Effects of display luminance, stimulus meaningfulness, and probe duration on visible and schematic persistence

Partial report performance is conceived of as consisting of two independent sources of information: visible persistence and schematic persistence. Following the work of Di Lollo and Dixon (1988), these two sources of information were separated experimentally by varying interstimulus interval and stimulus onset asynchrony independently. In the present experiment we asked whether visible persistence and schematic persistence would be affected by display luminance, stimulus meaningfulness, or probe duration. The results were fit accurately by an extension of the Di Lollo and Dixon independent-decay model in which display luminance affected visible persistence but stimulus meaningfulness and probe duration affected neither form of persistence directly.     

The contribution of visual persistence to the perceived duration of brief targets

Two experiments were conducted to examine the role of sensory persistence on tasks of perceived duration employing very brief visual stimuli. Using a standard temporal judgment task, the first experiment replicated both the “size effect” and “empty-filled” illusion reported by previous investigators. However, entirely comparable results were also found with a probematching task, which theoretically assesses the degree of persistence exhibited by a stimulus. The second experiment examined the effect of target luminance on perceived duration. Consistent with a sensory persistence interpretation, judgments of duration increased with increasing luminance. The results from the two experiments were discussed in terms of varying degrees of retinal persistence produced by different stimuli. This view was contrasted with currently dominant interpretations that postulate changes in perceived duration to reflect different information-processing requirements across stimulus conditions.     

Duration of visible persistence in relation to stimulus complexity.

Visible persistence refers to the phenomenal impression that a stimulus is still present after its offset. A dispute exists whether visible persistence is due to temporal sluggishness in the visual pathway (neural hypothesis) or whether it is a byproduct of information-extraction processes under cognitive control (process hypothesis). This was investigated by manipulating stimulus complexity in five temporal integration experiments and one recognition memory experiment. According to the process hypothesis, complex stimuli should persist longer than simple stimuli because they require more information extraction. This prediction was not confirmed; in all six experiments, complexity was found to have no reliable effect on the duration of visible persistence. By contrast, and in accordance with earlier findings, complexity was shown to have a significant effect on a short-lived, nonvisible form of memory known as schematic persistenc. This pattern of results supports two major conclusions: First, that the effects of complexity reported in earlier research were probably on schematic--rather than visible--persistence; and second, that visible persistence must be regarded as a residual neural trace of an extinguished stimulus, rather than as a byproduct of information-extraction processes.     

Iconic memory and visible persistence

There are three senses in which a visual stimulus may be said to persist psychologically for some time after its physical offset. First, neural activity in the visual system evoked by the stimulus may continue after stimulus offset (“neural persistence”). Second, the stimulus may continue to be visible for some time after its offset (“visible persistence”). Finally, information about visual properties of the stimulus may continue to be available to an observer for some time after stimulus offset (“informational persistence”). These three forms of visual persistence are widely assumed to reflect a single underlying process: a decaying visual trace that (1) consists of afteractivity in the visual system, (2) is visible, and (3) is the source of visual information in experiments on decaying visual memory. It is argued here that this assumption is incorrect. Studies of visible persistence are reviewed; seven different techniques that have been used for investigating visible persistence are identified, and it is pointed out that numerous studies using a variety of techniques have demonstrated two fundamental properties of visible persistence: theinverse duration effect (the longer a stimulus lasts, the shorter is its persistence after stimulus offset) and theinverse intensity effect (the more intense the stimulus, the briefer its persistence). Only when stimuli are so intense as to produce afterimages do these two effects fail to occur. Work on neural persistences is briefly reviewed; such persistences exist at the photoreceptor level and at various stages in the visual pathways. It is proposed that visible persistence depends upon both of these types of neural persistence; furthermore, there must be an additional neural locus, since a purely stereoscopic (and hence cortical) form of visible persistence exists. It is argued that informational persistence is defined by the use of the partial report methods introduced by Averbach and Coriell (1961) and Sperling (1960), and the term “iconic memory” is used to describe this form of persistence. Several studies of the effects of stimulus duration and stimulus intensity upon the duration of iconic memory have been carried out. Their results demonstrate that the duration of iconic memory is not inversely related to stimulus duration or stimulus intensity. It follows that informational persistence or iconic memory cannot be identified with visible persistence, since they have fundamentally different properties. One implication of this claim that one cannot investigate iconic memory by tasks that require the subject to make phenomenological judgments about the duration of a visual display. In other words, the so-called “direct methods” for studying iconic memory do not provide information about iconic memory. Another implication is that iconic memory is not intimately tied to processes going on in the visual system (as visible persistence is); provided a stimulus is adequately legible, its physical parameters have little influence upon its iconic memory. The paper concludes by pointing out that there exists an alternative to the usual view of iconic memory as a precategorical sensory buffer. According to this alternative, iconic memory is post-categorical, occurring subsequent to stimulus identification. Here, stimulus identification is considered to be a rapid automatic process which does not require buffer storage, but which provides no information about episodic properties of a visual stimulus. Information about these physical stimulus properties must, in some way, be temporarily attached to a representation of the stimulus in semantic memory; and it is this temporarily attached physical information which constitutes iconic memory.     

