A Response to Paul Griffiths’ Annihilationist Proposal

In his recent influential theological work, Paul Griffiths, the esteemed Buddhism scholar and Anglican convert to Catholicism, proposes, among other things, that annihilationism is a viable option for Christians, including Catholics, despite apparent magisterial prohibition. He argues, in effect, that every creature must be naturally mortal because bodily, including the angels. Therefore, de facto immortal creatures are not immortal by nature, but by a positive act of God in addition to the creative act. Accordingly, it makes no sense to assert the existence of an eternal hell. Rather, since sin is fundamentally corrosive, those who opt to continue down the rabbit's hole of sin literally become nothing. Hell, then, is a no‐place and a no‐time. Hence, as long as the damned continue to exist, they have the opportunity for eventual redemption as for eventual self‐annihilation. Griffiths attempts to defend this thesis in dialogue with Augustine, in particular, to the neglect of Aquinas, except to argue that Aquinas’ own arguments for the natural immortality of the human soul are incoherent. I will argue instead that spiritual being exists, that it is naturally immortal, that Aquinas demonstrates both, and that even an Augustinian such as Joseph Ratzinger recognizes Aquinas’ theological insights and builds on them.     

Abstracts of the Major Articles

Aquinas tried to establish his metaphysics of creation theologically and philosophically. Crea- ting belongs to God alone, as means that it is God＇s divine action. For God, as to its essence, is nothing but pure act. The essence of creation is creatio ex nihilo, as means that God the Creator alone creates the entire world out of nothing. Since God is the giver of being, the first principle a- lone, creating is but to give being. And the creatures, as to their existence, were created by God. Although all the things come from God absolutely, they have their own participated being and good. As a new theological paradigm, Aquinas＂ metaphysics of creation was a philosophical ex- pression of the Bible sentence, namely, ＂In the beginning God creates heaven and earth. ＂     

Being as Iconic: Aquinas on ‘He Who Is’ as the Name for God

Aquinas claims that ‘He Who Is’ is the most proper of the names we have for God. But this attempt to ‘describe’ God with a philosophical concept like ‘being’ can seem dangerously close to creating a false conception based on our limited understanding – an idol. A dominant criticism of Aquinas’ use of this term is that any attempt to use ‘being’ to describe God will inevitably make him merely some object in our ontology alongside other beings, unacceptably mitigating God's radical transcendence and otherness. I will argue that Aquinas has a very creative response to this charge: ‘being’ stands in a unique relationship as the only concept that can ensure we do not draw God under some particular creaturely limit and thus use divine names to create an ‘idol’. In other words, ‘being’ is a special paradigm concept/term which ensures that we preserve humility in our attempts to name God.     

论阿奎那创世形而上学的三个层面

阿奎那在形而上学基础上建构创世信仰,确立创世形而上学体系。此体系包含三个层面:上帝是世界的第一原则,其本质与存在同一,即纯粹的现实活动;创造作为上帝的本质体现和神圣活动就是存在的给予;世界万物,既绝对受造于上帝,又自有其分有之在,表现为存在论上的依存性和自在性。阿奎那的创世形而上学正是对《圣经》"起初,上帝创造天地"信仰告白的哲学表达,代表了新的神学范式。     

The Gift of the Non aliud: Creation from Nothing as a Metaphysics of Abundance

Although the doctrine of creation from nothing may seem to instantiate a metaphysics of privation, in which the creature’s existence is ultimately one of humiliation, further reflection shows that this conclusion is not justified. For God to be over against the creature as an other who might threaten its autonomy in this way would imply a gap between God’s will and creaturely substance that is inconsistent with creation ex nihilo, according to which creatures are other than God, but God, as the exclusive ground of creaturely existence, is ‘Not other’ than they. This point disrupts the relationships of privation or dependence that mark inner‐worldly acts of creating. To be (always only partly) dependent on a created other is indeed to be revealed as less than sufficient unto oneself; but to be (wholly) dependent on the ‘Not other’ is to be fully sufficient to fulfil the promise of one’s existence.     

