3~5岁幼儿权力概念多重隐喻的认知发展

为考察3~5岁幼儿“权力”概念的大小、垂直空间和重量多重隐喻的认知发展进程, 研究采用了将权力人物和无权力人物图片放置大圆形或小圆形、垂直空间的上方框或下方框和不平衡跷跷板重端或轻端的图片迫选任务。通过3个实验及综合分析发现：3岁幼儿尚不具备权力隐喻理解能力; 4岁是幼儿权力隐喻理解能力的重要发展时期, 具备正极权力概念的隐喻理解能力, 建立起有权力为“大、高、重”的多重隐喻联结; 5岁幼儿的权力隐喻理解能力进一步增强, 已具备较完整的多重隐喻理解能力, 建立起有权力为“大、高、重”、无权力为“小、下、轻”的多重隐喻联结。3~5岁幼儿“权力”概念的大小、垂直空间和重量多重隐喻理解能力同步发展, 不受隐喻靶域习得时间早晚的影响。系列研究表明, 学龄前幼儿的权力隐喻理解能力发展趋势符合隐喻一致性理论, 隐喻表征的产生并非“有或无”的模式, 而是“渐进”呈现发展。     

Understanding and appreciating metaphors

We consider three theories that have dominated discussions of metaphor. One view is that metaphors make comparisons, the basis for the comparison being the features (or categories) that the terms of the metaphor share. The second view is that metaphors involve an anomaly. The third view is that metaphors are ‘interactive’, producing a new way of seeing the terms. We propose a new theory—the domains-interaction view—that draws on elements of all three earlier views, but borrows especially from the interaction view. We consider the implications of our theory for three questions: What are metaphors? How are they understood? What makes a good metaphor? We argue that metaphors correlate two systems of concepts from different domains. The best metaphors involve two diverse domains (more distance between domains making for better metaphors) and close correspondence between the terms within those domains. We call the degree of correspondence within-domain similarity. Metaphors are interpreted in several stages: the terms of the metaphor are encoded; the domains involved are inferred; the structures to be seen as parallel are found; the correspondences between these structures are ‘mapped’ or constructed; the terms of the metaphor are compared. If the terms are not seen to match or occupy analogous roles in their different domains, then the metaphor may be reinterpreted. The evidence on all this is tentative but supports our view. We review two studies (Tourangeau and Sternberg, 1981) that support the hypothesis that distance within domain relates negatively to aptness, whereas distance between domains relates positively. Several studies on comprehension tend to disconfirm the comparison theory's notion that the tenor and vehicle necessarily share features. Tenor and vehicle also appear to have asymmetrical roles in the interpretive process.     

Hinge Contextualisma

The paper explores a possible connection between epistemic contextualism and hinge epistemology. My basic idea is that Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions play a possibility-governing role, in the sense that they govern our knowledge attributions by determining which possibilities count as relevant alternatives. This is a novel proposal with several theoretical advantages for both hinge epistemology and epistemic contextualism. On the one hand, in order to offer a substantial account of the way in which knowledge attributions work, the contextualist needs more than mere formal tools. She needs to tell us what goes inside the contexts that govern our conversations. On the other hand, the hinge epistemologist cannot be satisfied by mere metaphors (like the hinge metaphor). She needs to tell us how hinges can effectively govern our conversations. I take hinge contextualism to be the answer. With the help of hinges, we can furnish contexts; and with the help of contexts, we can put hinges to work.     

Metaphors in Nanomedicine: The Case of Targeted Drug Delivery

The promises of nanotechnology have been framed by a variety of metaphors, that not only channel the attention of the public, orient the questions asked by researchers, and convey epistemic choices closely linked to ethical preferences. In particular, the image of the ‘therapeutic missile’ commonly used to present targeted drug delivery devices emphasizes precision, control, surveillance and efficiency. Such values are highly praised in the current context of crisis of pharmaceutical innovation where military metaphors foster a general mobilization of resources from multiple fields of cutting-edge research. The missile metaphor, reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich’s ‘magic bullet’, has framed the problem in simple terms: how to deliver the right dose in the right place at the right moment? Chemists, physicists and engineers who design multi-functional devices operating in vitro can think in such terms, as long as the devices are not actually operating through the messy environment of the body. A close look at what has been done and what remains to be done suggests that the metaphor of the “therapeutic missile” is neither sufficient, nor even necessary. Recent developments in nanomedicine suggest that therapeutic efficacy cannot be obtained without negotiating with the biological milieu and taking advantage of what it affords. An ‘oikological’ approach seems more appropriate, more heuristic and more promising than the popular missile. It is based on the view of organism as an oikos that has to be carefully managed. The dispositions of nanocapsules have to be coupled with the affordances of the environment. As it requires dealing with nanoparticles as relational entities (defined by their potential for interactions) rather than as stable substances (defined by intrinsic properties) this metaphor eventually might well change research priorities in nanotechnology in general.     

