Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Misinformation Effects and Hindsight Bias

The present study examined individual differences in susceptibility to two similar forms of memory distortion: the misinformation effect and hindsight bias. The misinformation effect occurs when individuals witness an event, are provided with misinformation, and recall the original event as containing elements of the misinformation. Hindsight bias occurs when individuals make judgments, are provided with feedback, and recall their original judgments as being more similar to the feedback than they actually were. Seventy-five participants completed a misinformation task, a hindsight bias task, and several individual difference measures related to memory distortions. Working memory capacity was negatively correlated with the misinformation effect and hindsight bias, and the misinformation effect and hindsight bias were negatively correlated with one another. Although the misinformation effect and hindsight bias are measured with similar designs, and both are predicted by working memory capacity, the negative correlation between them suggests these phenomena result from somewhat different processes.     

Discrepancy detection in the retrieval-enhanced suggestibility paradigm

Retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES) refers to the finding that immediately recalling the details of a witnessed event can increase susceptibility to later misinformation. In three experiments, we sought to gain a deeper understanding of the role that retrieval plays in the RES paradigm. Consistent with past research, initial testing did increase susceptibility to misinformation – but only for those who failed to detect discrepancies between the original event and the post-event misinformation. In all three experiments, subjects who retrospectively detected discrepancies in the post-event narratives were more resistant to misinformation than those who did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, having subjects concurrently assess the consistency of the misinformation narratives negated the RES effect. Interestingly, in Experiments 2 and 3, subjects who had retrieval practice and detected discrepancies were more likely to endorse misinformation than control subjects who detected discrepancies. These results call attention to limiting conditions of the RES effect and highlight the complex relationship between retrieval practice, discrepancy detection, and misinformation endorsement.     

Sleep Increases Susceptibility to the Misinformation Effect

When individuals witness an event and are exposed to misleading postevent information, they often incorporate the misleading information into their memory for the original event, a phenomenon known as the misinformation effect. The present study examined the role of sleep in the misinformation effect. Participants (N = 177) witnessed two events; were exposed to misleading postevent information immediately, 12 hours later the same day, 12 hours later the next day, or 24 hours later; and then took a recognition test. All groups demonstrated the misinformation effect, and this effect was larger in groups with an overnight retention interval. Signal detection analyses revealed that sleep decreased sensitivity. These results suggest that sleep increases susceptibility to the misinformation effect, which may occur because sleep results in gist‐based representations of original events or because sleep improves learning of postevent information. Implications for interviewing eyewitnesses are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Misinformation and memory: the creation of new memories

Misleading information presented after an event can lead people to erroneous reports of that misinformation. Different process histories can be responsible for the same erroneous report in different people. We argue that the relative proportion of times that the different process histories are responsible for erroneous reporting will depend on the conditions of acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information. Given the conditions typical of most misinformation experiments, it appears that misinformation acceptance plays a major role, memory impairment plays some role, and pure guessing plays little or no role. Moreover, we argue that misinformation acceptance has not received the appreciation that it deserves as a phenomenon worthy of our sustained investigation. It may not tell us anything about impairment of memories, but it does tell us something about the creation of new memories.     

Misled subjects may know more than their performance implies

Many studies have demonstrated that subjects exposed to misleading postevent information are likely to report the misinformation with confidence on subsequent tests of memory for the event. The purpose of the present studies was to determine whether subjects exposed to misleading postevent information come to believe they remember seeing the misinformation at the original event. A second question addressed by the present studies is whether exposure to misinformation reduces subjects' ability to remember the source of items they witnessed at the original event. In two experiments, subjects viewed a slide sequence depicting an event, were subsequently exposed to misleading information or neutral information about selected aspects of the event, and were later tested on their memory for the source of original and misleading details. The results showed that exposure to misinformation did not lead subjects to believe they remembered seeing the misinformation, nor did it reduce subjects' ability to accurately identify the source of originally seen details. The same pattern of results was obtained whether subjects were tested immediately (Experiment 1) or after a 1-day delay (Experiment 2). Collectively, the results suggest that subjects may report misinformation even if they know they do not remember seeing it.     

Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

The present study examined age‐related differences in the misinformation effect for objects that were consistent or inconsistent with their environmental settings. Young and older adults viewed one of two slide sequences, each containing context‐consistent items (e.g., a blender in a kitchen setting or a saw in a woodshop setting) and context‐inconsistent items (a saw in a kitchen setting or a blender in a woodshop setting). After receiving misinformation through post‐event narratives, participants received tests of yes/no recognition requiring remember/know judgments (Experiments 1–3) and source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3) for slide details. Although age‐related differences in the misinformation effect were nonreliable, older adults tended to report misinformation as remembered more often than young adults, and source monitoring tests reduced the misinformation effect for both age groups. Misinformation effects were equivalent or larger for inconsistent objects than for consistent objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing potentiates new learning in the misinformation paradigm

