Children's Narratives Following Traumatic Brain Injury: Linguistic Structure, Cohesion, and Thematic Recall

Narrative discourse and intellectual functioning were examined 3 years following traumatic brain injury (TBI) in children 1 to 8 years of age at the time of injury. The language-impaired TBI group (n= 9) had language deficits during the subacute stage of recovery; their performance was contrasted with that of a TBI comparison group equated on neurologic and demographic variables that did not show subacute language impairment (n= 8) and a sibling comparison group (n= 9). The language-impaired TBI group had lower Verbal and Full-Scale IQ scores and produced fewer words and utterances than the sibling group on a story retelling task; their stories were characterized by fewer complete referential and lexical ties and more referential errors, indicating difficulty conjoining meaning across sentences. The language-impaired TBI group recalled approximately one-third of the propositions needed to maintain the story theme and made more errors sequencing the propositions than either the TBI or the sibling comparison groups. Group differences were not obtained on the Performance IQ scores or on measures of rate or fluency of speech production, mazes, use of conjunctives, or naming errors. The discourse deficiencies of children with TBI and acute language impairment were most pronounced at the level of cognitive organization of the text reflecting text macrostructure and were least apparent at the level of lexical and sentential organization reflecting text microstructure. Results are discussed in terms of the vulnerability of developing language abilities to disruption by brain injury.     

Belief and the basis of meaning

A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can support it.     

Spilling the beans on understanding and memory for idioms in conversation

Three experiments examine people's understanding and memory for idioms. Experiment 1 indicates that in a conversational context, subjects take less time to comprehend conventional uses of idiomatic expression than unconventional, literal uses. Paraphrase judgment errors show that there is a strong bias to interpret idiomatic expressions conventionally when there is no preceding context; however, subjects interpret literal uses of these expressions correctly when there is appropriate context. Experiment 2 showed that in a free recall task, literal uses of idioms are remembered better than conventional uses of these utterances. Experiment 3 indicated that in conversation, literal and idiomatic recall prompts facilitate memory for literal uses of idioms equally well. The results from these experiments suggest that memory for conventional utterances is not as good as for unconventional uses of the same utterances and that subjects understanding unconventional uses of idioms tend to analyze the idiomatic meaning of these expressions before deriving the literal, unconventional interpretation. It is argued that the traditional distinction between literal and metaphoric language is better characterized as a continuum between conventional and unconventional utterances.     

Formalization and the Objects of Logic

There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put forward in the debate. The core of the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for presupposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utterances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information about linguistic structure and pragmatic context.     

Children's use of expectations as a source of information in language comprehension

Six studies of children's comprehension of the passive transformation and of the Minimum Distance Principle are reviewed and their results integrated. Children were in kindergarten through Grade 6, inclusive. Expectations about usual grammatical relations (e.g., agent/action combinations) significantly affected children's comprehension: sentences reflecting expectations were understood more often than sentences contradicting children's expressed expectations. Results are discussed within the framework of referential event strategies in understanding spoken language. Limits of the effect of children's expectation on comprehension are described, including general cognitive developmental status, relevant belief systems, and nature of the psycholinguistic task.     

Autobiographical memories and views of the future: In relation to dysphoria

The present study investigated dysphoric individuals' self‐referential processing of autobiographical memories and future personal events, in relation to specificity and response latency. Dysphoric individuals (n  =  17) and nondysphoric controls (n  =  17) were selected from a larger sample based on self‐reported depression. Participants completed an autobiographical memory task (AMT) and a future event task (FET), using pleasant and unpleasant (anxiety‐relevant, depression‐relevant) emotional word cues. In response to each emotional cue, participants were required to access and write down a specific personal memory and future event, respectively. Consistent with the hypotheses, dysphoric individuals were less specific in describing pleasant and unpleasant experiences (particularly pleasant), irrespective of time condition. As expected, dysphoric individuals' specificity for distinct depression‐relevant and anxiety‐relevant experiences did not differ significantly. As predicted, all participants were less specific in describing future personal events than in recalling personal memories. As predicted, dysphoric individuals took longer to think of pleasant memories and pleasant future experiences than controls but, as expected, groups did not differ significantly on mean reaction times for past and future unpleasant experiences. Overall, the data showed a degree of consistency in participants' past and future‐oriented processing of self‐referential material. Although considerable research has investigated autobiographical memories in relation to emotional disturbance, the present findings suggest that constructing future emotional experiences is also an important aspect of mental health.     

Some aspects of language comprehension in anterior aphasia

The competency of language comprehension was evaluated in three groups: anterior aphasics, posterior aphasics, and normal control subjects. Test material was divided into two sentence groups (Fill in the Blank and True/False) emphasizing either (1) semantic, “real world,” identity words or (2) syntactic, relational words, and one paragraph interpretation task. Matching auditory and visual (written) presentations were given. The control subjects performed almost flawlessly but many errors were made by each aphasia group. Qualitative study revealed a marked difference in the comprehension problem of the two groups. The anterior aphasic group performed well on semantically weighted sentences but made errors on syntactically weighted material, regardless of mode of presentation. In contrast, the posterior aphasics made almost the same number of errors on both types of material, regardless of mode of presentation. These findings support the concept of defective language comprehension in anterior aphasia and further suggest that the defect centers on the syntactical structures which are also poorly handled in expressive output.     