ERP evidence for conceptual mappings and comparison processes during the comprehension of conventional and novel metaphors

Cognitive linguists suggest that understanding metaphors requires activation of conceptual mappings between the involved concepts. We tested whether mappings are indeed in use during metaphor comprehension, and what mapping means as a cognitive process with Event-Related Potentials. Participants read literal, conventional metaphorical, novel metaphorical, and anomalous target sentences preceded by primes with related or unrelated mappings. Experiment 1 used sentence-primes to activate related mappings, and Experiment 2 used simile-primes to induce comparison thinking. In the unprimed conditions of both experiments, metaphors elicited N400s more negative than the literals. In Experiment 1, related sentence-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in conventional, but not in novel metaphors. In Experiment 2, related simile-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in novel, but not clearly in conventional metaphors. We suggest that mapping as a process occurs in metaphors, and the ways in which it can be facilitated by comparison differ between conventional and novel metaphors.     

Creating shared reality in interpersonal and intergroup communication: the role of epistemic processes and their interplay

We describe research on the creation of shared reality in communication, emphasizing the epistemic processes that allow communicators to achieve confident judgements and evaluations about a communication topic. We distinguish three epistemic inputs: (1) the communicator’s own judgement about the topic (judgement of communicator); (2) the communicator’s perception of the audience’s judgement about the topic (judgement of audience); and (3) the communicator’s message to the audience about the topic (message of communicator). We argue that the influence of each input increases with the communicator’s confidence in the validity of that input. We review a variety of empirical studies in terms of this framework. We also address barriers to shared-reality creation in intergroup communication and describe interventions that work by increasing the validity strength of judgement of an outgroup audience. We discuss the relation between the present research and other approaches to social influence and social sharing.     

A review of processing and analysing visual metaphors in psychology

IntroductionA visual metaphor is an image depicting an incongruity in the spatial distribution of visual elements, which is not consistent with reality. In this paper, we present an overview of theoretical and empirical studies on visual metaphor processing.ObjectiveFirstly, attention is given to the spatial distribution of visual elements, which defines the type of visual metaphors as well as the meaning operations required to understand the communicative message. The paper then reviews several empirical studies that collect behavioural measures for assessing visual metaphor processing using questionnaires and exploring the role played by cognitive abilities. In line with the contemporary literature, we then present three semiotic dimensions for visual metaphor processing, namely the expression, conceptualisation, and communication. We then present a pilot study that focusses on these three dimensions. Few research studies have collected behavioural data for visual metaphors processing. This may be due to the lack of theoretical framework in the corresponding field of research. These three semiotic dimensions highlight the value of pursuing research on visual metaphors in the scope of psychology. The presented pilot study could be a starting point for the investigation of visual metaphors in the framework of psychology.ConclusionWe propose future avenues of research that consider the visual structure of metaphors and meaning operations while assessing the influence of cognitive abilities in visual metaphor processing.     

映射具体性和语境线索对新颖隐喻加工的影响

研究旨在考察映射具体性对新颖隐喻加工的影响及语境线索的作用,并进一步探索映射具体性高的隐喻加工困难的原因。实验1的ERPs结果发现：知觉隐喻反应时显著长于物理-心理隐喻和直接语义;两类隐喻在有语境线索下的反应时显著长于无语境线索。有语境线索的知觉隐喻比无语境线索在前部位置诱发了更负的N400成分,在中部诱发了更正的LPC成分;有语境线索的物理-心理隐喻在前部、顶部比无语境线索诱发了更正LPC成分。实验2的语义判断任务结果发现：在映射具体性不同的两类隐喻中,多映射通路隐喻的反应时均显著长于单一映射通路隐喻。总体结果支持语境线索对新颖隐喻加工的干扰效应。     

The career of metaphor

A central question in metaphor research is how metaphors establish mappings between concepts from different domains. The authors propose an evolutionary path based on structure-mapping theory. This hypothesis--the career of metaphor--postulates a shift in mode of mapping from comparison to categorization as metaphors are conventionalized. Moreover, as demonstrated by 3 experiments, this processing shift is reflected in the very language that people use to make figurative assertions. The career of metaphor hypothesis offers a unified theoretical framework that can resolve the debate between comparison and categorization models of metaphor. This account further suggests that whether metaphors are processed directly or indirectly, and whether they operate at the level of individual concepts or entire conceptual domains, will depend both on their degree of conventionality and on their linguistic form.     