Retrieval enhanced suggestibility (RES) is the finding that the misinformation effect is exacerbated when a test precedes misleading postevent information (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich Psychological Science 20: 66–73, 2009). In the present study, we tested three hypotheses relevant to RES. First, we examined whether retrieval of critical details was necessary for the RES effect. Second, we examined whether initial testing influenced the allocation of attention to critical details during postevent information processing. Finally, we examined whether RES resulted in impaired access to the originally learned information. We compared three groups of participants in three experiments: an identical-test group, a related-test group, and a standard misinformation group. Both testing groups were tested on the original event before the introduction of misinformation; however, the identical-test group took the same test before and after the misinformation, whereas the related-test group took different tests before and after misinformation. We found that testing before misleading postevent information affected attention allocation to details in the postevent narrative. Furthermore, the RES effect did not accompany reduced accessibility to the original information, as measured by a modified–modified free recall test. These data have implications for how testing may potentiate new learning.     

Whatever Gave You That Idea? False Memories Following Equivalence Training: A Behavioral Account of the Misinformation Effect

The misinformation effect is a term used in the cognitive psychological literature to describe both experimental and real-world instances in which misleading information is incorporated into an account of an historical event. In many real-world situations, it is not possible to identify a distinct source of misinformation, and it appears that the witness may have inferred a false memory by integrating information from a variety of sources. In a stimulus equivalence task, a small number of trained relations between some members of a class of arbitrary stimuli result in a large number of untrained, or emergent relations, between all members of the class. Misleading information was introduced into a simple memory task between a learning phase and a recognition test by means of a match-to-sample stimulus equivalence task that included both stimuli from the original learning task and novel stimuli. At the recognition test, participants given equivalence training were more likely to misidentify patterns than those who were not given such training. The misinformation effect was distinct from the effects of prior stimulus exposure, or partial stimulus control. In summary, stimulus equivalence processes may underlie some real-world manifestations of the misinformation effect.     

Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude‐based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left‐wing and right‐wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.     

Combating Co‐witness contamination: Attempting to decrease the negative effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Witnesses who discuss an event with others often incorporate misinformation encountered during the discussion into their memory of the event. Two experiments were conducted to establish whether this memory conformity also occurs in the context of an interview and whether it is possible to reduce the effect. Participants viewed a crime‐video which they then discussed with a co‐witness. Some participants were warned they may have been exposed to misinformation during the discussion before all were interviewed individually. In Experiment 1, participants made remember/know judgments about each component of their free recall, and in Experiment 2 they were asked to indicate the source of their memories. Co‐witness information was incorporated into participants' testimony, and this effect could not be significantly reduced using warnings and source‐monitoring instructions. Remember/know judgments may be useful in distinguishing ‘real’ memories from false memories. We make some recommendations regarding the interviewing of witnesses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Misinformation effect and centrality

Introduction and objectivesThe two objectives of this study are to examine the effects of the introduction of post-event information (correct and incorrect) on the memory of the central and peripheral aspects of a given situation and to determine the effects of this additional information on the level of confidence claimed by the participants regarding their reported memories.MethodOne hour and a half after watching a film, the participants were presented with three types of information, by means of open questions: leading, misleading and neutral. One week later, they carried out a recognition task, during which they had to assess to what extent they were sure of their answers.ResultsWhile the memory of the event was more accurate concerning the central aspects of the event than the peripheral elements, the misinformation effect appeared only in the central condition. In addition, following the presentation of incorrect information, the participants were more certain of their answers related to the central aspects.ConclusionThese results highlight the importance of taking into account the centrality factor in studies about the misinformation phenomenon.     

The Use of Recollection Rejection in the Misinformation Paradigm

The purpose of this research was to determine the role of recollection rejection in the rejection of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we examined the use of recollection rejection to reject contradictory and additive misinformation. We measured recollection rejection by comparing misinformation acceptance rates, graphing confidence‐accuracy data using phantom receiver operating characteristic curves, examining high confidence rejections of misinformation, and examining self‐report responses. These measures converged on the finding that participants used recollection rejection to reject both types of misinformation but used recollection rejection more on contradictory misinformation. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the delay between the event and misinformation and between misinformation and test. The length of both of these delays affected misinformation acceptance. Participants were more likely to use recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation after a short delay before encountering misinformation. Overall these findings indicate that people can spontaneously induce recollection rejection to reject misinformation and prevent false memories. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

错误信息效应的主要理论与影响因素的述评与展望

个体对原始信息的记忆受到随后错误信息的影响而产生错误记忆被称为错误信息效应.通过对新近研究的梳理与归纳,发现错误信息效应的研究热点集中于解释效应产生机制的理论研究以及效应的影响因素研究.因此,本文重点归纳和述评了错误信息效应的五种理论和三类影响因素.未来的研究建议从以下几方面开展:第一,错误信息产生机制和理论研究;第二...     

