The recovery of feelings in a folktale

The purpose of this essay is to explore the symptom of the denial of feelings and the subsequent recovery of feelings in relation to the task of uniting the human self. The spiritual, emotional, and physical implications of an exemplary narrative from the collection edited by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm are discussed in relation to the telescoping of the emotion of fear, the sensation of shuddering, and the experience of anxiety about the integrity of the self. The reader is cautioned that the study of folktales enriches our telling of them and is itself justified by that telling.     

Understanding the Self in Self-Transcendence

Based on the work of William James and Bernard Lonergan, this article proposes an understanding of the self as a duplex, dialectical, first-person reality constituted by consciousness and experienced as I and me.     

On seeing oneself as “left out”: The chronically complaining patient in psychotherapy

A clinical observation regarding patients who complain about feeling left out and/or second best provides the framework for this paper. What is expressed is a form of separation anxiety coupled with a loser self-concept. It is suggested that these patients represent a milder form of the moral masochism. Early theoretical formulations include Freud and his emphasis on the superego and Reich's emphasis on the masochist's fear of being left alone. Kramer's little man phenomenon is an example of a more current theoretical formulation which takes account of the complexities of the ego, and composite self and identity in the clinical phenomena observed. A case of a latency-aged child is provided.     

Modal Logics of Succession for 2-Dimensional Integral Spacetime

We consider the problem of axiomatizing various natural successor logics for 2-dimensional integral spacetime. We provide axiomatizations in monomodal and multimodal languages, and prove completeness theorems. We also establish that the irreflexive successor logic in the standard modal language (i.e. the language containing and ) is not finitely axiomatizable.     

Heidegger's Brightness as a Responsibility of the Therapist in Existential Family Therapy

The author reflects upon the Heideggerian concepts of thrown-ness, death imagery, arrogance and brightness and their usefulness in existential family therapy. The article describes and illustrates with clinical material the process of helping a couple or family to move from an arrogance response to thrownness and death imagery to the response of brightness as attendants of Being. The responsibilities of the therapist in facilitating such a process are also described.Director of the Worthington Logotherapy Institute, co-director of Lantz and Lantz Counseling Associates, and a professor at The Ohio State University. College of Social Work     

Construction of monadic three-valued Łukasiewicz algebras

The notion of monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebras was introduced by L. Monteiro ([12], [14]) as a generalization of monadic Boolean algebras. A. Monteiro ([9], [10]) and later L. Monteiro and L. Gonzalez Coppola [17] obtained a method for the construction of a three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a monadic Boolea algebra. In this note we give the construction of a monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a Boolean algebra B where we have defined two quantification operations and ^* such that ^*x=^*x (where ^*x=-^*-x). In this case we shall say that and ^* commutes. If B is finite and is an existential quantifier over B, we shall show how to obtain all the existential quantifiers ^* which commute with .Taking into account R. Mayet [3] we also construct a monadic three-valued ukasiewicz algebra from a monadic Boolean algebra B and a monadic ideal I of B. The most essential results of the present paper will be submitted to the XXXIX Annual Meeting of the Unión Matemática Argentina (October 1989, Rosario, Argentina).     

Kant and Sartre on self-knowledge

Conclusion The similarities between the Copernican and existentialist approach to self-knowledge can be clearly summarized by the combined effect they have on the correspondence model of self-knowledge. The self-knower who holds that knowledge conforms to its object is not only wrong but deceived if his goal is the complete one-to-one correspondence between, on the one hand, objectively validated propositions, and on the other an independently existing, recalcitrant reality (the Self). Both Kant and Sartre hold that we can know ourselves in terms of appearances or quasi-objects, but they both deny that we can know what we really are over and above the empirical, contingent and finite knowledge we have. For Kant, this is because we are, most fundamentally, something unknowable; for Sartre, it is because we are, most fundamentally, nothing. In both cases, the self we purport to know is in an important sense other than itself: in saying I, more is being said than we know — and less. The I is spoken only through and across that which is not I.     

Algebraic aspects of deduction theorems

The first known statements of the deduction theorems for the first-order predicate calculus and the classical sentential logic are due to Herbrand [8] and Tarski [14], respectively. The present paper contains an analysis of closure spaces associated with those sentential logics which admit various deduction theorems. For purely algebraic reasons it is convenient to view deduction theorems in a more general form: given a sentential logic C (identified with a structural consequence operation) in a sentential language I, a quite arbitrary set P of formulas of I built up with at most two distinct sentential variables p and q is called a uniform deduction theorem scheme for C if it satisfies the following condition: for every set X of formulas of I and for any formulas and , C(X{{a}}) iff P(, ) AC(X). [P(, ) denotes the set of formulas which result by the simultaneous substitution of for p and for q in all formulas in P]. The above definition encompasses many particular formulations of theorems considered in the literature to be deduction theorems. Theorem 1.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a logic to have a uniform deduction theorem scheme. Then, given a sentential logic C with a uniform deduction theorem scheme, the lattices of deductive filters on the algebras A similar to the language of C are investigated. It is shown that the join-semilattice of finitely generated (= compact) deductive filters on each algebra A is dually Brouwerian.A part of this paper was presented in abstracted form in Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 111–116, and in The Journal of Symbolic Logic.     

