The analytic hierarchy process: An effective tool for a strategic decision of a multidisciplinary research center

The external orientation of academic research centers has a high impact on their internal organization. A multidisciplinary research center of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands is concerned with a strategic, organizational decision impelled by a shift in its external orientation. This decision implies a choice for either an organizational structure based on disciplines or an organizational structure based on the fields of application of research. Due to diverging opinions concerning the desirability of each alternative, a multicriteria decisionmaking approach has been applied. Saaty’s Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) has been used to facilitate joint decisionmaking processes by evoking consistent logical foundations and consensus formations. Strategic management has used a forward AHP model to determine the future research activities of this center based on its external orientation. Subsequently, two comparable decisionmaking groups have used a backward AHP model to choose the most appropriate organizational structure, based on criteria for scientific research. Feedback procedures have reduced disagreements and have led to a clear decision for a structure based on application fields of research.     

Speaking truth to power: Empowerment ideology as social intervention and policy

The popularity, and subsequent ambiguity, in the use of the term “empowerment” has created an even greater need for reassessment in the applied context than in the theory and research literatures. This paper outlines some of the areas of community, organizational, and societal level social intervention and policy ostensibly based on the concept of empowerment. These include neighborhood voluntary associations (for environmental protection, community crime prevention, etc.), self-help groups, competence-building primary prevention, organizational management, health care and educational reforms, and national and international community service and community development policies. Issues in applying social research to community organizations and to legislative and administrative policy making are reviewed. Ten recommendations are offered, including the value of a dialectical analysis, for helping researchers and policy makers/administrators make more effective use of empowerment theory and research. Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less.” King of Hearts: “If there's no meaning in it, that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any.”—Lewis Carroll Portions of this paper were first presented in the program “Empowerment Theory, Research and policy” at the Biennial Conference on Community Research and Action, Williamsburg, Virginia, June 18, 1993. The author thanks Barbara B. Brown, Jo Ann Lippe, Ken Maton and his students, David V. Perkins, Marc A. Zimmerman, and the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Credible testimony in and out of court

Assessing informants’ credibility is critical to several aspects of the legal process (e.g., when police interrogate suspects or jurors evaluate witnesses). There is a large body of research—from various areas of psychology and allied fields—about how people evaluate each others’ credibility. We review the literature on lie detection and interpersonal perception to demonstrate that inferences regarding credibility may be multiply determined. Specifically, characteristics of the informant, of the listener, and of the situation affect people’s perceptions of informants’ credibility. We conclude with a discussion of research on calibration (i.e., an informant’s confidence-accuracy relation) because it offers fruitful avenues for future credibility research in the legal domain.     

Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making

Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic constituents (concepts)—the use of which requires an ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making—as investigated by neuroscience and psychology—is normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what role concepts play in the “goal-directed” decision-making system. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations.     

Understanding the Role of Emotion in Sense-making. A Semiotic Psychoanalytic Oriented Perspective

We propose a model of emotion grounded on Ignacio Matte Blanco’s theory of the unconscious. According to this conceptualization, emotion is a generalized representation of the social context actors are involved in. We discuss how this model can help to better understand the sensemaking processes. For this purpose we present a hierarchical model of sensemaking based on the distinction between significance—the content of the sign—and sense—the psychological value of the act of producing the sign in the given contingence of the social exchange. According to this model, emotion categorization produces the frame of sense regulating the interpretation of the sense of the signs, therefore creating the psychological value of the sensemaking.

Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism—individualized indexical contextualism—I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both (a) satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement-data and (b) is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic.     

Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility

Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.     

Transformation of the environmental regulatory system in Poland during the 1990s

This paper examines the transformation of environmental regulatory system in Poland during the 1990s. It is a case of institutional transplantation from the past into the present: the place remained constant but the economic and political context rapidly changed over time. Drawing on five case studies of privatized firms, a mailed questionnaire, and policy and institutional analysis, it investigates how Poland developed an effective system for managing industrial pollution while also achieving considerable socioeconomic progress. One key lesson is that considerable and effective evolution of policies can take place during radical shifts in the political-economic context, as long as certain conditions are fulfilled. These include a good “fit” between the approaches taken and the existing modes of conducting societal transactions; wide sharing of certain values among the key societal actors; and continuity in policies and institutions. It also appears that a broad support for the rule of law and due process are crucial. The case of Poland also suggests that, while the developing countries do not necessarily need to reenact the evolution that has taken place among the developed countries during the past three decades, neither can they expect to leapfrog from a highly polluting “dirty” economy to a sustainable economy. The study also suggests that success in the first phase of regulatory system’s transformation—centered around reducing pollution from the energy and manufacturing sectors—is not a predictor of its success in next phase, centered around sustainability issues. The types of institutions, political circumstances, and national capabilities are different for each phase. Halina Szejnwald Brown is professor of environmental science and policy at Clark University. She currently works in the areas of environmental policy, sociotechnical innovation for sustainability, and institutions for global governance.     

The Hope,Promise, and Possibility of Psychotherapy

In this paper, five values—diversity, science, education, practice, and spirit—(a) are examined within the professional context of psychotherapy, (b) are presented as forming the foundation of much if not all that is psychotherapy, and (c) are considered as binding values that join us as a community of practicing, theorizing, and researching psychotherapists. Some of the positives of each value are reviewed. Diversity has heightened our sensitivity to and respect for individual and cultural differences. Science has kept us focused on empirically challenging and empirically informing our practice. Education has maintained emphasis on providing solid training/supervision in psychotherapy and transmitting its culture. Practice has provided us with opportunities to increasingly implement and expand on our role as helpers and healers. Spirit has been the guiding light—the heart and soul—that supports, infuses and informs all of our therapeutic endeavors and gives them meaning. What follows is a celebration of sorts—(a) capturing some of what we have done and are doing right in psychotherapy, (b) reflecting some of the weight of those “right” efforts, and (c) conveying some of the inherent hope, promise, and possibility that forever guide us in our work.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

A baldrige process for ethics?

