COGNET: A national network for cognitive science

A planning committee funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation has agreed in principle on a draft proposal for the establishment of a national network of computers for research in cognitive science. The main ideas of the proposal are discussed in this paper.     

When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective

Since the 1990s medical technology has afforded exciting possibilities for studying the brain. Together with knowledge accrued through psychology and psychiatry, it has set the stage for pioneering research and stimulated disciplines such as Social Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science of Religion, Cognitive Anthropology, and Cognitive Archaeology. Another discipline has arisen, Neurotheology, which is interested in the brain and religious experience. Early proponents such as d'Aquili and Newberg had a religious agenda in their work. Others, such as members of Transcendental Meditation, have used experimental and brain studies to legitimate religious agendas. Experiential shamanists have embarked on a similar legitimation process. The differences between science and therapy and spirituality have been blurred or denied. Neurotheological attempts to discover areas of the brain responsible for religious experiences have led to untenable results. The fact that such research has passed the peer review process of leading psychological, psychiatric, and neurological journals is perhaps more indicative of the pervasiveness of religiosity throughout American society than of objective brain science. This essay argues that neurotheology is an example of the struggle between confessional and critical approaches to the study of religion. The main difference is that the battlefield of this struggle is the brain.     

A Web site in cognitive science

A Web site (http://web2-pc.uncc.edu/cogsci) has been established to support an interdisciplinary course in cognitive science. The modules include introductory reading material, interactive exercises/virtual laboratory, and pointers to existing material on the Web. Our approach to using the Web in support of instruction differs from distance learning initiatives because it is centered on an instructor and classroom experiences. The Web-based modules are used to supplement classroom lectures and provide an interdisciplinary perspective.     

A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science

‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, (i) if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to its physical enablers yet still metaphysically dependent on them, then Heideggerian cognitive science will either leave that metaphysical dependence an unexplained instance of supervenience, or ground it in speculation about brute metaphysical laws that have an unclear relationship to the ontology of the sciences. On the other hand, (ii) if Heideggerian cognitive science is not directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, but is instead merely aimed at the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological psychology, then it doesn’t fully address the ontological implications of phenomenology’s transcendental approach, and so, while it might succeed in explaining the realization of psychological phenomena scientifically, the existence of subjectivity will remain inexplicable based on the ontology of the sciences. Neither strategy succeeds in ‘naturalizing phenomenology’: (i) either rejects scientific naturalism, or makes its requirements trivial, while (ii) either rejects the transcendental dimension of phenomenology, or fails to address its ontological implications.     

A lexicon of attention: from cognitive science to phenomenology

This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness.     

Explaining delusions: a cognitive perspective

There is now considerable evidence for reasoning, attention, metacognition and attribution biases in delusional patients. Recently, these findings have been incorporated into a number of cognitive models that aim to explain delusion formation, maintenance and content. Although delusions are commonly conceptualized as beliefs, not all models make reference to models of normal belief formation. This review considers those models that explain delusions as a breakdown of normal belief formation (belief-positive models), approaches that explain the pathology only (belief-negative models) and approaches that view delusions as one end of a distribution of anomalous mental phenomena (the continuum view). A cognitive theory that includes the 'pragmatic pathology' of delusions will be able to address both the phenomenology and the treatment of delusion-related distress.     

A cognitive developmental perspective on counselling adolescents

Although developmental perspectives on counselling are increasingly popular, difficulties inherent in these perspectives impede their actual use in practice. In this paper, individual counselling is situated within a cognitive developmental (Piagetian) framework. Its major constructs — structure and function, assimilation and accommodation, and equilibration — can profitably be applied to the counselling of adolescents. The implications of these constructs for use by counsellors are presented in the light of the traditional responsive and initiative conditions required of the helping relationship. Thus, a perspective on actual counselling intervention founded on a major direction in developmental psychology is provided.     

Online webcam-based eye tracking in cognitive science: A first look

Online experimentation is emerging in many areas of cognitive psychology as a viable alternative or supplement to classical in-lab experimentation. While performance- and reaction-time-based paradigms are covered in recent studies, one instrument of cognitive psychology has not received much attention up to now: eye tracking. In this study, we used JavaScript-based eye tracking algorithms recently made available by Papoutsaki et al. (International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016) together with consumer-grade webcams to investigate the potential of online eye tracking to benefit from the common advantages of online data conduction. We compared three in-lab conducted tasks (fixation, pursuit, and free viewing) with online-acquired data to analyze the spatial precision in the first two, and replicability of well-known gazing patterns in the third task. Our results indicate that in-lab data exhibit an offset of about 172 px (15% of screen size, 3.94° visual angle) in the fixation task, while online data is slightly less accurate (18% of screen size, 207 px), and shows higher variance. The same results were found for the pursuit task with a constant offset during the stimulus movement (211 px in-lab, 216 px online). In the free-viewing task, we were able to replicate the high attention attribution to eyes (28.25%) compared to other key regions like the nose (9.71%) and mouth (4.00%). Overall, we found web technology-based eye tracking to be suitable for all three tasks and are confident that the required hard- and software will be improved continuously for even more sophisticated experimental paradigms in all of cognitive psychology.     

