Philosophy on steroids: a reply

Brent Kious has recently attacked several arguments generally adduced to support anti-doping in sports, which are widely supported by the sports medicine fraternity, international sports federations, and international governments. We show that his attack does not succeed for a variety of reasons. First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition, which has global, if somewhat contentious, currency. Second, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced construal of an anti-doping position. Third, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally ‘clear’, while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally ‘clear’, namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one’s argument, is not acceptable without further qualification. Fourth, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy. Moreover, it is argued that the analogies, being poorly selected and developed, fail to justify his conclusion that the anti-doping lobby lacks philosophical and moral authority for its stance. These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specific contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any particular conclusion for or against doping products or processes in this article, we conclude that an increased context-sensitivity will result in a more evenhanded appraisal of arguments on the matter.     

Solitude without Souls: Why Peter Unger hasn’t Established Substance Dualism

Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. We outline one such non-Dualist view, suggest how to resolve the dispute, respond to some objections, and argue that ours is but one of many views that survive Unger’s challenge. All these views are incompatible with microphysicalism. So Unger’s discussion does contain an insight: if you are the only conscious subject in your chair, then microphsyicalism is false. Unger’s mistake was to infer Substance Dualism from this; for microphysicalism is not the only alternative to Dualism.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

Revisioning Fordham's ‘Defences of the self’ in light of modern relational theory and contemporary neuroscience

This paper explores the evolution of Michael Fordham's ideas concerning ‘defences of the self’, including his application of this concept to a group of ‘difficult’ adult patients in his famous 1974 paper by the same name. After tracing the relevance of Fordham's ideas to my own discovery of a ‘self‐care system’ in the psychological material of early trauma patients (Kalsched 1996 ), I describe how Fordham's seminal notions might be revisioned in light of contemporary relational theory as well as early attachment theory and affective neuroscience. These revisionings involve an awareness that the severe woundings of early unremembered trauma are not transformable through interpretation but will inevitably be repeated in the transference, leading to mutual ‘enactments’ between the analytic partners and, hopefully, to a new outcome. A clinical example of one such mutual enactment between the author and his patient is provided. The paper concludes with reflections on the clinical implications of this difficult case and what it means to become a ‘real person’ to our patients. Finally, Jung's alchemical views on transference are shown to be useful analogies in our understanding of the necessary mutuality in the healing process with these patients.     

The Euthanasia Debate in Germany - What's the Fuss?

ABSTRACT Both opponents and proponents of Singer's right to speak about euthanasia have concentrated on the tenability of his claims. They have ignored the question of what legitimate grounds there are for suppressing academic discussion, and have failed to take into account the discussion of freedom of speech in recent legal theory. To do this is the aim of my paper. Section I claims that Singer's position is immoral. Section 2 turns to the question of whether it is protected by freedom of speech, irrespective of its merits. I reject two lines of defence for Singer's opponents, that they had no opportunity to present their case, and the Kantian idea of the primacy of practical reason. Section 3 turns to a defence from legal theory. It argues that Singer's views do not pose the kind of threat to other legal and moral values which would license a suspension of his freedom of expression. I conclude that it is illegitimate to silence Singer, since he does not deny the right to live of his disabled opponents, but legitimate to protest against him, since he denies that some of their lives are worth living, in disregard of their own preferences.     

Informational Realism and World 3

This paper takes up a suggestion made by Floridi that the digital revolution is bringing about a profound change in our metaphysics. The paper aims to bring some older views from philosophy of mathematics to bear on this problem. The older views are concerned principally with mathematical realism—that is the claim that mathematical entities such as numbers exist. The new context for the discussion is informational realism, where the problem shifts to the question of the reality of information. Mathematical realism is perhaps a special case of informational realism. The older views concerned with mathematical realism are the various theories of World 3. The concept of World 3 was introduced by Frege, whose position was close to Plato’s original views. Popper developed the theory of World 3 in a different direction which is characterised as ‘constructive Platonism’. But how is World 3 constructed? This is explored by means of two analogies: the analogy with money, and the analogy with meaning, as explicated by the later Wittgenstein. This leads to the development of an account of informational realism as constructive Aristoteliansim. Finally, this version of informational realism is compared with the informational structural realism which Floridi develops in his 2008 and 2009 papers in Synthese. Similarities and differences between the two positions are noted.     