Processio and The Place of Ontic Being: John Milbank and James K.A. Smith On Participation

James K.A. Smith argues that the ontology of participation associated with Radical Orthodoxy is incompatible with a Christian affirmation of the intrinsic being and goodness of creatures. In response, he proposes a Leibnizian view in which things are endowed with the innate dynamism of ‘force’. Creatures have a certain depth of being, and are intrinsically good, just because they each have an inner virtuality that they bring into expression. Such force is said to be a metaphysical component of the agent. In this paper it is asked whether John Milbank's ontology of participation can be defended by distinguishing between two senses of being a subject. Perhaps it is possible for a creature to bring into expression what is an infused ‘alien’ gift rather than a metaphysical component – to be expressive subject, but not ontic subject, for divine power. However, while this distinction promises to make sense of the reception of an indwelling ‘other’ in grace, knowledge and love, neither proper substance nor proper existence can be received in this way. A creature must be the ontic subject for its being, after all. Still, divine being might proceed from God as radical indwelling gift, as non‐ontic ground for ontic being.     

On preferring God's non-existence

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: ‘Does God exist?’ Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: ‘Would God's existence be a good thing?’ The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God's existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being's existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God's existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God's non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God's existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God's existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be.     

THE MAKER'S MEANING: DIVINE IDEAS AND SALVATION

The divine ideas tradition played a valuable but often unrecognized role in the history of Christian theology. This article investigates the possible loss to theology by examining how the divine ideas permitted a unified theology of creation and salvation, centred upon the contemplation of all things in Christ. Interpreting examples from Origen to Aquinas, the article demonstrates that leading theologians understood the full truth of all creatures to be known eternally by God in the procession of the Word, by whose incarnation, death, and resurrection the creatures are redeemed.     

ON BEING HEARD BUT NOT SEEN: MILBANK AND LASH ON AQUINAS,ANALOGY AND AGNOSTICISM

The article investigates an important recent dispute within systematic theology over the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. John Milbank has defended the view that the doctrine of analogy in Aquinas is peculiarly implicated with his entire ontology, that it cannot be understood in merely semantic terms, and that it involves a less “agnostic” position on knowledge of God than is often assumed. The article critically engages this position in two ways. It offers an archaeology of the prior polemical context out of which the claim arose, for the meaning and purpose of Milbank's claim are illuminated once it is seen as the vigorous repudiation of a “grammatical” or “linguistic” interpretation of Thomas on analogy which had been proffered earlier by Nicholas Lash. It will also provide a close investigation of the citations and interpretations of Aquinas texts that Milbank uses to ground his position, in order to adjudicate the dispute with Lash. The result will be to call strongly into question the plausibility of Milbank's readings of Aquinas. The article also indicates at several points the way in which those readings are shaped by an overriding anti‐Kantian thrust in Milbank's entire approach to the discussion. In conclusion, it adumbrates the larger and older question which subtends the entire dispute: to what degree is some kind of vision or intuitive grasp of being as such, or of God's being, granted human beings in this life?     

On Aquinas's Theological Reliabilism

In an essay titled Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge, Eleonore Stump rejects the idea that Aquinas's epistemology is foundationalist. I agree with Stump, and share in her conviction that the Angelic doctor developed instead what can be seen as a kind of theological reliabilism. In this article, I intend to take her position a step further. First, I would like to show that Thomistic reliabilism falls into a vicious circle if seen as based on a merely rational theism. Second, I am going to argue that for Aquinas such reliabilism depends instead on Christian faith, construed as the act of believing the revealed truth by virtue of the love relationship that God allows human beings to have with him.     

