Discouraging unethicality versus encouraging ethicality: Unraveling the differential effects of prevention‐ and promotion‐focused ethical leadership

Theory on the impact of ethical leadership has traditionally been based on a deontological approach to morality. Underlying this perspective is the assumption that all leader behaviors that encourage “normatively appropriate conduct” will influence followers in a similar fashion. Put differently, the current consensus seems to suggest that actions that focus on preventing unethical behavior—attending to “the wrong”—will have the same impact as actions that focus on promoting ethical behavior—attending to “the right.” Taking a within‐person approach, we draw upon social exchange theory to challenge this consensus and build theory that suggests a follower's felt trust from their leader will be differentially impacted by prevention‐ versus promotion‐focused ethical leadership. We also explore how these different types of ethical leadership may indirectly, through felt trust, impact citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. Finally, we consider how the role of the “moral manager” may interact with the “moral person” by identifying leader moral hypocrisy as an important between‐person moderator of these effects. Given the importance of ethical decision‐making in organizations and the calls for increased ethical leadership, our findings have important implications for both theory and practice.     

高校心理咨询师多重关系情境与决策类型的研究

为探索高校咨询师面临的多重关系伦理情境、决策过程,对访谈17名高校心理咨询师的资料进行分析。结果：常见情境主要包括接送礼物承载的新关系、来访者和咨询师除咨询关系外的师生关系、咨询师与和来访者有关的第三人有关系、咨询师在咨询室之外的场所偶遇来访者、来访者有咨询师的联系方式、来访者和咨询师有身体接触等。决策表现为两种：经验主导型,决策时未意识到处于伦理情境只凭经验决策;伦理主导型,决策时意识到处在伦理情境。结论：高校心理咨询存在一些特殊多重关系,心理咨询师需增加具有伦理意识的决策。     

Moral Emotions

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi‐dimensional and relative to human realities. The “axiological” position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.     

Moral relativism and deontic logic

If a native of India asserts “Killing cattle is wrong” and a Nebraskan asserts “Killing cattle is not wrong”, and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral point of view from which it proceeds. The second branch which we call truth value relativism affirms that the two judgments are contradictory. Truth value relativism appears to be logically incoherent. How can contradictory judgments be fully correct? For though there will be a sense of correctness in which each judgment is correct — namely by that of being correct relative to the morality relative to which each was expressed — if contradictory, the judgments cannot both be true, and thus cannot both be correct in this most basic sense of correctness. We defend truth value relativism against this sort of charge of logical incoherence by showing it can be accommodated by the existing semantical metatheories of deontic logic. Having done this we go on to argue that truth value relativism is the best version of relativism.     

道德判断中的框架效应:一个新的视角

道德领域亦存在框架效应,但有关这类偏差的研究仍然存在不足。研究以600名大学生为对象,以亚洲疾病和工厂风波两类经典情境为实验情境,设置正面和负面两类属性框架,以研究道德判断的框架效应。结果发现,在面临道德判断情境时,在正面框架下被试倾向于选择确定性方案,而在负面框架下被试倾向于选择风险性方案; 在正面框架下被试倾向于评价风险性方案更违背道德,在负面框架下则认为确定性方案更违背道德; 被试对情境中人物选择确定性或风险性方案道德之可谴责性评价与确定性或风险性方案本身之道德违背性评价的判断并不一致:在正面框架下,若情境中人物选择风险性方案,被试认为其行为更应受到谴责; 但在负面框架下,被试对情境中人物选择确定性方案和风险性方案在道德上应受谴责性的评价并无显著差异。研究还发现道德判断框架效应存在性别差异,负面框架下女生更为风险寻求。     

Fair Shares: A Preliminary Framework and Case Analyzing the Ethics of Offshoring

Much has been written about the offshoring phenomenon from an economic efficiency perspective. Most authors have attempted to measure the net economic effects of the strategy and many purport to show that “in the long run” that benefits will outweigh the costs. There is also a relatively large literature on implementation which describes the best way to manage the offshoring process. But what is the morality of offshoring? What is its “rightness” or “wrongness?” Little analysis of the ethics of offshoring has been completed thus far. This paper develops a preliminary framework for analyzing the ethics of offshoring and then applies this framework to basic case study of offshoring in the U.S. The paper following discusses the definition of offshoring; shifts to the basic philosophical grounding of the ethical concepts; develops a template for conducting an ethics analysis of offshoring; applies this template using basic data for offshoring in the United States; and conducts a preliminary ethical analysis of the phenomenon in that country, using a form of utilitarianism as an analytical baseline. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research.     

