In search of clarity: self-esteem and domains of confidence and confusion

To date, research suggests that self-concept clarity is a monolithic construct: Some people have clearly defined self-concepts in all domains, whereas others do not. The authors argued that self-concept clarity is instead multifaceted and varies across trait domains. The authors predicted that social commodities (SCs; e.g., looks, popularity, social skills) would show less self-concept clarity than would communal qualities (CQs; e.g., kindness, warmth, honesty), due to domain differences in observability, ambiguity, and controllability. Results replicated past findings that self-esteem predicts self-concept clarity but also demonstrated that participants' SC self-views were less clear than their CQ self-views. Moreover, people showed greater clarity about traits that were lower in observability and higher in ambiguity and controllability. These findings suggest that everyone, regardless of self-esteem, has self-concept domains of relative confidence and confusion.     

Noncognitive predictors of intelligence and academic achievement: An important role of confidence

Recent evidence about the relationship between cognitive tests and psychological noncognitive variables is reviewed. Noncognitive measures can be ordered with respect to their predictive validity. Many are poor predictors of intelligence and achievement. Measures of rationality, self-assessment of intelligence, Openness to Experience and self-concept correlate up to .35 with cognitive performance. Some domain-specific self-beliefs (self-efficacy and anxiety) have correlations with appropriate achievement tests that can reach .45. The best predictors of any kind of cognitive performance are measures of confidence (frequently reported correlations of .45 and above) that can capture a major part of predictive validity of the three self-beliefs. The role of self-beliefs has attracted much interest in education but their role in predicting performance on tests of fluid intelligence is likely to be low. However, self-beliefs and confidence in particular may prove to be the most potent noncognitive influences on the development of acculturated knowledge that is captured by measures of crystallized intelligence.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aspects of self-concept and their relationship to language performance and verbal reasoning ability

It has been claimed that self-concept is multidimensional, with dimensions such as mathematical self-concept and self-concept in language. The present study investigated the relationship of academic self-concept in language with performance on school-related language tasks and verbal reasoning ability. A total of 512 students in grades 7, 9, and 11 rated four aspects of their academic self-concept in language: self-perception, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and others' perception of their abilities. Verbal reasoning ability and performance on language tasks were assessed. Path analysis showed that performance on language tasks was influenced strongly by verbal reasoning abilities. Self-esteem and others' perception of one's abilities were affected directly by language performance. No direct relationship was found between academic self-concept in language and verbal reasoning ability. The results suggest that adolescents do not construe their academic self-concept according to their abilities but according to their performance in school and others' response to it.     

Sex Differences in Expressive Thought of Gifted Children in the Classroom

This study was a comparison of 92 high-achieving gifted girls with 97 high-achieving gifted boys on measures of cognitive thinking, classroom expressiveness, self-concept, and attitudes. These secondary school boys were significantly more expressive than the girls on all classroom variables. Written tests of similar abilities revealed no differences except that the girls were better at giving solutions to hypothetical problems. Differences found in self-concept and attitudes of the present sample supported the conclusions drawn by Kagan that intellectual aggressiveness is seen, in part, as a masculine counterpart and that this type of behavior when visible, as in the classroom discussion, may well raise anxiety and inhibit the gifted girl from full expression. The part played by sex-role expectations in inhibiting the free expression of intellectual power of girls in academic settings and later life would seem to warrant much further investigation. The expressive range of performance within sex groups also represents an important area for investigation.     

A structural model for postpartum responses to the somatic and cognitive items on the Beck Depression Inventory

A distinction can be drawn between those items on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) that reflect mainly cognitive and emotional symptoms and those that reflect somatic symptoms. Responses to the BDI were obtained from women at 3, 6, 9, and 24 weeks postpartum. The covariances of cognitive and somatic symptom scores across the four time points were closely fit by a structural equations model referred to as the simplex. The modeling indicates that earlier cognitive scores directly predict later somatic scores but that early somatic scores do not directly predict later cognitive scores. Other data confirm the results.Much of this research was supported while the first author was an NIMH Fellow at the University of Iowa (MH15168).     