Duration of visible persistence in relation to stimulus complexity

Visible persistence refers to the phenomenal impression that a stimulus is still present after its offset. A dispute exists whether visible persistence is due to temporal sluggishness in the visual pathway (neural hypothesis) or whether it is a byproduct of information-extraction processes under cognitive control (process hypothesis). This was investigated by manipulating stimulus complexity in five temporal integration experiments and one recognition memory experiment. According to the process hypothesis, complex stimuli should persist longer than simple stimuli because they require more information extraction. This prediction was not confirmed; in all six experiments, complexity was found to have no reliable effect on the duration of visible persistence. By contrast, and in accordance with earlier findings, complexity was shown to have a significant effect on a short-lived, nonvisible form of memory known as schematic persistence. This pattern of results supports two major conclusions: First, that the effects of complexity reported in earlier research were probably on schematic—rather than visible—persistence; and second, that visible persistence must be regarded as a residual neural trace of an extinguished stimulus, rather than as a byproduct of information-extraction processes.     

Continuous measurement of visible persistence

In the synchrony judgment paradigm, observers judge whether a click precedes or follows the onset of a light flash and, on other trials, whether or not a click precedes light termination. The interclick interval defines the duration of visible persistence. An elaboration of this method consists of two phases: In Phase 1, the luminance of a reference stimulus is psychophysically matched to the peak brightness of the test flash. Five luminance values between .1 and 1.0 of the reference stimulus are used subsequently. In Phase 2, a random one of the five reference stimuli, a test flash, and a click are presented; the observer judges whether the click occurred before or after the brightness of test flash reached the reference value (on onset trials) or decayed below it (on termination trials). This method was validated on 3 subjects with test stimuli whose luminance rises and decays slowly in time, and then was used to trace out the precise subjective rise and decay (temporal brightness response function) of brief flashes.     

Direct measures of short-term visual storage

Two experiments, involving seven conditions, explored the use of direct measures of visual persistence. In each, the subject was asked to judge if an intermittent stimulus appeared perceptually continuous, or whether it completely faded before the next presentation occurred. The first experiment showed that visual persistence was set at approximately 250 msec. for a recycling presentation of a circle in a tachistoscope; in another task employing a moving opaque slit passing back and forth over a circle, persistence times averaged 50 msec. longer. Reducing luminance by 2 log units increased persistence only slightly, though removing the adapting field increased it by over 100 msec. The second experiment, using the repeating circle, varied the duration of the stimulus, and compared monoptic with dichoptic presentations. Visual persistence was found to be independent of stimulus duration over a range of 4 to 200 msec., where all durations were above recognition threshold for the stimulus. Persistence was unaffected whether the stimulus was repeatedly presented in the same eye or alternated between eyes, strongly suggesting that the storage is central. Finally, a re-analysis of Dodwell and Engel's paper on stereopsis suggests that their effects can be adequately explained by visual persistence of the asynchronous stereo pairs, rather than a more complex fusion model. All of these results strongly support the use of visual persistence as a direct measure of short-term visual storage.     

