The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.     

Information Processing Strategies in Riskless Preference Reversals: The Prominence Effect

A preference reversal occurs whenever an individual prefers one alternative to another in one response mode (e.g., choice) but shows the opposite preference order in another response mode (e.g., attractiveness ratings, matching). In previous studies of riskless multiattribute preferences the most common reversal pattern involves a prominence effect: The more important attribute has a greater influence in choices than in matching judgments. Previous research has suggested that the prominence effect can be accounted for by the strategy compatibility principle, which states that response tasks can evoke different decision strategies and these strategies determine the relative impact of the various attributes. This article attempts to establish the mediating role of decision processes in determining the occurrence and pattern of riskless preference reversals. In a process tracing experiment we replicate previous findings of a prominence effect in riskless two-attribute preferences. In addition, there are clear differences in process between response modes, and these differences are consistent with previous explanations of riskless preference reversals. Finally, we are able to predict subject level differences in choice preferences and choice versus matching reversals using measures of information search.     

Compatibility and the use of information processing strategies

When a prominent attribute looms larger in one response procedure than in another, a violation of procedure invariance occurs. A hypothesis based on compatibility between the structure of the input information and the required output was tested as an explanation of this phenomenon. It was also compared with other existing hypotheses in the field. The study had two aims: (1) to illustrate the prominence effect in a selection of preference tasks (choice, acceptance decisions, and preference ratings); (2) to demonstrate the processing differences in a matching procedure versus the selected preference tasks. Hence, verbal protocols were collected in both a matching task and in subsequent preference tasks. Silent control conditions were also employed. The structure compatibility hypothesis was confirmed in that a prominence effect obtained in the preference tasks was accompanied by a lower degree of attention to the attribute levels in these tasks. Furthermore, as predicted from the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was found that fewer comparisons between attribute levels were performed in the preference tasks than in the matching task. It was therefore concluded that both these processing differences may explain the occurrence of the prominence effects. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Response Mode Bias in the Formation of Preference: Boundary Conditions of the Prominence Effect

Prior research has discovered that the most prominent attribute has greater influence on the formation of preference in choice versus matching tasks. We extend the research on this phenomenon, which is known as the prominence effect (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), by examining its generalizability and by providing insight into the psychological processes involved. The effects of task characteristics (i.e., the number of attributes and alternatives) and the effects of subject characteristics (i.e., processing goal) on the prominence effect were examined. In the first experiment we found that the prominence effect reverses when the number of attributes increases from two to four. That is, the prominent attribute is given greater weight in matching tasks rather than in choice tasks. A second experiment demonstrated that processing goal does influence the robustness of the prominence effect. We found that the influence of the prominent attribute on the formation of preference did not differ in choice and matching tasks when subjects′ processing goal was to form an overall impression of each of the alternatives. A third experiment, which explored the interaction between the response mode and processing goal in the four attribute case replicated this finding. Findings from Experiment 1 were also extended so that the reverse prominence effect was found when subjects processing goal was to memorize the information. Implications of these results are discussed.     

With age comes wisdom: decision making in younger and older adults

In two experiments, younger and older adults performed decision-making tasks in which reward values available were either independent of or dependent on the previous sequence of choices made. The choice-independent task involved learning and exploiting the options that gave the highest rewards on each trial. In this task, the stability of the expected reward for each option was not influenced by the previous choices participants made. The choice-dependent task involved learning how each choice influenced future rewards for two options and making the best decisions based on that knowledge. Younger adults performed better when rewards were independent of choice, whereas older adults performed better when rewards were dependent on choice. These findings suggest a fundamental difference in the way in which younger adults and older adults approach decision-making situations. We discuss the results in the context of prominent decision-making theories and offer possible explanations based on neurobiological and behavioral changes associated with aging.     

Response modes, decision processes and decision outcomes

Until recently, research on riskless multiattribute decision making has generally ignored a distinction among response modes, i.e. the type of response required of the decision maker. This neglect persisted in spite of the results of early studies on preference reversals in gambles, which showed a distinct difference between the decision outcomes of choice and those of judgment. This article examines the effects of response modes in relation to two explanations proposed in recent response mode studies: the compatibility hypothesis and the response mode continuum. An experiment was conducted with a process tracing technique (information boards), in which 104 subjects made decisions on the quality of student papers submitted for publication. Four response modes were compared: selecting, rejecting, classifying, and ranking of alternatives. In addition, information load was manipulated. Response mode influenced both the decision process and the decision outcome. The results are interpreted as supporting the response mode continuum idea, but not the compatibility hypothesis. A classification of response modes is proposed.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

