The interplay between presentation material and decision mode for complex choice preferences

Recent research suggests that, when faced with a choice between several alternatives described with a large number of attributes, people make better choices if they do not consciously ponder over the alternatives but rather perform a distraction task assumed to elicit unconscious thought. Subsequent research attempting to replicate this finding, however, provided mitigated support for its existence. The research reported here contributes to this ongoing debate on two grounds. First, it highlights a methodological confound between qualitative and quantitative presentation material and proposes a novel procedure that can accommodate both. Second, it shows that, whereas conscious deliberation leads to better decisions when alternatives are characterised by quantitative information, the use of a qualitative format for presenting information cancels the advantage of conscious deliberation.     

A sham drug improves a demanding prospective memory task

Every day, people rely on prospective memory—our ability to remember to perform a future action—to carry out myriad tasks. We examined how a sham cognitive enhancing drug might improve people's performance on a prospective memory task. We gave some people (but not others) the sham drug, and asked everyone to perform a high-effort prospective memory task. People who received the sham drug performed better on the prospective memory task. They also took longer to perform their ongoing task, suggesting that they increased their effortful monitoring. These results fit with research showing that suggestions can lead people to increase cognitive effort and increase memory performance.     

Time Urgency and Job Performance: Field Evidence of an Interactionist Perspective1

Individual predispositions toward time urgency were assessed among 118 emergency room nurses and 145 small‐town librarians. Following from research on person–job fit, according to which people perform better when the demands of the situation match their individual characteristics than when these are mismatched, it was hypothesized that nurses (who typically face high time‐urgent demands) would perform better when they scored high in time urgency, and that librarians (who typically face low time‐urgent demands) would perform better when they scored low in time urgency. The results, based on a standardized measure of task performance, were precisely as expected. The practical ramifications of these findings are discussed along with the implications for research on person–job fit.     

The left visual hemispace bias for the perception of chimeric faces: a further test of the difficulty of discrimination hypothesis

When people make judgments of visual-spatial forms, they generally perform better if the information is presented in their left visual hemispace (LVH), whereas for verbal material, they generally show a right visual hemispace (RVH) bias. For verbal material, the strength and direction of the effect also has been linked to task difficulty, with the bias shifting toward the RVH as task difficulty increases. Two experiments are presented that show the reverse direction of change for a nonverbal task; that is, when a nonverbal task is more difficult, the usual LVH effect shifts toward an RVH bias. Taking into account recent developments in theory and research on hemispheric differences in styles of information processing, we propose that task difficulty is related more generally to changes in processing style.     

How Stories in Memory Perpetuate the Continued Influence of False Information

People often encounter information that they subsequently learn is false. Past research has shown that people sometimes continue to use this misinformation in their reasoning, even if they remember that the information is false, which researchers refer to as the continued influence effect. The current work shows that the continued influence effect depends on the stories people have in memory: corrected misinformation was found to have a stronger effect on people's beliefs than information that was topically related to the story if it helped to provide a causal explanation of a story they had read previously. We argue this effect occurs because information that can fill a causal “gap” in a story enhances comprehension of the story event, which allows people to build a complete (if inaccurate) event model that they prefer over an accurate but incomplete event model. This effect is less likely to occur for stories in memory that end in a negative way, presumably because people are more motivated to accurately understand negative outcome events.     

Reconciling change blindness with long-term memory for objects

How can we reconcile remarkably precise long-term memory for thousands of images with failures to detect changes to similar images? We explored whether people can use detailed, long-term memory to improve change detection performance. Subjects studied a set of images of objects and then performed recognition and change detection tasks with those images. Recognition memory performance exceeded change detection performance, even when a single familiar object in the postchange display consistently indicated the change location. In fact, participants were no better when a familiar object predicted the change location than when the displays consisted of unfamiliar objects. When given an explicit strategy to search for a familiar object as a way to improve performance on the change detection task, they performed no better than in a 6-alternative recognition memory task. Subjects only benefited from the presence of familiar objects in the change detection task when they had more time to view the prechange array before it switched. Once the cost to using the change detection information decreased, subjects made use of it in conjunction with memory to boost performance on the familiar-item change detection task. This suggests that even useful information will go unused if it is sufficiently difficult to extract.     

Processing fluency affects behavior more strongly among people higher in trait mindfulness

Processing fluency is the ease of processing information about a stimulus, which people can attribute to the experience of enjoyment. Despite consistent findings that processing fluency can affect self-reported judgments, little research has examined whether processing fluency or its interactions with personality traits can affect behavior. The current studies demonstrate that processing fluency is more likely to affect behavior among people higher in trait mindfulness. We manipulated processing fluency with rhyming versus nonrhyming maxims in Study 1 and with regulatory fit versus nonfit in Study 2. Participants higher in mindfulness showed a stronger positive effect for processing fluency on the dependent variable: the number of ideas they listed in a task they continued for as long as they enjoyed it.     

