False physiological feedback and persuasion: Effect of fear arousal vs. fear reduction on attitude change

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that increases in false physiological feedback of fear arousal will enhance persuasion and that reduction in the arousal feedback is unnecessary for increased persuasion to occur. Prior research has usually found a positive relation between level of arousal and persuasion, but support for the drive reduction hypothesis is tenuous. However, Harris and Jellison (1971) claimed support for such a hypothesis. They manipulated subjects' fear arousal cognitively via false physiological feedback while the subjects listened to a persuasive communication. The present experiments used a similar procedure in an attempt to test an "arousal only" against an "arousal reduction" hypothesis. Subjects listened to a persuasive speech while receiving false feedback via a meter concerning their fear arousal. In Experiment I half of the subjects received high arousal and half received moderate arousal information. Within each of these conditions half of the subjects had their arousal reduced, and the other half did not. In Experiment II subjects received either low arousal, high arousal, or high then low arousal feedback while listening. The results of the two studies generally provided support for the "arousal only" hypothesis. An interpretation in terms of Bem's attribution theory was tentatively suggested.     

Processing of persuasive in-group messages

Two studies investigated the processes mediating the persuasive impact of messages representing in-group opinions. In the 1st study, subjects read either a strong or a weak message attributed to either an in-group member or to another group. Subjects were more persuaded by a strong message from the in-group than a weak one, suggesting content-focused processing of the in-group message. Subjects were equally unpersuaded by either a strong or a weak message from the other group, and showed little sign of message processing. In the 2nd study, Ss listened to in-group or other-group messages about issues that varied in their relevance to in-group membership. When the issue was relevant to the in-group, subjects were persuaded by a strong message from the in-group, unpersuaded by a weak message from the in-group, and equally unimpressed by strong and weak messages from the other group. When the issue was irrelevant to the in-group, subjects accepted the position advocated by the in-group regardless of message quality, and again ignored messages from the other group. These results suggest that increased message processing, and not merely the impact of source persuasion cues, can underlie in-group-mediated attitude change.     

Hyteresis and Uncertainty: The Effect of Uncertainty on Delays to Exit Decisions

The effects of feedback variability and the availability of information on exit decisions in a nonprofitable venture were investigated in a computer simulated marketing scenario. Half of subjects received feedback relatively low in variability and half of subjects received feedback substantially higher in variability. Half of subjects in each variability condition had the opportunity to purchase additional information regarding their investment. Subjects receiving feedback higher in variability delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often, and invested more resources than subjects receiving feedback lower in variability. Subjects with no opportunity to purchase information delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often, and invested more resources than subjects with the opportunity to purchase information. The results are consistent with Dixit's (1992) theory of uncertainty and hysteresis and indicate that an uncertain environment can affect whether a decision maker continues to invest when costs are higher than profits.     

Limiting speed,towards an intelligent speed adapter (ISA)

This study concerns the effects of a prototype intelligent speed adapter (ISA) on speeding in actual traffic. Twenty-four subjects were included in a test of effects of feedback on speed behaviour, mental workload and acceptance. Subjects drove an instrumented vehicle in normal traffic on various types of roads with different speed restrictions. Subjects completed the test route twice, half of the subjects received specific feedback in the second trial (experimental group), half of the subjects did not (control group). The groups differed in several ways, the most important being adaptation of their behaviour after feedback. Subjects in the experimental group behaved more according to traffic rules, in particular speed limits, than subjects in the control group. No significant differences in workload were found. Two types of feedback were tested to acceptance and were rated differently.     

Self-focused attention and belief perseverance

The perseverance of an erroneous belief was investigated in the debriefing paradigm as a function of self-focused attention. Subjects were given either success or failure experiences via bogus performance feedback and received this feedback under high or low mirror self-focusing. All subjects were subsequently debriefed about the false nature of the feedback, and then, before answering questions about their estimated actual performance and ability, mirror self-focus was again manipulated. The results showed that self-focus prior to debriefing increased belief perseverance while self-focus after debriefing reduced the perseverance effects. Discussion of these findings emphasized the role of self-focus in information processing before and adherence to veridical standards after debriefing.     

The effects of strong belief structures on information-processing evaluations and choice

This study examined the influence of the strength of belief structures on selected aspects of the decision-making process. To examine these issues, a business-acquisition decision scenario was studied in an experiment. Subjects played the role of a CEO of an electronics firm and were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of six potential acquisition candidates and to rate various aspects of the associated decision process. We presented half the subjects with information that the belief structure of their organization was extreme, agreed upon, and clear. The other half was presented with information that there was disagreement about the belief structure and that it was more ambiguous and less extreme. The results clearly showed that the decision process is different for people who were presented with an agreed-upon, extreme, and tightly constructed belief structure when compared to those who received information reflecting a weak and loosely constructed belief structure. A strong belief structure resulted in less positive evaluations, information requested, and money allocated to explore incompatible acquisition candidates (and vice versa for a highly compatible candidate) when compared to subjects using a weak belief structure. In addition, subjects in the strong-belief condition reported that their decision process would be characterized by less doubt, less time, less difficulty, and less conflict compared to subjects in the weak-belief structure condition. Implications for both decision theory and practical decision processes are discussed.     