A generalized distance function for preferential choices

Many cognitive theories of judgement and decision making assume that choice options are evaluated relative to other available options. The extent to which the preference for one option is influenced by other available options will often depend on how similar the options are to each other, where similarity is assumed to be a decreasing function of the distance between options. We examine how the distance between preferential options that are described on multiple attributes can be determined. Previous distance functions do not take into account that attributes differ in their subjective importance, are limited to two attributes, or neglect the preferential relationship between the options. To measure the distance between preferential options it is necessary to take the subjective preferences of the decision maker into account. Accordingly, the multi‐attribute space that defines the relationship between options can be stretched or shrunk relative to the attention or importance that a person gives to different attributes describing the options. Here, we propose a generalized distance function for preferential choices that takes subjective attribute importance into account and allows for individual differences according to such subjective preferences. Using a hands‐on example, we illustrate the application of the function and compare it to previous distance measures. We conclude with a discussion of the suitability and limitations of the proposed distance function.     

Cognitive models of choice: comparing decision field theory to the proportional difference model

People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying these preferential choices, two prominent cognitive models, decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993 ) and the proportional difference model (PD; González-Vallejo, 2002 ), were rigorously tested against each other. In two consecutive experiments, the participants repeatedly had to choose between monetary gambles. The first experiment provided the reference to estimate the models' free parameters. From these estimations, new gamble pairs were generated for the second experiment such that the two models made maximally divergent predictions. In the first experiment, both models explained the data equally well. However, in the second generalization experiment, the participants' choices were much closer to the predictions of DFT. The results indicate that the stochastic process assumed by DFT, in which evidence in favor of or against each option accumulates over time, described people's choice behavior better than the trade-offs between proportional differences assumed by PD.     

When choices give in to temptations: Explaining the disagreement among importance measures

Respondents’ overt statements of relative importance rarely correspond to weights derived from a regression analysis of their decisions. This paper conjectures that differential effects of high-level goals on importance beliefs and choices can explain these discrepancies. It is argued that the goal to justify decisions influences importance beliefs more than choices whereas the goal to assess preferences accurately affects choices more than importance beliefs. It is also argued that differential effects of high-level goals on importance statements and choices vary as a function of whether decision-maker controls the information flow and the extent of prior knowledge and experiences with choice options. These predictions were tested within the context of a contraceptive decision-making task. Choices among contraceptives made the justification goal salient to subjects by requiring tradeoffs between attributes that are either considered rational or tempting in making such decisions (e.g., health risks vs. pleasure/convenience). As predicted, subjects assigned larger importance weights to rational attributes in their subjective evaluations than in their choices whereas the impact of tempting attributes was stronger for choices than for subjective importance evaluations. Moreover, these observed discrepancies between importance measures were reduced in favor of rational attributes when subjects controlled the information flow and could not access their prior experiences. Overall, the results suggest that, although tempting attributes affect choices, decision makers appear to be unwilling to acknowledge the impact of tempting attributes on their decisions in judging attribute importance.     

Infants Detect Patterns of Choices Despite Counter Evidence,but Timing of Inconsistency Matters

Understanding others’ preference for a relational category of objects (e.g., prefer darker colored shirts) can be challenging for young children, as it involves comparison of choice options within and across exemplars. Adding to the challenge is occasional inconsistency in choices made by others. Here the authors examined whether 14-month-olds could detect an experimenter’s preference for taller objects when they observed choices that were somewhat inconsistent. Infants watched four familiarization events involving different object pairs: The experimenter chose the taller of two objects thrice and the shorter object once—the inconsistent choice was presented at different time points of familiarization. The infants detected the experimenter’s preference for taller objects only when they had observed three consistent choices consecutively from the beginning. This finding is in line with relational learning, specifically the significant role of initial data in the extraction of relational commonality. It also connects to the hierarchical Bayesian models of rational learning: Inconsistency can be discounted when the initial data allow learners to distinguish a highly probable hypothesis.     

Multialternative context effects obtained using an inference task

When decision-makers are faced with a choice among multiple options that have several attributes, preferences are often influenced by how the options are related to one another. For example, consumer preferences can be influenced, and even reversed, by the context defined by available products. This article discusses three standard context effects found in the preferential-choice literature: the attraction, similarity, and compromise effects. While decision theorists have attempted to explain these three effects under single modeling accounts, it has never before been demonstrated that these effects can be obtained within the same experimental paradigm. A set of experiments is described that demonstrate the three effects in an inference task. The paradigm is completely novel, as no previous experimental work has examined the standard context effects in inference. The experiments also add to evidence that the effects are not confined to choices among options with affective value, such as consumer products. The experimental results provide evidence that these effects might be a general property of human choice behavior and bring into question explanations of the effects that are based on the concept of loss-aversion asymmetry.     