The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut: What's It All About Theologically?

As a psychoanalytic thinker who offered by means of his self psychology a new paradigm of psychological development and functioning, Heinz Kohut was also a theologian manqué. With the help of the method of interpretation devised by Paul Tillich and David Tracy, Kohut's limit-concepts of tragic man, the self-object, and empathy, all set within his theory of narcissism, are elucidated as theological constructs. These are critiqued for adequacy from a Christian perspective. The conclusion is that Kohut's understanding of the human dilemma and of the way of salvation correlates well with Christianity, while his view of empathy as the means of salvation has created some confusion. Kohut has thus left an unfinished, profoundly important, agenda for theologians and clinicians.     

Before refraining: Concepts for agency

A structure is described that can serve as a foundation for a semantics for a modal agentive construction such as sees to it that Q ([ stit: Q]). The primitives are Tree,,Instant, Agent, choice. Eleven simple postulates governing this structure are set forth and motivated. Tree and encode a picture of branching time consisting of moments gathered into maximal chains called histories. Instant imposes a time-like ordering. Agent consists of agents, and choice assigns to each agent and each moment in Tree a set of possible choices, where each possible choice is a set of histories. All of these ingredients are referred to in the semantics suggested for [ stit: Q]. The most complex part of the discussion is the motivation for the definition of what it means for a typically non-terminating chain of moments jointly to witness the truth of [ stit: Q] at a moment.The paper begins with an informal account of the Refref conjecture, which says that the only way to refrain from refraining from seeing to something is to see to it. The paper ends with a consideration of an argument of Prior's that in a certain sense contemplation and action are inconsistent.     

Axiomatization of the De Morgan type rules

In Section 1 we show that the De Morgan type rules (= sequential rules in L(, ) which remain correct if and are interchanged) are finitely based. Section 2 contains a similar result for L(). These results are essentially based on special properties of some equational theories.     

The meaningful character of value-language: A critique of the linguistic foundations of emotivism

Conclusion The above arguments have not conclusively demonstrated the existence of value; nor have they sought to. Rather, they have focused primarily on value-language itself: what it is, what it means, and how men use it. In value-judgements, men intend to speak about reality, and not merely to manifest their feelings to influence others. The conceptual character of value-words gives them a formal objectivity lacking in mere manifestations of feeling; the meaning of value-words contains a claim to objectivity arising from the ontological claim to objectivity of value itself.These facts demonstrate conclusively that value-language differs essentially from emotive manifestations of feeling. Therefore, and in contradiction to both Ayer and Stevenson, even the most abstract of value-words can be used to form legitimate, conceptually meaningful value-judgements. As judgements, value-judgements can be true or false, not because of any factual content, but specifically as conceptually meaningful, pure value-judgements.I have deliberately restricted these investigations to consideration of language, without seriously arguing the ontology of value itself. Thereby, I have met the emotivists on their own ground. Even without demonstrating the existence of value, I have shown their analysis of value-language to be flawed. Further, I have identified a unique claim to objectivity in value-language which argues strongly in favor of the real existence of value as its ultimate foundation.For the simplest, most obvious explanation of this claim to objectivity is that it refers to value, which actually exists. That proof is logically the next step in my argument. A good place to begin would be a more careful, detailed analysis of the structure of human responses such as admiration, love, enthusiasm, etc., seeking to determine what they ontologically presuppose. Proof of the real existence of value would demonstrate the ontological grounds for the claim to objectivity of value-language. It would show that value-language is rooted in the real world, speaking of reality as it is. This would be the last, and most important sense in which value-language is meaningful and objective.

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Intellectual fascism

Intellectual fascism is the arbitrary belief that individuals possessing certain good traits (such as intelligence and creativity) are intrinsically superior to those possessing bad traits (such as stupidity or lack of artistry). Although it is true that under certain conditions and for various purposes some human traits are more advantageous or better than others, rating people as good or bad on the basis of their intellectual performances is inaccurate and is often as pernicious as is political-social fascism. Moreover, where political fascists at least rate themselves highly while damning and persecuting others, intellectual fascists tend to severely damn themselves (as well as others) when they lack superlative intellectual and artistic traits. According to RET, all global ratings of people tend to be fascistic overgeneralizations. Intellectual fascism is political-social fascism with the trait names changed—the same hearse with different license plates.This article is a revision of one that originally appeared in a book by Dr. Ellis entitledSuppressed.     

Truth,Sentential Non-Compositionalit,and Ontology

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.     