Reconsidering qualitative and quantitative research approaches: A cognitive developmental perspective

Rather than embracing the notion that contextualism requires purely qualitative methodologies, Westerman and Yanchar argue that there is a place for quantification in post-positivist research. Both authors provide compelling arguments for this position. From our cognitive developmental perspective, we see this as a move toward a new level of integration in psychology. Whereas reactive shifts between positivist quantification and radical contextualism exemplify the kind of pendulum swing we see in individual development immediately before the emergence of a new developmental level, the moves suggested by Westerman and Yanchar are in the direction of a qualitative shift—a new level of differentiation and integration. We argue that the arguments put forward by Westerman and Yanchar do not quite achieve consolidation at this new level, because they remain embedded in a post-positivist contextualism that demands an a priori rejection of psychological universals and strong forms of quantification. In our view, consolidation at this new level requires a shift to a problem-focused methodological pluralism that assimilates a wide range of methodological approaches, critiques them, and adapts them in light of the problems researchers seek to solve.     

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.     

Commercial cognitive/memory systems: A case study

Commercial cognitive/memory systems are products that enhance human cognition and memory. Using one of our own product developments as a case study, we describe three phases of commercial systems development and evaluation. We review published examples of Phase One research, report two quasi-experimental investigations that are representative of successful Phase Two research, and provide some measures used to assess the product's success in the early stages of Phase Three. Finally, we discuss the use of theories and findings from basic research in cognitive psychology to develop products of value to individuals and society.     

Mild cognitive impairment: a neuropsychological perspective

Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) is a clinical diagnosis in which deficits in cognitive function are evident but not of sufficient severity to warrant a diagnosis of dementia. For the majority of patients, MCI represents a transitional state between normal aging and mild dementia, usually Alzheimer's disease. Multiple subtypes of MCI are now recognized. In addition to presentations featuring memory impairment, symptoms in other cognitive domains (eg, executive function, language, visuospatial) have been identified. Neuropsychological testing can be extremely useful in making the MCI diagnosis and tracking the evolution of cognitive symptoms over time. A comprehensive test battery includes measures of baseline intellectual ability, attention, executive function, memory, language, visuospatial skills, and mood. Informant-based measures of neuropsychiatric symptoms, behaviors, and competency in instrumental activity are also included. Careful assessment can identify subtle deficits that may otherwise elude detection, particularly in individuals of superior baseline intellectual ability. As we move closer to disease-modifying therapy for Alzheimer's disease, early identification becomes critical for identifying patients who have an opportunity to benefit from treatment.     

Multiple systems: A new approach to cognitive theory

Abstract

Cognitive processes turn out to be both more innate and more culturally based than we used to think. On the one hand, ecological and interpersonal perception are innately prepared, available in infancy; on the other, mental development depends critically on social support. Taken together with the emerging multiple/modular structure of the brain, these discoveries demand a new kind of cognitive theory: an ecologically grounded, developmental account of distinct systems in interaction. Three such systems, primarily perceptual in function, are described here: (1) direct perception/action establishes an immediate non-representational sense of self and environment that grounds all other cognition; (2) interpersonal perception/reactivity produces species-specific patterns of social interaction; (3) recognition/representation identifies and classifies what is perceived. These systems are distinguished by neurological as well as psychological criteria: the neuroanatomical “where/what” distinction, for example, reflects the difference between direct perception and recognition. Cooperation among these three systems, which begins near the end of the first year, is basic to language and other forms of cultural learning.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.     

The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective

Cognitive science is a child of the 1950s, the product of a time when psychology, anthropology and linguistics were redefining themselves and computer science and neuroscience as disciplines were coming into existence. Psychology could not participate in the cognitive revolution until it had freed itself from behaviorism, thus restoring cognition to scientific respectability. By then, it was becoming clear in several disciplines that the solution to some of their problems depended crucially on solving problems traditionally allocated to other disciplines. Collaboration was called for: this is a personal account of how it came about.