Pretense, imagination, and belief: the Single Attitude theory

A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are ??belief-like?? in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a ??DCA??) called ??imagination?? that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and desire. On the present ??Single Attitude?? account of imagination, propositional imagining just is a form of believing. The Single Attitude account is also distinguished from ??metarepresentational?? accounts of pretense, which hold that both pretending and recognizing pretense in others require one to have concepts of mental states. It is argued, to the contrary, that pretending and recognizing pretense require neither a DCA nor possession of mental state concepts.     

Representations in language processing: why comprehension is not “brute-causal”

I defend a claim, central to much work in psycholinguistics, that constructing mental representations of syntactic structures is a necessary step in language comprehension. Call such representations “mental phrase markers” (MPMs). Several theorists in psycholinguistics, AI, and philosophy have cast doubt on the usefulness of positing MPMs (Devitt, 2006; Rohde, 2002; Schank & Birnbaum, 1984). I examine their proposals and argue that they face major empirical and conceptual difficulties. My conclusions tell against the broader skepticism that persists in philosophy—e.g., in the embodied cognition literature (Hutto & Myin, 2012)—about the usefulness of positing mental representations in psychological models. Using my discussion of sentence parsing as a case study, I propose several conditions on an appropriate appeal to mental representations. Finally, I point out that the familiar arguments from productivity, systematicity, and inferential coherence suffice to establish that MPMs themselves have a constituent structure of a sort that resembles that of public-language sentences. This supports the idea that computational operations defined over MPMs are sensitive to their syntactic structure.     

Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

Radicalizing numerical cognition

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities (e.g. perception), there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities.

     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

Representations in Distributed Cognitive Tasks

In this article we propose a theoretical framework of distributed representations and a methodology of representational analysis for the study of distributed cognitive tasks—tasks that require the processing of information distributed across the internal mind and the external environment. The basic principle of distributed representations Is that the representational system of a distributed cognitive task is a set of internal and external representations, which together represent the abstract structure of the task. The basic strategy of representational analysis is to decompose the representation of a hierarchical task into its component levels so that the representational properties at each level can be independently examined. The theoretical framework and the methodology are used to analyze the hierarchical structure of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Based on this analysis, four experiments are designed to examine the representational properties of the Tower of Hanoi. Finally, the nature of external representations is discussed.     

Piktorielle Repräsentationen als unterbestimmte räumliche Modelle

Central for the discussion about the pros and cons of pictorial representations is the indeterminacy problem. Whereas propositional representations can be underdetermined, it is a widespread opinion that pictorial representations are completely determined and committed to details. In contrast to this view, which is held — for example by Dennett, Pylyshyn and Iorger — in the present paper a variable system of commitments is proposed: Users of pictorial representations have alternatives with respect to interpretations and commitments since there are implicit annotations to these representations. The annotations refer to axiomatized geometric systems, which — from a cognitive point of view — can be seen as systems of commitments.     

How Do Artificial Neural Networks Classify Musical Triads? A Case Study in Eluding Bonini's Paradox

How might artificial neural networks (ANNs) inform cognitive science? Often cognitive scientists use ANNs but do not examine their internal structures. In this paper, we use ANNs to explore how cognition might represent musical properties. We train ANNs to classify musical chords, and we interpret network structure to determine what representations ANNs discover and use. We find connection weights between input units and hidden units can be described using Fourier phase spaces, a representation studied in musical set theory. We find the total signal coming through these weighted connection weights is a measure of the similarity between two Fourier structures: the structure of the hidden unit's weights and the structure of the stimulus. This is surprising because neither of these Fourier structures is computed by the hidden unit. We then show how output units use such similarity measures to classify chords. However, we also find different types of units—units that use different activation functions—use this similarity measure very differently. This result, combined with other findings, indicates that while our networks are related to the Fourier analysis of musical sets, they do not perform Fourier analyses of the kind usually described in musical set theory. Our results show Fourier representations of music are not limited to musical set theory. Our results also suggest how cognitive psychologists might explore Fourier representations in musical cognition. Critically, such theoretical and empirical implications require researchers to understand how network structure converts stimuli into responses.     

Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics.

     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

Scaling-up skilled intentionality to linguistic thought

Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can a person’s thoughts about absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs also be accounted for in such terms? We argue such a question will seem pressing so long as one fails to appreciate how richly resourceful the human ecological niche is in terms of the affordances it provides. The explanatory work that is supposedly done by mental representations in a philosophical analysis of cognition, can instead be done by looking outside of the head to the environment structured by sociomaterial practices, and the affordances it makes available. Once one recognizes how much of the human ecological niche has become structured by activities of talking and writing, this should take away at least some of the motivation for understanding linguistic thinking in terms of content-bearing internal representations. We’ll argue that people can think about absent, abstract or counterfactual because of their skills for engaging with what we will call “enlanguaged affordances”. We make use of the phenomenological analysis of speech in Merleau-Ponty to show how the multiple affordances an individual is ready to engage with in a particular situation will typically include enlanguaged affordances.

