Training and Stroop-like interference: evidence for a continuum of automaticity

Three experiments varied the extent of practice in an analog of the Stroop color-work task. Each experiment involved four phases: (a) baseline naming of four familiar colors, (b) training in consistently naming four novel shapes by using the names of the same four colors, (c) naming the colors when they appeared in the form of the shapes, and (d) naming the shapes when they appeared in color. In Experiment 1, with up to 2 hr of training in shape naming, colors were named much faster than shapes. Interference was observed only in Phase 4. In Experiment 2, with 5 hr of training, shape naming sped up, but was still slower than color naming. Nevertheless, there was symmetrical interference in Phases 3 and 4, and this persisted 3 months later without further training. Experiment 3 replicated this pattern and then extended practice to 20 hr, by which time shape and color naming were equally rapid. After 20 hr, interference appeared only in Phase 3, reversing the original asymmetry. The overall pattern is inconsistent with a simple speed of processing account of interference. The alternative idea of a continuum of automaticity--a direct consequence of training--remains plausible, and the implications of this perspective are considered.     

Preoccupied minds feel less control: Sense of agency is modulated by cognitive load

People have little difficulty distinguishing effects they cause and those they do not. An important question is what underlies this sense of agency. A prevailing idea is that the sense of agency arises from a comparison between a predictive representation of the effect (of a given action) and the actual effect that occurs, with a clear match between the two producing a strong sense of agency. Although there is general agreement on this comparison process, one important theoretical issue that has yet to be fully determined is whether these computations are consciously performed. Here, we studied this issue by requiring participants to perform a simple judgment of agency task under conditions of different concurrent working memory load. Working memory operations are known to tax conscious cognitive resources. We found that agency judgments were moderated by working memory load, with lower agency ratings being observed in the high load condition, suggesting that the sense of agency is dependent on the availability of conscious cognitive resources. An examination of the time-course of this load effect suggests that it is the construction of the mental representation of the predicted effect which is particularly dependent on said resources.     

Adding fear to conflict: A general purpose cognitive control network is modulated by trait anxiety

Studies of cognitive control show that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are involved in the detection and resolution of cognitive conflict. However, the neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying emotional interference effects are less consistent. We used fMRI during emotional and nonemotional versions of a facial Stroop task to investigate the effects of emotional stimuli on cognitive control. In the full group there was limited evidence that different prefrontal circuits manage conflict arising from emotional and nonemotional distractors. However, individual differences in trait anxiety affected both behavioral performance and neural activity during the emotional task. Relative to low-anxiety (LA) subjects, high-anxiety (HA) subjects showed greater amygdala activity to task-relevant emotional information and impaired performance and greater conflict-related activity in the dACC when emotional content was task-irrelevant. Only LA subjects activated rostral ACC during the emotional task. This is consistent with cognitive models of individual differences that hypothesize deficient control of task-irrelevant emotional information in HA subjects. Additional behavioral and fMRI results from this study may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals .org/content/supplemental.     

Interference control in adult ADHD: No evidence for interference control deficits if response speed is controlled by delta plots

Several theoretical accounts assume that interference control deficits belong to the core symptoms of adult ADHD. However, findings of increased interference effects in adult ADHD patients compared with healthy adults may be confounded with the simultaneous finding of generally slower responses in the patient group. The current study compared the magnitude of the interference effect in the Stroop task between a group of adults with ADHD and a healthy adult control group in a procedure that accounted for differences in overall response speed by using delta plots. The amount of interference did not differ between patient and control group at comparable reaction time levels. These results challenge the conclusions of the previous studies, in that they indicate that interference control is not impaired in adult ADHD.     

Lexical selection is not by competition: a reinterpretation of semantic interference and facilitation effects in the picture-word interference paradigm

The dominant view in the field of lexical access in speech production maintains that selection of a word becomes more difficult as the levels of activation of nontarget words increase--selection by competition. The authors tested this prediction in two sets of experiments. First, the authors show that participants are faster to name pictures of objects (e.g., "bed") in the context of semantically related verb distractors (e.g., sleep) compared with unrelated verb distractors (e.g., shoot). In the second set of experiments, the authors show that target naming latencies (e.g., "horse") are, if anything, faster for within--category semantically close distractor words (e.g., zebra) than for within--category semantically far distractor words (e.g., whale). In the context of previous research, these data ground a new empirical generalization: As distractor words become semantically closer to the target concepts--all else being equal--target naming is facilitated. This fact means that lexical selection does not involve competition, and consequently, that the semantic interference effect does not reflect a lexical level process. This conclusion has important implications for models of lexical access and interpretations of Stroop-like interference effects.     

