"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

Working Together but in Opposition: An Examination of the "Good-Cop/Bad-Cop" Negotiating Team Tactic

Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar “good cop/bad cop” distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role differentiation designed to enhance a team's success at the bargaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model (Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators' decision tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a person's initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini, 1984) and supports the model's usefulness as an approximate representation of negotiator cognition.     

Nonstrategic Delay in Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

The practice of bargaining is strongly affected by procedural features. Procedures matter because they affect each party's bargaining power and, consequently, the negotiation outcome. The extent and nature of delay between offers and counteroffers are an example of procedural specification in bargaining. Bargaining models consider delay only as a strategic screening device to build a reputation for toughness, the logic being that the party with the smaller cost of delay obtains all the gain from trade. In reality, however, delay between offers is common because of imperfect player control over the duration of the offers for reasons other than strategic, namely, transactional, timing, and interruptions. This delay, in essence, limits the number of rounds of offers and counteroffers in a fixed-period negotiation compared to when there is no delay and, in turn, is expected to affect negotiation outcome. The objective of the current research is to experimentally explore the implications of nonstrategic delay between offers and counteroffers in a finite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game with incomplete information but without discounting. Specifically, this study examines the effect of nonstrategic time delay during negotiation on (1) the effect of risk preference on negotiator effectiveness, (2) deadline effect, (3) first-mover advantage, and (4) conflict between the negotiating partners. As hypothesized, the results show that delay dilutes the effect of negotiators’ risk preference, eliminates the deadline effect, negates the first-mover advantage, and enhances dyadic conflict.     

Are some negotiators better than others? Individual differences in bargaining outcomes

The authors address the long-standing mystery of stable individual differences in negotiation performance, on which intuition and conventional wisdom have clashed with inconsistent empirical findings. The present study used the Social Relations Model to examine individual differences directly via consistency in performance across multiple negotiations and to disentangle the roles of both parties within these inherently dyadic interactions. Individual differences explained a substantial 46% of objective performance and 19% of subjective performance in a mixed-motive bargaining exercise. Previous work may have understated the influence of individual differences because conventional research designs require specific traits to be identified and measured. Exploratory analyses of a battery of traits revealed few reliable associations with consistent individual differences in objective performance-except for positive beliefs about negotiation, positive affect, and concern for one's outcome, each of which predicted better performance. Findings suggest that the field has large untapped potential to explain substantial individual differences. Limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications are discussed.     

Conflict and Negotiation: Trends and Emerging Issues

Theory and research on dyadic conflict is traced from its historical roots in social exchange theory and interpersonal gaming to current concerns with the cognitive and tactical aspects of multiple issue bargaining and conflict in close personal relationships. This review examines the contributions of research with the Prisoner's Dilemma game, explicit two-person bargaining paradigms, and threat games, as well as work on representative negotiation and third-party intervention in conflict. The interplay of structural and motivational variables in the understanding of conflict and negotiation is emphasized. Criticisms of the typical theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of conflict are noted, especially the lack of general theory and the questionable representativeness of typical laboratory paradigms. Finally, recent research in integrative bargaining and entrapment is examined for insights concerning the active role the parties themselves play in the structuring of their conflict, and the implications of such a role for cognitive as well as motivational factors in conflict resolution.     

The Price Is Right—Or Is It? A Reference Point Model of Two-Party Price Negotiations

This paper develops a social cognitive, reference point model of two-party price negotiations. The theoretical focus is on the role that reference points play as a means of calibration in the individual negotiator's decision processes and as a means of social influence in bargaining. Three studies are presented which examine how reference points based on personal preferences and budget constraints (i.e., reservation values) are combined with reference points based on available market information to affect outcomes. These studies support the interpretation that in captive transactions, contextual cues determine the extent to which market information versus reservation values influence outcomes. Certain contextual cues trigger perceptions of low versus high price variance, which in turn, lead negotiators to weight market information more or less heavily in internal processing and bargaining. When perceptions of low price variance are present, market information influences outcomes more than private reservation values. When perceptions of high price variance are present, reservation values tend to be more dominant in determining outcomes.     

Affective Influences on Judgments and Behavior in Organizations: An Information Processing Perspective

This article reviews and integrates recent research in experimental social psychology and organizational behavior demonstrating the pervasive influence that affective states or moods have on judgments, decision making, and behavior in organizations. An information processing theory, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) is described that can account for many of the empirical findings and also provides a promising theoretical base for future research in this area. The article reviews a range of experimental and applied studies consistent with the predictions of this model, demonstrating the role of information processing strategies in moderating affective influences on organizational behavior. Specifically, we discuss the influence of affect on such work-related behaviors as worker motivation, creativity and performance, interpersonal judgments and communication, performance appraisal judgments and selection interviews, organizational spontaneity, employee flexibility and helpfulness, absenteeism, and bargaining and negotiation behaviors. The implications of the information processing approach for understanding the influence of affect on organizational behaviors are discussed, and we argue for the greater integration of affect into contemporary theorizing and research in organizational settings.     

Language Use and Coalition Formation in Multiparty Negotiations

The alignment of bargaining positions is crucial to a successful negotiation. Prior research has shown that similarity in language use is indicative of the conceptual alignment of interlocutors. We use latent semantic analysis to explore how the similarity of language use between negotiating parties develops over the course of a three‐party negotiation. Results show that parties that reach an agreement show a gradual increase in language similarity over the course of the negotiation. Furthermore, reaching the most financially efficient outcome is dependent on similarity in language use between the parties that have the most to gain from such an outcome.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Get angry, get out: The interpersonal effects of anger communication in multiparty negotiation

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation.     

Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance

In 2 studies the authors show that the quality of deals negotiators reach are significantly influenced by their previous bargaining experiences. As predicted, negotiators who reached an impasse on a prior negotiation were more likely either to impasse in their next negotiation or to reach deals of low joint value compared to those who had reached an initial agreement. Notably, the impact of past performance on subsequent deals was just as strong for negotiators who changed partners on the 2nd occasion. Results highlight the role of bargaining histories as significant predictors of negotiation behavior. Moreover, they suggest that, at least in some cases, negotiations should be conceptualized as interrelated exchanges rather than separable incidents.     

Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument

Argument is often taken to deal with conflicting opinion or belief, while negotiation deals with conflicting goals or interests. It is widely accepted that argument ought to comply with some principles or norms. On the other hand, negotiation and bargaining involve concession exchange and tactical use of power, which may be contrasted with attempts to convince others through argument. However, there are cases where it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between bargaining and argument: notably cases where negotiators persuade others through `framing' and cases where the aims of negotiation have to do with public assertion and acceptance. Those cases suggest that the distinction between negotiation and argument is not absolute, and this raises the question whether rules about what is acceptable in argument and rules about what is acceptable in negotiation can all be viewed as instances of more general common norms about human interaction.     

Shaping cooperation behavior: The role of accessibility experiences and uncertainty

The present research investigates the influence on cooperative behavior of accessibility experiences associated with the retrieval of fairness‐relevant information from memory. We argue that the decision whether to cooperate in negotiations depends not only on information about the appropriateness of the negotiation procedure, but also on the experience of how difficult or easy it is to come up with this information. Supporting this hypothesis, it is shown that in the context of a bargaining experiment, participants' experiences of ease or difficulty in retrieving unfair aspects of the respective negotiation procedure strongly influence their cooperation behavior. In addition, we hypothesize and empirically substantiate that the influence of accessibility experiences on cooperation behavior occurs particularly in situations of certainty salience. Implications for future research on cooperation and on accessibility experiences are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

认知、动机、情感因素对谈判行为的影响

谈判,指两方或多方就利益不同而进行的协商,是解决选择冲突最常见的方式之一。认知、动机及情感因素,影响谈判者的信息处理与判断推理过程。谈判中它们既可能导致决策偏差,也可能促进决策质量。长期以来着眼于认知过程的谈判研究在社会心理学中占主流地位。近年,动机与情感因素对谈判行为的影响受到越来越多的关注。从社会认知的冷（cold：认知）、热（hot：动机、情感）两个角度,系统解析相关研究近年来的进展与成果,可以为揭示认知、动机、情感间的互动如何影响谈判行为打下基础     

Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: An Exploration of Stereotype Regeneration

We examine how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. We extend recent work demonstrating that stereotype activation leads to a male advantage and a complementary female disadvantage at the bargaining table (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). In the present investigation, we regenerate the stereotype of effective negotiators by associating stereotypically feminine skills with negotiation success. In Experiment 1, women performed better in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to successful negotiating, but not when gender-neutral traits were linked to negotiation success. Gender differences were mediated by the performance expectations and goals set by negotiators. In Experiment 2, we regenerated the stereotype of effective negotiators by linking stereotypically masculine or feminine traits with negotiation ineffectiveness. Women outperformed men in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically masculine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance, but men outperformed women when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance. Implications for stereotype threat theory and negotiations are discussed.     

Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-analysis

Although there have been numerous investigations into the relationship between gender and bargaining competitiveness over the past several decades, few conclusions have been reached. The results of 62 research reports on the relationship between gender and competitive behavior in dyadic bargaining interactions were examined by meta-analytic review. The average weighted effect size indicated that women appear to behave more cooperatively in negotiations than men, but this difference is slight. Results suggest that constraints on negotiators (imposed by abstract bargaining paradigms and restrictions on communication) lessen gender differences in negotiation behavior. Women were significantly more competitive than men when competing against an opponent who pursued a “tit-for-tat” bargaining strategy.     

Integrative bargaining in a competitive market

The behavioral decision theory literature was used to identify the determinants of negotiation success in an integrative bargaining, free-market exercise. This study provides a novel methodology for studying negotiation. Specifically, buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in negotiations with as many competitors as possible in a fixed time period. The results suggest that integrative bargaining behavior increases and the market converges toward a Nash equilibrium as negotiators gain experience. In addition, the results suggest that (1) positively framed negotiators (“What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) complete more transactions than negatively framed negotiators (“What will be my expenses on this transaction?”), (2) negotiators who are given moderately difficult profit constraints in order to be allowed to complete a transaction achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators without such constraints, and (3) both framing and the existence of constraints affect the total profitability of the negotiator.     

ANALYZING NEGOTIATION TACTICS: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEGOTIATION INTERACT SYSTEM

This research has three main objectives: to formulate a set of negotiation tactics based on a qualitative examination of bargaining interaction and prior research, to develop an interact system to code negotiation interaction based on these tactics, and to test the extent to which relative tactical use could be used to determine winners and losers in the negotiation. Three types of tactics were developed: attacking, defending, and regressing. The tactics were further divided into those that cued or constrained the next utterance, and those that responded to the prior utterance. Thus, each utterance was coded twice—as a response and as a cue. The structure of relative tactical use significantly predicted the outcome of experimental negotiations. In addition, it was demonstrated that when the structure of relative tactical use was displayed visually, the researcher could gain a clear picture of the exchange process in the negotiation.