The psychophysics of iconic storage

Some simple models of iconic storage, based on the persisting responses of photoreceptors, were tested in two experiments. Substantial changes in such physical parameters as adapting luminance, stimulus luminance, and stimulus contrast produced little or no change in the duration of partial-report performance. This is at odds with most receptoral models. It seems unlikely that any model based on receptoral persistence can accommodate the results, thus forcing one to locate the icon beyond the receptors and probably beyond the retina as a whole.     

A rapid effect of stimulus quality on the durations of individual fixations during reading

We developed a variant of the single fixation replacement paradigm (Yang & McConkie, 2001, 2004) in order to examine the effect of stimulus quality on fixation duration during reading. Subjects' eye movements were monitored while they read passages of text for comprehension. During critical fixations, equal changes to the luminance of the background produced either an increase (Up-Contrast) or a decrease (Down-Contrast) of the contrast of the text. The durations of critical fixations were found to be lengthened in the Down-Contrast but not the Up-Contrast condition. Ex-Gaussian modelling of the distributions of fixation durations showed that the reduction in stimulus quality lengthened the majority of fixations, and a survival analysis estimated the onset of this effect to be approximately 141 ms following fixation onset. Because the stimulus quality of the text during critical fixations could not be predicted or parafoveally previewed prior to foveation, the present effect can be attributed to an immediate effect of stimulus quality on fixation duration.     

Cortical dynamics of visual persistence and temporal integration

In a temporal integration experiment, subjects must integrate two visual stimuli, presented at separate times, to perform an identification task. Many researchers have assumed that the persistence of the leading stimulus determines the ability to integrate the leading and trailing stimuli. However, recent studies of temporal integration have challenged that hypothesis by demonstrating that several theories of persistence are incompatible with data on temporal integration. This paper shows that an account of visual persistence given by a neural network model of preattentive vision, called the boundary contour system, explains data on temporal integration. Computer simulations of the model explain why temporal integration becomes more difficult when the display elements are separated by longer interstimulus intervals or are of longer duration or of higher luminance, or are spatially closer together. The model suggests that different mechanisms underlie the inverse duration effects for leading and for trailing elements. The model further predicts interactions of spatial separation, duration, and luminance of the trailing display.     

An analysis of U-shaped metacontrast

Using a brightness-discrimination task similar to that employed by Bernstein, Proctor, Proctor, and Schurman (1973), masking functions were obtained in two experiments. In Experiment I, test stimulus (TS) and mask stimulus (MS) energies were held constant but luminance and duration were varied reciprocally. The obtained masking functions, plotted as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), were of an essentially identical U shape. This suggests that (a) SOA is a more suitable measure of delay than interstimulus interval, and (b) Bloch’s law holds for the requisite discrimination. In Experiment II, TS luminance and MS luminance were varied independently. This was to see whether the MS served as a frame of reference at short SOA, as suggested previously (Bernstein et al, 1973). The results were that this was, in fact, the case and that the transition from comparative to absolute judgment strategies as SOA increases is a major contributor to U-shaped masking functions.     