Avoiding Misinformation: Reinstating Target Modality

Explanations of the misinformation effect were considered in an experiment using a reversed eyewitness suggestibility design (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b). Forty-eight subjects read a narrative describing a photograph that they subsequently viewed. For half the subjects, the narrative contained misinformation. Recognition tests for objects appearing in the photograph were administered in either a verbal or a pictorial modality. A misinformation effect was found in the verbal condition, as found by Lindsay and Johnson. With pictorial probes there was no misinformation effect, indicating that reinstatement of the appropriate modality cues can eliminate the influence of misleading post-event information upon memory and permit the retrieval of the target memory. The experiment was conceived of and discussed within the headed records framework.     

Post‐event information presented in a question form eliminates the misinformation effect

This study investigated the influences of sentence surface forms on the misinformation effect. After viewing a film clip, participants received a post‐event narrative describing the events in the film. Critical sentences in the post‐event narrative, presented in either a statement or a question form, contained misinformation instead of questions with embedded false presuppositions; thus participants did not have to answer questions about the original event. During the final cued‐recall test, participants were informed that any relevant information presented in the post‐event narrative was not in the original event and that they should not report it. Consistent with previous findings, Experiment 1 demonstrated that post‐event information presented as an affirmative statement produced the misinformation effect. More importantly, post‐event information presented in a question form, regardless of whether it contained a misleading or studied item, increased the recall of correct information and reduced false recall. Experiment 2 replicated the main finding and ruled out an alternative explanation based on the salience of misleading items. Post‐event information presented in a question form created a condition similar to that which produces the testing effect.     

Correcting the misinformation effect

Decades of memory research have demonstrated a dire need for effective methods of correcting misinformation, particularly once it has been encoded. However, much of this research has exposed participants to misinformation first then provided a correction, and used indirect memory questions. Using a misinformation effect (ME) paradigm, in which participants' memory is distorted by misleading postevent information, we examine whether corrections can combat memory distortion on direct memory tests. Experiment 1 showed corrections greatly reduced the ME. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a longer lag time (3 min) between exposure to misinformation and its correction, except for participants that read only the misinformation and its correction. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that participants reported the most recent information they read, suggesting participants evaluate the correction's veracity. Finally, a meta‐analysis of the three experiments reiterates that corrections may be effective in combating misinformation.     

Not wallowing in misery – retractions of negative misinformation are effective in depressive rumination

People often continue to rely on misinformation in their reasoning after they have acknowledged a retraction; this phenomenon is known as the continued-influence effect. Retractions can be particularly ineffective when the retracted misinformation is consistent with a pre-existing worldview. We investigated this effect in the context of depressive rumination. Given the prevalence of depressotypic worldviews in depressive rumination, we hypothesised that depressive rumination may affect the processing of retractions of valenced misinformation; specifically, we predicted that the retraction of negative misinformation might be less effective in depressive ruminators. In two experiments, we found evidence against this hypothesis: in depressive ruminators, retractions of negative misinformation were at least as effective as they were in control participants, and more effective than retractions of positive misinformation. Findings are interpreted in terms of an attentional bias that may enhance the salience of negative misinformation and may thus facilitate its updating in depressive rumination.     

Habitual Susceptibility to Misinformation and Individual Differences in Eyewitness Memory

A novel multiple-event, multiple-item procedure was employed to identify individuals who were habitually susceptible to accepting post-event misinformation. Using this procedure, it was found that many people succumbed at least once to the effects of misinformation, given enough opportunities. Moreover, some individuals could be identified who showed a pattern of repeated susceptibility, accepting some misinformation for each of three separate events. Several individual difference measures discriminated between individuals who were habitually susceptible to false post-event information and those who were not; these include empathy, self-reported vividness of visual imagery and a memory accuracy measure. © by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why misinformation is more likely to be recognised over time: A source monitoring account

Although memory for actual events tends to be forgotten over time, memory for misinformation tends to be retrieved at a stable rate over long delays or at a rate greater than that found immediately after encoding. To examine whether source monitoring errors contribute to this phenomenon, two experiments investigated subjects' memory for the source of misinformation at different retention intervals. Subjects viewed a slide presentation, read a narrative containing misinformation, and, either 10 minutes or 1 week later, completed a recognition test about details seen in the slides and about the source of these details. After the longer retention interval in both experiments, participants were more likely to agree that they had seen misleading information and were also more likely to incorrectly associate the misinformation with the slide event. Theoretical implications of these findings are considered.     

误导信息效应中年龄差异与自信差异初探

本研究对误导信息效应中不同年龄被试对最初事件再认的表现差异和自信心差异进行了探讨。结果表明:在再认成绩方面,被试对误导项目的错误反应率要高于对控制项目的错误反应率,即产生了误导信息效应,而且老年被试比年轻被试更易受误导信息的影响;在自信心方面,被试不存在年龄差异,即无论是在误导项目上,还是在控制项目上,老年被试和年轻被试对其再认的正确和错误反应有一样高的自信心。