Choice behavior on discrete trials: a demonstration of the occurrence of a response strategy

Three pairs of pigeons were trained to peck at two keys presented simultaneoulsy in discrete trials with intertrial intervals of 1, 22, or 120 sec. Left-key responses incremented the probability of reinforcement for the first right-key response and, conversely, right-key responses incremented the probability of reinforcement for the first left-key response. In terms of relative response rates, it was found that all birds' choices were described by a momentary maximizing strategy, but this fact was not reflected in the detailed sequential statistics for birds with the longer (22 or 120 sec) intertrial intervals. It was hypothesized that choice behavior, in general, may be accurately described by a momentary maximizing sequence, but that prior failures to demonstrate this were due to “errors” in executing the momentary maximizing sequence. These misappropriated responses, which are hypothesized to be randomly distributed among the responses defining the momentary maximizing sequence, caused successive choices to appear to be statistically independent when, in fact, they were not.     

Context-sensitive adjustments of cognitive control: conflict-adaptation effects are modulated by processing demands of the ongoing task

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control in response to interference from irrelevant stimulus attributes have repeatedly been shown. The purpose of the current research was to investigate how these control adjustments are modulated by the processing demands of a primary task. To this end, the authors combined a primary task (a number comparison task: classifying digits as smaller or larger than 5) with a Simon task. Control adjustments were observed in the form of typical sequential modulations of the Simon effect. In addition, the authors found sequential modulations of the numerical distance effect and an interaction of both effects. Results suggest that not only response conflict due to interference from task-irrelevant features but also processing demands of task-relevant features determine the level of control adjustment in the subsequent trial.     

Top-down and bottom-up attentional control: On the nature of interference from a salient distractor

In two experiments using spatial probes, we measured the temporal and spatial interactions between top-down control of attention and bottom-up interference from a salient distractor in visual search. The subjects searched for a square among circles, ignoring color. Probe response times showed that a color singleton distractor could draw attention to its location in the early stage of visual processing (before a 100-msec stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA]), but only when the color singleton distractor was located far from the target. Apparently the bottom-up activation of the singleton distractor’s location is affected early on by local interactions with nearby stimulus locations. Moreover, probe results showed that a singleton distractor did not receive attention after extended practice. These results suggest that top-down control of attention is possible at an early stage of visual processing. In the long-SOA condition (150-msec SOA), spatial attention selected the target location over distractor locations, and this tendency occurred with or without extended practice.     

The attentional blink is governed by a temporary loss of control

Identification of the second of two brief targets is impaired at intertarget lags of less than about 500 msec. We compared two accounts of thisattentional blink (AB) by manipulating the number of digit distractors—and hence the lag—inserted among three letter targets in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of digit distractors. On the resource-depletion hypothesis, longer lags provide more time for processing the leading target, thus releasing resources for the trailing target. On the temporary-loss-of-control (TLC) hypothesis, intervening distractors disrupt the current attentional set, producing a trailing-target deficit. Identification accuracy for trailing targets was unimpaired not only at lag 1 (conventional lag 1 sparing) but also at later lags, if preceded by another target. The results supported the TLC hypothesis but not the resource-depletion hypothesis. We conclude that the AB is caused by a disruption in attentional set when a distractor is presented while the central executive is busy processing a leading target.     

Top-down and bottom-up attentional control: on the nature of interference from a salient distractor.

In two experiments using spatial probes, we measured the temporal and spatial interactions between top-down control of attention and bottom-up interference from a salient distractor in visual search. The subjects searched for a square among circles, ignoring color. Probe response times showed that a color singleton distractor could draw attention to its location in the early stage of visual processing (before a 100-msec stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA]), but only when the color singleton distractor was located far from the target. Apparently the bottom-up activation of the singleton distractor's location is affected early on by local interactions with nearby stimulus locations. Moreover, probe results showed that a singleton distractor did not receive attention after extended practice. These results suggest that top-down control of attention is possible at an early stage of visual processing. In the long-SOA condition (150-msec SOA), spatial attention selected the target location over distractor locations, and this tendency occurred with or without extended practice.     

The turple effect is modulated by base word frequency: Implications for models of lexical and semantic access

People who are asked to classify whether words presented visually belong to the category of animals respond to nonwords derived from animal names more slowly than they do to nonwords derived from nonanimal names. This is known as the turple effect (Forster, 2006; Forster & Hector, 2002). In the present article, we show that the turple effect is modulated by the frequency of the animal names from which the nonwords are derived: In particular, we show that nonwords derived from high-frequency animal names are rejected faster than those derived from low-frequency animal names. We discuss the implications of this result for two approaches to lexical and semantic access modeling. 2008 Psychonomic Society, Inc.     

When more is less: a counterintuitive effect of distractor frequency in the picture-word interference paradigm

Pictures were shown with superimposed word distractors of high and low frequency. Low-frequency distractors produced greater interference on picture naming than did high-frequency distractors. This distractor frequency effect was not affected by manipulations that facilitated or hindered distractor recognition. Interference was reduced for distractors that were read aloud several times prior to being shown in the picture-naming task. Together these findings suggest that the distractor frequency effect has its locus at some stage of lexical access for production. Other findings further constrain hypotheses about which level of speech production is involved in the effect. The distractor frequency effect has implications for models of lexical processing in speaking as well as for accounts of picture-word interference and the frequency effect.     

