Human Enhancement and the Anthropology of the “Entire Human Being”

About one and a half decades ago, two prominent reports were published in the United States (US) which strongly influenced subsequent international discussions on the topic of human enhancement: a 2002 report on “converging technologies for improving human performance”, based on a workshop which was organised by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and the US Department of Commerce in December 2001, and the first report of US President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE), published in October 2003 with the title Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. The 2002 report included a wide variety of contributions from academics in various fields of research, from representatives of US institutions, and from companies. Due primarily to the influence of the two NSF staff editing the report, it can be regarded as the first major instance of the influence of transhumanism, a techno-futurist ideology and movement, on the US technology and innovation discourse. The PCBE report, on the other hand, is a prime example of a conservative critique of the transhumanist notion of human enhancement. In this invited contribution, these two crucial publications are analysed mainly in order to point out the relevance of philosophical anthropology as developed since the 1920s by Helmuth Plessner and others. This remarkable school of thought is experiencing a revival in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and, to some extent, in the English-speaking world. In this article, it is argued that philosophical anthropology provides us with an important alternative to both anthropological essentialism and scientism, two approaches that are still highly relevant in current discourse on human enhancement.     

Fallen or Unfallen? Christ's Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness

Abstract: Because Christ's sinlessness is a matter of virtual consensus among Christians, debates over whether the human nature he assumed was fallen or unfallen turn on the ontological conditions of his being ‘without sin’ (Heb. 4:15). The claim that Christ assumed a fallen nature can be defended by distinguishing between fallenness and sinfulness as properties of nature and hypostasis, respectively. Moreover, by highlighting the peculiar place of the will in human nature, this christological analysis helps counter the charge that an Augustinian understanding of original sin entails a dualism inconsistent with belief in the goodness of creation and human moral accountability.     

Human Dignity as the Essence of Nussbaum’s Ethics of Human Development

Philosophia - Martha C. Nussbaum, in the context of ancient philosophy, formulated ethics of human development based on 10 basic human capabilities (and opportunities) as a precondition of...     

Is Human Life Absurd?

Philosophia - This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces...     

Beyond Death: The Treatment of Indigenous Human Remains—a Human Rights Perspective

Indigenous human remains that have been disinterred and removed (often overseas) without the permission of the descendants of the deceased fall within the broader category of movable cultural heritage. It is accepted that the rights associated with culture as well as certain other human rights—such as freedom of expression and association—are applicable directly to cultural heritage. When considering the human rights dimension of the treatment of indigenous human remains, it is vital to appreciate that for indigeneous peoples the bodies of their ancestors represent an important spiritual heritage as well as being an essential element in their sense of identity. Therefore, both their religious practices (which may include the worship of their ancestors) and their right to cultural identity (and the associated material heritage) should be respected. Most legal systems have laws that prohibit the disturbance of burial grounds, although it is not uncommon for old burial grounds to be turned over to other purposes. For indigenous peoples, both the dead and their burial grounds remain sacred even after thousands of years. The potential for conflict between the wider social importance of indigenous human remains as repositories of scientific information and their special significance to the indigenous community concerned is strong. This raises important ethical questions for anthropologists and museum curators in relation to the treatment of indigenous human remains.     

Nietzsche's Critique of Pure Altruism—Developing an Argument from Human,All Too Human

Abstract

Nietzsche often appears, especially in his writings from the middle period, to endorse psychological egoism, namely the claim that all actions are motivated by, and are for the sake of, the agent’s own self-interest. I argue that Nietzsche’s position in Human, All Too Human (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) should not be so understood. Rather, he is claiming, more weakly and more plausibly, that no action is entirely unegoistic, entirely free of egoistic motivations. Thus some actions might be motivated both by egoistic and unegoistic motives, on his view. Nietzsche’s argument may, in other words, be understood to be directed specifically against Schopenhauer’s portrayal of moral motivation, as pure, entirely unalloyed altruism, to show that this sort of action is impossible, not to rule out the possibility of any altruistic motive whatsoever. In light of Schopenahuer’s moral psychology, to which Nietzsche to some extent adhered at that time, I develop a concept of motivation and reconstruct Nietzsche’s argument.     

Who Cares About Human Rights?

