When two wrongs can make a right: Regulatory nonfit, bias, and correction of judgments

We propose that when people consider whether their judgments are accurate enough, feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit (inconsistency between regulatory state and strategic means) can suggest that the answer is no and enhance correction of judgments relative to feelings of rightness from regulatory fit. Results from two experiments supported that hypothesis. When we activated an accuracy motive, participants who experienced regulatory nonfit provided judgments more consistent with correction for bias when they experienced regulatory nonfit than when they experienced regulatory fit (Experiment 1). Drawing participants’ attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings eliminated the effect of regulatory fit on apparent correction of judgments (Experiment 2), suggesting attribution of regulatory fit/nonfit feelings to the accuracy of those judgments.     

“This story is right on”: The impact of regulatory fit on narrative engagement and persuasion

When people read a story, feelings of rightness from regulatory fit (consistency between regulatory state and strategic means) could suggest that the story is “right on” relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. Under these conditions, individuals who are experiencing feelings of rightness should engage more with the narrative and be more persuaded by its implicit messages. Results from two experiments supported these hypotheses. Participants in Experiment 1 were more mentally engaged (transported) by the story when they experienced regulatory fit. We replicated this effect in Experiment 2 and extended it to endorsement of story‐consistent beliefs, an indicator of persuasion via narratives. Additionally, we found that drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of feelings of rightness eliminated the regulatory fit effects on transportation and persuasion, suggesting attribution of feelings of regulatory fit/nonfit to the plausibility of the narrative world. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of incidental experiences of regulatory fit on trust

Two experiments provide support for the hypothesis that when people assess how much they trust another person, feelings of rightness from an initial, brief experience of regulatory fit (consistency between prevention or promotion regulatory focus of goals and strategic means) can suggest the other person is trustworthy, relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. This regulatory-fit effect on trust was stronger for acquaintances than for individuals participants knew well (Experiment 1) and was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to how right the earlier, trust judgment-irrelevant event made them feel (Experiment 2). Implications are discussed for regulatory-fit theory, possible applications to applied settings and to other populations, and possible effects of other types of regulatory fit.     

Making message recipients "feel right": how nonverbal cues can increase persuasion

Nonverbal cues are an inherent component of most persuasive appeals. We use regulatory-fit theory as a framework for understanding the effect of nonverbal cues on a message's effectiveness, and as a foundation for developing a new persuasion technique. We propose that when the nonverbal cues of a message source sustain the motivational orientation of the recipient, the recipient experiences regulatory fit and feels right, and that this experience influences the message's effectiveness. Experimental results support these predictions. Participants experiencing regulatory fit (promotion-focus participants viewing messages delivered in an eager nonverbal style, prevention-focus participants viewing messages delivered in a vigilant nonverbal style) had more positive attitudes toward a message's topic and greater intentions to behave in accordance with its recommendation than did participants experiencing nonfit. Feeling right was also greater for participants experiencing fit than for those experiencing nonfit and was associated with greater message effectiveness. Regulatory-fit theory provides a framework for making precise predictions about when and for whom a nonverbal cue will affect persuasion.     

如何道歉更有效:调节聚焦与信息框架的作用

本研究结合调节聚焦理论探讨了如何道歉更有效。两个实验通过启动不同调节聚焦,创设冒犯情境并呈现不同框架的道歉信息,考察调节聚焦与道歉框架对道歉效果的影响。结果表明,向促进聚焦的受害者呈现积极框架的道歉信息、向防御聚焦的受害者呈现消极框架的道歉信息能改善受害者对冒犯者的评价,降低交往回避倾向,获得较好的道歉效果,且正确感是此种影响发生的内在机制。     

The eureka error: inadvertent plagiarism by misattributions of effort

The authors found that the feeling of authorship for mental actions such as solving problems is enhanced by effort cues experienced during mental activity; misattribution of effort cues resulted in inadvertent plagiarism. Pairs of participants took turns solving anagrams as they exerted effort on an unrelated task. People inadvertently plagiarized their partners' answers more often when they experienced high incidental effort while working on the problem and reduced effort as the solution appeared. This result was found for efforts produced when participants squeezed a handgrip during the task (Experiment 1) or when the anagram was displayed in a font that was difficult to read (Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b). Plagiarism declined, however, when participants attended to the source of the effort cues (Experiments 3a and 3b). These results suggest that effort misattribution can influence authorship processing for mental activities.     

愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响：确定感和控制感的中介作用

本研究基于评估倾向理论, 通过3项实验考察了特定负性情绪(愤怒)对延迟折扣的影响, 并探究确定感和控制感评估倾向在这一关系中的作用。实验1考察愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响, 结果发现, 愤怒组被试的延迟满足倾向显著强于恐惧组和控制组。实验2采用实验因果链设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 愤怒情绪可以有效增强个体的确定感和控制感(实验2a), 同时确定感和控制感能够增强个体的延迟满足倾向(实验2b)。实验3采用中介测量设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中起完全中介作用。本研究结果表明, 当个体进行跨期决策时, 体验到与确定感和控制感有关的偶然愤怒情绪会增强其延迟满足倾向。本研究对探究特定负性情绪对个体延迟折扣的影响具有一定的启示意义。     

Engaging the consumer: The opposing forces of regulatory nonfit versus fit

Higgins and Scholer (Higgins, E. T., and Scholer, A. A. (2009). Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19(2), 100-114) propose that while opposing forces do not create value, value is created when people engage in the act of countering these forces. To the extent that feeling wrong from regulatory nonfit may be perceived as an opposing force, their hypothesis can be extended to understanding regulatory nonfit effects. More specifically, while regulatory nonfit does not create value, the experience of regulatory nonfit may signal that something “feels wrong”. Consumers may be prompted to counter this feeling wrong experience when they are involved in the decision making process, and this intervention in turn leads to value creation.     

Transfer of value from fit

People experience regulatory fit when they pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation (E. T. Higgins, 2000). Five studies tested whether the value experienced from regulatory fit can transfer to a subsequent evaluation of an object. In Studies 1 and 2, participants gave the same coffee mug a higher price if they had chosen it with a strategy that fit their orientation (eager strategy/promotion; vigilant strategy/prevention) than a strategy that did not fit. Studies 3-5 investigated possible mechanisms underlying this effect. Value transfer was independent of positive mood, perceived effectiveness (instrumentality), and perceived efficiency (ease), and occurred for an object that w as independent of the fit process itself. The findings supported a value confusion account of transfer.     

Power,competitiveness, and advice taking: Why the powerful don’t listen

Four experiments test the prediction that feelings of power lead individuals to discount advice received from both experts and novices. Experiment 1 documents a negative relationship between subjective feelings of power and use of advice. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that individuals experiencing neutral and low levels of power weigh advice from experts and experienced advisors more heavily than advice from novices, but individuals experiencing high levels of power discount both novice and expert advice. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that this tendency of individuals experiencing high levels of power to discount advice from experts and novices equally is mediated by feelings of competitiveness (Experiment 3) and confidence (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, Experiment 4 shows that inducing high power individuals to feel cooperative with their advisors can mitigate this tendency, leading them to weigh expert advice more heavily than advice from novices. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed.     

When fit matters more: The effect of regulatory fit on adaptation to change

Regulatory fit theory predicts that motivation and performance are enhanced when individuals pursue goals framed in a way that fits their regulatory orientation (promotion vs. prevention focus). Our aim was to test the predictions of the theory when individuals deal with change. We expected and found in three studies that regulatory fit is beneficial only when a prevention focus is involved. In Study 1, an experiment among students, prevention- but not promotion-focused participants performed better in a changed task when it was framed in fit with their regulatory orientation. In Study 2, a survey among employees experiencing organizational changes, only the fit between individual prevention (and not promotion) focus and prevention framing of the changes by the manager was associated with higher employee adaptation to changes. In Study 3, a weekly survey among employees undergoing organizational change, again only prevention regulatory fit was associated with lower employee exhaustion and higher employee work engagement. Theoretical and practical implications of applying regulatory focus theory to organizational change are discussed.     

A test of the regulatory fit hypothesis in perceptual classification learning

This article builds a bridge between research on regulatory focus in motivation and classification learning. It tests the hypothesis that a fit between the situational regulatory focus and the reward structure of the task leads to greater cognitive flexibility than does a mismatch between situational focus and the reward structure and that the fit between the regulatory-focus-induced processing characteristics and the nature of the environment influences performance. In Experiment 1, we used a classification task for which cognitive flexibility should be advantageous and examined both gains (Experiment 1A) and losses (Experiment 1B) reward structures. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a classification task for which cognitive flexibility should be disadvantageous. In Experiment 2, we used a gains reward structure, and in Experiment 3, we used a losses reward structure. As was predicted, when cognitive flexibility was advantageous, the participants in a regulatory fit showed faster learning and more quickly shifted toward the optimal response strategy. Also as was predicted, when cognitive flexibility was disadvantageous, the participants in a regulatory mismatch showed faster learning and more quickly shifted toward the optimal response strategy. Implications for current theories of motivation and classification learning are discussed.     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

The asymmetric effect of regulatory fit on moral judgments of other-oriented lies

We examined whether regulatory fit effects are asymmetric—namely, whether they occur only among individuals with a promotion focus or a prevention focus. We adopted a task where individuals make moral judgments of other-oriented lies and conducted three studies. The results indicated that prevention-focused individuals judged other-oriented lies based on a vigilant strategy as more moral than lies based on an eager strategy (Studies 1 and 2). Meanwhile for promotion-focused individuals, there were no differences between eager and vigilant strategies on moral judgments of other-oriented lies. Additionally, the results suggested that the feeling of rightness is an underlying mechanism of the regulatory fit effects of prevention focus (Study 3).     