Current Trends in Education in Russia: Preliminary Outcomes Indicative of Students' Cognitive Development

Using a sample school population (N = 333) in Voronezh, Russia, this study investigated the comparative effect of two different types of Russian public schooling—traditional and innovative—on students' analytical, creative, and practical abilities. These abilities were assessed through (1) ratings by parents and teachers and (2) student performances on tests and other evaluative exercises, as well as student self-reports. The study found that innovative schools appear to do a better job of developing students' cognitive abilities (analytical, creative, and practical) than do more traditional institutions; in particular, the innovative schools significantly enhanced students' creative abilities. This study begins to illuminate the impact of massive societal change, and accompanying educational responses, on the cognitive development of Russian youth.     

More than g: Evidence for the Incremental Validity of Performance-Based Assessments for Predicting Training Performance

Past research has consistently shown that tests measuring specific cognitive abilities provide little if any incremental validity over tests of general mental ability when predicting performance on the job. In this study, we suggest that the seeming lack of incremental validity may have been due to the type of content that has traditionally been assessed. Therefore, we hypothesised that incremental validity can be obtained using specific cognitive abilities that are less highly correlated with g and are matched to the tasks performed on the job. To test this, we examined a recently developed performance-based measure that assesses a number of cognitive abilities related to training performance. In a sample of 310 US Navy student pilots, results indicated that performance-based scores added sizeable incremental validity to a measure of g. The significant increases in R² ranged from .08 to .10 across criteria. Similar results were obtained after correcting correlations for range restriction, though the magnitude of incremental validity was slightly smaller (ΔR² ranged from .05 to .07).     

A Neuropsychological Approach to Intelligence

This paper proposes that current psychometric intelligence tests are limited in evaluating cognitive activity. From a neuropsychological perspective, they fail to measure some fundamental cognitive abilities such as executive functions, memory, and visuospatial abilities. The analysis of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale presented shows that the original rationale for selecting the specific subtests included in the WAIS was unclear. The concept of a g factor in cognition is also analyzed, with the conclusion that the g factor continues to be controversial. The value of intelligence tests in predicting school performance is also criticized. It is proposed that the psychometric concept of general intelligence should be deleted from cognitive and neurological sciences. Finally, it is proposed that, in the future, neuropsychological instruments sensitive to more specific cognitive abilities replace current psychometric intelligence tests.     

Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination

Is there a common and general basis for confidence in human judgment? Recently, we found that the properties of confidence judgments in the sensory domain mirror those previously established in the cognitive domain; notably, we found underconfidence on easy sensory judgments and overconfidence on hard sensory judgments. In contrast, data from the Uppsala laboratory in Sweden suggest that sensory judgments are unique; they found a pervasive underconfidence bias, with overconfidence being evident only on very hard sensory judgments. Olsson and Winman (1996) attempted to resolve the debate on the basis of methodological issues related to features of the stimulus display in a visual discrimination task. A reanalysis of the data reported in Baranski and Petrusic (1994), together with the findings of a new experiment that controlled stimulus display characteristics, supports the position that the difference between the Canadian and the Swedish data is real and, thus, may reflect cross-national differences in confidence in sensory discrimination.     

Greater response cardinality indirectly reduces confidence

Koriat's Self-Consistency Model of subjective confidence proposes that the consistency and accessibility with which a response is retrieved are cues to confidence in the accuracy of that response. The Self-Consistency Model, however, has only been assessed using two-alternative forced-choice questions. Consideration of open-ended questions suggested that response cardinality—the number of unique response options that might come to mind—should directly reduce response consistency, and thus indirectly reduce confidence. Australian undergraduate students (N?=?389) completed a 20-item open-ended general-knowledge test with confidence ratings attached to each answer. Replicating previous Self-Consistency Model findings, but in an open-ended format for the first time, consistency and accessibility were independent positive predictors of confidence, though the prediction of accessibility did not reach statistical significance. Extending the model, the number of unique responses given by participants, a measure of response cardinality, was found to be a strong negative predictor of consistency and indirect negative predictor of confidence. Implications of the results therefore include the use of simple strategies such as prompting or providing varying numbers of response options as potentially effective for manipulating cardinality and thus confidence.     