Differential effects of instructions and consequences on human conditional discrimination performance

Two studies evaluated the differential behavioral effects of instructions and feedback in matching-to-sample procedures. In Experiment 1, 20 college students received true or false instructions and trial-by-trial or delayed feedback in three phases. In a fourth, final phase the instructions remained the same, but feedback changed from trial-by-trial to delayed, or from delayed to trial-by-trial. In Experiment 2, half of another 20 participants received true instructions during three phases, followed by false instruction in a fourth phase; the other half of the participants received false instructions during three phases, followed by true instructions in the fourth phase. Feedback sequences were as in Experiment 1. The results of both experiments revealed historical effects of instructions and feedback. Most participants demonstrated strong instructional control, overriding the control by contingencies. These results suggest that the present procedure offers optimal possibilities to make the differential effects of instructions and feedback on human behavior clearly identifiable when conditional discrimination tasks are used.     

THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK IN VOLUNTARY CONTROL OF BLOOD PRESSURE IN INSTRUCTED SUBJECTS1

Forty normal male volunteers were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions and instructed to raise and lower their systolic blood pressure. Subjects received either beat-to-beat feedback contingent on pressure changes, noncontingent beat-to-beat feedback, noncontingent feedback presented randomly with respect to the occurrence of each heart beat, or instructions alone. The order of increase and decrease trial blocks was counterbalanced across groups. Subjects receiving contingent feedback were monetarily rewarded for appropriate pressure changes. Subjects receiving noncontingent feedback received rewards and feedback equal to the mean received by the contingent group. Subjects in the instructions-only condition were also paid this bonus but were informed of their earnings only at the conclusion of the experiment. Results indicated that in the presence of instructions, feedback, whether contingent or noncontingent, added little to subjects' ability to control pressure during a single session. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

Two methods of reducing overconfidence

Prior research has suggested that most people are seriously overconfident in their answers to general knowledge questions. We attempted to reduce over-confidence in each of two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 half of the subjects answered five practice questions which appeared to be difficult. The remaining subjects answered practice problems which appeared to be easy but were actually just as difficult as the other group's practice questions. Within each of these two groups, half of the subjects received feedback on the accuracy of their answers to the practice questions, while the other half received no feedback. All four groups then answered 30 additional questions and indicated their confidence in these answers. The group which had received five apparently “easy” practice questions and then had been given feedback on the accuracy of their answers was underconfident on the final 30 questions. In Experiment 2 subjects who anticipated a group discussion of their answers to general knowledge questions took longer to answer the questions and expressed less overconfidence in their answers than did a control group.     

The Effect on Behavior of Being in a Control Group

This study examined how individuals react when they know they are missing an experimental treatment as a function of having been assigned to a control group. Subjects in one condition were informed that they were a control group and would miss receiving extra money for doing well on experimental tasks. Subjects in a second condition were informed that they would miss receiving electric shocks for doing poorly on the same tasks. In the third condition subjects were given no information about missed conditions. Subjects who believed they were missing the chance to receive extra money tended to do worse, while those who believed they were missing the shocks did better on the experimental tasks than did subjects unaware of any other condition. In addition, missing-reward subjects made more errors and did less work than did missing-punishment subjects. There were no differences in attitude towards the experiment as a function of experimental condition. Differences in task performance were discussed in terms of inequity theory (Adams, 1963), the evaluation of social programs, and Campbell's (Note 1) suggestion of "informed randomization.     

The power of the glance: Desire to see and be seen in cooperative and competitive situations

Heider (1958) has suggested that perception aides control and power over that which is perceived. Individuals' belief in this assumption was tested in an interpersonal situation. Subjects were given the expectation that they would be either cooperating or competing with another person in a game. Half of the subjects were lead to believe they would be interviewing their partner or opponent before the game, and half expected to be interviewed. Subjects who expected to interview the other could choose whether or not to see the other person through a one-way mirror. Subjects who expected to be interviewed could choose whether or not they wanted to be seen by the other. As predicted, the tendency to choose to allow perception was strong in all conditions except the condition in which subjects expected to compete with the other and might be seen by him.     

Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence after evidential discrediting

Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence were investigated in a debriefing paradigm by comparing the reactions of field-dependent and field-independent persons to the total evidential discrediting of their beliefs. Ss were exposed to apparent success or failure experiences via false performance feedback on a novel discrimination task. Following a debriefing procedure which revealed the bogus nature of the feedback. Ss estimated their actual performance and ability at the task. The results showed that belief persistence after evidential discrediting was greater for field dependents than for field independents. Explanations of the findings based on dissonance-reduction mechanism and disbelief in the discrediting were discussed, but the preferred interpretation of the results involved differences in cognitive re-structuring as a function of cognitive style.     

