Children’s strategy use when playing strategic games

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ.     

Children’s Binding of What-Where-When-Who in Episodic Memory: Identifying Oneself in the Past

It is usually accepted that the binding of what, where, and when is a central component of young children’s and animals’ nonconceptual episodic abilities. We argue that additionally binding self-in-past (what-where-when-who) adds a crucial conceptual requirement, and we ask when it becomes possible and what its cognitive correlates are. In the central task, children aged 3.5 years to 6.5 years watched a light display on Day 1, with 2 lights coming on simultaneously or in 1 of 2 orders. This light display was filmed from 1 of 3 positions: with the camera behind the child, above the child, or facing the child. On Day 2, children watched 3 videos from the original angle, and each represented 1 of the 3 light configurations, with the child in the video occluded. Participants had to decide which occluded child they were and justify their choice by reference to the lights. Above-chance performance was evident after 4.5 years of age. In addition, all children received the following tasks: spatial perspective taking, seeing leads to knowing, modus tollens reasoning, and second-order theory of mind. With age and verbal ability partialed out, only second-order theory of mind correlated significantly with performance on the central task.     

Executive function is necessary for perspective selection,not Level-1 visual perspective calculation: Evidence from a dual-task study of adults

Previous research suggests that perspective-taking and other “theory of mind” processes may be cognitively demanding for adult participants, and may be disrupted by concurrent performance of a secondary task. In the current study, a Level-1 visual perspective task was administered to 32 adults using a dual-task paradigm in which the secondary task tapped executive function. Results suggested that the secondary task did not affect the calculation of perspective, but did affect the selection of the relevant (Self or Other) perspective for a given trial. This is the first direct evidence of a cognitively efficient process for “theory of mind” in adults that operates independently of executive function. The contrast between this and previous findings points to a distinction between simple perspective-taking and the more complex and cognitively demanding abilities more typically examined in studies of “theory of mind”. It is suggested that these findings may provide a parsimonious explanation of the success of infants on ‘indirect’ measures of perspective-taking that do not explicitly require selection of the relevant perspective.     

Relationship between Social Cognition and Temperament in Preschool‐aged Children

The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between temperament and social cognition, including theory of mind and emotion understanding, in 34 preschool‐aged children (aged 3–4 years). Theory of mind was measured with a belief–desire reasoning assessment, and emotion understanding was measured with an affective perspective‐taking task. Child temperament was provided by online parent report. Consistent with previous research, theory of mind correlated with shy and socially observant temperament. In contrast, emotion understanding was associated with attention focusing and low intensity pleasure (enjoyment of low arousal activities). Both theory of mind and emotion understanding were positively related to inhibitory control and negatively related to activity level. In sum, theory of mind and emotion understanding, while both associated with executive functioning, correlate with distinct social preference temperament dimensions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Early Executive Functions: A Longitudinal Study from 12 to 36 Months

It has been proposed that executive functions develop in a hierarchical fashion, such that early, simple abilities seen already during the first year of life become increasingly coordinated with development, thereby enabling the emergence of more complex abilities. Although this hierarchical model has received support from empirical studies comparing executive function task performance across age groups, necessary support from longitudinal studies taking an individual differences perspective on development is missing. In addition, the model stresses the importance of attention in executive function development, but we do not know in what way attention contributes to the continued development once the earliest forms of simple functions have emerged. Using a longitudinal design, the present study investigated the relations between individual differences in simpler forms of executive functions as well as sustained attention at age 12 months and more complex executive functions at 24 and 36 months. The results indicated partial support for the hierarchical model, with infant inhibition being predictive of working memory in toddlerhood. In addition, at 12 months, sustained attention contributed to the development of toddler executive functions via the simple executive functions. This suggests that by this age, sustained attention has become an integrated part of early, simple executive functions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

7-11岁儿童心理状态信息理解与使用的发展特点及关系

采用失言任务和改进的说服任务考察了153名7-11岁儿童的心理理论理解和使用能力的发展状况。结果发现：儿童的失言理解能力和心理状态信息使用能力7-9岁时发展迅速,9岁后趋于稳定;两种能力的发展趋势基本一致,两者呈现中度相关;8-9岁是儿童失言理解和心理状态信息使用发展的转折点。结果表明：心理状态理解和使用的能力是儿童心理理论发展的重要组成部分,两者的发展基本同步。     

Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g. inhibition). Special circumstances such as early bilingualism may enhance ToM development or other capacities required by ToM tasks. Here we compare 3‐year‐old bilinguals and monolinguals on a standard ToM task, a modified ToM task and a control task involving physical reasoning. The modified ToM task mimicked a language‐switch situation that bilinguals often encounter and that could influence their ToM abilities. If such experience contributes to an early consolidation of ToM in bilinguals, they should be selectively enhanced in the modified task. In contrast, if bilinguals have an advantage due to better executive inhibitory abilities involved in ToM tasks, they should outperform monolinguals on both ToM tasks, inhibitory demands being similar. Bilingual children showed an advantage on the two ToM tasks but not on the control task. The precocious success of bilinguals may be associated with their well‐developed control functions formed during monitoring and selecting languages.     

Visual perspective taking impairment in children with autistic spectrum disorder

Evidence from typical development and neuroimaging studies suggests that level 2 visual perspective taking - the knowledge that different people may see the same thing differently at the same time - is a mentalising task. Thus, we would expect children with autism, who fail typical mentalising tasks like false belief, to perform poorly on level 2 visual perspective taking as well. However, prior data on this issue are inconclusive. We re-examined this question, testing a group of 23 young autistic children, aged around 8 years with a verbal mental age of around 4 years and three groups of typical children (n = 60) ranging in age from 4 to 8 years on a level 2 visual perspective task and a closely matched mental rotation task. The results demonstrate that autistic children have difficulty with visual perspective taking compared to a task requiring mental rotation, relative to typical children. Furthermore, performance on the level 2 visual perspective taking task correlated with theory of mind performance. These findings resolve discrepancies in previous studies of visual perspective taking in autism, and demonstrate that level 2 visual perspective taking is a mentalising task.     

Savvy or Haphazard? Comparing Preschoolers’ Performance Across Selective Learning Tasks Based on Different Epistemic Indicators

Children frequently select learning sources based on epistemic cues, or cues pertaining to informants’ knowledge. Previous research has shown that preschoolers preferentially learn from informants who have been accurate in the past, appear confident, or have had visual access to relevant information. The present series of studies aimed to investigate the relation between these 3 types of epistemic selective learning abilities in 176 children ages 3 years to 6 years. Results indicated that children’s performance was mostly uncorrelated across the different selective learning tasks and tasks measuring theory of mind and executive function were not found to predict any selective learning skills. Implications for the reliability and current conceptual understanding of these selective learning tasks are discussed.     

The link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities

Various studies have shown that infants in their first year of life are able to interpret human actions as goal‐directed. It is argued that this understanding is a precondition for understanding intentional actions and attributing mental states. Moreover, some authors claim that this early action understanding is a precursor of later Theory of Mind (ToM) development. To test this, we related 6‐month‐olds’ performance in an action interpretation task to their performance in ToM tasks at the age of 4 years. Action understanding was assessed using a modified version of the Woodward‐paradigm ( Woodward, 1999 ). At the age of 4 years, the same children were tested with the German version of the ToM scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004 ). Results revealed a correlation between infants’ decrement of attention to goal‐directed action and their ability to solve a false belief task at the age of 4 years with no modulation by language abilities. Our results indicate a link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities.     

7～9岁儿童失言理解与执行功能的关系

为了说明学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的关系,研究采用失言理解、威斯康星卡片分类和汉诺塔任务分别考察了90名7—9岁儿童的心理理论和执行功能。结果表明,失言理解与抑制-转换能力相关显著（r=0．34,P〈0．01）,但是与计划能力相关不显著（r=0．06,P〉0．05）。在控制年龄后,失言理解与抑制-转换能力的相关仍然显著（r=0．29,P〈0．05）。研究结果说明,学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的相关模式与学龄前儿童完全一致,提示心理理论与执行功能的相关关系从学龄前延续到了学龄阶段。     

Development of theory of mind and executive control

Several recent studies have demonstrated a developmental link, in the age range of 3–5 years, between the acquisition of a ‘theory of mind’ and self control. In this review, we consider the existence of such a link in assessing five competing theoretical hypotheses that might help us to understand the nature of this developmental advance: (1) executive control depends on theory of mind; (2) theory of mind development depends on executive control; (3) the relevant theory of mind tasks require executive control; (4) both kinds of task require the same kind of embedded conditional reasoning; (5) theory of mind and executive control involve the same brain region. We briefly describe these theoretical accounts and evaluate them in the light of existing empirical evidence. At present, only account (3) can be ruled out with some confidence.     

