共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Robert Schroer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):329-341
The experience of looking at a tilted penny involves a “phenomenological doubleness” in that it simultaneously seems to be
of something circular and of something elliptical. In this paper, I investigate the phenomenological doubleness of this experience
by comparing it to another case of phenomenological doubleness––the phenomenological doubleness of seeing an object in a painting.
I begin by pointing out some striking similarities between the phenomenological characters of these two experiences. I then
argue that these phenomenological characters have a common explanation. More specifically, I argue that the psychological
mechanism that explains the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing an object in a painting can be extended
to also explain the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing a tilted penny.
相似文献
Robert SchroerEmail: |
2.
Kious BM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):213-234
There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a
practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral
transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive,
suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
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Brent M. KiousEmail: |
3.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
4.
5.
Thomas Sattig 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):179-195
Four-dimensionalists offer a unified picture of various puzzles about identity over time, including the puzzle of fission,
the puzzle of constitution and the puzzle of undetached parts. What unifies the four-dimensionalist approaches to these puzzles
is the possibility of temporal overlap—the possibility for distinct continuants to share a common temporal part, or stage.
I claim that the unified picture is inconsistent, if there are informative criteria of identity over time. I will show that
while temporal overlap is compatible with four-dimensionalist criteria of diachronic composition, temporal overlap is incompatible
with any four-dimensionalist criteria of diachronic identity.
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Thomas SattigEmail: |
6.
A. D. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):197-212
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
相似文献
A. D. SmithEmail: |
7.
Sins of the American Empire and Pastoral Responses 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Ryan LaMothe 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(4):459-472
This article describes attributes of the American Empire and addresses characteristic sins—pride, sloth, greed, and idolatry—that
are necessary for maintaining the domestic and foreign policies aimed toward expanding the economic and military power of
the United States. In particular, I claim that theo-political narratives and rituals extant in U.S. culture are internalized,
structuring our collective psyches and shaping both our wills and actions. Pride, sloth, greed, and idolatry signify the distortion
of will, giving rise to actions that result in harm and alienation. To address this reality, several pastoral strategies are
depicted.
相似文献
Ryan LaMotheEmail: |
8.
Dan Arnold 《Argumentation》2008,22(1):135-147
This paper examines some Indian philosophical arguments that are understandable as transcendental arguments—i.e., arguments
whose conclusions cannot be denied without self-contradiction, insofar as the truth of the claim in question is a condition
of the possibility even of any such denial. This raises the question of what kind of self-contradiction is involved—e.g.,
pragmatic self-contradiction, or the kind that goes with logical necessity. It is suggested that these arguments involve something like practical reason—indeed, that they just are arguments against the primacy of “theoretical reason.” This characterization illuminates a characteristically
Indic appeal to ordinary language.
相似文献
Dan ArnoldEmail: |
9.
Mark Heller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):83-101
The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim
that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism
has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once
we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore
encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the Donkey Problem’s conventionalism and deflate the debate between 3Dists
and 4Dists.
相似文献
Mark HellerEmail: |
10.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(2):195-216
This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal
recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally
agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience
consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of
experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological
concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’
can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience.
相似文献
Matthew RatcliffeEmail: |
11.
Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Sokolowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):167-175
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does
this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are
more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology
to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary
and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato
and Kant.
相似文献
Robert SokolowskiEmail: |
12.
Number sense and quantifier interpretation 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We consider connections between number sense—the ability to judge number—and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers.
In particular, we present empirical evidence concerning the neuroanatomical underpinnings of number sense and quantifier interpretation.
We show, further, that impairment of number sense in patients can result in the impairment of the ability to interpret sentences
containing quantifiers. This result demonstrates that number sense supports some aspects of the language faculty.
相似文献
Robin ClarkEmail: |
13.
Beata Stawarska 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(2):217-236
I engage phenomenological and empirical perspectives on dialogical relations in infancy in a mutually enlightening and challenging
relation. On the one hand, the empirical contributions provide evidence for the primacy of first-to-second person interrelatedness
in human sociality, as opposed to the claim of primary syncretism heralded by Merleau-Ponty, and also in distinction from
the ego-alter ego model routinely used in phenomenology. On the other hand, phenomenological considerations regarding the
lived affective experience of dialogical relatedness enrich and render intelligible the psychological accounts of dialogue
in terms of observable behavior. Phenomenological and empirical perspectives on dialogical relatedness thus combine to offer
an affectively charged and conversationally patterned notion of primary intersubjectivity in the I-you mode.
相似文献
Beata StawarskaEmail: |
14.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
15.
Bill Brewer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):87-97
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind
in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy
replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational
content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly
consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting
mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.
相似文献
Bill BrewerEmail: |
16.
Patrick Toner 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):281-297
In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts.
The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms.
It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances,
this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
相似文献
Patrick TonerEmail: |
17.
Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
相似文献
Richard FumertonEmail: |
18.
In this paper, we examine Shaun Gallagher’s project of “naturalizing” phenomenology with the cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology (FLP). While we think it is a productive proposal, we argue that Gallagher does not employ genetic phenomenological methods in his execution of FLP. We show that without such methods, FLP’s attempt to locate neurological
correlates of conscious experience is not yet adequate. We demonstrate this by analyzing Gallagher’s critique of cognitive
neuropsychologist Christopher Frith’s functional explanation of schizophrenic symptoms. In “constraining” Gallagher’s FLP
program, we discuss what genetic phenomenological method is and why FLP ought to embrace it. We also indicate what types of
structures a genetically modified FLP will consider, and how such an approach would affect the manner in which potential neurological correlates of conscious
experience are conceptually understood and experimentally investigated.
相似文献
Kyle Powys WhyteEmail: |
19.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295
20.
Chris R. Schlauch 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(1):61-80
This essay considers how we “create meaning” in the interplay of “felt sense” and “symbols,” and examines the direct and immediate interplay between some common everyday experiences and a series of concepts from psychoanalytic perspectives to reveal how this interplay has affinities with religion. Psychoanalysis and religion are overlapping projects. Psychoanalytic symbolizing of experience facilitates our knowing features of religion not previously known, as well as knowing features previously known, in new ways.
相似文献
Chris R. SchlauchEmail: |