“Some more” notes,toward a “third” sophistic

Historians of rhetoric refer to two Sophistics, one in the 5th century B.C. and another c. 2nd century A.D. Besides these two, there is a 3rd Sophistic, but it is not necessarily sequential. (The 3rd is counter to counting sequentially.) Whereas the representative Sophists of the 1st Sophistic is Protagoras, and the second, Aeschines, the representative sophists of the 3rd are Gorgias (as proto-Third) and Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Paul de Man.To distinguish between and among Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and then Protagoras, Gorgias, and Lacan, the author determines how far each of these personages can count. The model of counting, used semiotically across the topoi of possible/impossible, is that of the people of New Guinea: one thing, two things, many things. It is determined (generally) that the philosophers, including Aristotle, count to one; the Sophists to two; and Gorgias, Lacan, and Lyotard, et al. count to many things, thereby breaking up a monism or binarism. The ancient philosophers employ a substratum of probability to hold together the contraries of possible/impossible; the Sophists employ anti/logic, which keeps the contraries/antitheses separate and therefore without synthesis, but which eventually threatens the integrity of the substratum, or the law of non-contradiction; and Gorgias, Lacan, Lyotard et al. theorize about the impossibility/Resistance of the Logos (reason, logic, law, argumentation, history) to Theory/Totalization, because of the Gorgian Kairos and the Lacanian Real — both of which enter the Logos and break up the cycle of the antitheses and create something new, irrational (Untersteiner).This breaking up has a negative/positive influence on Protagoras's man-measure doctrine, which in turn has a similar influence on the problem of the ethical subject. The subject/agent not only no longer knows (by way of Logos) but also no longer acts (as independent agent); the subject becomes a function of Logos as determined by Kairos/Real; it moves from a hypotaxis/syntaxis of one and two to a radical parataxis/paralogy of some more.From the Impossibility/tragedy of knowledge, however, comes the Possible, or Possibilisms, which allows for the new (though divided) ethical subject to reclaim its position as individual. Such a reclamation of the subject, however, has a profound effect on argumentation, and especially the notion of consensus. What is wanted, then, in a Third Sophistic ethical — as opposed to a political — rhetoric is dissensus through radical parataxes and paralogies.     

Verisimilitude vs. legisimilitude

The recent theories of truthlikeness have not paid attention to the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations. L.J. Cohen has expressed this by saying that science aims at legisimilitude rather than verisimilitude. G. Oddie has given a reply to Cohen by defining the notion of legisimilitude in terms of higher-order logics. This paper gives a different reply to Cohen by treating laws as physically necessary generalizations and by defining the notion of legisimilitude as closeness to a suitably chosen lawlike sentence.     

Pacifism as a moral ideal

Conclusion In conclusion I would like to forestall one potential misunderstanding. As I have described it the pacifist ideal may seem so difficult to attain that it may seem closed off from the aspirations of ordinary human beings; and there is no doubt that few people are likely to attain this ideal to any great degree. This accords with our intuition that true, by which I think we mean paradigm pacifists, are rare indeed. But ideals can be sought, as well as attained, to greater or lesser degrees. So there are many ordinary people who regard themselves as pacifists because they avoid violence more scrupulously than most. On my analysis their claim might well be true.This paper was originally written for the Gandhi-King Society Meeting held in April of 1984 at the Western Division Meeting of the APA. I am greatful to Greg Rich, Albert Flores, and others who have helped me with their comments.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

The Client Is the Most Important Common Factor: Clients' Self-Healing Capacities and Psychotherapy

I first briefly review the dodo bird verdict and suggest that we should be responding to it by looking for a new way to conceptualize how therapy works. Then I describe the dominant medical or treatment model of psychotherapy and how it puts the client in the position of a dependent variable who is operated on by supposedly potent therapeutic techniques. Next I argue that the data do not fit with this model. An alternative model is that the client is the most important common factor and that it is clients' self-healing capacities which make therapy work. I then argue that therapy has two phases—the involvement phase and the learning phase—and that the involvement phase is the most important. I next review the five learning opportunities provided by therapy. Finally, I argue that a relational model of therapy focused on consultation, collaboration, and dialogue is better than a treatment model.     

From I: A/M to “Who am I?”—Aggregation/Massification and Trauma-Based Affects and Object Relations in Groups: A Response to Earl Hopper

Hopper's portrayal of the fourth basic assumption of Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification has two components: (1) a revision of Turquet's theory of BA Oneness to incorporate the polarity of aggregation and massification stemming from annihilation anxiety; and (2) a conception of the difficult patient as having an encapsulated psychosis. Hopper's theory of the encapsulated psychosis offers an important but incomplete perspective in explaining borderline and narcissistic pathology, as well as psychological trauma. In this response to Hopper, I suggest that the fourth assumption is in fact a still more primitive state of boundary opening and closing. I also see a need to differentiate trauma as such from borderline pathology, and further hold that the relationship between Hopper's British Independent theory and trauma theories based on dissociation needs to be clarified.