Conflicting emotions: The connection between affective perspective taking and theory of mind

The relation between theory of mind and affective perspective taking was examined in a study with 42 three‐ to five‐year‐olds. Children completed tasks measuring affective perspective taking, theory of mind, and receptive language abilities. Significant positive correlations existed between overall affective perspective taking and theory of mind performance, independent of age and language. The relation between theory of mind and affective perspective taking was strongest for those scenarios in which there was a conflict between the child and the friend's emotional responses. These findings indicate that the abilities to understand conflicting emotions and to understand false beliefs are related aspects of social development.     

Fonctions exécutives et théorie de l’esprit chez le jeune enfant : une relation réciproque ?

The aim of this study was to assess the specific relation between 18-month-olds’ performance on tasks measuring language skills, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The ToM tasks included measures of intention and false-belief understanding whereas working memory and inhibitory control were assessed with three EF tasks. Expressive vocabulary was assessed with the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. The main findings showed that both aspects of ToM are strongly linked at this age to inhibitory control, but not to working memory abilities. Language skills were not associated with either ToM or EF abilities. With regard to inter-tasks coherence within EF and ToM, we replicated previous findings with no consistency across EF tasks but an association between false-belief and intention understanding. Overall, these findings provide evidence for a link between executive function and theory of mind at the youngest age ever tested. They also challenge the view that EF is not required to succeed on the false-belief task based on spontaneous responses.     

Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play.     

Individual differences in speakers’ perspective taking: The roles of executive control and working memory

Both speaking and listening require taking into account the perspective of one’s communicative partner. Is perspective taking a domain-specific process internal to the language production and comprehension systems? Or is it a domain-general process regulated by the same mechanisms that are used to regulate other forms of behavior? Past research has shown that listeners’ perspective taking is at least partially regulated by inhibitory control and working memory (WM), suggesting that it may be best thought of in domain-general terms. The present experiment was designed to explore individual differences in nonlinguistic executive functioning in order to assess whether domain-general mechanisms help regulate speakers’ perspective-taking behavior. A group of 60 speakers participated in a referential communication task and in tasks measuring WM and executive control (EC). The results revealed that WM and EC were both predictive of the speakers’ perspective taking, suggesting that perspective taking may be regulated by domain-general mechanisms.     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

The Role of Executive Function in Arithmetic Problem-Solving Processes: A Study of Third Graders

This study investigated the roles of different executive function (EF) components (inhibition, shifting, and working memory) in 2-step arithmetic word problem solving. A sample of 139 children aged 8 years old and regularly attending the 3rd grade of primary school were tested on 6 EF tasks measuring different EF components, a reading task and a reading comprehension task, an arithmetic facts task evaluating basic knowledge of calculation, and three 2-step arithmetic word problems. Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the roles of the different EF components in the various phases of the problem-solving process. The results showed that EF affects the various phases of problem solving differently over and above calculation knowledge and reading abilities. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to further understanding the role of cognitive skills in mathematical problem solving and in relation to instructional approaches that may increase children’s performance on 2-step arithmetic word problems.     

Time’s up! Involvement of metamemory knowledge,executive functions,and time monitoring in children’s prospective memory performance

This study examined time-based prospective memory (PM) in children and explored the possible involvement of metamemory knowledge and executive functions in the use of an appropriate time-monitoring strategy depending on the ongoing task’s difficulty. Specifically, a sample of 72 typically developing children aged 4, 6, and 9 years old were given an original PM paradigm composed of both an ongoing procedural activity and a PM task. Half of the participants (expert group) were trained in the ongoing activity before the prospective test. As expected, results show that time monitoring had a positive effect on children’s PM performance. Furthermore, mediation analyses reveal that strategic time monitoring was predicted by metamemory knowledge in the expert group but only by executive functions in the novice group. Overall, these findings provide interesting avenues to explain how metamemory knowledge, strategy use, and executive functions interact to improve PM performance during childhood.     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。