Information persistence in the integration of partial cues for object recognition

A great many studies have shown that the perceptual effects of very brief visual stimuli can persist beyond the duration of the stimulus itself. These effects include sustained perception of the stimulus even though it is no longer present and the integration of information across an interstimulus interval. These two forms of sustained activity can be characterized as visible persistence and information persistence. Iconic memory protocols and a number of discrimination tasks have demonstrated the existence of information persistence that can last up to several hundred milliseconds, but there is little evidence that the cues needed for identification of objects can be transferred across intervals in this range. In the present experiments, a minimal transient discrete cue protocol was used to demonstrate that shape cues, these being provided by subsets of dots that mark the outer boundary of nameable objects, can be integrated over several hundred milliseconds and that the duration is a function of ambient room illumination. The experiments further evaluated whether this information persistence is mediated by visible persistence. Although both perceptual effects have durations that are an inverse function of room illumination, the ability to integrate partial shape cues was not determined by the duration of visible persistence.     

Information-acquisition rate, short-term memory, and cognitive equivalence: reply to Sperling

The effect of stimulus luminance on visual information acquisition depends on the duration for which the stimulus is displayed. In this reply, three duration regions are described, and the accounts of luminance effects provided by Loftus (1985d) and Sperling (1986) are compared for each region. Of particular interest is why different combinations of duration and luminance produce equal performance levels. Two possibilities are considered: first, equal performance may be a logical consequence of equivalent cognitive states and second, equal performance may be a coincidental consequence of different cognitive states. I suggest that equal performance following relatively short durations results from equivalent cognitive states, whereas equal performance following longer durations results from different cognitive states.     

Spatial-frequency-dependent visible persistence and specific reading disability

Visible persistence duration for sine-wave gratings was measured in 9-year-old normal and specific-reading-disabled children. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of stimulus duration on visible persistence. The results demonstrated a Reading Group X Spatial Frequency interaction with disabled readers showing a smaller increase in persistence duration with increasing spatial frequency than controls. This interaction was greatest with stimulus durations longer than 80 msec. In Experiments 2a and 2b persistence was measured across a range of contrasts from .1 to .5. The stimulus durations employed were 100 msec in Experiment 2a and 300 msec in Experiment 2b. In both experiments, increasing contrast decreased persistence duration at 2 and 12 cycles per degree (c/deg) for the control group. In the specific-reading-disabled group, however, contrast had little effect on the persistence of 2-c/deg gratings in either experiment. In Experiment 2a the persistence of the 12-c/deg grating decreased with increasing contrast for both groups. In Experiment 2b contrast had significantly less effect on persistence duration in the specific-reading-disabled group, however, contrast had little effect on the persistence of 2-c/deg ratings in either experiment. In Experiment 2b contrast had significantly less effect on persistence duration in the specific-reading-disabled group than in the control group at 12 c/deg. Consequently, contrast had less effect on persistence in specific-reading-disabled children than in normal readers, especially at durations longer than the "critical duration" for each spatial frequency. Experiment 3 extended this finding to gratings with spatial frequencies of 4 and 8 c/deg. These results indicate a difference between normal and specific-reading-disabled children in cortical visible persistence. Two scores of visual processing were derived from the above experiments. On these scores the reading-disabled children were divided into Visual Disabled Readers (approximately 70%--eight subjects) and Nonvisual Disabled Readers (approximately 30%--four subjects). The percentages of disabled readers in each category remained constant when the sample size was increased to 61 normal and disabled readers.     

Picture perception: effects of luminance on available information and information-extraction rate

In each of four experiments, complex visual stimuli--pictures and digit arrays--were remembered better when shown at high luminance than when shown at low luminance. Why does this occur? Two possibilities were considered: first that lowering luminance reduces the amount of available information in the stimulus, and second that lowering luminance reduces the rate at which the information is extracted from the stimulus. Evidence was found for both possibilities. When stimuli were presented at durations short enough to permit only a single eye fixation, luminance affected only the rate at which information is extracted: decreasing luminance by a factor of 100 caused information to be extracted more slowly by a factor that ranged, over experiments, from 1.4 to 2.0. When pictures were presented at durations long enough to permit multiple fixations, however, luminance affected the total amount of extractable information. In a fifth experiment, converging evidence was sought for the proposition that within the first eye fixation on a picture, luminance affects the rate of information extraction. If this proposition is correct and, in addition, the first eye fixation lasts until some criterion amount of information is extracted, then fixation duration should increase with decreasing luminance. This prediction was confirmed.     