Dorsal anterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex have inverse roles in both foraging and economic choice

Recent research has highlighted a distinction between sequential foraging choices and traditional economic choices between simultaneously presented options. This was partly motivated by observations in Kolling, Behrens, Mars, and Rushworth, Science, 336(6077), 95–98 (2012) (hereafter, KBMR) that these choice types are subserved by different circuits, with dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) preferentially involved in foraging and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) preferentially involved in economic choice. To support this account, KBMR used fMRI to scan human subjects making either a foraging choice (between exploiting a current offer or swapping for potentially better rewards) or an economic choice (between two reward-probability pairs). This study found that dACC better tracked values pertaining to foraging, whereas vmPFC better tracked values pertaining to economic choice. We recently showed that dACC’s role in these foraging choices is better described by the difficulty of choosing than by foraging value, when correcting for choice biases and testing a sufficiently broad set of foraging values (Shenhav, Straccia, Cohen, & Botvinick Nature Neuroscience, 17(9), 1249–1254, 2014). Here, we extend these findings in 3 ways. First, we replicate our original finding with a larger sample and a task modified to address remaining methodological gaps between our previous experiments and that of KBMR. Second, we show that dACC activity is best accounted for by choice difficulty alone (rather than in combination with foraging value) during both foraging and economic choices. Third, we show that patterns of vmPFC activity, inverted relative to dACC, also suggest a common function across both choice types. Overall, we conclude that both regions are similarly engaged by foraging-like and economic choice.     

Effect propensity

In a choice between two options, decision makers can often be roughly divided into three groups: those who strongly prefer the first option, those who strongly prefer the second option, and those whose choices are most sensitive to the specific conditions (Switchers). In any reference state, such as the experimental control, Switchers’ choices are unlikely to be exactly equally divided between the options, which potentially creates a ceiling effect among those most susceptible to influence by the particular conditions or experimental manipulations. The limited growth potential of the option favored by Switchers in the reference state can produce “effect propensity,” whereby any condition or manipulation applied to the reference state is more likely to increase the share of the other option. We test this proposition in a series of studies in the context of choices between safe and risky options and between lower-price/quality and higher-price/quality options. The results indicate that a large majority of conceptually unrelated manipulations tend to increase the choice share of risky and higher-price/quality options. This effect propensity can be reversed when the risky and higher-price/quality options are the status quo alternatives or asymmetrically dominating in the reference state. Alternative explanations for effect propensity are examined. We discuss the implications of effect propensity for the interpretation of research findings, the selection of controls, and theory tests.     

Evidence that judgments of learning are causally related to study choice

Three experiments investigated whether study choice was directly related to judgments of learning (JOLs) by examining people’s choices in cases in which JOLs were dissociated from recall. In Experiment 1, items were given either three repetitions or one repetition on Trial 1. Items given three repetitions received one on Trial 2, and those given one repetition received three on Trial 2—equating performance at the end of Trial 2, but yielding different immediate Trial 2 JOLs. Study choice followed the “illusory” JOLs. A delayed JOL condition in Experiment 2 did not show this JOL bias and neither did study choice. Finally, using a paradigm (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) in which similar JOLs are given to forward and backward associative pairs, despite much worse performance on the backward pairs, study choice again followed the mistaken JOLs. We concluded that JOLs—what people believe they know—directly influence people’s study choices.     

Negative-based prominence: the role of negative features in matching and choice

Previous research related to the prominence effect (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) has mainly focused on the causes and boundary conditions of the effect. This article investigates the determinants of prominence and explores a negative-based prominence effect in which the negative attribute becomes the prominent one. Using a matching-choice procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the negative dimension became the prominent one under two different cover stories, suggesting that the negative feature looms larger in choice than in matching. The robustness of negative-based prominence was further demonstrated in a direct choice task without matching (Experiment 3) and was shown to be resistant to the impact of added positive features (Experiment 4). Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 distinguish between two determinants of prominence: intrinsic prominence caused by attribute importance and negative-based prominence caused by negative attribute values. By lowering the values on the positive dimension and enhancing the values on the negative dimension, one can reverse the prominence effect. The results suggest that, compared to a matching task, choice leads to enhanced sensitivity to negative features. The relations between negative characteristics of an attribute and other factors that determine prominence are discussed in the final section.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.     

Preference for negative emotions

This research demonstrates that preference for emotions sometimes cannot be equated with a positive-negative valence dimension. Participants were asked to make choices between pairs of affect-inducing options opposite in valence but equal in activation. The results showed that in absence of contextual cues or situational constraints, choices followed a pleasure-maximizing principle. However, when information was provided about a context cueing appropriateness of certain emotions over others, a preference reversal was observed so that negative emotions were preferred over positive emotions. These results are discussed in relation to current theories of pleasure-maximizing choice and behavior.