Review of Evnine,Simon J., Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood,New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. viii + 176, £32.50 (cloth)

The different occurrences of a word in a sentence cannot be identified with the one word type, nor with its many tokens. What then are occurrences of a word? How can one type occur more than once in another type? Is the conception of ‘structural universals’ that leads to these questions incoherent, as Lewis maintained? I argue against the answer Wetzel suggested, which identifies sentences with functions from numbers to expressions, and propose instead that occurrences of one type in another are subtypes with different relative positions in the whole. Types have subtypes as well as tokens. Occurrences in non-symmetrical types like sequences are individuated by their relative positions in the type. Occurrences in a symmetrical whole have different positions but stand in the same relations to the other components. They are numerically different subtypes that do not differ from each other qualitatively.     

Sara Protasi: The Philosophy of Envy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Hardback (ISBN 978-1-316-51917-2), £75. 260 pp

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Envy is a complex and intriguing emotion that has received too little philosophical attention in recent years. Sara Protasi has come to remedy that gap with an...