“More Splendid than the Sun”: Christ’s Flesh among the Reasons for the Incarnation

This article defends two arguments proposed by Robert Grosseteste for the view that the Incarnation is logically prior to the Fall. Each of them is motivated by the goodness of Christ as a creature who is nonetheless worthy of worship, though the first considers this fact as an intrinsic good, and the second considers it as instrumentally good, by virtue of its making possible fleshly communion between God and his creatures. I will then consider Bonaventure’s reasons for rejecting these arguments, which turn on the worry that they posit a divine obligation to become Incarnate. I show that while Bonaventure’s concern is reasonable, he addresses it at the unacceptable cost of denying important aspects of the Incarnation’s purpose in the actual world. However, Bonaventure accepts that the Incarnation and Passion are “necessary” for human redemption in a way that is consistent with divine freedom, an intuition which Aquinas brings to particularly clear expression by analyzing the Incarnation as necessary in the sense of being the most fitting means of salvation. Applying this line of thought to Christ’s flesh, considered as the fitting instrument by which God has elected to perfectly beatify humanity, allows us to reconcile Grosseteste’s insistence on the Incarnation’s priority to the Fall with Bonaventure’s insistence on its absolute gratuity.     

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON DEATH AND THE SEPARATED SOUL

Since St. Thomas Aquinas holds that death is a substantial change, a popular current interpretation of his anthropology must be mistaken. According to that interpretation – the ‘survivalist’ view – St. Thomas holds that we human beings survive our deaths, constituted solely by our souls in the interim between death and resurrection. This paper argues that St. Thomas must have held the ‘corruptionist’ view: the view that human beings cease to exist at their deaths. Certain objections to the corruptionist view are also met.     

ALBERT,AQUINAS, AND DIONYSIUS

Beyond the usual distinction between East and West, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas stand not only as commentators, but also appear to be close readers, of Dionysius' works. While Albert's own metaphysics of the Good tends to underline the diffusive dimension of the Good in a creation conceived of as an emanation, Thomas uses Dionysius to elaborate his notion of God as a free creator and to define His unique relation to creatures. If Albert's own via negativa is closer to Dionysius than one might have expected, it nonetheless stands within the same scope as Thomas' conception of proximity to God, as they both borrow the Dionysian exitus/reditus pattern to offer a divinization process of salvation through peace and praise.     

On Denying the Right God: Aquinas on Atheism and Idolatry

Thomas Aquinas appears not to have been intellectually challenged by formal atheisms, nor are his 'five ways' of proving the existence of God best understood as arguments with formal statements of philosophical atheism. But his emphatically 'negative' theology does seem to offer a response to an over‐optimistic and potentially idolatrous 'affirmativeness', and we might see the relevance of this negative theology as challenging atheisms of our times to come up with more radical forms of denial than they customarily achieve. In the light of this account of Thomas' natural theology, how are we to view his 'five ways'? As on the one hand valid as rational proofs and at the same time as avoiding the pitfalls of a Scotist 'onto‐theological' metaphysics.     

Why Philosophy Abides for Aquinas

In Truth in Aquinas Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank continue Radical Orthodoxy's 'reinterpretation' of the history of philosophy and theology by evaluating philosophy as metaphysics so that 'metaphysics collapses into sacra doctrina ' in Thomas Aquinas. Their strategy for saving Aquinas from Heideggerian 'onto-theology' is the opposite of that Jean-Luc Marion who in 'Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-théo-logie' keeps philosophy and metaphysics distinct from sacred teaching. The article examines some of the questions involved by reconsidering the nature of philosophy as textual commentary in late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. It goes on to examine what Aquinas means by 'the truth of things', and concludes by looking at how he treats the aspects of metaphysics and the relation of metaphysics and sacra doctrina . Hankey judges that Marion is right on this question. The author suggests that what is involved with Milbank and Pickstock is not a reinterpretation of Aquinas. What they have written depends on mistakes and misrepresentations of basic points in his teaching, e.g, participation, intellectual intuition and abstractions, God's being and his existence in things, with the result that Thomas looks more like Descartes or Spinoza than himself.     