Previous studies of human rights attitudes are reviewed, new measures are reported, and a three-factor model is identified (Human Rights Endorsement, Commitment, and Restriction). Individual differences that predict attitudes on each factor overlapped but differed. Dispositional empathy, education, and global knowledge contributed to an endorsement of human rights ideals, but none of these affected commitment or restriction. Globalism (vs. nationalism) and principled moral reasoning strengthened human rights commitment, while ethnocentrism and the social dominance orientation weakened it. Authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and belief that the world cannot be changed increased a willingness to restrict the rights of unpopular groups, while principled moral reasoning and self-rated liberalism decreased it. In short, the individual differences that influence human rights attitudes depend substantially upon which dimension of these attitudes is considered.     

Bosnia—Requiem for the Vanishing Human

Taking a position informed by postcolonial thought, it is argued that Jung's concept of individuation, with its emphasis on separateness and the withdrawal of projections, is essentially modern and Western. Any group of people is regarded by Jung only as a regressive threat to the individuation process. Jung's European colonialism is evident in his trips to Africa and his response to the dreams that he had there. It is argued that traces of this colonialism remain evident as a colonialism of the psyche to the extent that opposites such as light/dark, white/black, civilized/primitive, conscious/unconscious remain as the organizing principles in our theory of psyche. The author's experience of growing up in apartheid South Africa is discussed, together with an account of a dream of a traditional Xhosa woman and another Xhosa woman's life. Thereafter, Senghor's concept of negritude is used to describe an individuating consciousness that might be closer to our shared human experience than is found in Jung's writings. Individuation is then discussed in terms of the Zulu concept of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is based on the recognition that we become persons through other persons who treat us as persons, and that the community can be imagined as facilitating our individuation. It is suggested that Ubuntu might describe our experience of growth within the Jungian community.     

Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.     

Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful?

Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.     

Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

Human Values and Product Symbolism: Do Consumers Form Product Preference by Comparing the Human Values Symbolized by a Product to the Human Values That They Endorse?1

The present study proposes a cognitive process in which consumers form product preference by attending to and evaluating the human values symbolized by a product against the human values that they endorse. Individuals in the treatment group were informed that owners or heavy users of specific products hold certain human values. Results show that, compared with the control group, the treatment group perceived greater human value product symbolism and held more favorable attitudes toward products that symbolized the values that they endorsed. Moreover, the consistency between value endorsement and product preference was strongest for individuals in the treatment group who had a predisposition to attend to the symbolic meanings of products or believed that values in general are personally relevant.     

Is Human Enhancement also a Personal Matter?

Emerging technologies are increasingly used in an attempt to “enhance the human body and/or mind” beyond the contemporary standards that characterize human beings. Yet, such standards are deeply controversial and it is not an easy task to determine whether the application of a given technology to an individual and its outcome can be defined as a human enhancement or not. Despite much debate on its potential or actual ethical and social impacts, human enhancement is not subject to any consensual definition. This paper proposes a timely and much needed examination of the various definitions found in the literature. We classify these definitions into four main categories: the implicit approach, the therapy-enhancement distinction, the improvement of general human capacities and the increase of well-being. After commenting on these different approaches and their limitations, we propose a definition of human enhancement that focuses on individual perceptions. While acknowledging that a definition that mainly depends on personal and subjective individual perceptions raises many challenges, we suggest that a comprehensive approach to define human enhancement could constitute a useful premise to appropriately address the complexity of the ethical and social issues it generates.     

Is Human Behavior Autocorrelated? An Empirical Analysis

The current review and analysis investigated the presence of serial dependency (or autocorrelation) in single-subject applied behavior-analytic research. While well researched, few studies have controlled for the number of data points that appeared in the time-series and, thus, the negative bias of the r coefficient, and the power to detect true serial dependency effects. Therefore, all baseline graphs that appeared in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA) between 1968 and 1993 that provided more than 30 data points were examined for the presence of serial dependency (N = 103). Results indicated that 12% of the baseline graphs provided a significant lag-1 autocorrelation, and over 83% of them had coefficient values less than or equal to (±.25). The distribution of the lag-1 autocorrelation coefficients had a mean of .10. Subsequent distributions of partial autocorrelations at lags two through seven had smaller means indicating that as the distance between observations increases (i.e., the lag), serial dependency decreased. Although serial dependency did not appear to be a common property of the single-subject behavioral experiments, it is recommended that, whenever statistical analyses are contemplated, its presence should always be examined. Alternatives for coping with the presence of significant levels of serial dependency were discussed in terms of: (a) using alternative statistical procedures (e.g., ARIMA models, randomization tests, the Shewhart quality-control charts); (b) correcting statistics of traditional parametric procedures (e.g., t, F); or (c) using the autocorrelation coefficient as an indicator and estimate of reliable intervention effects.