Does the mastery of center-embedded linguistic structures distinguish humans from nonhuman primates?

In a recentScience article, Fitch and Hauser (2004; hereafter, F&H) claimed to have demonstrated that cotton-top tamarins fail to learn an artificial language produced by a phrase structure grammar (Chomsky, 1957) generating center-embedded sentences, whereas adult humans easily learn such a language. We report an experiment replicating the results of F&H in humans but also showing that subjects learned the language without exploiting in any way the center-embedded structure. When the procedure was modified to make the processing of this structure mandatory, the subjects no longer showed evidence of learning. We propose a simple interpretation for the difference in performance observed in F&H’s task between humans and tamarins and argue that, beyond the specific drawbacks inherent in F&H’s study, researching the source of the inability of nonhuman primates to master language within a framework built around Chomsky’s hierarchy of grammars is a conceptual dead end.     

Eye movements and spoken language comprehension: effects of visual context on syntactic ambiguity resolution

When participants follow spoken instructions to pick up and move objects in a visual workspace, their eye movements to the objects are closely time-locked to referential expressions in the instructions. Two experiments used this methodology to investigate the processing of the temporary ambiguities that arise because spoken language unfolds over time. Experiment 1 examined the processing of sentences with a temporarily ambiguous prepositional phrase (e.g., "Put the apple on the towel in the box") using visual contexts that supported either the normally preferred initial interpretation (the apple should be put on the towel) or the less-preferred interpretation (the apple is already on the towel and should be put in the box). Eye movement patterns clearly established that the initial interpretation of the ambiguous phrase was the one consistent with the context. Experiment 2 replicated these results using prerecorded digitized speech to eliminate any possibility of prosodic differences across conditions or experimenter demand. Overall, the findings are consistent with a broad theoretical framework in which real-time language comprehension immediately takes into account a rich array of relevant nonlinguistic context.     

Untrained speakers' use of prosody in syntactic disambiguation and listeners' interpretations

We investigated how naively produced prosody affects listeners' end interpretations of ambiguous utterances. Non-professional speakers who were unaware of any ambiguity produced ambiguous sentences couched in short, unambiguous passages. In a forced-choice task, listeners could not tell which context the isolated ambiguous sentences came from (Exp. 1). However, listeners were able to correctly paraphrase the least ambiguous subset of these utterances, showing that prosody can be used to resolve ambiguity (Exp. 2). Nonetheless, in everyday language use, both prosody and context are available to interpret speech. When the least ambiguous sentences were cross-spliced into contexts biasing towards their original interpretations or into contexts biasing towards their alternative interpretations, answers to content questions about the ambiguous sentence, confidence ratings, and ratings of naturalness all indicated that prosody is ignored when context is available (Exp. 3). Although listeners can use prosody to interpret ambiguous sentences, they generally do not, and this makes sense in light of the frequent lack of reliable prosodic cues in everyday speech. Received: 3 April 1998 / Accepted: 21 October 1998     

Language-guided visual processing affects reasoning: The role of referential and spatial anchoring

Language is more than a source of information for accessing higher-order conceptual knowledge. Indeed, language may determine how people perceive and interpret visual stimuli. Visual processing in linguistic contexts, for instance, mirrors language processing and happens incrementally, rather than through variously-oriented fixations over a particular scene. The consequences of this atypical visual processing are yet to be determined. Here, we investigated the integration of visual and linguistic input during a reasoning task. Participants listened to sentences containing conjunctions or disjunctions (Nancy examined an ant and/or a cloud) and looked at visual scenes containing two pictures that either matched or mismatched the nouns. Degree of match between nouns and pictures (referential anchoring) and between their expected and actual spatial positions (spatial anchoring) affected fixations as well as judgments. We conclude that language induces incremental processing of visual scenes, which in turn becomes susceptible to reasoning errors during the language-meaning verification process.     

The coordinated interplay of scene, utterance, and world knowledge: evidence from eye tracking

Two studies investigated the interaction between utterance and scene processing by monitoring eye movements in agent–action–patient events, while participants listened to related utterances. The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine if and when depicted events are used for thematic role assignment and structural disambiguation of temporarily ambiguous English sentences. Shortly after the verb identified relevant depicted actions, eye movements in the event scenes revealed disambiguation. Experiment 2 investigated the relative importance of linguistic/world knowledge and scene information. When the verb identified either only the stereotypical agent of a (nondepicted) action, or the (nonstereotypical) agent of a depicted action as relevant, verb-based thematic knowledge and depicted action each rapidly influenced comprehension. In contrast, when the verb identified both of these agents as relevant, the gaze pattern suggested a preferred reliance of comprehension on depicted events over stereotypical thematic knowledge for thematic interpretation. We relate our findings to language comprehension and acquisition theories.     