     

Aligning Logical and Psychological Contributions to the Understanding of Human Reasoning

Modern logic is an abstract study of consequence rather than a mechanistic study of reasoning. This abstract view has much to offer psychological studies of the representations which implement human reasoning. This paper reviews recent results showing the abstract equivalence of all the main psychological competence models of syllogistic reasoning. Their apparently contrasting representations are computationally equivalent for the kind of data presented. The true empirical contrasts between theories lie in other details of implementation — in whether integrated representations are constructed and in the sequence of cases considered. These contrasts are independent of sentential, graphical or mental model representation.Logic is also a guide to representation requirements. Linear syllogism models are representable by sequences of tokens, whereas categorial syllogism models generally require attribute binding. However, one consequence of the present semantic analysis is that all categorial syllogism competence models converge on an algorithm which avoids representation of more than a single sequence.The paper goes on to consider what evidence could distinguish the representations implementing reasoning in working memory. The example of dual task paradigms is considered and some conceptual questions are raised about the identification of the modalities of working memory subsystems with linguistic and spatial representations. Carefully distinguishing memory medium from memory interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is the interpretation of the contents of memory which determines whether it holds spatial or linguistic information. It is argued that the critical dimension for understanding reasoning processes is the expressiveness of interpretation of representations.     

Carving up space at imaginary joints: can people mentally impose arbitrary spatial category boundaries?

Empirical attempts to understand connections between abstract cognition and sensori-motor processes have pointed toward an embodied view of cognition, where cognitive activity is strongly tied to sensori-motor activity. Here the authors test the ability of the cognitive system to impose structure on the world using a well-established phenomenon in spatial cognition--biases near spatial category boundaries. Results from 5 experiments suggest that participants were unable to mentally impose a spatial category boundary without perceptual support, even when explicitly instructed to do so. The authors conclude by considering the implications of these findings for abstraction within other domains of cognition.     

多元表征假设：概念表征机制的新观点

传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。     

抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

On representation,goals and cognition

In this paper we address three concepts that are much talked about in the animal robotics community. These concepts are (1) representations, (2) goals, and (3) minimal cognition. We want to distinguish between information as an objective commodity and representation as something which involves a user, i.e. a system which accesses and uses information. Information per se lies out there and exists independently of any system that makes use of it. Representations presuppose design and require a user. We want to distinguish different kinds of purposive behaviour, which involve different notions of goals, which themselves appear to be different from the point of view of the agent, the designer and the naive observer. We want to try to define cognition in terms of the minimal criteria that would be acceptable in view of our definitions of representations and goals. We recognise that full‐blown cognition may require ingredients other than those of minimal cognition.     

认知心理学的实用性转向

认知心理学实用性转向的根本涵义在于强调认知对于行动的效用与价值。传统认知心理学视认知系统的主要工作是怎样精确地 “表征” 世界，以便在大脑中建立一个外部世界的心理模型。实用性转向则强调认知系统的主要工作不是 “表征” 或 “反映”，而是指导有机体更有效地行动，认知是有 “效用” 的，它的效用就在于指导有机体适应和改造环境的活动。认知产生于行动、服务于行动，与行动水乳交融。这些理论观点来源于实用主义哲学。詹姆斯、杜威等人的经典实用主义对行动和效果的强调深刻影响了部分认知心理学家，促使他们放弃表征为中心的认知观而转向行动导向的认知观。在作者看来，由于这种转向强调了认知的 “效用”，因而对于认知心理学的健康发展将产生积极影响。     

The constructivist brain

How do the representations underlying cognitive skills emerge? It is becoming increasingly apparent that answering this question requires integration of neural, cognitive and computational perspectives. Results from this integrative approach resonate with Piaget's central constructivist themes, thus converging on a 'neural constructivist' approach to development, which itself rests on two major research developments. First, accumulating neural evidence for developmental plasticity makes nativist proposals increasingly untenable. Instead, the evidence suggests that cortical development involves the progressive elaboration of neural circuits in which experience-dependent neural growth mechanisms act alongside intrinsic developmental processes to construct the representations underlying mature skills. Second, new research involving constructivist neural networks is elucidating the dynamic interaction between environmentally derived neural activity and developmental mechanisms. Recent neurodevelopmental studies further accord with Piaget's themes, supporting the view of human cortical development as a protracted period of hierarchical-representation construction. Combining constructive growth algorithms with the hierarchical construction of cortical regions suggests that cortical development involves a cascade of increasingly complex representations. Thus, protracted cortical development, while occurring at the expense of increased vulnerability and parental investment, appears to be a powerful and flexible strategy for constructing the representations underlying cognition.     

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use.