Interaction of dominant focus and conditional reflex as a functional unit of behavior organization

The interaction of two fundamental phenomena—the dominant focus and the conditional reflex—discovered and introduced by A. A. Ukhtomsky and I. P. Pavlov lay at the basis of behavior. According to E. A. Asratyan, the backward conditioned connection is a specialized dominant focus in the functional structure of the consolidated conditional reflex. It makes the behavior goal-directed and active. The dominant focus and conditioned reflex play the same role in the adaptive behavior of the individual as does variability and selection in the process of evolutional adaptation. That is why it is impossible to agree with Popper and Eccles that hypothesis theory has to replace Pavlov’s theory of the conditional reflex. Imprinting and psychonervous activity by images (I. S. Beritashvili) are two special exemplars of conditional reflexes after one coincidence. The so-called “elementary reasoning activity of animals” (according to L. V. Krushinsky) is a kind of the instinctive inherited behavior.     

The organization of classical and instrumental conditional reactions

This paper makes a theoretical analysis of the process of formation of neural associations among sensory changes produced in the brain by environmental stimuli; it also analyzes the origin of classical and instrumental conditional reactions. It has been proposed that sensory traces of stimuli “intermingle,” forming patterns of associations in “polymodal” structures of the brain. The sensory traces of stronger stimulus dominate over the sensory traces of weaker stimulus in the pattern. An activation of a pattern of associations by any of the stimuli involved releases a reaction typical of the stronger stimulus (called a reinforcing or unconditional stimulus) before the latter is presented. That type of reaction, called classical conditional reaction, is dispensable; it is one of post-reinforcement origin and therefore, is not represented in the pattern of associations. When a physiological act, such as a definite movement (e.g., pressing a bar) must precede the obtaining of the reinforcing stimulus, this physiological act, called an instrumental conditional reaction, is also evoked each time the pattern of associations has been activated. The instrumental conditional reaction is indispensable and, because of its pre-reinforcement origin, belongs, through its sensory feedback, to the pattern of associations.     

Typology of dogs by the conditional reflex method

Some of the problems and concerns which initiated and motivated the development of typological research in Pavlov’s laboratories are reviewed. Explanations are developed as to the basic theme underlying the typing methods. Two outstanding methods of typing dogs, the “large standard” and the “small standard,” are presented in considerable detail. The basic four types that emerge from the testing procedures and some of their shortcomings are discussed. The importance to Western investigators of acquiring a first hand knowledge of this methodology is stressed.     

Effect of movement on the cardiac conditional reflex

The cardiac component of the motor conditional reflex to a faradic stimulus to the hind leg in three dogs was measured. The leg was paralyzed by crushing 4 to 5 anterior roots of the lumbar nerves (second to sixth). The cardiac experiments were repeated beginning four days after operation and measurements were taken of the cardiac conditional reflex. A comparison of the increase in cardiac rate to the conditional stimulus before and after operating showed no significant difference in spite of the fact that the dog was unable to lift his leg to the stimulus. From this we conclude that the execution of the movement is not necessary for the increase of heart rate in the cardiac conditional reflex.     

A note on conditional reflex studies of schizophrenia in France

In France, beginning with 1946, the method of Ivanov-Smolenski was used to study schizophrenia, but after 1957, sensory conditioning procedures have been employed (EEG sound-light, evoked potentials in children, SAE conditioning in adults) and more recently eye blink and operant conditioning).     

The affective organization of parenting: adaptive and maladaptive processes

This article presents a 3-component model of parenting that places emotion at the heart of parental competence. The model emphasizes (a) child, parent, and contextual factors that activate parents' emotions; (b) orienting, organizing, and motivating effects that emotions have on parenting once aroused; and (c) processes parents use to understand and control emotions. Emotions are vital to effective parenting. When invested in the interest of children, emotions organize sensitive, responsive parenting. Emotions undermine parenting, however, when they are too weak, too strong, or poorly matched to child rearing tasks. In harmonious relationships emotions are, on average, positive because parents manage interactions so that children's and parents' concerns are promoted. In distressed relationships chronic negative emotion is both a cause and a consequence of interactions that undermine parents' concerns and children's development.     

The heart rate component of the social reflex in dogs: The conditional effects of petting and person

Five dogs were given a 480-cps tone followed by shock for more than 200 trials. A 200-cps tone was then introduced followed by a person petting the dog at the end of the conditional signal (CS) for 50 trials. Finally, the 480-cps tone-shock (T-S) sequence was reintroduced for five trials, after which the person entered the experimental room and stood beside the dog during one additional T-S sequence. It was observed that both the heart rate (HR) increase to shock, and the HR decrease to petting could be conditioned rapidly (1–5 trials). These findings are discussed in terms of the theory of stimulus substitution in classical HR conditioning. After the person had been made part of a CS for petting, and the T-S sequence reintroduced, the HR increase during the CS was reduced. The HR response to the shock, however, was greater than the response to this US when the dog was alone. A control group, given the same T-S sequence with a person present who had not been a CS for petting, did not show any significant HR changes from the usual response given to the T-S sequence. It is emphasized that these findings, in conjunction with earlier reports, indicate that the cardiovascular system may be a valuable index in studying the psychophysiology of socialization processes.     

On two types of conditional reflex: General laws of association

Both types of conditioning are based on the general laws of associations-connections between the centers involved. Whereas the experimental procedures of classical conditioning expose mainly the conditioned stimulus (CS)-unconditioned stimulus (US) connection, those of instrumental conditioning expose the conditioned stimulus (CS)-response (R) connection. Thus, the main differences between the two types of conditioning are those associated with the different centers involved in each, not the associative-connective laws themselves.     

Respiratory conditional reflex formation with CO2 and electric shock as unconditional stimuli

In 12 birds used in a CO₂ conditioning experiment there was no evidence of the formation of either a respiratory or a cardiac conditional reflex. Tone and light separately or together were used as conditional stimuli. CS-US intervals ranging from 0.5 to 10 seconds were used. CO₂ concentrations up to 7.4% were also employed. In the shock conditioning experiments six of seven birds showed a respiratory change to the conditional stimulus. In one pigeon perfect differentiation was obtained between the reinforced and nonreinforced tones. The marked difference in conditionability of sensory and chemical stimuli to the “respiratory center” is discussed in relation to the central nervous system connections of the respiratory control mechanism.     

The case for motivated reasoning

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.     

The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.