Strategic Numeracy: Self-Serving Reasoning About Health Statistics

This research shows that the same people who appear to have low numerical competence when analyzing personally irrelevant health-related numerical information are able to overcome their reasoning shortcomings and make better judgments when they are shown equivalent information that is personally relevant, and when only a sophisticated kind of reasoning enables them to interpret this information in a favorable way. The fact that people can engage in poorer or more sophisticated numerical reasoning depending on whether that reasoning produces favorable or unfavorable conclusions has implications both for the concept of numeracy as an individual-difference variable and for health communication.     

Meaning-Making in Delayed-Return Cultures: The Case of Personal Uncertainty

The large majority of humans nowadays live in cultures in which there is often a delay between the efforts they exert and the feedback they receive regarding the outcome of their efforts. As a result, individuals may experience uncertainty between their efforts and outcomes, leading them to pay special attention to uncertainty information. In particular, we propose that when people feel uncertain about themselves, this may be alarming to them as it may signal that their personal contract with their delayed-return culture may be in jeopardy. Therefore, under conditions of personal uncertainty, people are looking forward to events that bolster their cultural worldviews and detest events that violate these worldviews. We review research findings that show that personal uncertainty indeed has a special role in the social psychology of meaning-making and worldview defense, sometimes even yielding a better explanation of worldview defense reactions than terror management theory.     

Patterns of Preference for Numerical and Verbal Probabilities

We report results of an experiment designed to test a principle formulated by Budescu and Wallsten (1995), that, when communicating uncertainty information, mode choices are sensitive to sources and degrees of vagueness. In addition, we examined subjects’ efficacy in using such uncertainty information as a function of communication mode, source, and vagueness. In phase one of the experiment, subjects in a dyad used precise (numerical) or imprecise (verbal) expressions to communicate to a remote partner precise or vague uncertainty about the likelihoods of events. Spinner outcomes were used to generate precise uncertainty while answers to almanac questions were used to elicit vague uncertainty. In phase two, subjects saw the events paired with their partners’ estimates of similar events, and were asked to gamble on one event from each pair. Communication mode preferences were measured as the relative frequency that subjects chose the numerical mode to either express or receive uncertainty information regarding the events. Efficacy was measured as the relative frequency that subjects choose from the pair the event associated with the objectively more probable uncertainty expression. Underlying uncertainty interacted with direction of communication to affect preferences for modes of expression of the probabilities. Subjects preferred precise (numerical) information, especially for precise events (spinners). For vague events (questions), their preference for precise (numerical) information was stronger when receiving than when communicating information. Similar preferences were reflected in the efficiency of subsequent gamble decisions based on the probability estimates. Specifically, decisions were more efficacious (i.e. consistent with Expected Utility) when degrees of precision in events and estimates matched. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probabilities Associated with Precise and Vague Forecasts

Forecasts of future outcomes, such as the consequences of climate change, are given with different degrees of precision. Logically, more precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 3–4°) have a smaller probability of capturing the actual outcome than less precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 2–6°). Nevertheless, people often trust precise forecasts more than vague forecasts, perhaps because precision is associated with knowledge and expertise. In five experiments, we ask whether people expect highly confident forecasts to be associated with wider or narrower outcome ranges than less confident forecasts (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), and, conversely, whether they expect precise forecasts to be issued with higher or lower confidence than vague forecasts (Experiments 3 and 4). The results revealed two distinct ways of thinking about confidence intervals, labeled distributional (wide intervals seen as more probable than narrow intervals) and associative (wide intervals seen as more uncertain than narrow intervals). Distributional responses occurred somewhat more often in within‐subjects designs, where wide and narrow prediction intervals and high and low probability estimates can be directly compared, whereas separate evaluations (in between‐subjects design) suggested associative responses to be slightly more frequent. These findings are relevant for experts communicating forecasts through confidence intervals. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New perspectives on the expression of quantity

The expression of quantity is central to many acts of communication, both formal and casual. Expressions of quantity, whether in numbers and percentages or in language, are used to convey information about frequency, certainty, risk, and degrees of association. It has typically been supposed that the many linguistic expressions that convey quantities are merely vague ways of indicating information that would be better conveyed by numbers and percentages, whenever possible. However, we show that such a view is too simplistic and is misleading. Language expressions can be more informative than numerical information alone. Language expressions carry built-in perspectives that affect the inferences and decisions made by listeners and readers. We also show that information presented through numbers (e.g., the depiction of fat content of foods) is not necessarily neutral, but also induces perspective. Failure to recognize effects of perspective may have led to some false conclusions about how people attribute causation.     