Regret Causes Ego-Depletion and Finding Benefits in the Regrettable Events Alleviates Ego-Depletion

ABSTRACT. This study tested the hypotheses that experiencing regret would result in ego-depletion, while finding benefits (i.e., “silver linings”) in the regret-eliciting events counteracted the ego-depletion effect. Using a modified gambling paradigm (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a retrospective method (Experiments 3 and 5), five experiments were conducted to induce regret. Results revealed that experiencing regret undermined performance on subsequent tasks, including a paper-and-pencil calculation task (Experiment 1), a Stroop task (Experiment 2), and a mental arithmetic task (Experiment 3). Furthermore, finding benefits in the regret-eliciting events improved subsequent performance (Experiments 4 and 5), and this improvement was mediated by participants’ perceived vitality (Experiment 4). This study extended the depletion model of self-regulation by considering emotions with self-conscious components (in our case, regret). Moreover, it provided a comprehensive understanding of how people felt and performed after experiencing regret and after finding benefits in the events that caused the regret.     

Regulatory fit and persuasion: transfer from "Feeling Right."

The authors propose that when a message recipient "feels right" from regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000), this subjective experience transfers to the persuasion context and serves as information for relevant evaluations, including perceived message persuasiveness and opinions of the topic. Fit was induced either by strategic framing of message arguments in a way that fit/did not fit with the recipient's regulatory state or by a source unrelated to the message itself. Across 4 studies, regulatory fit enhanced perceived persuasiveness and opinion ratings. These effects were eliminated when the correct source of feeling right was made salient before message exposure, supporting the misattribution account. These effects reversed when message-related thoughts were negative, supporting the claim that fit provides information about the "rightness" of one's (positive or negative) evaluations.     

What is pressure? Evidence for social pressure as a type of regulatory focus

Previous research (Markman, Maddox, & Worthy, 2006) suggests that pressure leads to choking when one is learning to classify items on the basis of an explicit rule, but it leads to excelling when one is learning to classify items on the basis of an implicit strategy. In this article, we relate social pressure to regulatory focus theory. We propose that the effects of pressure on performance arise because pressure induces a prevention focus that interacts with the more local reward structure of the task. To test this hypothesis, we repeated previous research, but using a losses reward structure, so that participants under pressure were in a regulatory fit. We also successfully replicated previous results by using a gains reward structure. In contrast with participants who attempted to maximize gains on each trial, participants who attempted to minimize losses choked on the implicit-learning task but excelled on the explicit-learning task. The results suggest a three-way interaction between pressure level, task type, and reward structure.     

Moral value transfer from regulatory fit: what feels right is right and what feels wrong is wrong

People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.     

Sinful flesh: Sexual objectification threatens women's moral self

The current investigation examined whether sexual objectification leads to perceived contamination in women victims, which, in turn, triggers sinful feelings. The results of three experiments provide converging support for these predictions. Female participants reported greater sinful feelings than their non-objectified counterparts, after receiving objectifying comments on their physical appearance from an alleged male partner (Experiment 1) or recalling a past experience of objectification (Experiments 2 and 3). Furthermore, perceived contamination mediated the effect of objectification on sinful feelings. We also found that perceived personal responsibility of being objectified moderated the above effects, such that the effects were only observed among participants who perceived themselves as highly responsible for objectification experience, but not among those who perceived low personal responsibility. These findings contribute to the literature by explaining why objectification elicits sinful feelings in female victims and who is more susceptible to this influence.     

Automatic emotion regulation after social exclusion: tuning to positivity

Nine experiments tested competing hypotheses regarding nonconscious affective responses to acute social exclusion and how such responses may relate to positive mental health. The results strongly and consistently indicated that acute social exclusion increased nonconscious positive affect. Compared to nonexcluded participants, excluded participants recalled more positive memories from childhood than did accepted participants (Experiment 1), gave greater weight to positive emotion in their judgments of word similarity (Experiments 2 and 3), and completed more ambiguous word stems with happy words (Experiments 4a and 4b). This process was apparently automatic, as participants asked to imagine exclusion overestimated explicit distress and underestimated implicit positivity (Experiment 3). Four final experiments showed that this automatic emotion regulation process was found among participants low (but not high) in depressive symptoms (Experiments 5 and 6) and among participants high (but not low) in self-esteem (Experiments 7 and 8). These findings suggest that acute exclusion sets in motion an automatic emotion regulation process in which positive emotions become highly accessible, which relates to positive mental health.