The role of interference control in working memory: a study with children at risk of ADHD

The study aimed to test whether the impairment in a working memory task observed in children at risk of ADHD was due to a lack of control of interfering information being processed whilst carrying out the memory task. Two groups of children at risk of ADHD with or without a learning disability (reading impairment) were compared to a control group in a working memory task. Activation of irrelevant items was tested with a lexical decision task presented immediately after the final recall in about half of the trials. Results showed a poor working memory performance in children at risk of ADHD and reading disability associated with a larger activation of irrelevant information than that of control children. Results indicated that the to-be-excluded and interfering items are still highly accessible to working memory in children that fail the working memory task. The examination of working memory and interference control of children at risk of ADHD with a learning disability revealed a counterintuitive picture of children with poor working memory showing better recall/activation of processed information. This picture is consistent with a view of working memory related to an efficient inhibitory control that influences cognitive functioning.     

Representational momentum in dynamic facial expressions is modulated by the level of expressed pain: Amplitude and direction effects

Humans have developed a specific capacity to rapidly perceive and anticipate other people’s facial expressions so as to get an immediate impression of their emotional state of mind. We carried out two experiments to examine the perceptual and memory dynamics of facial expressions of pain. In the first experiment, we investigated how people estimate other people’s levels of pain based on the perception of various dynamic facial expressions; these differ both in terms of the amount and intensity of activated action units. A second experiment used a representational momentum (RM) paradigm to study the emotional anticipation (memory bias) elicited by the same facial expressions of pain studied in Experiment 1. Our results highlighted the relationship between the level of perceived pain (in Experiment 1) and the direction and magnitude of memory bias (in Experiment 2): When perceived pain increases, the memory bias tends to be reduced (if positive) and ultimately becomes negative. Dynamic facial expressions of pain may reenact an “immediate perceptual history” in the perceiver before leading to an emotional anticipation of the agent’s upcoming state. Thus, a subtle facial expression of pain (i.e., a low contraction around the eyes) that leads to a significant positive anticipation can be considered an adaptive process—one through which we can swiftly and involuntarily detect other people’s pain.     

Low perceived control as a risk factor for episodic memory: the mediational role of anxiety and task interference

Low perceived control is considered a risk factor for poor cognitive functioning, but the mechanisms are unclear. The goal of the present study was to analyze anxiety and task interference as sequential mediators of the association between control beliefs and episodic memory. Cognitive-specific control beliefs were assessed prior to the lab session. State anxiety was assessed in the lab, followed by a word list recall task. The frequency of intrusive thoughts during the memory task was reported by the participants as a measure of task interference after the completion of the cognitive testing. The results for 152 participants from the ages of 22 to 84 years supported the predicted three-path mediation model. Lower levels of control beliefs were associated with higher state anxiety, which in turn affected episodic memory performance by increasing the likelihood of task interference, with age, sex, and verbal abilities as covariates. The implications of the results for developing interventions to improve memory performance are considered.     

Quasi-reinforcement: control of responding by a percentage-reinforcement schedule

When a variable-interval schedule of reinforcement was segmented into small fixed-interval components, with reinforcements following some components and brief blackouts following the others, rate of responding doubled and a positively accelerated pattern within each component was obtained. Presented according to this percentage reinforcement paradigm, the blackouts approximated the functions of a food reinforcer. These effects occurred only when the behavior sequence required to produce reinforcement was identical to that required to produce blackout. The quasi-reinforcing effects of these blackout stimuli suggest that a neutral stimulus need not occasion or accompany a primary reinforcer to acquire reinforcing properties.     

Visual search for size-defined target objects is modulated by the Ebbinghaus apparent-size illusion: facilitatory and inhibitory effects of the context objects

Five experiments were carried out to investigate under which conditions the apparent size of objects is computed and exploited optimally in visual search for size-defined targets. Observers searched for a target test circle that was retinally larger than the distractor test circles, with both types of circles surrounded by context circles modulating the apparent size of the test circles (Ebbinghaus illusion). RTs were the faster the better test circles could be differentiated from the context circles, ie with smaller numbers of context circles, larger distances, and higher lightness (or colour) contrast between test and context circles. Apparent-size modulation had a strong influence on search RTs, resulting in faster RTs with smaller, and slower RTs with larger, context circles. A model assuming overall facilitatory effects of the apparent-size modulation and interference effects arising from decreasing test-context circle discriminability can explain the present results.     

The primacy of primary control is a human universal: a reply to Gould's (1999) critique of the life-span theory of control.

This reply to S. J. Gould's (1999) critique of J. Heckhausen and R. Schulz's (1995) life-span theory of control addresses four issues: (1) the universal claim that primary control holds functional primacy over secondary control, (2) the status of secondary control as a confederate to primary control, (3) empirical evidence and paradigms for investigating universality and cultural variations, and (4) the capacity of the human control system to manage both gains and losses in control throughout the life span and aging-related decline in particular. Theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence from evolutionary, comparative, developmental, and cultural psychology are presented to support the authors' view that primary control striving holds functional primacy throughout the life span and across cultural and historical settings. Recommendations for empirically investigating the variations in the way primary control striving is expressed in different cultures are outlined.