Assessing the validity of inferences from scores on the cognitive reflection test

Decision‐making researchers purport that a novel cognitive ability construct, cognitive reflection, explains variance in intuitive thinking processes that traditional mental ability constructs do not. However, researchers have questioned the validity of the primary measure because of poor construct conceptualization and lack of validity studies. Prior studies have not adequately aligned the analytical techniques with the theoretical basis of the construct, dual‐processing theory of reasoning. The present study assessed the validity of inferences drawn from the cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. We analyzed response processes with an item response tree model, a method that aligns with the dual‐processing theory in order to interpret CRT scores. Findings indicate that the intuitive and reflective factors that the test purportedly measures were indistinguishable. Exploratory, post hoc analyses demonstrate that CRT scores are most likely capturing mental abilities. We suggest that future researchers recognize and distinguish between individual differences in cognitive abilities and cognitive processes.     

Realism of confidence in obsessive-compulsive checkers

The study examined whether obsessive-compulsive (OC) checkers have reduced confidence in their knowledge. OC checkers were compared with panic disorder (PD) patients and nonpatient controls using a calibration-of-knowledge procedure. Participants completed a general knowledge questionnaire, rated their confidence in each answer, and estimated the total number of correct answers. These responses were converted to 2 measures of confidence relative to performance--over/underconfidence and over/underestimation. OC checkers had lower scores than nonpatients did on both measures, whereas the PD patients did not differ from either group. For the OC checkers, relative confidence was inversely related to the severity of obsessions. The authors speculate that confidence may depend on a confirmation bias in testing hypotheses and that the reduced confidence in OC checkers may reflect a disconfirmation bias in this population.     

Predicting the Development of Analytical and Creative Abilities in Upper Elementary Grades

In some models, intelligence has been described as a multidimensional construct comprising both analytical and creative abilities. In addition, intelligence is considered to be dynamic rather than static. A structural equation model was used to examine the predictive role of cognitive (visual short-term memory, verbal short-term memory, selective attention) and socio-emotional (motivation, self-concept, well-being) child characteristics in the development of analytical and creative abilities in 116 Dutch children over the course of 5th and 6th grade. Results showed increasing levels of both analytical and creative abilities over the grades with the 2 types of abilities developing more or less independently. The development of analytical abilities was predicted by visual and verbal short-term memory and self-concept, the development of creative abilities by visual short-term memory and well-being. These results show that analytical and creative abilities have highly independent developmental trajectories, each with specific cognitive and socio-emotional predictors.     

Effects of amount of information on judgment accuracy and confidence

When a person evaluates his or her confidence in a judgment, what is the effect of receiving more judgment-relevant information? We report three studies that show when judges receive more information, their confidence increases more than their accuracy, producing substantial confidence–accuracy discrepancies. Our results suggest that judges do not adjust for the cognitive limitations that reduce their ability to use additional information effectively. We place these findings in a more general framework of understanding the cues to confidence that judges use and how those cues relate to accuracy and calibration.     

Executive functions and social information processing in adolescents with severe behavior problems

One tradition in research for explaining aggression and antisocial behavior has focused on social information processing (SIP). Aggression and antisocial behavior have also been studied from the perspective of executive functions (EFs), the higher-order cognitive abilities that affect other cognitive processes, such as social cognitive processes. The main goal of the present study is to provide insight into the relation between EFs and SIP in adolescents with severe behavior problems. Because of the hierarchical relation between EFs and SIP, we examined EFs as predictors of SIP. We hypothesized that, first, focused attention predicts encoding and interpretation, second, inhibition predicts interpretation, response generation, evaluation, and selection, and third, working memory predicts response generation and selection. The participants consisted of 94 respondents living in residential facilities aged 12–20 years, all showing behavior problems in the clinical range according to care staff. EFs were assessed using subtests from the Amsterdam Neuropsychological Test battery. Focused attention was measured by the Flanker task, inhibition by the GoNoGo task, and working memory by the Visual Spatial Sequencing task. SIP was measured by video vignettes and a structured interview. The results indicate that positive evaluation of aggressive responses is predicted by impaired inhibition and selection of aggressive responses by a combination of impaired focused attention and inhibition. It is concluded that different components of EFs as higher-order cognitive abilities affect SIP.     