The place and understanding of the doctrine of God in Heinrich Bullinger’s theology

Abstract

The article examines the place of, and the main emphases in, the doctrine of God in Bullinger’s theology. In comprehensive presentations of his theology, the doctrine of God generally follows that of the Word of God. He usually begins with God as one (against the role of creatures such as the saints and images) and God as three. The other main elements (besides the knowledge of God) are God as creator, his providence and his predestination, usually in that order. Underlying all of them is the stress on God’s goodness. Highlighted is Bullinger’s appeal throughout to the Bible and Church Fathers, often identifying the views of his opponents with early Church heresies. This appeal also supports his claim to orthodoxy and catholicity, as do the creeds in his prefaces to The Decades and to The Second Helvetic Confession. His underlying pastoral and practical concerns are evident.     

SPONTANEOUS “CURES”: NORMAN REIDER'S FORGOTTEN PAPER,PART II

Part I of this paper combined an introduction to Norman Reider's original 1955 paper with a republication of the paper itself. Part II is a discussion of the complexities of a comparison of past and present psychoanalytic literature. The concept of enactment is proposed as one of many possible alternative views in considering Reider's notion of spontaneous “cures.” A careful consideration of these spontaneous cures within the ordinary ups and downs of any psychoanalytic treatment sheds important light on our continuing confusion about how we define the term cure, and therefore about the nature of change during psychoanalytic treatment. This alternative perspective is only one of many plausible ones for present‐day readers. The purpose of this republication is not to propose an explanation for “what really happened” with Reider and his patients; rather, it is to reconsider the fallacy of evaluating his paper outside its historical context and thereby failing to appreciate his courage in presenting what at the time were radical views. Questions about the complexity and confusion regarding cure and change require reexamination of the neglect of epistemology on the part of psychoanalysis in prolonging the confusion about distinguishing psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.     

G. Stanley Hall's Adolescence: Brilliance and nonsense

G. Stanley Hall's two-volume work on adolescence is assessed from the perspective of modern psychology, 100 years after he published it. A surprising number of similarities exist between Hall's views of adolescence and our own, and several of those similarities are discussed here. Some of the most striking differences between Hall's views and the views of today's psychologists are also discussed, specifically, Hall's grounding of his beliefs about adolescent development in a Lamarckian evolutionary psychology that assumed the inheritance of acquired characteristics and memories; his views of sexuality, especially masturbation; and his claim that religious conversion is normative in adolescence. The cultural and historical context of Hall's views is then discussed, with an emphasis on how an awareness of the context of Hall's views can enhance our awareness of the context of our own views today.     

Sometimes You Feel Like a Nut, Sometimes You Don't: Citizens' Ambivalence About Abortion

Recent research has recognized that many people simultaneously hold positive and negative attitudes about important political issues. This paper reviews the concept of attitudinal ambivalence and introduces a survey measure of ambivalence adapted from the experimental literature. An analysis of two statewide telephone surveys of Florida voters reveals that (1) a number of voters have ambivalent attitudes about abortion rights; (2) the amount of ambivalence varies according to the circumstances (elective versus traumatic) under which an abortion is obtained; (3) ambivalence about elective abortions is essentially unrelated to ambivalence about traumatic abortions; (4) voters who support abortion rights are more ambivalent about elective abortions than about traumatic abortions, whereas the pattern is reversed for abortion rights opponents; and (5) extreme views in support of or opposition to abortion rights can sometimes mitigate the amount of ambivalence felt by voters.     

William James on emotion and intentionality

In my reply I focus on three topics: the usefulness of Searle’s physical analogies for understanding the relationship between higher-level mental properties and lower-level physical properties, the question of overdetermination and the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that Searle’s reply does not refute my arguments against his analogies, while concerns about overdetermination are only taken away because his reply shows that there is no genuine unconscious mental causation in his view. That makes it hard to understand how he can maintain at the same time that we follow rules unconsciously.     

Misdirected by the gap: the relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional misdirection

In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert (2010) however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and has the potential to highlight the utility of these two phenomena. However, it is important not to be misdirected by subtle differences between particular instances of each phenomenon, at the expense of failing to detect the opportunities that these phenomena present for extending our understanding of attention and awareness.     