Attributions of causality and reactions to uncontrollable outcomes

The experiment tested the hypothesis that the stress experienced by a person who is unable to control aversive stimulation is not a function of lack of control per se, but of the attribution of causality that (s)he makes for failure to exert control. Subjects were given a problem-solving task, and were told that they could prevent aversive noise bursts by correctly solving the problems. Subjects then received false feedback that they had done either well or poorly on the problems. In addition, failing subjects received information that led them to attribute their performance either to their own lack of ability or to situational factors (task difficulty). Subjects who attributed their failure to their own incompetence felt considerably more stress than subjects who made situational attributions. In fact, the latter subjects experienced no more stress than subjects who were successful in controlling the stimulation. Surprisingly, subjects whose attributions for performance led them to feel personally incompetent performed better than the remaining subjects both on problems administered in the same situation, and on problems administered in a new and different situation. The implications of the results for future helplessness studies and for the learned helplessness model were discussed.     

The relationship between arousal and positive self-presentation

Investigated the validity of the hypothesis that subjects would experience arousal if they received information suggesting that they were presenting themselves to others in a negative manner. Twenty-seven subjects were randomly assigned to a control, evaluation apprehension, or negative feedback group. Subjects' heart-rate was continuously monitored as subjects' rated a series of photographs. Subjects in the evaluation apprehension group were given a cue as to how to present themselves positively whereas subjects in the negative feedback group were told, following their response to the 15th photograph, that their responses suggested maladjustment. Heart-rate change above a baseline measure revealed that an increase in heart-rate occurred only when subjects were informed that they were transmitting negative information. Such a finding supports a positive self-presentation explanation of subject motives in the psychological experiment.     

Maximization of biofeedback following cognitive stress preselection in generalized anxiety

53 subjects, who scored high on an anxiety check list, were evaluated for their responsiveness to relaxation exercises and biofeedback. Each subject was cognitively stressed prior to the training phase by imagining anxiety-provoking situations. Analysis was done on pertaining/posttraining anxiety scores and physiological parameters (galvanic skin response, differences in finger temperature, and frontalis muscle activity). Subjects given feedback corresponding to that physiological parameter which changed the most when stressed, maximized that feedback more than subjects receiving nonrelevant or no feedback. All groups reported significant reductions in anxiety symptoms. Follow-up analysis 15 mo. later showed 76% of the subjects were still symptom-free for anxiety regardless of type of feedback received.     

Ruminative thought and the deactivation of an intention

When do individuals manage to disengage from intentions, when do they fail to do so? It is suggested that a major reason for a failure to disengage lies in a postactional evaluation that goes astray. This is especially likely if the context does not provide cues for other activities. Cues from another activity waiting to be enacted should induce a pressure to terminate the evaluation of the performance of the past activity. They should focus this evaluation on an analysis of elements of the performance rather than self evaluation. If the focus is on self-evaluation, the susceptibility for ruminative thinking increases. In an experiment to test these assumptions, subjects (N=53) worked on an intelligence test task. Half the subjects received failure feedback on all six problems of this task. The other half received no failure feedback. Subjects’ thoughts during a waiting period following the intelligence test task were assessed. Before the beginning of the waiting period, half the subjects received cues for another test to follow. The data supported the hypothesis that cues for a new activity help subjects to stop thinking about the first task. Without cues, subjects were susceptible to falling into self-evaluation loops. In this case, subjects were unable to remove the past task from their minds until the end of the waiting period. With cues, the postactional evaluation became task-centered, promoting a disengagement from the past task.     

Body image variability: the influence of body-composition information and neuroticism on young women's body dissatisfaction

The current studies consider the effect of body size, body composition feedback, and the moderating influence of neuroticism (N) on three measures of body dissatisfaction (BD) in young women. In Study One, normal-sized subjects who were given false feedback indicating that they were either fatter or leaner than average showed heightened BD compared to groups who received either accurate or no feedback about body size. There was no evidence of a moderating effect of N. In Study Two, thinner-than-average subjects who received accurate body-size feedback showed greater satisfaction than a control group receiving no information. For heavier than average subjects, feedback only increased BD for those low on N. Although these results show mixed support for N as a moderator, they are the first to show an effect of body composition information on BD.     

Performance feedback improves the resolution of confidence judgments

A training experiment was carried out to examine whether feedback concerning the appropriateness of confidence judgments, given in terms of probability, improves calibration and resolution skills. Subjects participated in four separate sessions in which they responded to a series of general knowledge questions. Immediately before completing the questionnaires in Sessions 2, 3, and 4, half of the subjects were given detailed feedback concerning their confidence levels and accuracy rates. The remaining half were given no such feedback, and thus served as a control group. The resolution of confidence judgments improved across sessions to a greater extent for the group exposed to performance feedback than for the control group. Calibration of confidence judgments was uninfluenced by the performance feedback manipulation.