In this paper we describe and explore a management tool called the Caux Round Table Self-Assessment and Improvement Process (SAIP). Based upon the Caux Round Table Principles for Business — a stakeholder-based, transcultural statement of business values — the SAIP assists executives with the task of shaping their firm’s conscience through an organizational self-appraisal process. This process is modeled after the self-assessment methodology pioneered by the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Program. After briefly describing the SAIP, we address three topics. First, we examine similarities and differences between the Baldrige approach to corporate self-assessment and the self-assessment process utilized within the SAIP. Second, we report initial findings from two beta tests of the tool. These illustrate both the SAIP’s ability to help organizations strengthen their commitment to ethically responsible conduct, and some of the tool’s limitations. Third, we briefly analyze various dimensions of the business scandals of 2001–2002 (Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc.) in light of the ethical requirements articulated with the SAIP. This analysis suggests that the SAIP can help link the current concerns of stakeholders — for example, investors and the general public — to organizational practice, by providing companies with a practical way to incorporate critical lessons from these unfortunate events. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

The ethics of belief: doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue.     

What Matters for Well-Being: Individual Perceptions of Quality of Life Before and After Important Life Events

In recent decades, what matters for individual quality of life (QoL) has increasingly been the focus of empirical social science research. However, individuals are rarely asked directly what is important for their quality of life as part of large-scale surveys. The present analysis studies perceptions of what matters for QoL in a large-scale longitudinal dataset—the British Household Panel Survey—which includes an open-ended question on QoL in three waves spanning ten years. We find that concepts of QoL change over the life course and differ between men and women. We hypothesize that changes in perceptions of QoL are related to important life events, such as the birth of a first child and retirement. These life events constitute ’turning points’ after which individuals often shift their priorities of what matters for their QoL. We further explore whether such shifts in priorities are stable or disappear more than five years after the life event.     

Cells,circuits, and choices: Social influences on perceptual decision making

Making decisions is an integral part of everyday life. Social psychologists have demonstrated in many studies that humans’ decisions are frequently and strongly influenced by the opinions of others—even in simple perceptual decisions, where, for example, participants have to judge what an image looks like. However, because the effect of other people’s opinions on decision making has remained largely unaddressed by the neuroimaging and neurophysiology literature, we are only beginning to understand how social influence is integrated into the decision-making process. We put forward the thesis that by probing the neurophysiology of social influence with perceptual decisionmaking tasks similar to those used in the seminal work of Asch (1952, 1956), this gap could be remedied. Perceptual paradigms are already widely used to probe neuronal mechanisms of decision making in nonhuman primates. There is also increasing evidence about how nonhuman primates’ behavior is influenced by observing conspecifics. The high spatial and temporal resolution of neurophysiological recordings in awake monkeys could provide insight into where and how social influence modulates decision making, and thus should enable us to develop detailed functional models of the neural mechanisms that support the integration of social influence into the decision-making process.     

The Ignorant Citizen: Mouffe,Rancière,and the Subject of Democratic Education

Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order. For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy.     

Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.     

Existential loneliness and end-of-life care: A systematic review

Patients with a life-threatening illness can be confronted with various types of loneliness, one of which is existential loneliness (EL). Since the experience of EL is extremely disruptive, the issue of EL is relevant for the practice of end-of-life care. Still, the literature on EL has generated little discussion and empirical substantiation and has never been systematically reviewed. In order to systematically review the literature, we (1) identified the existential loneliness literature; (2) established an organising framework for the review; (3) conducted a conceptual analysis of existential loneliness; and (4) discussed its relevance for end-of-life care. We found that the EL concept is profoundly unclear. Distinguishing between three dimensions of EL—as a condition, as an experience, and as a process of inner growth—leads to some conceptual clarification. Analysis of these dimensions on the basis of their respective key notions—everpresent, feeling, defence; death, awareness, difficult communication; and inner growth, giving meaning, authenticity—further clarifies the concept. Although none of the key notions are unambiguous, they may function as a starting point for the development of care strategies on EL at the end of life.     

A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena.     

The persistence of the belief that madness is hereditary

For more than a century geneticists and social scientists have been trying to prove that mental illness is hereditary. Today most professionals and lay people believe that the hereditary nature of schizophrenia and various other mental illnesses has been confirmed by an accumulation of various evidence. However, a review of that evidence finds that is far from conclusive. It is therefore suggested that a stubborn insistence on this genetic theory of madness is itself part of the problem—a universal tendency to sweep the dark side of family life under the rug—and leads to biased research.     

Context-dependent Dynamic Processes in Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Differentiating Common and Unique Effects of <Emphasis Type="Italic">State Regulation Deficits</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Delay Aversion</Emphasis>

The ability to specify differential predictions is a mark of a scientific models’ value. State regulation deficits (SRD) and delay aversion (DAv) have both been hypothesized as context-dependent dynamic dysfunctions in ADHD. However, to date there has been no systematic comparison of their common and unique elements. Here we review these hypotheses—and describe the core and secondary manifestations of the two constructs and review evidence in support of them. Second, we focus on what are seen as the hallmark indicators of the two deficits—preference of small immediate over large delayed rewards for DAv and the slow event rate effect for SRD. We describe the overlap between these two manifestations and then explore how experimental manipulations and the analysis of neuropsychological and physiological mediators of effects can allow us to differentiate these two patterns of neuropsychological dysfunction on the basis of specific predictions. Finally, we highlight the implications of neuropsychological heterogeneity for the practical implementation of tests of DAv and SRD.