The role of transparency in perceptual grouping and pattern recognition.

The shortest stimulus exposure time for which transparency can be seen was examined. In the first experiment, overlapping digits were presented for 120 ms and the luminance in the overlapping regions was varied. Subjects reported, in separate blocks of trials, either the apparent transparency of the digits or the identity of the digits. When the luminance was set so that one set of digits appeared to be seen through the other, recognition of the digits was high. When the luminance in the overlapping regions did not produce impressions of transparency, digit recognition was low. In the second experiment, digit identification at several stimulus durations was compared between stimuli that had luminance that was valid for transparency and stimuli that had invalid luminance. Performance was found to be higher in the valid luminance condition than in the invalid condition after as little as 60 ms exposure duration. This result suggests that the impression of transparency requires only relatively short exposure durations.     

Effects of attention manipulation on judgments of duration and of intensity in the visual modality

The “attentional model” of time estimation assumes that temporal judgments depend on the amount of attention allocated to the temporal processor (the timer). One of the main predictions of this model is that an interval will be judged shorter when attention is not allocated to the temporal parameters of the task. Previous studies combining temporal and nontemporal tasks (dual-task method) have suggested that the time spent processing the target duration might be a key factor: The less time devoted by the subject to the temporal task, the shorter the judged duration. In the two experiments presented here, subjects were asked to judge both the duration of a visual stimulus and an increment in intensity occurring at any time during this stimulus. In the second experiment, trials without intensity increments were added. The main result is that the judged duration was shorter when the increment occurred later in the stimulus or did not occur. In those cases, subjects had been expecting increment occurrence during most part of the stimulus and thus had focused for a shorter time on stimulus duration. We propose that attention shifts related to expectancy and to detection of the increment reduce subjective duration.     

The latency of response in relation to Bloch’s law at threshold’

Bloch’s law failed to hold for latencies of response in a threshold experiment where frequencies ofresponse did, nevertheless, obey the law. Dark-adapted Ss were instructed to respond as soon as they detected flashes of various luminances and durations. The frequency of response increased with increases in stimulus energy (luminance times duration); it was constant when energy was constant. The latency of response, measured from stimulus onset. varied inversely with energy; it also varied inversely with the luminance of flashes that were constant in energy. The results were consistent with data from earlier threshold and simple reaction time experiments.     

Increment thresholds against pulsed and steady backgrounds

Cornsweet and Pinsker reported that ΔL/L was constant at all values of L for briefly pulsed fields (ΔL was the luminance increment required for discriminating which of two nearby flashed fields was brighter). We obtain the same result when the subject must detect which of two briefly (4-msec) flashed backgrounds contains an increment at its center. However, when the background and increment are flashed at a longer duration (200 msec) ΔL/L decreases with increasing L as is obtained with a steady background. Two previous models which handle earlier work do not readily accommodate this result; we suggest a theoretical approach that does.     

Response latencies to the onset and offset of visual stimuli

Simple response times (RTs) are known to be slower to the offset of a visual stimulus than to its onset. This is called the onset advantage. In the first of four experiments, we discovered that a spurious onset advantage can be produced by the long persistence of P31 phosphor. In the remaining three experiments, we found that offset RTs were slower only when they were made in a context in which responses to the abrupt onset of some stimuli had to be suppressed. We tested this hypothesis of response suppression in two ways: (1) by mixing regular onset trials with other trials on which a response to an onset had to be suppressed, and (2) by ramping the emergence of "offset" stimuli over time, so that offsets were the only abrupt events in the display. In both cases, we found that the onset advantage depended critically on whether the responses were made in a context of response suppression. We conclude that the onset advantage is mediated not by sensory factors such as visible persistence, but by response programming factors that are strongly affected by contextual events.