The use of prosodic cues in language discrimination tasks by rats

Recent research with cotton-top tamarin monkeys has revealed language discrimination abilities similar to those found in human infants, demonstrating that these perceptual abilities are not unique to humans but are also present in non-human primates. Specifically, tamarins could discriminate forward but not backward sentences of Dutch from Japanese, using both natural and synthesized utterances. The present study was designed as a conceptual replication of the work on tamarins. Results show that rats trained in a discrimination learning task readily discriminate forward, but not backward sentences of Dutch from Japanese; the results are particularly robust for synthetic utterances, a pattern that shows greater parallels with newborns than with tamarins. Our results extend the claims made in the research with tamarins that the capacity to discriminate languages from different rhythmic classes depends on general perceptual abilities that evolved at least as far back as the rodents. Electronic Publication     

The kindergarten path effect revisited: children's use of context in processing structural ambiguities

Research with adults has shown that ambiguous spoken sentences are resolved efficiently, exploiting multiple cues--including referential context--to select the intended meaning. Paradoxically, children appear to be insensitive to referential cues when resolving ambiguous sentences, relying instead on statistical properties intrinsic to the language such as verb biases. The possibility that children's insensitivity to referential context may be an artifact of the experimental design used in previous work was explored with 60 4- to 11-year-olds. An act-out task was designed to discourage children from making incorrect pragmatic inferences and to prevent premature and ballistic responses by enforcing delayed actions. Performance on this task was compared directly with the standard act-out task used in previous studies. The results suggest that young children (5 years) do not use contextual information, even under conditions designed to maximize their use of such cues, but that adult-like processing is evident by approximately 8 years of age. These results support and extend previous findings by Trueswell and colleagues (Cognition (1999), Vol. 73, pp. 89-134) and are consistent with a constraint-based learning account of children's linguistic development.     

Persistence of Initial Misanalysis With No Referential Ambiguity

Previous research reported that in processing structurally ambiguous sentences comprehenders often preserve an initial incorrect analysis even after adopting a correct analysis following structural disambiguation. One criticism is that the sentences tested in previous studies involved referential ambiguity and allowed comprehenders to make inferences about the initial interpretation using pragmatic information, suggesting the possibility that the initial analysis persisted due to comprehenders' pragmatic inference but not to their failure to perform complete reanalysis of the initial misanalysis. Our study investigated this by testing locally ambiguous relative clause sentences in Japanese, in which the initial misinterpretation contradicts the correct interpretation. Our study using a self‐paced reading technique demonstrated evidence for the persistence of the initial analysis with this structure. The results from an eye‐tracking study further suggested that the phenomenon directly reflected the amount of support given to the initial incorrect analysis prior to disambiguating information: The more supported the incorrect main clause analysis was, the more likely comprehenders were to preserve the analysis even after the analysis was falsified. Our results thus demonstrated that the preservation of the initial analysis occurs not due to referential ambiguities but to comprehenders' difficulty to fully revise the highly supported initial interpretation.     

Effect of Rate,Intonation, and Sentence Length on Nigerian Children's Imitation of Adults' Utterances

This Nigerian study replicated the work of Bonvillian et al. (1979) on the effects of rate, intonation, and sentence length on children's sentence imitation. Nursery school children (N = 12; M age = 5 years, 0.5 months) were asked to imitate sentences that varied in rate of presentation, intonation, and length. Results revealed better imitation of shorter sentences than longer ones, of sentences read at a rate nearer the children's normal speech rate than those read at a faster or slower rate, and of sentences read with normal intonation than those read with flat intonation. These findings replicated those of Bonvillian et al., while indicating an even stronger effect of intonation in the Nigerian sample, because its effect was not limited to long sentences but affected all sentences. Adults' utterances to children are often slow, with exaggerated intonation. The present findings suggest that such modifications in adults' speech facilitate children's language comprehension.     

Interpretive dilemmas created by the minnesota multiphasic personality inventory 2 (MMPI-2)

While the new MMPI-2 has the potential to provide more and better clinically relevant information than its predecessor, its introduction also creates several important problems for clinicians and researchers. In particular, the new norms and the use of uniform (rather than linear) T-scores result in the same raw scores on the two tests yielding clinical profiles that can be quite different, both qualitatively and quantitatively. These differences can result in difficulty in MMPI-2 profile interpretation when the user is relying on MMPI interpretive strategies. This paper addresses these concerns and offers some temporary remedial strategies.     

Sentence interference in the Stroop task

In two experiments on Stroop interference, we examined whether sentences can be processed without the intention of the reader. Participants named the ink colors in which words in sentences were printed, and the ink colors in which the same words, randomly arranged, were printed. In Experiment 1, sentences yielded longer response times (RTs) and more errors than did nonsentences, but only when they included words that were highly relevant to the color-naming task (i.e., color and color-related words). In Experiment 2, sentences yielded more errors than did nonsentences, and sentences in which the color words matched the set of ink colors yielded longer RTs than did nonsentences. The results indicate that sentence processing can be obligatory when the component words are highly relevant to the task.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.