions, it seems worthwhile for future research to unite the two models into one conceptual framework.     

The spacing illusion: a spatial aperture problem?

A geometrical illusion in which the horizontal spacing between adjacent parallel lines in a row is underestimated when the lines are tilted away from vertical in a chevron configuration was investigated in two experiments. The perceived spacing was found to decrease as the tilt angle increased, consistent with the idea that separation judgements are influenced by the normal spacing between lines ie at right angles to the line orientation. It is proposed that this illusion reveals an analogue in spatial perception to the well-known aperture problem in motion perception. In establishing the separation of nearby or overlapping shapes in an image, the visual system cannot only rely upon the normal separation of contours belonging to each shape (as would be visible through small spatial apertures or receptive fields), since this varies with contour orientation. The system is therefore faced with a spatial aperture problem. The spacing illusion may arise because information usually available to solve the problem is absent in the illusion figure, or it may reflect a bias in favour of the orthogonal, which is adopted in the face of the ambiguity.     

Effect of structured visual environments on apparent eye level

Each of 12 subjects set a binocularly viewed target to apparent eye level; the target was projected on the rear wall of an open box, the floor of which was horizontal or pitched up and down at angles of 7.5 degrees and 15 degrees. Settings of the target were systematically biased by 60% of the pitch angle when the interior of the box was illuminated, but by only 5% when the interior of the box was darkened. Within-subjects variability of the settings was less under illuminated viewing conditions than in the dark, but was independent of box pitch angle. In a second experiment, 11 subjects were tested with an illuminated pitched box, yielding biases of 53% and 49% for binocular and monocular viewing conditions, respectively. The results are discussed in terms of individual and interactive effects of optical, gravitational, and extraretinal eye-position information in determining judgements of eye level.     

How does familiarity with a voice affect trait judgements?

From only a single spoken word, listeners can form a wealth of first impressions of a person’s character traits and personality based on their voice. However, due to the substantial within-person variability in voices, these trait judgements are likely to be highly stimulus-dependent for unfamiliar voices: The same person may sound very trustworthy in one recording but less trustworthy in another. How trait judgements differ when listeners are familiar with a voice is unclear: Are listeners who are familiar with the voices as susceptible to the effects of within-person variability? Does the semantic knowledge listeners have about a familiar person influence their judgements? In the current study, we tested the effect of familiarity on listeners’ trait judgements from variable voices across 3 experiments. Using a between-subjects design, we contrasted trait judgements by listeners who were familiar with a set of voices – either through laboratory-based training or through watching a TV show – with listeners who were unfamiliar with the voices. We predicted that familiarity with the voices would reduce variability in trait judgements for variable voice recordings from the same identity (cf. Mileva, Kramer & Burton, Perception, 48, 471 and 2019, for faces). However, across the 3 studies and two types of measures to assess variability, we found no compelling evidence to suggest that trait impressions were systematically affected by familiarity.     

Temporal contiguity and the judgement of causality by human subjects

Three experiments examined the role of the degree of temporal contiguity between an action and an outcome in human causality judgement. In all the experiments subjects were required to perform an action—pressing a key on a computer keyboard—and to judge the extent to which the action caused an outcome on the computer screen to occur. The action and outcome occurred on a free-operant schedule. In the first experiment a 2-sec delay between the action and outcome reduced causality judgements relative to a situation in which there was no delay. In the second experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 4, 8, and 16 sec were compared with judgements in conditions in which the same pattern of outcomes occurred non-contingently with respect to the subjects' responding. In both of these experiments the events were controlled by random ratio schedules, following the procedure of Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983), in which each condition was divided into 1-sec intervals. In the third experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 2, 4, or 8 sec were compared in a continuous procedure rather than one divided into 1-sec intervals. In all experiments the increasing delays led to progressively lower judgements of causality. The results are related to three accounts of the mechanism underlying human causality judgement and are also compared with results from analogous animal conditioning studies.     

Rapid judgements in assessing verbal and nonverbal cues: their potential for deception researchers and lie detection

In the present study it was investigated to what extent observers (i) could make rapid yet reliable and valid judgements of the frequency of verbal and nonverbal behaviours of interviewees (liars and truth tellers) and (ii) detect deceit after making these rapid judgements. Five observers watched 52 videoclips of 26 liars and 26 truth tellers. The findings revealed that rapid judgements were reliable and valid. They also revealed that observers were able to detect truths and lies well above the level of chance after making these rapid judgements (74% accuracy rate was found). The implications of these findings for deception researchers and lie detection are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Mood on Evaluative Judgements: Influence of Reduced Processing Capacity and Mood Salience

Schwarz and Clore (1983) proposed that the effects of mood on evaluative judgements are due to people's use of a “feeling heuristic”. Results of the present study suggest that this heuristic is particularly likely to be used under conditions of reduced processing capacity, induced by time pressure and competing task demands, as both factors intensified the effects of mood on evaluative judgements. In addition, previous findings that increasing the salience of a judgement-irrelevant cause disrupts the effects of mood on evaluative judgements were replicated. All of these effects were, however, obtained only when mood was salient to the participants, suggesting that to be effective, mood must exceed a threshold of salience. Taken together, the findings further support the hypothesis that at least in some situations, the effects of moods on evaluative judgements are based on a controlled inference strategy, rather than on automatic priming effects.     

Classification and recognition in artificial grammar learning: Analysis of receiver operating characteristics

In two experiments we investigated recognition and classification judgements using an artificial grammar learning paradigm. In Experiment 1, when only new test items had to be judged, analysis of z-transformed receiver operating characteristics (z-ROCs) revealed no differences between classification and recognition. In Experiment 2, where we included old test items, z-ROCs in the two tasks differed, suggesting that judgements relied on different types of information. The results are interpreted in terms of heuristics that people use when making classification and recognition judgements.