Self-deception requires vagueness

The paper sets out to reveal conditions enabling diagnostic self-deception, people’s tendency to deceive themselves about the diagnostic value of their own actions. We characterize different types of self-deception in terms of the distinction between intervention and observation in causal reasoning. One type arises when people intervene but choose to view their actions as observations in order to find support for a self-serving diagnosis. We hypothesized that such self-deception depends on imprecision in the environment that allows leeway to represent one’s own actions as either observations or interventions. Four experiments tested this idea using a dot-tracking task. Participants were told to go as quickly as they could and that going fast indicated either above-average or below-average intelligence. Precision was manipulated by varying the vagueness in feedback about performance. As predicted, self-deception was observed only when feedback on the task used vague terms rather than precise values. The diagnosticity of the feedback did not matter.     

A sham drug improves a demanding prospective memory task

Every day, people rely on prospective memory--our ability to remember to perform a future action--to carry out myriad tasks. We examined how a sham cognitive enhancing drug might improve people's performance on a prospective memory task. We gave some people (but not others) the sham drug, and asked everyone to perform a high-effort prospective memory task. People who received the sham drug performed better on the prospective memory task. They also took longer to perform their ongoing task, suggesting that they increased their effortful monitoring. These results fit with research showing that suggestions can lead people to increase cognitive effort and increase memory performance.     

The effect of information overlap on communication effectiveness

It makes sense that the more information people share, the better they communicate. To evaluate the effect of knowledge overlap on the effectiveness of communication, participants played a communication game where the "director" identified objects to the "addressee". Pairs either shared information about most objects' names (high overlap), or about the minority of objects' names (low overlap). We found that high-overlap directors tended to use more names than low overlap directors. High overlap directors also used more names with objects whose names only they knew, thereby confusing their addressees more often than low-overlap directors. We conclude that while sharing more knowledge can be beneficial to communication overall, it can cause communication to be locally ineffective. Sharing more information reduces communication effectiveness precisely when there is an opportunity to inform-when people communicate information only they themselves know.     

When intuitions are helpful: Prior beliefs can support reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem

Intuitions are often considered suboptimal because they can bias people's thinking. The bat-and-ball problem is a celebrated example of this potentially detrimental aspect of intuitions since it elicits a very appealing and prepotent intuitive but incorrect response. We propose to show that certain kinds of intuitions (i.e., prior beliefs) can help people to reason better on this task. In two experiments, participants answered either a classic congruent version of the bat-and-ball problem in which the intuitively cued response fitted with prior knowledge (i.e., was believable) or a modified incongruent version in which the intuitively cued response conflicted with prior knowledge (i.e., was unbelievable). Results indicate that participants who solved the modified unbelievable version performed better than participants who solved the classic believable version. Our data highlight that prior beliefs, even in the bat-and-ball problem, can accidentally make people perform better, probably because they encourage them to adopt a more effortful processing strategy.     

Increases in rewards promote flexible behavior

Offering reward for performance can motivate people to perform a task better, but better preparation for one task usually means decreased flexibility to perform different tasks. In six experiments in which reward varied between low and high levels, we found that reward can encourage people to prepare more flexibly for different tasks, but only as it increased from the level on the previous trial. When the same high rewards were offered continuously trial after trial, people were more inclined to simply stick with doing what had worked previously. We demonstrated such enhancements in flexibility in task switching, a difficult visual search task, and an easier priming of pop-out search task, which shows that this effect generalizes from executive tasks to perceptual processes that require relatively little executive control. These findings suggest that relative, transient changes in reward can exert more potent effects on behavioral flexibility than can the absolute amount of reward, whether it consists of money or points in a social competition.     

Why Frankenstein is a Stigma Among Scientists

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises.     

SASB: A Bridge Between Personality Theory and Clinical Psychology

The World Wide Web has inarguably become an integral part of the daily lives of the majority of the world's population. Many people spend more time online than with any given person on any particular day, yet the cognitive impact of being online remains understudied in psychology. We examine the research that has been done, and relate other related research findings, in an effort to attract more research to this area. We analyze some of the key factors that may have an impact on what and how we learn online, whether we are interacting with the cloud mind interpreted by Google or with other people via text based communication. We investigate how this development changes our perception of reality and how we may evaluate online information in ways that differ from face-to-face encounters. Living our lives in cyberspace changes what kinds of information we most frequently process and how we habitually deploy our cognitive resources, for better and for worse. When people interact with the Internet they may adopt particular mind-sets, modulating basic psychological processes. We integrate disparate lines of research in an effort to provide avenues for future investigation.