The Patience of God the Creator: Reflections on Genesis 1:1–2:4a

This article proposes that Genesis 1:1–2:4a be read in terms of an exercise of divine patience – an act of ‘letting be’ and ‘letting happen’ wherein God establishes, guides, waits on and endorses the free action of non‐human creatures. It first articulates a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, affirming that God is solely responsible for the establishment of a dynamic, complex and valuable cosmos. Next, it contends that God's creative efforts include the empowerment of non‐human creatures who reward God's patience and commit themselves to the task of creatio cooperativa. It then argues that the emergence of human beings is a creative act undertaken by God and non‐human creatures, such that the human bears both the imago dei and the imago mundi. In conclusion, the article considers the relationship of divine and human action, the limits of the idiom of causality, and the possibility of developing a doctrine of creation in light of the witness of the Hebrew Bible.     

Transcendental being: Scotus and Scotists

Of singular importance to the medieval theory of transcendentals was the position of John Duns Scotus that there could be a concept of being univocally common, not only to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. Scotus's doctrine of univocal transcendental concepts violated the accepted view that, owing to its generality, no transcendental notion could be univocal. The major difficulty facing Scotus's doctrine of univocity was to explain how a real, as opposed to a purely logical, concept could be abstracted from what agreed in nothing real, in this case, God and creatures. The present article examines Scotus's solution to this difficulty and its interpretation in four of his noted fourteenth-century followers. It is shown that the balance Scotus's solution achieved between the competing demands of the real diversity between God and creatures, on the one side, and the conceptual unity of transcendental being, on the other, is taken in opposed directions by his interpreters. Either the real diversity of God and creatures is given priority, so that the concept of being becomes a purely logical notion, or the real unity of the concept of being is stressed, so that some sort of real community is posited between God and creatures.In the following notes,Lect. andOrd. are abbreviations forLectura andOrdinatio, the titles of Scotus's earlier and later versions of his Oxford commentary on theSentences, respectively.     

The Problem of Criteria and the Necessity of Natural Theology

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ‐centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self‐disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post‐liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old‐fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self‐evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life‐world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach.     

On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to Presence in a Distracted World

In the biblical creation story human beings are depicted as beings ejected from the true home given to them in creation and entrapped in the dynamics of their flight from God. Franz Rosenzweig suggested that modern life is best understood as a type of chronic living death characterized by an animate but nevertheless sterile experience of loss. Following Eric Santner's presentation of this theme in Rosenzweig, this article will explore what it might mean to recover a sense of the goodness of place and particularity. I will examine Santner's suggestion that to become present to ‘place’ is to have undergone the ‘undeadening’ intervention of another person, who offers us an exit route in the midst of the tangle of our lived lives. I will then show how the main lines of his analysis both parallel and offer ways to sharpen important aspects of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account in Creation and Fall of the dynamics of the Fall and the healing of creatures. Human beings are depicted by Bonhoeffer as in need of being transformed into creatures, a theological insight resting on a complex account of creation, and which I will suggest, in conclusion, is a particularly important theme of a Christian gospel that can speak to a world saturated by the desire to be elsewhere.     

Noah's Ark,Mt. Meru,and the God of the Rainbow

The warning is clear: Unless human beings reach a change of civilization in the ecological sense within the next ten years, we will not have a future—any future. However, a change of civilization does require a change of religious beliefs as well. As Lynn White Jr. asserted many years ago, our present science and technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our ecological and economic crises can be expected from them alone. “Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious,” as White assures, “the remedy must also be essentially religious.” Still, where do we begin? The author is convinced that any ecological reconstruction of Christian theology and missiology must begin with the Scripture. A solid re‐reading of the Bible will do. This is the reason why the author revisits the well‐known story of Noah's ark to reveal the inconvenient truth almost verbatim – the truth that the Noah's Ark is the story of God's new covenant of life with not only human beings but also with the Earth, represented by the animals from the ark. After scrutinizing the creation stories in Genesis 1 to 9, comparing in particular the two different commandments of God in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2, as well as in Genesis 1 and Genesis 9, the author confirms that a just and sustainable future can only be built upon the biblical God of the rainbow, who shows no favor to human beings, and who makes a new covenant of life with all flesh. What we need is a new vision of Christian beliefs and discipleship that honors God, values the Earth, and emphasizes humility [humus] of humanity [humus], concludes the author.