One concept or two? A reply to Raine

It is suggested that Raine's criticisms of the paper by Barbour-McMullen, Coid and Howard rest on misconceptions, particularly regarding the nature of the supposed conceptual dichotomy between “North American” and “European” concepts of psychopathy. Several points of clarification are offered. It is maintained that psychopathy is indeed a dual, rather than a unitary, concept.     

Schema anticipation in recall: memory process or report strategy?

Summary This article reports an experimental investigation testing the hypothesis that recall reports are systematically biased by the recaller's knowledge about who is to receive the recall report, while that bias is absent from a recognition test. Subjects listened to one of two versions of a story recounting John's visit to the doctor. After the story was read, subjects were asked to recall the story either with standard-recall instructions or with instructions to recall for peers, for Martians, or for a contest. In a fifth condition, subjects performed a filler activity, viz., the recall of a personal experience. After the recall test subjects were administered a recognition test. Between the groups no systematic differences in memory performance were observed in the recognition test. Recall for peers appeared to be poorer than recall in the other conditions. Subjects in the recall for a contest condition scored higher than the subjects in the other groups. Not only did groups differ with respect to bias, but there were also systematic differences in the memory or discrimination scores. The findings are discussed within the framework of schema theory.     

Dilution: atheoretical burden or just load? A reply to Tsal and Benoni (2010)

Load theory of attention proposes that distractor processing is reduced in tasks with high perceptual load that exhaust attentional capacity within task-relevant processing. In contrast, tasks of low perceptual load leave spare capacity that spills over, resulting in the perception of task-irrelevant, potentially distracting stimuli. Tsal and Benoni (2010) find that distractor response competition effects can be reduced under conditions with a high search set size but low perceptual load (due to a singleton color target). They claim that the usual effect of search set size on distractor processing is not due to attentional load but instead attribute this to lower level visual interference. Here, we propose an account for their findings within load theory. We argue that in tasks of low perceptual load but high set size, an irrelevant distractor competes with the search nontargets for remaining capacity. Thus, distractor processing is reduced under conditions in which the search nontargets receive the spillover of capacity instead of the irrelevant distractor. We report a new experiment testing this prediction. Our new results demonstrate that, when peripheral distractor processing is reduced, it is the search nontargets nearest to the target that are perceived instead. Our findings provide new evidence for the spare capacity spillover hypothesis made by load theory and rule out accounts in terms of lower level visual interference (or mere "dilution") for cases of reduced distractor processing under low load in displays of high set size. We also discuss additional evidence that discounts the viability of Tsal and Benoni's dilution account as an alternative to perceptual load.     

Event-based and emergent timing: dichotomy or continuum? A reply to Repp and Steinman (2010)

B. H. Repp and S. R. Steiman (2010) suggested that event-based and emergent timing, usually conceived as mutually exclusive modes of timing, could in fact coexist in a single activity. According to this point of view, rhythmic activities could exploit mixtures of control modes, in which the relative importance of event-based and emergent components could depend on task characteristics. This point of view, in the opinion of the authors of the present article, corresponds to a fundamental misunderstanding of the theoretical basis of the event-based and emergent distinction, and is not supported by any experimental evidence. However, they present some new results that could support new lines of reasoning for the future developments of research in this domain.     

Which is the real intelligence? A reply to Robinson (1999)

Robinson's ([Robinson, D.L. (1999). The ‘IQ’ factor: implications for intelligence theory and measurement. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 715–735]) arguments that crystallized intelligence represents the “one valid intelligence factor” are disputed. It is argued that Robinson seriously underestimated the relevance of fluid abilities to “intelligence”, by using an inappropriate criterion for assessing the intelligence-saturation of cognitive ability variables. The relevance of fluid and crystallized abilities to popular, psychometric, and biological conceptions of intelligence is discussed, and the issue of age-related changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence is also addressed.     

Available but unattended conceptual information in working memory: temporarily active semantic content or persistent memory for prior operations?