Bullinger's Defence of Infant Baptism in Debate with the Anabaptists

Abstract

Bullinger presents his understanding of infant baptism not only in systematic or summary form in the Decades and confessional works but also in dialogue or discussion form in other works. From 1525 what is fundamental in expounding his view and in challenging his opponents’ views is the argument from the covenant, which is one and eternal. In 1525 he begins with this and then examines Anabaptist objections. However in 1531 and 1560 he begins with his opponents’ case, though with different elements in it. The substance of his defence of infant baptism is unchanged between 1525 and 1560, though some new arguments emerge over the years. There is continuity between Zwingli and Bullinger, both in the argument from the covenant and in a range of biblical arguments. However, unlike Zwingli, Bullinger makes no use of election in support of his case and later expounds Acts 19 differently from Zwingli.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science

Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate.     

The Philosopher and the Revolutionary State: How Karl Popper’s Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals

The present paper is an attempt to explore the impact of Karl Popper’s ideas on the views of a number of intellectual groups in post‐revolutionary Iran. Throughout the text, we have tried to make use of original sources and our own personal experiences. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that the Viennese philosopher has made a long‐lasting impression on the intellectual scene of present‐day Iran in that even those socio‐political groups which are not in favour of his ideas, especially his model of critical rationalism, have felt the urgent need to make themselves familiar with them. Moreover, many of Popper’s ideas have directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of the decision‐makers in Iran since 1978.     

Joseph LeConte on evolution,education, and the structure of knowledge

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the theory of evolution profoundly influenced American thought. In the form of Social Darwinism it significantly shaped views on race, civilization, and political theory. Sociology and psychology were developing concurrently as disciplines. All of these were destined to have an effect upon education, for many intellectuals believed that science in general and evolutionary theory in particular were directly applicable to all areas of thought. Among the advocates of such a role for science and evolutionary theory was Joseph LeConte, whose views on the subject are outlined and compared with his contemporaries.     

Duhem,the Arabs,and the history of cosmology

Duhem has generally been understood to have maintained that the major Greek astronomers were instrumentalists. This view has emerged mainly from a reading of his 1908 publication To Save the Phenomena. In it he sharply contrasted a sophisticated Greek interpretation of astronomical models (for Duhem this was that they were mathematical contrivances) with a naive insistence of the Arabs on their concrete reality. But in Le Système du monde, which began to appear in 1913, Duhem modified his views on Greek astronomy considerably; his more subtle understanding included the recognition that many Greeks subordinated mathematical astronomy to physical theory. But he could not completely repudiate his earlier views about Greek astronomy in part because his extreme nineteenth century prejudices led him to continue to insist on a clear-cut demarcation between Greek and Arabic astronomy. The inevitable result is a certain unevenness in the Système and some glaring inconsistencies.     

Withdrawal,matching, withdrawal-matching,and variable-matching strategies in reducing attack-instigated aggression

Several studies have investigated strategies that a participant in dyadic aggression may use to reduce the aggression of the other participant. In one set of these studies the subject is instigated to aggression by an opponent who sets maximum shocks for the subject to receive during the first block of six trials. Following attack-instigation, opponents shift to withdrawal and matching strategies for 18 trials. The withdrawal strategy is an abrupt shift to the lowest levels of shock possible. The matching strategy is the exact matching by an opponent of the shock set by the subject on the previous trial. With these procedures the withdrawal strategy has been the most effective method to reduce aggression. These results led to the suggestion that the effectiveness of the withdrawal strategy may be due to immediate, unambiguous communication by the opponent of his willingness to reduce attack. This hypothesis was tested in the present study by creating a matching condition modified to include immediate, unambiguous communication of willingness to reduce attack. In this withdrawal-matching condition the opponent followed attack with two trials of the lowest levels of shock before shifting to a matching strategy. Although the withdrawal-matching strategy did not lead to shock settings that were significantly lower than the matching strategy, there was evidence that subjects interacting with withdrawal-matching opponents did reduce their shock settings from block 1 to block 4 more rapidly than subjects interacting with matching opponents. A variable matching strategy was also used to provide a more realistic analogy of matching in the mundane world. While subjects with variable-matching opponents also did not set shock levels during blocks 2, 3, and 4 that were significantly lower than the matching strategy, there was evidence that subjects in this condition reduced their shock levels more rapidly than subjects with matching opponents. Although the effects were not as strong as expected, the results do provide some support for the interpretation that the effectiveness of the withdrawal strategy may be due to unambiguous communication of willingness by the opponent to reduce his or her aggression. The effectiveness of the variable-matching strategy was attributed to interrupting the tendency of the subject and his or her opponent to match each other's responses. Consistent with earlier attack-instigated aggression studies, the withdrawal strategy in the present study led to a rapid reduction in aggression.