Reaction times and error rates for judging nominal identity of letter strings

Most theories of “same”-“different” judgments predict that “same” responses should be at least as slow as “different” responses. However, the contrary has often been found. To explain this, a two-processor model has been proposed. In this model, a fast processor and a slow processor operate simultaneously. “Same” responses are initiated by whichever processor first indicates that the stimuli are “same,” whereas “different” responses are initiated only by the slow processor. In the experiment reported here, Ss judged whether two successively presented letter strings were nominally “same” or “different.” It was expected that the fast processor would be incapable of making nominal identity judgments. Thus, both “same” and “different” responses would be initiated by the slow processor. Consequently, “same” responses should have been slower than “different” responses. However, this did not occur. This finding casts doubt upon, but does not disprove, the two-processor model.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

Doing Ethics or Changing for the Better?

In this paper, classical pragmatism is used as a method, not as a substantial ethical theory, to develop “moral pragmatics.” Moral pragmatics offers a constructive approach for making progress where traditional ethical theories converge, and it innovates ethical deliberation. Assuming widespread agreement that real moral problems need practical solutions, the paper addresses two related problems: the missing link between ethical theories and moral practice, and the question of who is in charge of finding such solutions. It argues that “conscience” can create a link between ethical knowledge and moral practice, and that this partly discharges “the ethicist” from the task of solving problems that are not really, or not only, hers. Two specific methodological innovations are suggested that go beyond admonitions to render ethics sensitive to context. Instead, a reevaluation of “casuistry” and a sensitivity for “finding the right words” give an idea of how to achieve this goal.     

How Japanese students reason about agricultural biotechnology

Many have claimed that education of the ethical issues raised by biotechnology is essential in universities, but there is little knowledge of its effectiveness. The focus of this paper is to investigate how university students assess the information given in class to make their own value judgments and decisions relating to issues of agricultural biotechnology, especially over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Analysis of homework reports related with agricultural biotechnology after identification of key concepts and ideas in each student report is presented. The ideas were sorted into different categories. The ideas were compared with those in the reading materials using the same categories. These categories included: concern about affects on humans, affects on the environment, developing countries and starvation, trust in industry, responsibility of scientists, risk perception, media influence, need for (international) organizations or third parties, and information dissemination. What was consistent through the different years was that more than half of the students took a “neutral” position. A report was scored as “neutral” when the report included both the positive and negative side of an issue, or when the student could not make a definite decision about the use of GMOs and GM food. While it may be more difficult to defend a strong “for” or “against” position, some students used logical arguments successfully in doing so. Sample comments are presented to depict how Japanese students see agricultural technology, and how they value its application, with comparisons to the general social attitudes towards biotechnology.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

Perceptual encoding in comparative judgments of race

Ss made comparative judgments along the black-white racial dimension using opposite response sets (“Which is blacker?” or “Which is whiter?”). Three classes of pictures were used: B (black),W (white), and M (racially mixed). I or the BM judgments. “Which is whiter?” took significantly longer. The MW and BW judgments showed no difference between response instructions. Analysis of the stimuli showed that skin tone was not the primary perceptual attribute used in racial encoding. The observation of a funnel effect in the judgment latencies is shown to be consistent with other research demonstrating the effect of response set in comparative judgments Further. the results support sociological observations about the cultural use of the linguistic labels “black” and “white”     

The Buddhist Roots of Watsuji Tetsurô's Ethics of Emptiness

Watsuji Tetsurô (1889–1960) is famous for having constructed a systematic socio‐political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought (based on lectures given in the 1920s), in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine‐tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non‐duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities.     