In 2 experiments, the authors investigated available but unattended information following working memory task demands. The experimental task presented a memory set containing exemplars from 2 conceptual categories. Following instructions to focus attention on only 1 category, priming of both categories was assessed with category comparisons of exemplar pairs. Priming was greatest for the focused category and for exemplars from the memory set (direct priming). Priming also extended to new exemplars of both categories (indirect priming) and showed little decline over more than 1 min of intervening processes. Finally, changing between category exemplars and features across memory set and comparison phases eliminated the indirect priming. These results support a persistent, operation-specific, procedural account of available but unattended conceptual information in working memory.     

How does imagery in interactive consumption lead to false memory? A reconstructive memory perspective

Consumers are often exposed to information that may contradict their consumption experience, leading to “false memory” for aspects of the consumption. We develop a theory suggesting why false memory may be heightened due to imagery processing. We subject this theory to a rigorous test in three experiments. We find that post-consumption imagery makes it more difficult to discern between consumption and misleading information thereby boosting false recall. Yet, imagery that is more consumption-based helps reduce consumers' susceptibility to false memory. Consistent with this notion, we explicate the role that attention plays at different stages of consumption in affecting false memory.     

Is the enhancement of memory due to reward driven by value or salience?

Past research using two levels of reward has shown that the higher-value items are remembered better than lower-value items and this enhancement is assumed to be driven by an effect of reward value. In the present study, multiple levels of reward were used to test the influence of reward salience on memory. Using a value-learning procedure, words were associated with reward values, and then memory for these words was later tested with free recall. Critically, multiple reward levels were used, allowing us to test two specific hypotheses whereby rewards can influence memory: (a) higher value items are remembered better than lower value items (reward value hypothesis), and (b) highest and lowest value items are remembered best and intermediate-value items are remembered worst (following a U-shaped relationship between value and memory; reward salience hypothesis). In two experiments we observed a U-shaped relationship between reward value and memory, supporting the notion that memory is enhanced due to reward salience, and not purely through reward value.     

Unskilled and unaware--but why? A reply to Krueger and Mueller (2002)

J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999) argued that the unskilled suffer a dual burden: Not only do they perform poorly, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller (2002) replicated these basic findings but interpreted them differently. They concluded that a combination of the better-than-average (BTA) effect and a regression artifact better explains why the unskilled are unaware. The authors of the present article respectfully disagree with this proposal and suggest that any interpretation of J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller's results is hampered because those authors used unreliable tests and inappropriate measures of relevant mediating variables. Additionally, a regression-BTA account cannot explain the experimental data reported in J. Kruger and D. Dunning or a reanalysis following the procedure suggested by J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller.     

The conjunction fallacy? A reply to Bar-Hillel

In her commentary on our article, Bar-Hillel (1991) argues that our normative interpretation of the Lindaproblem is inaccurate and that the representativeness heuristic can account for all of the relevant data. I argue that the normative interpretation of the Linda problem remains slippery and that representativeness fails to account for much of the data. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports our suggestion that subjects use different underlying models in estimating likelihoods in different con problems.     

Disruption of short-term memory by distractor speech: Does content matter?

Four experiments replicate the finding that auditory distractors that are lexically identical to the visual target items dramatically increase the irrelevant-speech effect on serial recall. This effect was previously attributed to interference of incompatible order cues. The present results suggest that a different interpretation of this effect is required. Experiment 2 replicates the order congruence effect observed by Hughes and Jones (2005), but shows that this effect is most likely due to an attenuation of interference that is caused by strategic attention shifts to the nominally irrelevant material. Experiments 3 and 4 show that the between-stream similarity effect generalizes to a condition in which the distractor items were drawn from the same category as the targets, but were not identical to them. By showing that nonacoustic distractor features can increase interference in serial recall of lists of supposedly “meaningless” items such as digits or consonants, the results are most consistent with models that postulate an integration of short-term and long-term memory such as the embedded-processes model and the feature model and are inconsistent with classical structural accounts of memory.