The rhetorical voice of psychoanalysis

The rhetorical voice of psychoanalysis has a long history and has only recently come to be seen as a special feature of the theory. Its beginnings can be found in Freud's earliest pleadings for the usefulness of metaphor and analogy, although he felt that they were largely provisional and would eventually be replaced by more durable concepts. We have begun to see problems in replacing the central metaphors; the rhetorical base of psychoanalysis may be more enduring than we thought. While our metaphors may never provide epistemic access to the stuff of the mind, they can and do point to specific clinical encounters. Ways must be found to expand our rhetorical treasure chest and develop language even better suited to our concepts and observations.     

Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences

A number of recent arguments purport to show that imprecise credences are incompatible with accuracy-first epistemology. If correct, this conclusion suggests a conflict between evidential and alethic epistemic norms. In the first part of the paper, I claim that these arguments fail if we understand imprecise credences as indeterminate credences. In the second part, I explore why agents with entirely alethic epistemic values can end up in an indeterminate credal state. Following William James, I argue that there are many distinct alethic values that a rational agent can have. Furthermore, such an agent is rationally permitted not to have settled on one fully precise value function. This indeterminacy in value will sometimes result in indeterminacy in epistemic behaviour—that is, because the agent’s values aren’t settled, what she believes might not be.     

Metaphor in computer science

The language of computer science is laced with metaphor. We argue that computer science metaphors provide a conceptual framework in which to situate constantly emerging new ontologies in computational environments. But how computer science metaphors work does not fit neatly into prevailing general theories of metaphor. We borrow from these general theories while also considering the unique role of computer science metaphors in learning, design, and scientific analysis. We find that computer science metaphors trade on both preexisting and emerging similarities between computational and traditional domains, but owing to computer science's peculiar status as a discipline that creates its own subject matter, the role of similarity in metaphorical attribution is multifaceted.     

Aptness predicts preference for metaphors or similes, as well as recall bias

Why might we sometimes prefer a metaphor such as “genes are blueprints” to a simile such as “genes are like blueprints”? One possibility is that metaphors are preferred when the comparison between a tenor (e.g., genes) and a vehicle (e.g., blueprints) seems especially apt. That is, metaphors might be used when the comparison captures many salient features of the tenor in question. The present experiments examined the relation between the aptness of comparisons and people’s preferences for expressing those comparisons as metaphors or as similes. In Experiment 1, it was found that there is consensus on how to express particular comparisons. In Experiment 2, it was found that this preference can be predicted from the aptness of a comparison. It was also found that aptness can predict errors in the recall of comparisons. These findings have implications for theories of metaphor.     

A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle

Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not apply to epistemically non-ideal agents. I agree with this, but argue here that it misses the point of Reflection. Rather than an epistemic principle concerning reasons for belief, Reflection concerns the semantics of belief avowal. I present a non-factual interpretation of Reflection, argue that the principle provides a constraint on the ways in which one can reflectively endorse one’s future epistemic self, and say something about the logic governing such an interpretation.     

What makes delusions pathological?

Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads delusional subjects to regard some contextual elements as deeply puzzling or highly significant.     

Towards a literary account of mental health from James' Principles of Psychology

The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James' “The Psychologist's Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James' spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James' central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.     

隐喻在文章语境中的理解--概念隐喻理论探讨

概念隐喻理论认为,语言系统中存在着广泛的隐喻一致性,人们对于隐喻的理解是通过将其匹配到基本的概念隐喻来进行的。但有研究者指出,除了一些新颖的隐喻,惯用隐喻的理解并不需要概念匹配。本研究认为,概念隐喻已经储存在长时记忆中,在文章语境中,无论惯用隐喻还是新颖隐喻的理解都可能产生概念匹配。三个实验支持了这一假设。实验一通过目标句的阅读反应时探讨不同文章版本下目标句的理解情况;实验二和实验三从事后与即时两方面对各种文章版本下的概念匹配情况进行比较。研究结果支持了概念隐喻理论。     

From species ethics to social concerns: Habermas’s critique of “liberal eugenics” evaluated

Three arguments of Habermas against “liberal eugenics”—the arguments from consent, responsibility, and instrumentalization—are critically evaluated and explicated in the light of his discourse ethics and social theory. It is argued that these arguments move partly at a too deep level and are in part too individualistic and psychological to sufficiently counter the liberal position that he sets out to criticize. This is also due to limitations that prevent discourse ethics from connecting effectively to the moral and political domains, e.g., through a discussion of justice. In spite of these weaknesses, Habermas’s thesis is of major relevance and brings up neglected issues in the discussion about eugenic reproductive practices. This relevance has not been duly recognized in bioethics, largely because of the depth of his speculations of philosophical anthropology. It is argued that Habermas’s notion of the colonization of the lifeworld could provide the analytical tool needed to build that bridge to the moral and political domain.