On the assessment of genetic technology: Reaching ethical judgments in the light of modern technology

The “Model for Reaching Ethical Judgments in the context of Modern Technologies — the Case of Genetic Technology”, which is presented here, has arisen from the project “Ethical Criteria bearing upon Decisions taken in the field of Biotechnology”. This project has been pursued since 1991 in the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Technikforschung (ZIT) of the Technical University of Darmstadt, with the purpose of examining decision-making in selected activities involving the production of transgenic plants that have a useful application. The model is the basis of an outline for interviews to investigate how far decisions concerning the development of such plants with genetic techniques take ethical criteria into account. It was necessary to design this new model because other models for reaching judgments of this kind were not conceptually suited for concrete application. This model represents a problem related approach and combines methodological with substantive typology. In this it differs from comparable models for reaching ethical judgments.     

Strategy use in question-answering: Memory strength and task constraints on fan effects

The time taken to recognize a studied fact increases as a function of the number of other previously studied facts sharing concepts with the test fact. The phenomenon, known as the “fan effect,” has been shown to disappear and sometimes even reverse itself when the set of facts are thematically related. The shift from interference toward facilitation occurs only when subjects can use a plausibility-like strategy. In this experiment, subjects learned variously sized sets of rehted facts about fictitious people. Subjects were asked to make either recognition judgments (“Did you study this fact?”) or consistency judgments (“Is this fact consistent with what you studied7”). Subjects made these judgments both the day the material was acquired and 2 days later. The research reported here supports the hypothesis that, with delay, there is a shift in tendency toward more use of the plausibility strategy, away from the careful strategy of searching for an exact match that produces the fan effect. The plausibility strategy produced either a speedup with greater fan or an increase in error rates when the strategy was inappropriate. Plausibility effects were larger at a delay, in both reaction time and error patterns, regardless of whether subjects were asked to make consistency judgments or recognition judgments. Also as predicted, response times became faster as the tendency to adopt the plausibility strategy without first trying direct retrieval increased.     

On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics

In this paper, I take a critical stance on the emerging field of nanoethics. After an introductory section, “Conceptual Foundations of Nanotechnology” considers the conceptual foundations of nanotechnology, arguing that nanoethics can only be as coherent as nanotechnology itself and then discussing concerns with this latter concept; the conceptual foundations of nanoethics are then explicitly addressed in “Conceptual Foundations of Nanoethics”. “Issues in Nanoethics” considers ethical issues that will be raised through nanotechnology and, in “What’s New?”, it is argued that none of these issues is unique to nanotechnology. In “It’s a Revolution!”, I express skepticism about arguments which hold that, while the issues themselves might not be unique, they nevertheless are instantiated to such a degree that extant moral frameworks will be ill-equipped to handle them. In “What’s Different?”, I draw plausible distinctions between nanoethics and other applied ethics, arguing that these latter might well identify unique moral issues and, as such, distinguish themselves from nanoethics. Finally, in “What Now?”, I explore the conclusions of this result, ultimately arguing that, while nanoethics may fail to identify novel ethical concerns, it is at least the case that nanotechnology is deserving of ethical attention, if not a new associative applied ethic.     

Response to Requests for Abortion: The Influence of Guilt and Knowledge1

Participants who varied in their levels of sex guilt and sexual knowledge indicated the extent of their approval for abortion in response to 10 case histories of abortion applicants. The case histories were varied in terms of the circumstances under which conception had occurred. Sex guilt was significantly related to abortion decisions while sexual knowledge registered little effect. Low sex guilt students were more favorable toward abortion requests than were high sex guilt students, but both groups were more favorable toward abortion when conception was the result of failure of a contraceptive method than when it was due to the applicant's inconsistent use of the method. In addition, high sex guilt students' abortion decisions were significantly influenced by the relationship of the applicant to her coital partner. When the relationship was “steady,” they approved the request, whereas abortion was denied to the applicant who conceived with a casual partner. The results were discussed within the context of the debate over the morality of abortion and the problem of unwanted adolescent pregnancy. It was suggested that sex guilt may play a larger role in these issues than has been previously recognized, and that presenting the “facts” (sexual knowledge) may have little impact in abortion related decisions.