Favourable and unfavourable conditions for children's confidence judgments

Two studies are presented in which favourable and unfavourable conditions for children's meta‐cognitive monitoring processes are examined. Previously reported findings have shown that especially children's uncertainty monitoring (in contrast to certainty monitoring) poses specific problems for children in their elementary school years. When interviewing children about an observed event, answerable and unanswerable questions in two question formats (unbiased and misleading) were used, and 8‐ and 10‐year‐old children as well as adults were asked to rate their confidence on a three‐point scale concerning each response. Results of Study 1 show that accuracy instructions and the option to answer with ‘I don't know’ inflate children's level of confidence because uncertain answers are withheld. Results of Study 2 revealed that children's difficulty with uncertainty monitoring may lie in a cognitive overload during the interview because immediate confidence judgments were less precise and less adequate compared with delayed confidence judgments. Participants' rating of their uncertainty after having erroneously provided an answer to an unanswerable question proved that children aged 8 years and older are able to experience and report levels of uncertainty but, as was shown for answerable questions, these emerging competencies are dependent on favourable task conditions.     

Sex differences in confidence influence patterns of conformity

Lack of confidence in one's own ability can increase the likelihood of relying on social information. Sex differences in confidence have been extensively investigated in cognitive tasks, but implications for conformity have not been directly tested. Here, we tested the hypothesis that, in a task that shows sex differences in confidence, an indirect effect of sex on social information use will also be evident. Participants (N = 168) were administered a mental rotation (MR) task or a letter transformation (LT) task. After providing an answer, participants reported their confidence before seeing the responses of demonstrators and being allowed to change their initial answer. In the MR, but not the LT, task, women showed lower levels of confidence than men, and confidence mediated an indirect effect of sex on the likelihood of switching answers. These results provide novel, experimental evidence that confidence is a general explanatory mechanism underpinning susceptibility to social influences. Our results have implications for the interpretation of the wider literature on sex differences in conformity.     

Constructing a self: The role of self-structure and self-certainty in social anxiety

Current cognitive models stress the importance of negative self-perceptions in maintaining social anxiety, but focus predominantly on content rather than structure. Two studies examine the role of self-structure (self-organisation, self-complexity, and self-concept clarity) in social anxiety. In study one, self-organisation and self-concept clarity were correlated with social anxiety, and a step-wise multiple regression showed that after controlling for depression and self-esteem, which explained 35% of the variance in social anxiety scores, self-concept clarity uniquely predicted social anxiety and accounted for an additional 7% of the variance in social anxiety scores in an undergraduate sample (N = 95) and the interaction between self-concept clarity and compartmentalisation (an aspect of evaluative self-organisation) at step 3 of the multiple regression accounted for a further 3% of the variance in social anxiety scores. In study two, high (n = 26) socially anxious participants demonstrated less self-concept clarity than low socially anxious participants (n = 26) on both self-report (used in study one) and on computerised measures of self-consistency and confidence in self-related judgments. The high socially anxious group had more compartmentalised self-organisation than the low anxious group, but there were no differences between the two groups on any of the other measures of self-organisation. Self-complexity did not contribute to social anxiety in either study, although this may have been due to the absence of a stressor. Overall, the results suggest that self-structure has a potentially important role in understanding social anxiety and that self-concept clarity and other aspects of self-structure such as compartmentalisation interact with each other and could be potential maintaining factors in social anxiety. Cognitive therapy for social phobia might influence self-structure, and understanding the role of structural variables in maintenance and treatment could eventually help to improve treatment outcome.     

Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.